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ABSTRACT 
 
The intention of my thesis is to shed light on a technique of integration implemented by the 
European Court of Justice described as ‘power-based approach.’ Frequently neglected and 
overlooked, it is distinct from the ECJ traditional rights-based approach. It materializes in a 
specific range of free movement cases where Member States are suspected of having impinging 
on the free movement principle – understood as encompassing the four economic freedoms 
and EU citizenship – when they exercise what the Court deems as being their retained powers. 
A variety of fields are concerned, such as nationality, direct taxation, social security, or 
education. My overall claim is that the power-based approach contributes to defining and 
shaping the contours of the relationship between the European Union and its Member States, 
of EU interstate relations and, ultimately, of Union membership. 
I start with an attempt at deconstruction to identify the defining features of the cases concerned 
by this approach: (i) they revolve around the structural notion of power; (ii) the applicability of 
the free movement principle stems from the disjunction of the scope of application of EU law 
from the scope of EU powers; (iii) the settlement of the conflicts at hand amounts to a ‘mutual 
adjustment resolution,’ which consists in putting limitations on the exercise of the powers 
retained by Member States, while the Court itself tends to soften its own approach to protect 
national autonomy. I then proceed with an effort at reconstruction. First, I identify the 
jurisdictional implications of the power-based approach. Next, I look into its implications for 
membership of the Union. Lastly, I provide an overall critical and structural reassessment. I 
show that the silence of the Court regarding the rationale behind its approach has the effect of 
weakening its legitimacy and its authority. I finally identify its resulting structural model. 
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Finisce sempre cosi, con la morte. 
Prima, però, c’è stata la vita. 
La vita, nascosta sotto il bla, bla, bla, bla, bla. 
Tutto s’è sedimentato sotto il chiacchiericcio e il rumore. 
Il silenzio e il sentimento, l’emozione e la paura. 
Gli sparuti, incostanti sprazzi di bellezza. 
E poi lo squallore disgraziato e l’uomo miserabile. 
Tutto è sepolto dalla coperta dell’imbarazzo dello stare al mondo. 
Bla, bla, bla, bla. 
Altrove, c’è l’altrove. 
Io non mi occupo dell’altrove. 
Dunque, che questo romanzo abbia inizio. 
In fondo, è solo un trucco. 
Si, è solo un trucco. 
 
La Grande Bellezza 
(P. Sorrentino, 2013) 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is sometimes actually more difficult to make people 
see that there is a problem than to make them, once 
they have seen it, comprehend its solution.1 
1. Justice S. O’CONNOR pointed out, in New York v. United States, that the issue relating to 
the “proper division of authority between the Federal Government and the States” is the 
“oldest question of [US] constitutional law.”2 She was referring to the fact that, from the earliest 
days of the formation of the Union, the United States has faced the question as to how to draw 
the lines between the two levels of authority, given that the national government is subject to 
the principle of enumerated powers. This challenge continues nowadays and concerns all 
manner of actors: the state and national political arenas, the state and national legislative and 
executive branches, the judiciary, and, last but not least, the everyday citizens. Every federal 
system is, as a matter of fact, confronted with this fundamental issue, which often turns out to 
be very difficult to settle, and which requires answers and solutions to be refined on a continual 
basis. In particular, the very nature of the relationship between the two levels of government, 
and therefore of the Union itself, stems from the lines that will be drawn between their 
respective spheres of authority. The European Union is no exception. In this respect, J. H. H. 
WEILER noted, already long ago, that “the most significant change in Europe, justifying 
appellations such as ‘transformation’ and ‘metamorphosis,’ concerns the evolving relationship 
between the Community and its Member States.”3 Such a change has been induced, to a certain 
extent, by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter “the Court of 
Justice,” “the Court,” or “the ECJ”). In the same manner as the US Supreme Court, the Court 
of Justice has indeed been assigned the difficult task of settling jurisdictional conflicts between 
                                                 
1 Preface by E. S. CORWIN, in E. S. CORWIN, Liberty against government, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1948), xii. 
2 New York v. United States 488 U.S. 1041, 1049 (1992). 
3 J. H. H. WEILER, “The Transformation of Europe,” in The Constitution of Europe: Do the new Clothes have an 
Emperor? And other Essays on European Integration, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 12. 
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2 
the European Union and the Member States. The various cases decided by the Court, affecting 
and shaping the links between the two levels of authority of the European Union legal order, 
have resulted in the constant development of the relationship between the European Union 
and the Member States. 
2. Against this backdrop, my thesis intends to shed light on the entrenchment of a fairly 
recent form of integration that I describe as a ‘power-based approach,’ and that materializes in a 
specific range of free movement cases. Frequently neglected and overlooked, it is a technique 
used by the Court of Justice to settle jurisdictional disputes in which Member States are 
suspected of impinging on the free movement principle – understood as encompassing the four 
traditional economic freedoms4 and European Union citizenship5 – when they exercise what 
                                                 
4 The four traditional economic freedoms encompass: 
The free movement of goods 
Article 34 TFEU: “Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be 
prohibited between Member States.” 
Article 35 TFEU: “Quantitative restrictions on exports, and all measures having equivalent effect, shall be 
prohibited between Member States.” 
Article 36 TFEU: “The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, 
exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection 
of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or 
archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions 
shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between 
Member States.” 
The free movement of persons 
Article 45 TFEU [workers]: “1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union. 
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between 
workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and 
employment.  
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health:  
1. (a) to accept offers of employment actually made;  
2. (b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;  
3. (c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing 
the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or administrative action;  
4. (d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, subject to 
conditions which shall be embodied in regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.  
4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public service.” 
Article 49 TFEU [establishment]: “Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be 
prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries 
by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State.  
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to 
set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of 
Article 54, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such 
establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.” 
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the Court deems as being their retained powers. Ultimately, the power-based approach of the 
Court of Justice has significant implications for the constitutional ordering of the European 
Union. It indeed contributes to defining and shaping the contours of the relationship between 
the European Union and its Member States, and the fundamental features of the status of the 
Member States within the European Union. 
3. By way of introduction, I start by drawing the contextual background of my thesis, in 
order to better grasp the various issues that arise in relation to the question of the division of 
authority in the European Union. I then proceed with an empirical identification of the cases 
that reflect the Court of Justice’s power-based approach. I then set out the original analytical 
framework employed throughout the thesis. Last but not least, I shed light on the two 
fundamental purposes pursued by my thesis, which are, respectively, (i) the identification of an 
original form of legal integration; and (ii) placing emphasis on the significance of the power-
based approach for the constitutional dynamics of the European Union. 
1. The oldest of the newest questions of European Union law 
4. The initial limited focus on issues relating to the relations between the spheres of authority of the 
European Union and the Member States. Until relatively recently, issues relating to the “proper 
division of authority” between the European Union and its Member States were, with a few 
exceptions,6 seldom explored in the literature.7 This may be explained by several factors. First of 
all, focus was initially primary put on the issues relating to the nature of European Union law, 
                                                 
Article 52§1 TFEU [establishment]: “The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof 
shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing 
for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.” 
The free movement of services 
Article 56 TFEU: “Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on freedom to provide 
services within the Union shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a 
Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.” 
The free movement of capital 
Article 63§1 TFEU: “Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on the 
movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.” 
5 Article 21§1 TFEU: “Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures 
adopted to give them effect.” 
6 See, for instance, K. LENAERTS, Le juge et la Constitution aux États-Unis d’Amérique et dans l’ordre juridique 
européen, (Brussels: Bruylant, 1988). 
7 A. VON BOGDANDY & J. BAST, “The federal order of competences,” in Principles of European Constitutional Law, 
(Eds.) A. VON BOGDANDY & J. BAST, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 275, 276. These authors point out that 
“[l]egal literature had almost exclusively focused on Article 235 EEC.” [Now Article 352 TFEU, the so-called 
“flexibility clause] 
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its constitutionalizing process,8 and legitimacy.9 These issues became even more prominent 
when the Court of Justice consecrated the principles of direct effect10 and primacy.11 Second of 
all, the limited attention paid to jurisdictional issues also stemmed from the initial wording of 
the Treaties. The Treaties were, as a matter of fact, silent as to how the two levels of authority 
were to interact.12 By way of illustration, they did not explicitly mention the principle of 
conferral until the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover they neither specified 
which powers were conferred on the Communities, nor did they define how these powers were 
to be exercised. Instead, they were based on a functionalist method, which replaced the 
federalist13 and idealist14 aspirations of the aftermath of World War II. Under the functionalist 
approach, the spheres of jurisdiction of the European Union, as well as the way they have to be 
exercised, were identified with reference to the list of tasks and objectives provided by Article 2 
EC15 and Article 3 EC16 respectively, combined with sector-specific provisions.17 As a result, 
                                                 
8 E. STEIN, “Lawyers, judges, and the making of a transnational constitution,” 75 American Journal of American Law 
1 (1981). 
9 S. BOERGER & M. RASMUSSEN, “Transforming European Union law: The establishment of the constitutional 
discourse from 1950 to 1993,” 10 EuConst 199-225 (2014). 
10 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, [1963] ECR 3. 
11 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] ECR 585. 
12 R. SCHÜTZE, “The European Community’s federal order of competences – A retrospective analysis,” in 50 Years 
of the European Treaties: Looking back and thinking forward, (Eds.) M. DOUGAN & S. CURRIE, (Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 2009), 63, 70. 
13 G. DE BÚRCA, “The language of rights and European integration,” available from 
http://aei.pitt.edu/6920/1/de_búrca_gráinne.pdf. 
14 E. MAULIN, “Le pouvoir constituant dans l’Union européenne,” 45 Droits 73, 77 (2007). 
15 Article 2 EC: “The Community shall shave as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and 
monetary union and by implementing the common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, to 
promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable 
and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic performance, 
a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and 
economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.” 
16 Article 3 EC: “For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall include, as provided in 
this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out therein: (a) the elimination, as between Member States, of 
customs duties and quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all other measures having 
equivalent effect; (b) a common commercial policy; (c) an internal market characterized by the abolition, as 
between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital; (d) measures 
concerning the entry and movement of persons in the internal market as provided for in Article 100c; (e) a 
common policy in the sphere of agriculture and fisheries; (f) a common policy in the sphere of transport; (g) a 
system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted; (h) the approximation of the laws of 
Member States to the extent required for the functioning of the common market; (i) a policy in the social sphere 
comprising a European Social Fund; (j) the strengthening of economic and social cohesion; (k) a policy in the 
sphere of the environment; (l) the strengthening of the competitiveness of Community industry; (m) the 
promotion of research and technological development; (n) encouragement for the establishment and development 
of trans-European networks; (o) a contribution to the attainment of a high level of health protection; (p) a 
contribution to education and training of quality and to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States; (q) a 
policy in the sphere of development cooperation; (r) the association of the overseas countries and territories in 
General Introduction 5 
powers and objectives became deeply intertwined,18 the former being intrinsically linked to the 
systemic dynamic of the Treaties.19 Last but not least, the initial lack of interest in the relations 
between the European Union and the Member States from a power-based perspective was 
probably caused by the Court of Justice’s own approach. As some authors have rightly pointed 
it out, it has “never attempted to delineate a complete doctrine of the division of powers 
between the [European Union] and the Member States.”20 With the notable exception of the 
field of external relations,21 the Court’s reasoning does not rely, generally, on a power-based 
legal framework when faced with issues relating to the division of authority between the two 
levels of government, but almost exclusively on arguments of a functionalist nature. 
5. The growing interest in issues relating to the division of powers in the European Union. My 
thesis, which focuses on the constitutional adjudication by the European Court of Justice of 
disputes of a jurisdictional nature, is part of a growing literature. Issues relating to the division 
of powers between the European Union and its Member States, and to the protection of 
Member States’ jurisdiction in particular, have gradually become considered crucial. This shift 
flows from three main factors. First, the functionalist approach has resulted in a significant 
expansion of the jurisdiction held by the European Union. Second, this has led to an 
increasing fear of the so-called ‘competence creep’ phenomenon. Lastly, this has ultimately 
given rise – ironically – to the inclusion of tools of a federal nature into the new treaties, in 
                                                 
order to increase trade and promote jointly economic and social development; (s) a contribution to the 
strengthening of consumer protection; (t) measures in the spheres of energy, civil protection and tourism.” 
17 A. G. SOARES, “The principle of conferred powers and the division of powers between the European 
Community and the Member States,” 23: 1 Liverpool Law Review 57, 58-59 (2001); L. BURGORGUE-LARSEN, “A 
propos de la notion de compétence partagée,” available from http://www.univ-
paris1.fr/fileadmin/IREDIES/Contributions_en_ligne/L._BURGORGUE-LARSEN/LBL-RGDIP_1_-2.pdf, 6-7. 
18 L. POTVIN-SOLIS, “Competences partagées et objectifs matériels,” in Objectifs et compétences dans l’Union 
européenne, (Ed.) E. NEFRAMI, (Brussels, Bruylant, Coll. Droit de l’Union européenne, 2013), 29-30; E. NEFRAMI, 
“Le rapport entre objectifs et compétences: de la structuration et de l’identité de l’Union européenne,” in Objectifs 
et compétences dans l’Union européenne, (Ed.) E. NEFRAMI, (Brussels, Bruylant, Coll. Droit de l’Union européenne, 
2013), 5. 
19 P. PESCATORE, La répartition des compétences et des pouvoirs entre les Etats membres et les Communautés 
européennes: Etude des rapports entre les Communautés et les Etats membres, (1967) 5; L. AZOULAI, 
“Introduction,” in The Question of competence in the European Union, (Ed.) L. AZOULAI, (Oxford, United Kingdom; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2. 
20 G. DE BÚRCA & B. DE WITTE, “The delimitation of powers between the EU and its Member States,” in 
Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union, (Eds.) A. ARNULL & D. WINCOTT, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2002, Oxford Studies in European Law), 201. See, in the same vein, C. TIMMERMANS, “ECJ doctrines on 
competences,” in The Question of competence in the European Union, (Ed.) L. AZOULAI, (Oxford, United Kingdom; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 155. 
21 See Case 22/70, Commission v Council, [1971] ECR 263 (ERTA). 
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order to better define, and even circumscribe, the scope of the powers held by the European 
Union. This was indeed aimed at safeguarding Member States’ jurisdiction. 
6. The expansion of the jurisdiction held by the European Union. The jurisdiction held by the 
European Union – understood as encompassing the former European Community as well as 
the European Union – has significantly expanded over the years. As P. CRAIG accurately points 
it out, three ranges of actors are responsible for this expansion: the Member States themselves, 
the institutions of the European Union, and the European Court of Justice.22 The action of 
Member States has taken two forms: the amendment process of the Treaties, and the assent to 
the adoption of acts of secondary legislation by the institutions of the European Union.23 With 
respect to the former, the successive reforms of the Treaties, since the adoption of the Single 
European Act, have expanded the scope of the objectives assigned to the Community and the 
European Union by gradually adding up new legal bases for sector-specific policies. Mention 
should also be made of the fact that the Single European Act abandoned the unanimity rule. 
Since then, the Council has adopted most acts of secondary legislation by a simple or qualified 
majority. This logically implies that acts may be introduced into the European Union legal 
order against the will of a minority of the Member States. Member States have moreover 
generally assented to the work of the European Union institutions when the latter have 
interpreted the reach of the legislative jurisdiction of the European Union broadly. S. 
WEATHERILL refers, in this regard, to their “long-standing readiness”24 to adopt acts relating to 
policies non-explicitly mentioned in the treaties on the basis of Article 352 TFEU,25 or of 
Article 114 TFEU while protecting non-purely economic values.26 Accordingly, Member States 
and the institutions of the European Union have acted in concert to expand the scope of the 
jurisdiction held by the European Union. Last but not least, the European Court of Justice has 
also played a significant role. It has indeed consistently legitimized, from a legal point of view, 
the action of the two other sets of actors. Through a teleological and finalist interpretation of 
                                                 
22 P. CRAIG, “Competence and Member State autonomy: Causality, consequence and legitimacy,” Oxford Legal 
Studies Research Paper No 57/2009, 2. 
23 Ibid., 16. 
24 S. WEATHERILL, “Competence creep and competence control,” Yearbook of European Law (2004) 23(1): 1, 6. See 
also, in the same vein, P. CRAIG, “Competence and Member State autonomy: Causality, consequence and 
legitimacy,” above, n. 22, 16. 
25 V. MICHEL, “2004: le défi de la répartition des compétences,” Cahiers de Droit Européen 17, 36 (2003). 
26 G. DE BÚRCA & B. DE WITTE, “The delimitation of powers between the EU and its Member States,” above, 20, 
215. 
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the Treaty, it has developed various doctrines linking the objectives fulfilled by the Treaty to the 
exercise of the jurisdiction of the European Union, thereby broadening the scope of European 
Union general or sector-based powers.27 
7. The fear of competence creep. The joined action of the Member States, the institutions of 
the European Union, and the European Court of Justice gave rise, starting in the late 
1990s/early 2000s, to the fear of ‘competence creep,’ which can be defined as “a deficit in 
confidence about the Union’s readiness to operate within its constitutional limits.”28 An 
increasing number of voices, such as the German Länder’s voice in particular,29 began to contest 
the expansion of the jurisdiction of the European Union, arguing that it overstepped on 
Member States’ own spheres of authority, thereby undermining the integrity of their powers. 
The flexibility clause of Article 352 TFEU30 and the internal market harmonization clause of 
Article 114 TFEU31 were two of the main bones of contention. They were notably accused of 
amounting to granting ‘general authorizations’ to the European Union. More generally 
speaking, European Union action was increasingly seen as infringing the principle of conferral. 
Against this background, the Declaration 23 of the Treaty of Nice on the future of the Union 
called for “a deeper and wider debate about the future of the European Union.” It launched a 
fourfold process of reflection addressing, in particular, the question as to “how to establish and 
monitor a more precise delimitation of powers between the European Union and the Member 
                                                 
27 A. G. SOARES, “The principle of conferred powers and the division of powers between the European 
Community and the Member States,” above, 17, 63, 65; J. DUTHEIL DE LA ROCHÈRE, “La jurisprudence de la 
Court de Justice des Communautés européennes et la Souveraineté des Etats,” in La Constitution et l’Europe, (Paris, 
Montchrestien, 1992), 234, 240; L. AZOULAI, “La fabrication de la jurisprudence communautaire,” in Dans la 
fabrique du droit européen : scènes, acteurs et publics de la Cour de la justice des Communautés européennes, (Eds.) P. 
MBONGO & A. VAUCHEZ, (Brussels: Bruylant, 2009), 153, 156; A. TIZZANO, “Quelques observations sur le 
développement des compétences communautaires,” 48 Pouvoirs, 81, 85 (1989). 
28 S. WEATHERILL, “Competence creep and competence control,” above, n. 24, 6; S. WEATHERILL, “Better 
competence monitoring,” 30 European Law Journal 23, 24 (2005). 
29 F. C. MAYER, “The debate on European powers and competencies. Seeing the trees but not the forest,” available 
from http://www.whi-berlin.eu/documents/whi-paper1803.pdf, 15.  
30 Article 352 TFEU: “If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined 
in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the 
necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. Where the measures in question are 
adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, it shall also act unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.” 
31 Article 114 TFEU: “Save where otherwise provided in the Treaties, the following provisions shall apply for the 
achievement of the objectives set out in Article 26. The European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, 
adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action 
in Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.” 
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States, reflecting the principle of subsidiarity.” Following this, the European Council issued the 
Laeken Declaration in December 2001,32 which set out the “challenges and reforms in a 
renewed Union.” It mentioned in the first place the “better division and definition of 
competence in the European Union.” Accordingly, the problem of the division of authority, 
which had been latent since the formation of the Communities, became one of the core 
concerns of the institutions of the European Union. The Laeken Declaration addressed, in this 
respect, three issues: the distinction between different types of powers, the need for a 
reorganization of the system of powers, and the balance between the need to preserve Member 
States’ jurisdiction and the preservation of the powers held by the European Union itself. 
8. The protection of Member State jurisdiction. As is well known, the Laeken Declaration 
paved the way for the Convention on the future of Europe, which led, in turn, to the stillborn 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The latter comprised several provisions defining 
and rendering explicit the system of powers of the European Union, which were taken up by 
the Lisbon Treaty. To begin with, the Treaties resulting from the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty 
reaffirm the cornerstone principle of conferral, defined as follows: 
Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the 
objectives set out therein.33 
They comprise multiple and redundant reassertions that the system of powers in the European 
Union is based on this principle, and that, as a result, all powers not conferred upon the 
European Union remain within the jurisdiction of the Member States.34 This reveals the 
concern of the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty to curtail the expansion of the jurisdiction of the 
European Union, and to protect the integrity of national powers.  
9. Other legal orders. This willingness to preserve certain subject matters from the incursions 
of the law of the central authority has not only occurred in the European Union legal order. In 
the aftermath of the ratification of the Constitution of the United States, for instance, the 
states added the Tenth Amendment to the Bill of Rights: 
                                                 
32 Available from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/68827.pdf.  
33 Article 5§2 TEU. 
34 See, e.g., Articles 4§1 TEU; Article 7 TFEU; and the Declaration 18 in relation to the delimitation of 
competences. See S. WEATHERILL, “The limits of legislative harmonization ten years after Tobacco Advertising: How 
the Court’s case law has become a ‘drafting guide’,” 12 German Law Journal 827, 850-851 (2011); L. AZOULAI, 
“Introduction,” above, n. 19, 10-12. 
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The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. 
Likewise, the members of the League of Nations had the same reaction with respect to the 
international legal order in the first half of the twentieth century. Article 15§8 of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations provided that: 
If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, 
to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction 
of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its 
settlement. 
Through this provision, States aimed to exclude certain subject matters from the international 
settlement of conflicts. They expressed similar concerns when they adopted Article 2§7 of the 
Charter of the United Nations after World War II: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall 
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but 
this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
VII.  
10. Article 4 TEU. On top of the provisions safeguarding Member State jurisdiction, the 
Treaty on European Union attempts for the first time to comprehensively delineate the 
relationship between the European Union and the Member States, as well as interstate relations 
in its Article 4, which deserves to be quoted at length: 
1. In accordance with Article 5, competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties 
remain with the Member States.  
2. The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as 
their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential 
State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law 
and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the 
sole responsibility of each Member State.  
3. Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States 
shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the 
Treaties.  
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure 
fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the 
institutions of the Union.  
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from 
any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the Union's objectives.  
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As M. BLANQUET indicates, this provision represents “a significant component of a legal 
definition of what is a Union of States.”35 Its first two paragraphs pertain to the obligations 
imposed on the European Union. The latter is not only subject to the conferral principle; it 
must also comply with a range of requirements aimed at ensuring that Member States retain 
their State identity. All in all, this provision can be described as being fundamentally structural, 
in the sense that it aims to define the overall structure of the European Union. 
11. The current system of powers of the European Union. Last but not least, the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, from its Article 2 TFEU to its Article 6 TFEU, provides a 
typology36 of the various types of powers that form the basis of the system of powers of the 
European Union. The European Union legal order comprises exclusive powers, powers shared 
between the European Union and its Member States, and powers relating to European Union 
action to support, coordinate or supplement action of the Member States. This typology is 
aimed at clarifying and better delimiting the scope of the overall jurisdiction held by the 
European Union. Many authors have however expressed doubts as to its chances of achieving 
such a goal. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that the Lisbon Treaty has kept the European 
Union internal market harmonizing power (Article 114 TFEU)37 intact, and that it has even 
broadened the scope of the flexibility clause (Article 352 TFEU),38 which was already subject to 
broad judicial constructions. Altogether, the following observation made by L. D. KRAMER in 
the context of the US constitutional order may be easily transposed to the context of the 
European Union – and, for that matter, to any federal system that has a constitution 
enumerating the powers of the federation:  
                                                 
35 M. BLANQUET, “Article I-5,” in Traité établissant une constitution pour l’Europe, (Eds.) L. BURGORGUE-LARSEN, A. 
LEVADE, F. PICOD, Tome 1, (Brussels, Bruylant, 2005), 100. 
36 For typologies established in the literature before the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe see, for 
instance, A. G. SOARES, “The principle of conferred powers and the division of powers between the European 
Community and the Member States,” above, n. 17, 60s; V. MICHEL, “2004: le défi de la répartition des 
compétences,” above, n. 25, 54s; A. VON BOGDANDY & J. BAST, “The federal order of competences,” above, n. 7, 
289s; R. SCHÜTZE, “The European Community’s federal order of competences – A retrospective analysis,” above, 
n. 12, 72s. 
37 B. DE WITTE, “A competence to protect. The pursuit of non-market aims through internal market legislation,” 
in The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU Internal Market, (Ed.) P. SYRPIS, (Cambridge/New York, Cambridge 
University Press), 2012, 25, 45. 
38 A. VON BOGDANDY & J. BAST, “The federal order of competences,” above, n. 7, 300. 
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All we have [in the Constitution] are a set of broadly-defined powers and a set of very 
general principles that, in any given context at any given time, can lead reasonable people 
to reach very different conclusions about the proper limits of federal authority.39 
As a result, the question of the proper articulation between the two levels of authority remains, 
in the European Union, more relevant than ever. 
2. Empirical identification of the cases analyzed in the present thesis 
12. Empirical criterion: the formulae. It is in this context that my thesis intends to focus on a 
specific range of free movement cases. As I have already mentioned, the European Court of 
Justice implements, in these cases, an original approach centring on the notion of power and 
having significant implications for the relationship between the European Union and its 
Member States. Since I look into this issue more thoroughly later on,40 it is sufficient at this 
stage to stress that these cases ought to be singled out from what I have described as ‘traditional 
free movement cases,’ understood the remainder of cases involving one of the four economic 
freedoms and/or European Union citizenship. One of their defining features resides in the fact 
that the Court of Justice systematically states formulae, most of the time at the applicability 
stage. The wording of these formulae varies, depending on the field involved, but it is built on 
the same pattern. The various formulae all amount to asserting, in substance, that: 
Even though this [field involved] falls within Member States’ powers, Member States must nonetheless 
comply with European Union law while exercising this power. 
That being said, I have used these formulae as empirical criteria to identify the various cases 
where the Court of Justice implements its power-based approach, and thus to circumscribe the 
scope of my thesis. From now on, when I refer to terms such as ‘cases involving powers 
retained by Member States,’ or ‘cases concerned by the Court of Justice power-based approach,’ 
I am referring to the judgments that have been decided, up to now, by the European Court of 
Justice and that comprise one (or more) of the aforementioned formulae. 
13. The main fields concerned by the power-based approach. Everything considered, the formulae 
have allowed me to identify eight main ranges of cases, which relate to the following fields of (i) 
nationality, (ii) direct taxation, (iii) the rules governing surnames, (iv) the enforcement for the 
                                                 
39 L. D. KRAMER, “Putting the politics back into the political safeguards of federalism,” 100 Columbia L. Rev. 215, 
292 (2000). 
40 See Infra, Chapters 1, 2, & 3. 
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recovery of debts, (v) cross-border health care, (vi) higher education, (vii) the compensation of 
civil war victim, and (viii) the right to take collective action. I will show in Chapter 2 that the 
Court of Justice has, to a certain extent, departed from its rights-based approach, and has 
gradually subjected an increasing number of fields to its power-based approach.41 Therefore, 
this list should not be seen as exhaustive, but rather as an indicative list illustrating which fields, 
as of today, are concerned by the power-based approach. 
14. Overview of the cases concerned by the power-based approach. All in all, I have gathered 
several dozens of cases. The following table provides a general overview of the various issues 
raised in these decisions. For the sake of clarity, I have divided the cases into two broad 
categories, depending on whether they involve entry restrictions where host states are suspected 
of infringing the free movement principle or exit restrictions where the focus is on home states. 
I have moreover indicated the leading and most emblematic cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 See, Infra, §120. 
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 Entry restrictions Exit restrictions 
(i) Nationality 
• Individual having dual citizenship prevented from exercising 
their free movement rights because national authorities refuse 
to recognize their nationality. [Case C-369/90, Micheletti, 
[1992] ECR I-4239] 
• Individuals prevented from exercising their free movement 
rights on the grounds that they do not/no longer hold the 
nationality of at least one Member State. [Case C-192/99, 
Kaur, [2001] ECR I-1237; Case C-135/08, Rottmannn, [2010] 
ECR I-1449] 
 
(ii) Direct 
Taxation 
• Taxation of nonresident individuals: nonresidents not granted 
the same tax advantages or not subject to the same tax rules 
as residents on the grounds that they are not in objectively 
comparable situations. [E.g. workers: Case C-279/93, 
Schumacker, [1995] ECR I-225] 
• Taxation of nonresident corporations: nonresident 
corporations not granted the same tax advantages or not 
subject to the same tax rules as residents on the grounds that 
they are not in objectively comparable situations. [E.g. 
corporate tax rates: Case C-311/97, Royal Bank of Scotland, 
[1999] ECR I-2651] 
• Taxation of inbound dividends: foreign inbound dividends 
taxed more heavily than national inbound dividends. [E.g. 
Case C-315/02, Lenz, [2004] ECR I-7063] 
• Taxation of resident individuals: residents involved in cross-
border situations not granted the same tax advantages or 
subject to the same tax rules as those involved in purely 
internal matters. [E.g. Case C-35/98, Verkooijen, [2000] ECR 
I-4071] 
• Taxation of resident corporations: resident corporations 
involved in cross-border situations not granted the same tax 
advantages or subject to the same tax rules as those involved 
in purely internal matters. [E.g. cross-border tax relief: Case 
C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, [2005] ECR I-10837] 
• Taxation of outbound dividends: outbound dividends taxed 
more heavily if they are granted to nonresidents shareholders 
than residents. [E.g. Case C-513/04, Kerckhaert-Morres, [2006] 
ECR I-10967] 
• Exit taxes: additional tax burdens imposed on 
individuals/companies moving to other Member States. [E.g. 
Case C-371/10, National Grid Indus, [2011] ECR I-12273] 
(iii) Rules 
governing 
surnames 
• EU citizens face, in their host states, administrative refusals to 
change their surnames or to have them recognized according 
to the rules in force in their country of origin/in the country 
where they hold their other nationality. [E.g. Case C-148/02, 
Garcia Avello, [2003] ECR I-11613; Case C-208/09, 
Wittgenstein, [2010] ECR I-13693] 
 
(iv) 
Enforcement 
for the 
recovery of 
debts 
 
• Conditions of the enforcement for the recovery of debts vary 
depending on whether individuals reside in their home state 
or have moved to another Member State. [Case C-224/02, 
Pusa, [2004] ECR I-5763] 
(v) Cross-
border health 
care 
 
• EU patients having received treatments abroad without the 
prior authorization of their state of affiliation are denied 
benefits (reimbursements in particular) from the social 
security scheme of their state of affiliation. [E.g. Case C-
120/95, Decker, [1998] ECR I-1831; Case C-158/96, Kohll, 
[1998] ECR I-1931; Case C-372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-
4325] 
(vi) Higher 
education 
• Access to higher education systems: nonresident individuals 
subject to heavier burdens with respect to the conditions of 
access to national higher education systems. [Case C-147/03, 
Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969; Case C-73/08, 
Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735] 
• Nonresident students are denied or not granted financial 
support under the same conditions as resident students. [Case 
C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119] 
• Financial support of outgoing students: outgoing students 
subject to more burdensome conditions to study abroad than 
students remaining in their home country. [E.g. Joined Cases 
C-11/06 & 12/06, Morgan & Bucher, [2007] ECR I-9161] 
(vii) 
Compensation 
of civil war 
victims 
 
• The legal framework applicable to the compensation of civil 
war victims excludes from its scope nationals not residing in 
the home state. [E.g. Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen, [2006] ECR 
I-10451] 
(viii) Right to 
take collective 
action 
• A provider of services established in another Member State 
and willing to post workers faces collective actions 
undertaken by trade unions in the host Member State in order 
to force it to enter into negotiations and to sign a collective 
agreement according to which working conditions of the 
home state apply. [Case C-341/05, Laval, [2007] ECR I-
11767] 
 
• A company faces collective action in order to induce it to 
enter into a collective agreement under which employees 
working in a subsidiary established in another Member State 
should be subject to the same working conditions as those of 
the home state. [Case C-438/05, Viking, [2007] ECR I-0779] 
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Without going into detail, as I deal with this issue in depth later,42 two points deserve to be 
made. First of all, it is striking that the Court of Justice power-based approach is implemented 
in fields that pertain to the core of Member State political autonomy – nationality, direct 
taxation, personal status, recovery of debts – and social autonomy – direct taxation, social 
security, education, right to take collective action. It does not particularly concern their 
regulatory powers, but rather fundamental public policies which, taken together, form the basis 
of what is commonly considered, in Western Europe, as their state identity. It is moreover 
remarkable that these fields are generally seen as falling outside the traditional scope of action 
of the European Union, and, accordingly, as remaining the primary responsibility of the 
Member States. Second of all, the retained powers should not be confused with Member States’ 
reserved powers, which are traditionally defined, with reference to the principle of conferral, as 
the “competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties.”43 Neither should they be 
confused with Member States’ residual powers. The latter are used in the context of the powers 
shared between the European Union and the Member States, and they correspond, as such, to 
the powers remaining within the hands of the Member States. Thus, for instance, to quote but 
one example, in case of minimum harmonization, all the fields not concerned by European 
Union action are said to fall within the residual powers of the Member States.  
3. An original analytical framework 
15. I have chosen to use a specific and original analytical framework to explore the cases 
involving powers retained by Member States. First, my inquiry consists in analyzing the 
technique that is implemented by the Court of Justice in these cases. Second, the legal 
framework of my thesis mirrors the Court of Justice power-based approach, since it also centers 
on the notion of power. It moreover relies on a structural perspective. Last but not least, it 
draws on various comparisons, which allows the many singularities of the power-based 
approach to be better identified. 
a. The analysis of a technique implemented by the European Court of Justice 
16. Analysis of a technique v. analysis of a field. The fundamental purpose of my thesis is to 
shed light on the technique employed by the European Court of Justice in the cases involving 
                                                 
42 See, Infra, §§42-52. 
43 Article 5§2 TEU. 
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powers retained by Member States, and on its ramifications. As I have already mentioned, the 
Court develops, in these cases, a singular judicial technique, through an original interpretation 
of the free movement principle – hereafter, the ‘power-based approach.’ Broadly speaking, this 
technique contains singular features. In contrast to the Court’s traditional rights-based 
approach, it is largely centered on the notion of ‘power’ – or ‘competence’ to use the words of 
the Court of Justice. Furthermore, the Court of Justice almost systematically states formulae, 
most of the time at the applicability stage of the cases concerned by the power-based approach. 
Besides the applicability stage, the justification phase of the cases where the Court implements 
its original technique is also peculiar. Indeed, the Court of Justice develops what I have 
described as a ‘mutual adjustment resolution.’ This original way of adjudicating jurisdictional 
conflicts between the European Union and the Member States consists in imposing original 
adjustment requirements on the exercise of Member States’ powers, while the Court adapts its 
own approach in such a way as to preserve Member State autonomy. In short, my inquiry does 
not consist in focusing on specific fields, but in identifying how the Court of Justice shapes and 
fashions an original interpretation of the free movement principle. In other words, my thesis 
does not aim to define abstractly what the powers retained by Member States are or, to put it 
differently, it does not focus on fields per se. Instead, it intends to shed light on how the Court 
limits the exercise of certain national powers that it considers retained by the Member States. 
17. Basic assumption. That being said, the fundamental assumption underlying my thesis is 
that the implementation of the power-based approach by the European Court of Justice has 
significant implications for the relationships between the European Union and its Member 
States and for the interrelations among the Member States. Therefore, I will assume, 
throughout my inquiry, that analyzing how the Court develops its original technique, and 
identifying the implications of such a technique, allow for a better and deeper understanding of 
the constitutional order of the European Union and its developments. In other words, I start 
from the assumption that the analysis of the Court of Justice’s technique will be revealing of 
fundamental features of the legal order of the European Union.44 
                                                 
44 On the significance of legal “technicalities,” and the fact that scholars often overlook them, see A. RILES, “A new 
agenda for the cultural study of law: Taking on the technicalities,” 53 Buffalo Law Review 973-1033 (2005-2006), 
who takes the example of the conflicts of laws in the US to sustain her claim that the study of technicalities allows 
for a better understanding of a legal system and should not be seen as only containing a technical dimension. 
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b. Free movement cases analyzed through a structural perspective 
18. The third defining component of the analytical framework used throughout my thesis 
refers to the fact that I analyze free movement cases from a structural perspective. 
19. The traditional analytical frameworks used to examine free movement cases. Free movement 
cases may be analyzed through different prisms. First, decisions relating to the four economic 
freedoms can be read from an economic perspective, raising anti-protectionism issues.45 Second, 
all free movement cases, regardless of whether they are based on one of the economic freedoms 
or on European Union citizenship, may be examined through the lenses of individual rights.46 
Both approaches take as their starting points the individual, and focus primarily on the bonds 
between the European Union and individuals. In the first case, the emphasis is put on the 
freedom of economic operators. Some of the key issues relate to, for instance, how to achieve a 
genuine internal market without obstacles to trade, or how to strike a balance between the 
deregulating effects of the Court of Justice case law and the need for appropriate standards of 
protection. The second perspective primarily focuses on the legal means put in the hands of 
natural or legal persons to exercise their free movement rights, i.e. to challenge national laws. 
As a result, it is principally interested in the role played by those granted rights under European 
Union law in the process of European integration. My analysis of the free movement cases 
involving powers retained by Member States departs from these two approaches. 
20. The approach of my thesis. In a similar way to various authors, the analytical framework 
used in my thesis is based on a structural reading of free movement cases.47 I focus, for the most 
part, on the implications induced by free movement cases for the division of authority between 
the European Union and the Member States, and interstate relations. Admittedly, there are 
variations among free movement cases, which are even sometimes significant. Thus, for 
instance, each freedom is subject to its own conditions of applicability. The Court of Justice has 
developed, in this regard, specific definitions of the notions of goods, services, remuneration, 
                                                 
45 J. SNELL, “Who’s got the power? Free movement and allocation of competences in EC law,” 22: 1 YEL 323 
(2003). 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid.; N. BERNARD, “La libre circulation des marchandises, des personnes et des services dans le Traité CE sous 
l’angle de la compétence,” 34 Cahiers de Droit Européen 11, 32 (1998); M. P. MADURO, We the court : the European 
Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution : a critical reading of Article 30 of the EC Treaty, (Oxford : Hart, 
Evanston, Ill., USA : Distributed in the United States by Northwestern University Press, 1998); S. WEATHERILL, 
“Pre-emption, harmonization and the distribution of competence to regulate the Internal Market,” in The Law of 
the Single European Market. Unpacking the premises, (Eds.) C. BARNARD & J. SCOTT (Hart Publishing, 2002). 
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workers, self-employed, and so forth. Likewise, the assessment of the restriction stage varies, 
depending on the freedom involved. As for the justification stage, it is less subject to variations. 
The assessment of justifications depends more on the subject matter at hand. Each field has, as 
a matter of fact, its own set of justifications. However, notwithstanding these variations, my 
analysis starts from the assumption that the overall reasoning developed by the European Court 
of Justice is, from a structural point of view, similar in all free movement cases.48 First of all, its 
reasoning is always divided into the same steps, regardless of the freedom involved: (i) 
applicability stage: do the facts of the case fall within the scope of application of one of the 
freedoms?; (ii) restriction stage: does the national law that allegedly infringes the free movement 
principle have a restrictive object and/or restrictive effects? (iii) justification stage: are the 
justifications put forward by the Member State in question admissible? If so, is the national 
measure proportionate? Second of all, these various steps of reasoning have similar structural 
implications: (i) from a structural point of view, the applicability stage amounts to assessing 
whether European Union law may intrude into the national sphere of authority at hand i.e. 
whether European Union law may potentially impose requirements upon Member States 
within this sphere; (ii) in case the Court of Justice concludes that the national measure at hand 
does not have a restrictive object or effect, the national sphere of authority results in not being 
affected by European Union law. Member States remain free from constraints. However, if the 
Court finds that the national measure is in fact restrictive, it will most probably impact the 
national power at hand; (iii) finally, the national power is most impacted in cases where the 
Court concludes that the national measure in question has a disproportionate effect. Broadly 
speaking,49 this has the effect of compelling Member States to modify the way they exercise their 
powers, or of even preventing their exercise – this situation is dealt with, under the traditional 
‘internal market law approach,’ through the lenses of the regulation/deregulation debate. In 
addition, free movement cases may even alter national spheres of authority when the national 
measure is found to be proportionate. The Court may indeed consider the proportionality of 
the measure conditional on the fulfillment of additional requirements affecting national 
                                                 
48 Some authors are of the view that the convergence does not only concern the constitutional implications of free 
movement cases. See, for instance: A. TRYFONIDOU, “Further steps on the road to convergence among the market 
freedoms,” 35: 1 Eur. Law Rev. 36-56 (2010); P. OLIVER & W.-H. ROTH, “The internal market and the four 
freedoms,” in A Review of forty Years of Community Law: Legal Developments in the European Communities and the 
European Union, (Ed.) A. MCDONNELL, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005), 129, esp. 440-441. 
49 I will deal with this issue at length in Chapter 4 of the thesis. See, Infra, §§ 238s. 
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powers. That being said, my thesis mirrors the approach of the Court of Justice, which 
increasingly tends to take the free movement cases as a whole. To this end, it provides a 
crosscutting analysis of the free movement cases involving powers retained by Member States – 
while taking their variations into account when necessary. This ultimately allows me to draw a 
comprehensive picture of their various structural implications. 
21. An analysis centering on the Member States. Most of the analyses relating to the case law of 
the European Court of Justice dealing with the issue of the division of authority in the 
European Union legal order tend to focus primarily on the impact of this case law on the 
powers of the European Union.50 Alternatively, as I have already mentioned, free movement 
cases are read through the prism of the individual. By contrast, the approach I have adopted 
throughout my thesis places an emphasis on the Member States, in a way similar to the analyses 
focusing on the principles of institutional and procedural autonomy of Member States.51 I start 
from a premise similar to that of A. VON BOGDANDY & J. BAST, according to whom a “proper 
understanding of the Union’s competences requires one to consider its impact on the Member 
States’ competences.”52 I also draw on O. BEAUD, who has pointed out that: 
In the phenomenological analysis of the ‘federal operation,’ the emphasis is often put on 
the most striking aspect of the federal covenant: the creation of the Federation as a new 
political entity. But if one becomes aware of the fact that this Federation is the sum of two 
entities that ought to be analytically distinguished – the federation and the member States 
– one must reintegrate in her analysis what happens to these States, which become member 
States.53 
In other words, my analysis takes as a starting point the implications induced by the application 
of the law of free movement for the Member States. In so doing, I look at the latter under two 
                                                 
50 This holds true with respect to legal analyzes, but also with respect to analyzes conducted in the field of political 
science. See, for instance, D. S. MARTINSEN, “Welfare policies under pressure? The domestic impact of cross 
border social security in the European Union,” EUI Working Paper SPS 2004/11, 22. 
51 See, among many: NEFRAMI E. “Le rapport entre objectifs et compétences: de la structuration et de l’identité de 
l’Union européenne,” in Objectifs et Compétences dans l’Union européenne, (Ed.) E. NEFRAMI, (Bruylant, Brussels, 
2013), 5-26; M. LE BARBIER-LE-BRIS, “Les principes d’autonomie institutionnelle et procédurale et de coopération 
loyale,” in Liber amicorum en l’honneur de Jean Raux. Le droit de l’Union européenne en principes, (Editions Apogée, 
Publications du Centre d’Excellence Jean Monnet de Rennes, 2006), 423s; K. LENAERTS, “L’encadrement par le 
droit de l’Union européenne des compétences des Etats membres,” in Mélanges Jacquet, (Paris: Dalloz, 2010). 
52 A. VON BOGDANDY & J. BAST, “The federal order of competences,” above, n. 7, 285. 
53 O. BEAUD, Théorie de la Fédération, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2007), 201: “Dans l’analyse 
phénoménologique de l’ « opération fédérale », on met souvent l’accent sur l’aspect le plus frappant du pacte 
fédératif: la création de la Fédération comme nouvelle entité politique. Mais si l’on prend conscience du fait que 
cette Fédération est la somme de deux entités qu’il faut analytiquement distinguer – la fédération et les Etats 
membres – on doit réintégrer dans son analyse ce qui arrive à ces Etats qui deviennent des Etats membres.” 
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discrete angles. On the one hand, I treat them classically, in their vertical relationship to the 
European Union. I intend to establish how compliance with the European Union interest 
affects relations between the European Union and its Member States. On the other hand, I also 
examine the Member States horizontally, within the framework of their interrelationships. I look 
at their interactions, and seek to assess how they mutually influence each other. This allows me 
to gain an in-depth understanding of the fundamental interactions between the two sets of 
actors which, taken together, form the European Union. And, ultimately, this enables me to 
infer from these findings fundamental conclusions as to the identity of the European Union 
itself. 
c. ‘Reasoning by comparing’ 
22. Two points of comparison. Last but not least, the ultimate component of the analytical 
framework I have developed can be described as ‘reasoning by comparing.’ In the manner of L. 
HARTZ, my approach is based on the following line of questioning: 
How can we know the uniqueness of anything except by contrasting it […]?54 
One of the crucial points of my thesis being that the European Court of Justice develops an 
original and unique form of integration in cases involving powers retained by Member States, I 
have decided to compare its various features to other legal structures and processes. I do not 
mean to assimilate them, but rather to contrast them, in order to bring to light the singularities 
of the Court of Justice power-based approach. I have selected two main yardsticks against which 
to compare the range of cases at hand. On the one hand, I contrast them with other cases 
decided by the European Court of Justice. As might be expected, I draw comparisons between 
cases involving powers retained by Member States and traditional free movement cases, in order 
to assess the extent to which, and in which respects, the former differ from, or resemble, the 
latter. In addition, I also make frequent references to the cases decided in the field of external 
relations. The latter are, as will be seen later on,55 the first range of decisions in which the 
Court of Justice has developed a structural reasoning. Instead of being based on a rights-based 
perspective, it has traditionally primarily focused on the issue of the division of authority 
between the European Union and the Member States, and on how their two respective spheres 
                                                 
54 L. HARTZ, The liberal tradition in America, (Hartcourt Brace, 1955), 4. 
55 See, Infra, § 89. 
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of authority interact. On the other hand, I have opted for comparing the Court’s power-based 
approach to other legal orders. Among several foreign references, such as, for instance, public 
international law or the case law of the German Constitutional Court, I put great emphasis, for 
the following reasons, on the US constitutional order.  
23. The US constitutional order. First of all, I have found the US constitutional debate over 
the nature of the Union appealing. In a similar way to the European Union, the United States 
corresponds to an integrative model of federalism, characterized by the integration of previously 
independent states.56 As noted by C. WARREN, at the end of the eighteenth century: 
[T]he differences between the States – economic, social, religious, commercial – were in 
some instances as great as the differences between many of the nations of Europe today; 
and out of these differences arose materially hostile and discriminating state legislation.57 
In addition, if they knew that they wanted to form a union more integrated than the entity 
established by the Articles of Confederation, the drafters of the US Constitution did not, 
however, unequivocally identify, from a legal point of view, the polity they were creating. A 
long and fundamental debate over the nature of the Union followed from this ambivalence: 
was it a genuine federation? Or was it rather closer to what we would call today a 
confederation, or even an international organization?58 Was sovereignty vested in the national 
government on the contrary was it held by the states?59 As is well known, this debate was settled 
by the Civil War. However aside from the historical interest, the issue relating to the division 
of authority between the national government and the states remains fundamental today. The 
question as to how to preserve the integrity of both the national government and the states 
while ensuring unity is still subject to lively debates that the US Supreme Court is called upon 
to settle. I therefore make frequent references to US constitutional law throughout my thesis, 
especially in the final chapters.  
                                                 
56 LENAERTS K. “Constitutionalism and the many faces of federalism,” 38 The American Journal of Comparative Law 
205, 206 (1990). 
57 C. WARREN, The Supreme Court and Sovereign States, (Princeton University Press, 1924), 9. See, in a similar vein, 
L. B. KADEN, “Politics, Money, and State sovereignty: The judicial role,” 79 Colum L. Rev. 847, 852-853 (1979). 
58 See, for instance, M. DIAMOND, “What the framers meant by federalism,” in A Nation of States, (Ed.) R. 
GOLDWIN, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1974), 27, who defends the view that “[f]ederalism meant then exactly what 
we mean now by confederalism.”  
59 L. CATÁ BACKER, “The extra-national state: American confederate federalism and the European Union,” 7 
Colum. J. Eur. Law 173, esp. 176-177 (2001). 
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24. Mention must be made, in this respect, of the various US Constitutional clauses that 
the US Supreme Court uses to settle jurisdictional disputes between the states and the national 
government, and therefore to define the contours of their relationship. (i) First, Article 1, 
Section 8 of the US Constitution puts forward the enumerated powers principle by setting out 
an explicit list of powers that are conferred upon Congress; (ii) the Tenth Amendment asserts, 
as I have already pointed out,60 that all the powers not delegated to Congress belong to the 
States or to the people; (iii) the US Constitution also contains clauses that pertain specifically 
to the question of free movement, coupled with that of the promotion of national unity:61 the 
Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and the right to travel, 
though the constitutional sources of the latter remain unclear. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of 
the Constitution states that: 
Congress shall have power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes. 
The US Supreme Court interprets it under two discrete perspectives. It is first an instrument to 
settle what I would describe as ‘positive’ jurisdictional conflicts, when Congress is suspected of 
having gone beyond the power delegated to it while adopting an act, or, alternatively, when the 
states are suspected of having violated the Commerce Clause through the adoption of a statute 
conflicting with an Act of Congress. In this context, the Commerce Clause resembles Article 
114 TFEU, the provision granting the legislator of the European Union power to adopt 
harmonizing acts in relation to the internal market. One of the latest typical illustrations 
involving the Commerce Clause is, for instance, National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, in which the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the Obamacare Act.62 
Second, the Court also interprets the Commerce Clause from a negative perspective. The latter 
is then generally referred to as the ‘dormant Commerce Clause.’ The issue is no longer whether 
Congress has infringed the enumerated power principle, but instead whether the states have 
encroached upon Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, even if Congress has not 
                                                 
60 See, Supra, § 9. 
61 D. LAYCOCK, “Equality and the citizens of sister states,” 15 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 431, 439 (1987). 
62 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. __ (2012). 
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(yet) regulated the field at hand.63 Viewed from this angle, the dormant Commerce Clause is 
reminiscent of the four economic freedoms of the European Union legal order.  
25. Turning now to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, its Section 2 
provides that: 
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in 
the several States. 
Also known as the Comity Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause governs interstate 
relations. The US Supreme Court has interpreted it in such a way as to bar the states from 
discriminating against out-of-staters, i.e. nonresidents – this type of discrimination corresponds 
to nationality-based discriminations in the European Union legal order. Last but not least, the 
right to travel has been defined as follows: 
[…] the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be 
treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in 
the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the 
right to be treated like other citizens of that State.64 
Its constitutional sources remain unclear. For some, they are to be found in the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, while for others they reside in the Privileges or Immunities or 
the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.65 Notwithstanding this question, 
its third component is of particular interest, since it aims to protect those newly arrived in a 
state, or, in other words, to bar a state from discriminating between long-established and new 
residents. Therefore, taken together, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the 
right to travel are, to some extent, equivalent to what we would describe in the European 
Union legal order as the free movement principle. They are indeed reminiscent of European 
Union citizenship and of some aspects of the economic freedoms. As I show later on,66 the US 
                                                 
63 The question as to whether the Commerce Clause comprises this ‘dormant’ dimension has raised much debate 
among US constitutional scholars. For an overview of this debate and its pros and cons, see, for instance, V. BLASI, 
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Supreme Court has notably used these various clauses to impose limits upon state reserved 
powers. As a result, they are fundamental to understand how the states and the central 
government interact within the US constitutional order. In sum, they constitute an interesting 
point of reference for the analysis of the European Court of Justice power-based approach. 
4. Two fundamental ranges of purposes 
26. The contours of my analytical framework having been established, I can now turn to the 
identification of the various purposes of my thesis. To put it briefly, it aims to (i) demonstrate 
that the approach developed by the Court of Justice in cases involving powers retained by 
Member States amounts to an original form of legal integration, and to (ii) bring to light its 
significance for the European Union constitutional dynamics. 
a. An exercise in deconstruction 
27. To be ‘original,’ a technique of integration must refer to a legal approach developed by 
the Court that is both specific and applied in a distinct range of cases. In other words, it must 
distinguish itself from other forms of integration in such a way as to be singled out and 
described as unique. For the present purposes, I broadly define the concept of legal integration 
as the penetration of European Union law into national legal systems.67 In this respect, an 
important distinction must be kept in mind between law understood as an object, and law 
understood as an agent of European integration.68 Given the above, this thesis primarily refers 
to law as an agent, i.e. to the legal means and techniques used to achieve and further European 
integration.  
28. The unicity of the power-based approach. In order to shed light on the original character of 
the Court of Justice power-based approach, I endeavor to establish an in-depth deconstruction 
of the various cases concerned by it. I moreover aim to build up a comprehensive analysis, and 
draw comparisons of their defining features. This requires, in particular, the refutation of the 
                                                 
67 A.-M. BURLEY & W. MATTLI, “Europe before the Court: A political theory of legal integration,” 47: 1 
International Organization 43 (1993), 43; L. AZOULAI, “La révolution introduite par Pierre Pescatore dans l’étude du 
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68 R. DEHOUSSE & J. H. H. WEILER, “The legal dimension,” in The Dynamics of European Integration, (Ed.) W. 
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two following powerful arguments that could be advanced to deny the existence and/or the 
significance of the power-based approach. According to the first, cases involving powers 
retained by Member States would not fundamentally differ from traditional free movement 
cases, given that the two sets of cases are both based on the same general legal framework. They 
are based on the same Treaty provisions – the economic freedoms and European Union 
citizenship – and the Court divides its rulings into the same steps of reasoning: applicability, 
restriction, and justification. The second relates to the material scope of the national powers 
concerned by the power-based approach. Since they cover, at first glance, very heterogeneous 
areas, there seems to be no obvious reason why the Court would develop an approach that is 
common to these fields. 
29. The forms of integration developed by the Court of Justice. As D. SIDJANSKI puts it, the 
“various types of integration develop at various levels, interfere, influence each other within a 
general interdependence framework.”69 J. H. H. WEILER drew, in this respect, a compelling 
typology70 of the various forms of integration developed by the Court, the function and the 
effects of which are to shape and govern the relationship between the European Union and its 
Member States. He identified four categories of mutation that have affected their interplay, and 
that reflect the fact that the jurisdiction of the European Union has substantially grown over 
the years. J. H. H. WEILER first distinguished the category of extension, “in the area of 
autonomous Community jurisdiction,”71 which concerns the mutation of human rights in the 
European Union legal order as well as the standing of the European Parliament. This form of 
integration “did not have a direct impact on the jurisdiction of the Member States”72 since it 
primarily concerned European Union’s own powers. The second category, absorption, 
encompasses instances in which the Court of Justice rules that European Union measures 
trump conflicting national measures even if they affect “areas over which the Community has 
no competence.”73 The third category concerns the issue of incorporation. J. H. H. WEILER 
borrows this concept from US constitutional law. This is a doctrine developed by the Supreme 
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70 J. H. H. WEILER, “The Transformation of Europe,” above, n. 3, 45s. 
71 Ibid., 45. 
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Court of the United States, whereby the federal Bill of Rights not only applies to the measures 
of the federal government but also to state action.74 Last but not least, the category of expansion 
is depicted as “the most radical form of jurisdictional mutation” because it corresponds to cases 
where “the original legislation of the Community ‘breaks’ jurisdictional limits.”75 This typology 
shows that these legal forms of integration, as they are developed by the European Court of 
Justice, may: (i) not have direct implications for Member States (extension); (ii) have 
implications for the existence of European Union and/or national powers (expansion + 
incorporation); (iii) have implications for the exercise of national powers (absorption + 
incorporation). The categories of expansion and absorption are of significant interest for the 
present purposes.  
30. Expansion. The expansion form of integration corresponds to legal techniques used to 
resolve disputes involving the division of powers between the European Union and its Member 
States. The Court of Justice is called upon, in these cases, to draw boundaries between the 
respective spheres of jurisdiction of the European Union and the Member States. As J. H. H. 
WEILER and many other authors point out, it has always interpreted European Union powers 
in an expansive way with, as a result, a reduction76 and/or an erosion77 of national powers. The 
most obvious of these legal techniques can be found in the Court’s interpretation of current 
Article 352 TFEU, also called the flexibility clause. The Court has endorsed a very expansive 
use of this provision, which has served as the legal basis for developing policies that are not 
mentioned in the Treaties, such as the environmental policy or the protection of consumers.78 
The doctrine of exclusivity, as developed in the context of EU external relations, is another 
telling example. While a certain range of subject matters is exclusive, such as fisheries 
conservation or commercial policy,79 under other circumstances the exercise of its – express or 
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implied – powers by the European Union entails the exclusion of Member States’ powers.80 The 
interpretation of Article 114 TFEU also reflects the Court’s expansionist stance on the powers 
held by the European Union. The Court has confirmed, for instance, that subject matters not 
strictly economic may be nonetheless harmonized.81 The Court’s developments in free 
movement cases, decided in the absence of legislation at the level of the European Union, can 
also be analyzed in light of J. H. H. WEILER’s expansion concept. M. P. MADURO claims, by way 
of illustration, that cases involving the free movement of goods imply choices regarding the 
division of powers between the European Union and the Member States. In his view, they boil 
down to deciding on the issue of who, between the Union and Member States, should have 
jurisdiction over a certain subject matter.82 This observation also holds true for the other 
fundamental freedoms as well as for European Union citizenship. 
31. Absorption. Besides these forms of legal integration pertaining to the division of powers 
and therefore to the existence of both European and national powers, the Court has developed 
absorption techniques that have significant implications for the exercise of Member States’ 
powers. In some instances, the Court requires Member States to comply with European Union 
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law each time the exercise of their powers undermines the exercise of European Union powers, 
even when they pertain to areas over which the European Union has no jurisdiction. To this 
end, it imposes specific legal restraints on the conditions of exercise of national powers. The 
Court developed this approach for the first time in Casagrande. This decision involved the field 
of education, traditionally seen as reserved to the Member States. The legality of Regulation 
1612/68 was challenged on the grounds that the Community infringed Member States’ 
educational powers. The Court of Justice held that: 
[A]lthough educational and training policy is not as such included in the spheres which the 
Treaty has entrusted to the Community institutions, it does not follow that the exercise of 
powers transferred to the Community is in some way limited if it is of such a nature as to 
affect the measures taken in the execution of a policy such as that of education and 
training.83 
The Court also places restraints on the exercise of national external powers. As a result of the 
broader recognition of shared powers – and the relative decline of the doctrine of exclusivity – 
it increasingly reviews the conditions attached to the exercise of national external powers.84 
Interestingly, the aforementioned expansion techniques also have an absorbing effect on the 
exercise of Member States’ powers. The broader the material scope of European Union 
powers, the more likely the exercise of national powers to impinge upon the latter. With 
respect to the nature of the restraints upon the exercise of national powers, R. BIEBER rightly 
pointed out that “[t]he closer the connection between the exercise of national powers and the 
Community legislation, the stronger the effects of the obligations which can be derived from 
Community law.”85 
32. The power-based approach contextualized. That being said, the purpose of my exercise in 
deconstruction is twofold. First of all, I intend to identify whether the power-based approach 
falls within one (or more) of J. H. H. WEILER’s categories; or, alternatively, to what extent it 
borrows from them. Second of all, I start from the premise that the Court of Justice has not 
built the power-based approach from scratch. Instead, it has drawn some of its defining features 
                                                 
83 Case 9/74, Casagrande, [1974] ECR 773, 12. 
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competence,” in EC External Relations Law in the Maastricht Era, (Eds.) A. DASHWOOD & C. HILLION, (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2000), 198-199. 
85 R. BIEBER, “On the mutual completion of overlapping legal systems: the case of the European Communities and 
the national legal orders,” Eur. Law Rev. 157 (1988). 
General Introduction 
 
28 
on some of its pre-existing integration techniques. What makes this form of integration 
‘original’ is that the Court operates it in a specific and distinctive manner while at the same 
time creating specific and novel features. Accordingly, my thesis emphasizes both continuity and 
change, and aims to show how the Court, on the basis of its existing judicial constructions, has 
been gradually implementing a distinct and original form of integration in a specific range of 
free movement cases. To put it differently, it seeks to put the power-based approach in 
perspective, by assessing to what extent it borrows from other doctrines developed by the Court 
of Justice, or, on the contrary, the extent to which it distinguishes itself from them. 
b. An exercise in reconstruction 
33. My thesis combines the exercise in deconstruction with an attempt at reconstruction. 
This exercise has a threefold purpose, which I intend to deal with by taking the theory of 
federalism as the starting point of my analysis. 
34. A threefold purpose. Reconstructing the Court of Justice reasoning implies placing my 
various findings in a broader perspective, in order to shed light on the significance of the 
power-based approach for the European Union constitutional dynamics. In other words, this 
endeavor aims to assess what the power-based approach adds to the constitutional law of the 
European Union and, therefore, to a better understanding of the European Union building 
process. This requires addressing three different sets of issues, which relate, respectively, to: (i) 
the necessity to limit national powers in order to preserve the European Union interests;86 (ii) 
the interplay between Member States and the European Union, and Member States’ 
interrelations;87 and (iii) the shaping of the contours of a “Member State status.” With respect 
to the first issue, cases involving powers retained by Member States are all about the limitations 
put on the conditions of exercise of national powers. In this respect, an accurate understanding 
of these decisions requires the paradox as to how a given power can both fall within national 
spheres of jurisdiction, and be subject to European Union law requirements to be overcome. 
Turning now to the second issue, cases pertaining to the powers retained by Member States, as I 
have already mentioned earlier, primarily concern the division of authority between the two 
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levels of government of the European Union. They indeed invite the Court to decide on how 
the European Union and its Member States are to interact with respect to fields over which the 
former has no, or very limited, jurisdiction, but which nonetheless affect its interests. In this 
respect, the following chapters show that the preservation of national autonomy is a constant 
concern for the Court of Justice. In so doing, the Court takes into account, throughout its 
rulings, the effects of its decisions on the special bonds that link States with their respective 
nationals and residents. Similarly, the Court seeks to coordinate national and European Union 
spheres of powers in such a way as to simultaneously preserve European Union powers and 
Member States’ specific and legitimate interests. The cases concerned by the power-based 
approach also pertain to Member States’ interrelationships, and the way Member States 
interact, or do not interact, in fields that form the core of their identity. Accordingly, the 
impact of the application of European Union law on these relations needs to be identified. As a 
result, my thesis intends to identify the implications of the Court of Justice power-based 
approach for the European Union vertical and horizontal institutional relationships. Last but 
not least, it finally aims to draw a comprehensive picture of the resulting conditions of Union’s 
membership. To put it differently, its purpose is to shed light on the defining features of the 
status of the Members of the European Union. How does the Court of Justice define and 
fashion them? What are the implications for the Member States? And, ultimately, for the 
identity of the European Union? In order to address these various issues, I am taking the theory 
of federalism as the starting point of the exercise in reconstruction.  
35. Federalism does not exclusively relate to the nation-state. The second fundamental element of 
the analytical framework I use to examine free movement cases involving powers retained by 
Member States relates to my understanding of the European Union as a federation or, to put it 
differently, as a polity governed by a federal principle. Broadly speaking, federalism is a system 
of government, which relies on a federal arrangement. D. J. ELAZAR has defined the latter as: 
[O]ne of partnership, established and regulated by a covenant, whose internal relationships 
reflect the special kind of sharing that must prevail among the partners, based on a mutual 
recognition of the integrity of each partner and the attempt to foster a special unity among 
them.88 
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Federal arrangements are characterized, in essence, by the existence of two levels of 
government, which means, from a constitutional point of view, that powers are divided 
between the two.89 As a result, in federal systems, two levels of government, i.e. the federal 
government on the one hand, and the constituent government on the other hand, exercise 
their powers with respect to the same territory and the same population simultaneously.90 In 
Europe, when scholars examine federal arrangements, they generally take the concept of 
sovereignty, understood as indivisible, as the starting point of their inquiries. This prompts 
them to divide the federal principle into two “mutually exclusive species,”91 the confederation 
and the federal state. While the former characterizes international arrangements, the latter, so 
the argument goes, exclusively refers to nation states. As a result, the “F” word is most of the 
time associated with the idea of nation-state. In addition, issues relating to federalism are very 
often reduced to a strict typology of confederations and federal states.92 Against this 
background, O. BEAUD has described this twofold distinction as an “intellectual obstacle” to 
the analysis of federalism,93 and has shown that federalism is instead first and foremost a 
unitary phenomenon. In the same manner as H. KELSEN,94 he contends that federal states and 
confederations of states do not differ in nature, but rather in degree. As P. RILEY puts it, these 
two forms of political organization are meant to address the same concerns: 
Federalism, both as a scheme for the internal structuring of a single state and as a plan of 
international organization, can most plausibly be understood as having arisen as an 
alternative to, and (more precisely) in opposition to, the existence and the monolithic 
power of the sovereign states of post-sixteenth century modernity.95 
The fundamental idea, consisting in dividing responsibilities between two levels of government, 
remains, regardless of the precise ‘federal form of government’ adopted by the polity: 
[U]sing the federal principle does not necessarily mean establishing a federal system in the 
conventional sense of a modern federal state. The essence of federalism is not to be found 
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in a particular set of institutions but in the institutionalization of particular relationships 
among the participants in political life.96 
Everything considered, the concept of federalism may thus equally be used “within or without 
the framework of a nation-state.”97 
36. The division of authority between the European Union and its Member States: A federal issue. 
Against this backdrop, I have decided to look into the issues relating to the division of authority 
raised by the free movement cases involving powers retained by Member States through the 
lenses of federalism. To this end, I understand the European Union as a federation, defined as 
a “union of states”98 based on a federal principle, without presupposing that it amounts to a 
state. Admittedly, I do not contend that all of its features are federal. But I nonetheless share 
the view of several authors,99 and R. SCHÜTZE’s stance in particular,100 that issues relating to the 
division of powers between the European Union and its Member States are similar to those of a 
federal system. J. H. H. WEILER has noted, in this respect, that, in the European Union, the 
allocation of powers, which governs the relationship between the Union and its Member States, 
is “very much like similar sets of norms in most federal states.”101 The European Court of 
Justice moreover plays a fundamental role in relation to the settlement of disputes relating to 
the federal division of authority between the European Union and the Member States. It is 
enough to think, for instance, of the Tobacco Advertising controversy, in which the Court held 
for the first time that the European Union had gone beyond its attributed powers when it 
adopted a directive regulating the advertisement of tobacco.102 As a result, it has increasingly 
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become similar to federal constitutional courts.103 Taken together, these two factors explain 
that, from a structural point of view, the European Union can be described as a federation. 
37. The theory of federalism as the starting point of the exercise in reconstruction. As M. DIAMONDS 
has accurately pointed out: 
Federalism is always an arrangement pointed in two contrary directions or aimed at 
securing two contrary ends. One end is always found in the reason why the member units 
do not simply consolidate themselves into one large unitary country; the other end is 
always found in the reason why the member units do not choose to remain simply small 
wholly autonomous countries.104 
To put it differently, federalism is characterized by two opposite principles: a centripetal 
principle, which tends to give precedence to the central government interests and jurisdiction, 
and a centrifugal principle, according to which the autonomy of the members of the federation 
must be safeguarded,105 and their global political status maintained.106 In sum: 
In any federal system, it is likely that there will be continued tension between the federal 
government and the constituent polities over the years and that different ‘balances’ 
between them will develop at different times. The existence of this tension is an integral 
part of the federal relationship, and its character does much to determine the future of 
federalism in each system.107 
This tension precisely underlies the whole of the cases involving power retained by Member 
States, and its identification is at the core of my thesis. Accordingly, through the use of the 
theory of federalism, I can address the question as to how the Court of Justice proceeds to 
strike a balance between the need to preserve the unity of the European Union legal order, 
while preserving diversity within the European Union.108 Focusing on the federal operation that 
takes place in cases involving powers retained by Member States moreover allows me to identify 
the transformation that affects Member States. I can identify to what extent Union membership 
requires Member States to alter the political and social powers that form the core of their 
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identity. Furthermore, this allows me to assess to what extent Union membership affects 
Member State autonomy and, ultimately, their identity as nation-states. 
5. Outline of the thesis 
38. Given the above, I have divided my thesis into six chapters. The first three shed light on 
the three fundamental features of the Court of Justice power-based approach. Taken together, 
they single it out from the approach traditionally implemented in free movement cases. In 
Chapter 1, I show that, in contrast to traditional free movement cases, the Court of Justice 
reasoning amounts to a ‘power-based approach.’ In Chapter 2, I focus on the applicability stage 
of the cases concerned by the power-based approach, and demonstrate that the Court proceeds 
to a disjunction of the scope of application of European Union law from the scope of the 
powers conferred on the European Union. As for Chapter 3, it concerns more specifically the 
restriction and the justification stages of the cases involving powers retained by Member States. 
It claims that the settlement of the jurisdictional conflicts at hand amounts to a ‘mutual 
adjustment resolution.’ On the one hand, the Court of Justice places limitations on the exercise 
of the national powers where the European Union nonetheless holds no, or very limited, 
jurisdiction. But, on the other hand, the Court adapts its own approach to the sensitive 
character of the fields analyzed herein. In the remaining three chapters, I intend to reconstruct 
the Court of Justice power-based approach in three ways. First of all, I identify its effects in 
Chapter 4, and address the issue as to whether the cases involving powers retained by Member 
States result in a disempowerment of the Member States and/or an empowerment of the 
European Union. Second of all, in Chapter 5, I shed light on the existence and the nature of 
the various implications induced by the power-based approach for European Union 
membership. Lastly, Chapter 6 gathers the various findings of the five preceding chapters in 
such a way as to provide an overall structural reassessment. This allows me to shed light, first, 
on the persistent silence of the Court regarding the question of why certain fields are 
concerned by the power-based approach, and regarding the foundations of this original form of 
integration. Second, I identify which structural model the Court of Justice is led to 
(un)consciously implement through the entrenchment of its power-based approach. 
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INTRODUCTION OF CHAPTER 1.  
39. Purpose of Chapter 1. This first chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the 
European Court of Justice power-based approach. Its purpose is twofold. On the one hand, it 
focuses on the fields concerned by this original approach, and seeks to understand why, despite 
the disparate character of the subject matters covered, the Court of Justice nevertheless subjects 
them to a common legal framework. On the other hand, this chapter sheds light on the first 
defining feature of the power-based approach. In cases involving powers retained by Member 
States, the notion of power plays a crucial role throughout the Court’s reasoning. By contrast, 
in traditional free movement cases, the Court primarily focuses on the articulation of the 
norms in conflict through the principle of primacy. It is only indirectly interested in dealing 
with the implications of its case law for the interplay between national and European Union 
spheres of powers. This is evidenced by the fact that, in these cases, the Court barely reasons in 
terms of powers – indeed it seldom refers to this concept at all. This is not the case in the 
rulings involving retained powers. Instead, the Court gives more weight to issues relating to the 
division of authority between the European Union and the Member States, and among 
Member States. 
40. Outline of Chapter 1. In order to shed light on the first feature of the Court of Justice 
power-based approach, Chapter 1 is divided into two sections. In Section 1, I elaborate on the 
fields briefly listed in the general introduction.1 In this respect, I present a thorough description 
of these fields and demonstrate that, notwithstanding their apparent heterogeneity, they 
nonetheless share common defining features. In Section 2, I focus on the overall reasoning 
developed by the Court of Justice in cases involving powers retained by Member States, and 
show that it revolves around the structural notion of power. 
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SECTION 1. THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE FIELDS CONCERNED BY THE POWER-BASED APPROACH 
41. The statement of the formulae at the applicability stage of the cases involving powers 
retained by Member States reveals that the Court of Justice singles out a certain range of powers 
with the view to subjecting them to a particular legal framework. The criteria used by the Court 
in its selection remain obscure and ill-defined. As a matter of fact, nowhere in the cases does 
the Court indicate why, and/or on what basis, it subjects a given field to the power-based 
approach.2 Against this backdrop, the purpose of this first section is to identify those powers in 
relation to which the Court develops its power-based approach. At first glance, the fields 
analyzed herein seem, to say the least, heterogeneous, since they cover very diverse subject 
matters. However, a closer look at the Court of Justice case law indicates that they nonetheless 
share three fundamental features. First, they all are, in one way or another, defining 
components of what is traditionally considered in Western Europe as Member State autonomy. 
Second, they fall, for the most part, outside the jurisdiction of the European Union. With 
respect to these fields, European Union powers are either very limited or simply nonexistent. 
Third, and maybe more importantly, the exercise of powers in these fields is essentially based 
on the principle of closure, while their internal coherence is conditional upon the erection of 
boundaries. 
1. Constitutive components of Member State autonomy as reflected in the ECJ case law 
42. In the following, I draw a distinction between the fields pertaining to national political 
autonomy – nationality, direct taxation, the rules governing surnames and the enforcement for 
the recovery of debts – and those that fall within Member State social autonomy – social 
protection, education and the right to take collective action.3 This logically entails that, as far as 
these fields are concerned, Member States make different policy choices or, in other words, that 
they exercise their powers according in different, sometimes conflicting, manners. 
a. Key-components of political autonomy 
43. To begin with, nationality may be broadly defined as a legal bond between the state and 
the individual. As noted by S. O’LEARY: 
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The determination of nationality is regarded as an exercise of national sovereignty since it 
is one of the primary means by which a state defines itself and, in particular, its personal 
spectrum.4 
Through the adoption of nationality laws, states as sovereign decide which individuals are 
subject to the set of rights and duties in force on their territories. In other words, nationality 
policies determine who is to enjoy the status of membership of a community.5 Accordingly, 
nationality can be described as a core component of national autonomy, for the survival of a 
state depends on its ability to include (exclude) individuals into (from) its population: 
In order to exist, every nation-state needs a population and a territory. Since individual 
human beings have a limited lifespan, states – to ensure their own continuity over time – 
have had to find legal tools that not only attribute nationality but also transmit it from 
generation to generation.6 
As a result, nationality policy is closely linked to fundamental political choices7 – it has decisive 
implications, for instance, for national immigration and integration policies. In this regard, 
countries of immigration and countries of emigration generally do not pursue the same 
objectives, and this is reflected in the way they grant nationality. Similarly, states have different 
views over integration, and can see nationality as a sign of integration and/or as a factor of 
integration.8 They therefore do not impose the same range of conditions with respect to the 
acquisition of nationality. Altogether, Member States use four tools as bases of their respective 
nationality policies:9 
Jus soli: a person acquires the nationality of his/her place of birth; 
Jus sanguini: a person acquires the nationality of one of his/her parent or ancestor; 
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Residency: a person acquires the nationality of his/her country of residence after a certain 
length of residence; 
Matrimonial status: a person acquires the nationality of the country of his/her spouse. 
Some concrete examples show that nationality policies substantially differ from one Member 
State to another. Suffice to think, for instance, of Italy, where the jus sanguini principle plays a 
cornerstone role given that “acquisition of the Italian nationality has been mostly rooted in 
family relationship.”10 Conversely, nationality laws in the United Kingdom reflect a policy 
preference for the jus soli principle.11 As for France, it combines both principles.12 
44. Direct taxation. The same holds true for the field of direct taxation: “it is difficult to 
conceive of a modern nation-state that could sustain itself and protect its people from physical 
or economic harm without raising revenue through taxation of some kind.”13 Taxation is 
essential to preserve the territorial integrity of a state. It is also vital to conduct social and 
economic policies. This is especially true with respect to the Member States of the European 
Union, which have long substantially intervened into domestic matters relating to economy 
and social matters14 – and, in this respect, direct taxation is as much an expression of political 
autonomy as social autonomy. Member States have set up very different tax systems. “As a 
result, there are significant differences in national tax structures in the EU as regards the 
financing of the national budget and the welfare system.”15 As evidenced by the European 
Commission, Member States have implemented disparate tax arrangements, not to mention the 
divergences in tax rates and the tax base.16 As way of example, a comparison between the 
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13 See A. CHRISTIANS, “Sovereignty, taxation and social contract,” 18 Minn. J. Int’l L. 99, 104 (2009): “Since 
taxation is typically the main means by which governments support themselves and provide public goods, the 
ability and need of the state to tax is easily conflated with the concept of sovereignty.” See also D. BRÄUTIGAM, 
“Building Leviathan: Revenue, State Capacity and Governance,” 33: 3 IDS Bulletin 10 (2002), who quotes T. 
Hobbes, The Leviathan, 1651: “These are the rights which make the essence of sovereignty: …The power to protect 
his subjects… [the power] of execution of the laws… the power of raising money.” 
14 See D. RING, “What’s at stake in the sovereignty debate?: International tax and the nation-state,” Boston College 
Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 153, 10-11 (2008). 
15 C. KELLERMANN & A. KAMMER, “Deadlocked European tax policy. Which way out of the competition for the 
lowest taxes?,” European Tax Policy 2/2009, 132. 
16 EUROSTAT, Taxation trends in the European Union, Statistical book, 2012 Edition. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_structure
s/2012/report.pdf. 
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various national tax systems has allowed C. KELLERMANN and A. KAMMER to divide the 
Member States into four groups.17 The first is composed of the newer Member States, and is 
characterized by low top income tax rates and low tax revenues generated by personal income 
tax. The second comprises countries such as France and Germany, and corresponds to high 
burden on earned income and nominally high income and corporate tax rates. In the third 
group, also called the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model, social security contributions play a subordinate role 
while the level of differentiation and formalization of tax practices is high. As for the fourth 
group, it is made up of Scandinavian countries as well as countries such as Belgium, Austria 
and Italy. Its main features are high revenues from personal income tax, and very high overall 
tax-to-GDP ratio. 
45. Enforcement for the recovery of debts. The conditions relating to the enforcement for the 
recovery of debts are another component of national political autonomy. The theory of 
sovereign statehood intrinsically links sovereignty to coercive power, which remains exclusively 
in the hands of the sovereign state. HOBBES, for instance, saw in the power of execution of the 
laws one of the rights which make up the very essence of sovereignty.18 Similarly to what 
prevails in the previous fields, Member States have set up various substantial conditions of 
enforcement. 
46. Surnames, viewed as legal institution, are multifaceted.19 Being a means of identifying 
individuals by reference to their families or lineages,20 they can be described as part of an 
inalienable birthright. They are also components of individual personality, and they relate, as 
such, to individual rights. However, the attribution and change of surnames are not usually left 
to the choice of individuals. Being of public interest, they are essential to the identification of 
individuals, be it, for instance, for military, criminal, or fiscal purposes.21 States have therefore a 
vested interest in controlling the means of identification of their nationals/residents by 
adopting laws governing surnames. In this respect, structural differences exist among national 
                                                 
17 KELLERMANN C. & KAMMER A. “Deadlocked European tax policy. Which way out of the competition for the 
lowest taxes?,” above, n. 15, 132s. 
18 See above, n. 13. 
19 G. CORNU, Droit civil. Introduction – Les personnes – Les biens, Montchrestien, Coll. Domat Droit Privé, 7th Ed., 
216. 
20 J. VERLINDEN, Columbia Journal of European Law 706 (2005). 
21 W. SCHÄTZEL, “Le nom des personnes en droit international,” 95 Recueil des Cours 177, 197 (1968): “Ce sont 
essentiellement des considérations d’ordre militaire (conscription), d’ordre pénal (casier judiciaire) et d’ordre fiscal 
qui ont conduit l’État à [réglementer le nom].” 
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laws governing surnames. If the latter pursue the same ultimate policy goal, i.e. the 
identification of individuals, they also reflect key-policy choices, and express specific national 
interests. Thus, Member States differ in the weight they attach to individual freedom and 
public order. Some of them have a liberal approach towards the rules governing the change of 
surnames. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the only limit to the change of surnames is 
fraud.22 Others however have much stricter laws, making the change nearly impossible. 
Similarly, Member States put different emphasis on gender issues. In some of them, the passing 
on of surnames is meant to be gender-neutral but, in others, it is still mostly patriarchal. The 
last model corresponds, for instance, to the situation prevailing in Belgium. The situation is 
different in Spain, where children bear double surnames, composed of the first element of the 
father’s surname and of the first element of the mother’s surname – parents can choose the 
order of their children’s surnames, provided that the latter all bear the same surname. 
b. Key-components of social autonomy 
47. The notion of welfare state. Turning now to the remaining fields, a distinction is to be 
drawn between those that are components of the welfare state and those that are part, more 
generally, of national social policies. Social security and education pertain to functions undertaken 
by the welfare state. Defining the latter notion is not an easy task and is much debated in the 
literature,23 as evidenced by F.-X. KAUFMAN who has summarized the various understandings. 
This concept may indeed refer to: 
(a) a state that provides economic security and social services for certain categories (or all) 
of its citizens; 
(b) a state that takes care of a substantial redistribution of resources from the wealthier to 
the poor; 
(c) a state that has instituted social rights, as part of citizenship; 
(d) a state that aims at security for and equality among its citizens; 
                                                 
22 J.-J. LEMOULAND, “Le choix du prénom et du nom en droit français,” in L’identité de la personne humaine. Étude de 
droit français et de droit comparé, (Ed.) J. POUSSON-PETIT (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2003), 633. 
23 D. WINCOTT, “Reassessing the social foundation of welfare (state) regimes,” 6: 3 New Political Economy 409 
(2001). N. BARR, The Economics of the Welfare State, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5th Éd. 2012), 7; J. ALBER, 
“Continuities and changes in the idea of the welfare state,” 16 Politics & Society 451-468 (1988). 
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(e) a state that is assumed to be explicitly responsible for the basic well-being of all of its 
members.24 
In the same vein, F.-X. MERRIEN has identified three main functions of the welfare state.25 First, 
welfare states establish social security systems through regulatory intervention in order to 
provide their citizens with economic security. Second, they are characterized by the setting up of 
vertical and horizontal redistribution mechanisms and, thirdly, by their will to provide their 
population with a range of services and collective facilities at lower market costs.26 More 
technically speaking, two main types of benefits are provided by the welfare state. The first 
category consists of cash benefits, which can themselves be divided into two sub-categories: 
social insurance, “awarded without an income of wealth test, generally on the basis of (a) 
previous contributions and (b) the occurrence of a specified event, such as becoming 
unemployed or reaching a specific age,”27 and non-contributory benefits, which are made up of 
universal benefits, “awarded on the basis of a specified contingency, without a contribution or 
an income test,” and “designed to help individuals and families who are in poverty.”28 As for 
the second category, it consists of benefits-in-kind. The fields of education and cross-border 
health care fall within the latter category, while the compensation of civil war victims 
constitutes a universal benefit. 
48. Welfare state models. There exist several models of welfare state within the European 
Union, which differ in substantial aspects. Even if, today, G. ESPING-ANDERSEN’s original 
categorization is currently undergoing reappraisal, his work nonetheless deserves specific 
consideration. He indeed brought fundamental changes to existing theories29 when he 
published The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism in 1990.30 He identified three distinct 
categories: 
                                                 
24 F.-X. KAUFMAN, “Major problems and dimensions of the welfare state,” in The welfare state and its aftermath, 
(Eds.) S. N. EISENSTADT, O. AHLMEIR, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 45. 
25 For a more economic perspective, see N. BARR, The Economics of the Welfare State, above, n. 23 who defines the 
objectives of the welfare state as follows: efficiency, supporting living standards, inequality reduction, social 
integration and administrative feasibility. 
26 F.-X. MERRIEN, L’État providence, (1st ed., Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997), 7. 
27 N. BARR, The Economics of the Welfare State, above, n. 23. 
28 Ibid. 
29 See e.g. F.-X. MERRIEN, L’État providence, above, n. 26; J. ALBER, “Continuities and changes in the idea of the 
welfare state,” above, n. 23. 
30 G. ESPING-ANDERSEN, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1990), 248p. 
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The ‘liberal’ welfare state “in which means-tested assistance, model universal transfers, or 
modest social-insurance plans predominate”31 (United States, Canada and Australia); 
The conservative and strongly ‘corporatist’ welfare state where “corporatism was subsumed 
under a state edifice perfectly ready to displace the market as a provider of welfare; hence, 
private insurance and occupational fringe benefits play a truly marginal role […] the state’s 
emphasis on upholding status differences means that its redistributive impact is 
negligible”32 (Austria, France, Germany, Italy); 
The ‘social-democratic’ welfare state in which “the principles of universalism and de-
commodification of social rights were extended also to the new middle classes”33 
(Scandinavian countries). 
49. Various health care systems coexist among the members of the European Union. They are 
a way for Member States to pursue three main policy objectives: ensuring quality of medical 
benefits, geographical access to doctors and hospitals, and financial access.34 A distinction must 
be drawn between social insurance systems and national health services.35 The former comprises 
reimbursement schemes (France, Belgium, Luxembourg), under which patients are reimbursed 
for the cost of medical care, and benefits-in-kind schemes (Austria, Germany, The Netherlands), 
under which the competent health institution directly pays health practitioners. These systems 
are financed through social security contributions. As for national health services (United 
Kingdom, Ireland, and most Southern Member States), they are funded by public taxation and 
operate in accordance with the principle of benefits-in-kind. In addition, all Member States 
have set up mechanisms relating to capacity planning in order to “tune health care supply to 
the national populations’ need.”36 Such mechanisms vary greatly and reflect the “institutional 
and regulatory framework”37 of health care systems. Thus, for instance, patients may have the 
freedom to choose their medical practitioners, or, conversely, their choice may be limited to 
health providers who have concluded agreements with the sickness fund. Similarly, 
practitioners may or may not be subject to quota regulations.38 Finally, some Member States 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 26. 
32 Ibid., 27. 
33 Ibid., 27-28. 
34 A. P. VAN DER MEI, Free movement of persons within the Community: Cross-border access to public benefits, (Oxford; 
Portland, Or.: Hart 2003), 223. 
35 These categories are only ‘ideal types’: T. K. HERVEY, “The current legal framework on the right to seek health 
care abroad in the European Union,” 9 The Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 261, 267 (2006/2007). 
36 R. BAETEN & W. PALM, “The compatibility of health care capacity planning policies with EU internal market 
rules,” in Health care and EU Law, (Ed.) J. W. VAN DE GRONDEN, (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press; Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2011), 391. 
37 Ibid., 392. 
38 A. P. VAN DER MEI, Free movement of persons within the Community: Cross-border access to public benefits, above, n. 34, 
225. 
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have conferred a role of ‘gatekeeper’ to general practitioners who steer patients to the 
appropriate specialists. It is well-known fact that national health care policies involve substantial 
public investments. Therefore, Member States constantly seek to strike a balance between their 
population’s needs, and the necessity to control costs. This is one of the main reasons why their 
health care systems are all based on the territoriality principle.39 On the one hand, only 
residents – regardless of nationality – have access to their health care system and, on the other 
hand, medical care is exclusively provided by medical practitioners who are established on the 
national territory. 
50. The compensation of civil war victims is another type of benefit provided by some of the 
European welfare states. It generally consists of universal non-contributory benefits, i.e. benefits 
that are “awarded on the basis of a specified contingency, without either a contribution or an 
income test.”40 The award of such benefits is closely linked to the historical past and culture of 
each Member State which has set up mechanisms aiming at conferring a financial 
compensation on civil war victims. 
51. As for education,41 it accounts for a significant portion of Member States’ budgets. 
Overall, Member States spend around 5% of their GDP on education.42 In Europe, education 
systems are also based on the principle of territoriality: they are open to residents while stricter 
requirements may be imposed on nonresidents, including European Union nonresidents. Here 
again, Member States implement diverse policies, depending on their social, religious, and 
cultural traditions.43 As a result, various education systems coexist within the European 
Union.44 They differ in three main respects: structure and content of courses, organization, and 
funding. Looking more particularly at organizational aspects, European educational systems 
share important common features: not only are they all based on the territoriality principle, but 
they also are largely public in nature. Moreover, they pursue efficiency and social justice 
                                                 
39 Y. JORENS, “The right to health care across borders,” in The impact of EU law on health care systems, (Eds.) M. 
MCKEE et al. (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2002), 86. 
40 N. BARR, The Economics of the Welfare State, above, n. 23, 8. 
41 For our purposes, I focus on higher education only in the subsequent chapters. 
42 EURYDICE, EUROSTAT, Key Data on Education in Europe 2012, available from 
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/key_data_series/134EN.pdf, 87. 
43 A. P. VAN DER MEI, Free movement of persons within the Community: Cross-border access to public benefits, above, n. 34, 
337. 
44 For a historical perspective, see E. HACKL, “Towards a European area of higher education. Change and 
convergence in European higher education,” EUI Working Papers RCS 2001/09, 3-6. 
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objectives.45 Despite these common characteristics, Member States have nonetheless set up 
different mechanisms in relation to the conditions of access to their educational systems. In this 
regard, a distinction must be drawn between unrestricted/open access and restricted access. A 
system is said to be of open access when the admission requirement is solely based on the 
completion of secondary-school certificate. It concerns only a few Member States: Belgium, 
France, Italy, Malta, and Austria.46 All the others have opted for restricted access systems. The 
latter correspond to situations where places available are limited through the imposition of a 
numerus clausus. The decision to limit places may come from central or regional authorities or 
from higher education institutions themselves.47 In restricted access systems, the selection of 
candidates can be either based on entrance examinations, the submission of personal records or 
the attendance of interviews.48 With respect to European educational systems funding, private 
funding remains marginal in all Member States. It represents on average 13,8% of educational 
expenditure.49 However, higher education is almost never free of charge.50 Member States 
generally impose varying levels of administrative fees and/or tuition fees. In this regard, they 
have all set up financial support mechanisms, which also differ substantially. First, the levels of 
financial support are disparate.51 Second, financial support may cover fees and/or living costs. 
Third, it may take various forms: tax relief, family allowances, grants or loans. All in all, there 
exist three categories of financial support within the European Union: 1) financial support to 
students to cover the cost of living, in the form of loans and/or grants; 2) financial support for 
the payment of administrative fees and contributions to tuition costs, in the form of loans 
and/or grants, exemptions and/or reductions; 3) financial assistance to the parents of students 
in tertiary education, in the form of family allowances and/or tax relief.52 All Member States 
provide financial support to students to cover living costs, but only seven provide all three types 
of support.53 Finally, mention must be made of the fact that some Member States provide 
students with specific financial support to encourage mobility across the European Union. The 
                                                 
45 A. P. VAN DER MEI, Free movement of persons within the Community: Cross-border access to public benefits, above, n. 34, 
337. 
46 EURYDICE, EUROSTAT, Key Data on Education in Europe 2012, above, n. 42, 63. 
47 Ibid., 61-62. 
48 Ibid., 64. 
49 Ibid., 93. There are, on this point, significant disparities among EU Member States: it goes from 2,7% in 
Sweden up to 30,5% in the UK. 
50 Ibid., 106: it is free of charge in Denmark, Malta, Finland and Sweden. 
51 Ibid., 101. 
52 Ibid., 106. 
53 Ibid., 106: Germany, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Austria and Slovakia. 
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foregoing thus shows that Member States have made different key-policy choices in the field of 
higher education. Their educational policies pursue common objectives, social justice in 
particular, but they do not attach the same weight to the same social principles, such as the 
equality of educational opportunity for all, the widening of access to tertiary education, or 
student financial independence. 
52. As for the right to take collective action, it is an important aspect of national social policies, 
and it is regulated by national labor laws. T. NOVITZ has demonstrated that the right to strike in 
particular encompasses several dimensions. It is first a socio-economic right, in the sense that it 
is a means for workers to promote their economic welfare and security.54 Second, it can be 
described as a civil liberty because it is highly related to the freedom of association, the freedom 
from forced labor, and the freedom of speech.55 Thirdly, it also comprises a political dimension 
to the extent that it may have the effect of influencing both employer and governmental 
policies.56 Thus, the right to strike reveals the balance of power that exists between the state, 
employers, and employees. As it is generally intrinsically linked to the history of social 
movements in the Member States, its regulation varies greatly in Europe. Indeed, Member 
States tend to define the notion of striking according to their own traditions, and differ with 
respect of the legal status recognized to the right to strike.57 F. FABBRINI has identified, in this 
respect, four discrete models that prevail among the Member States of the European Union.58 
First, a model of “enhanced protection” of the right to strike, which characterizes, for instance, 
France and Italy. It bestows much discretion on employees and trade unions, and is built upon 
“solid constitutional foundations.” Second, in the Nordic countries, the right to strike is also 
protected at the constitutional level. Social partners play a defining role, in particular through 
collective agreements. Third, under the model embodied by Germany, the right to strike is not 
formally protected by the constitution. It is subject to numerous limitations, including the 
                                                 
54 T. NOVITZ, International and European protection of the right to strike: A comparative study of standards set by the 
International Labor Organization, the Council of Europe and the European Union, (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 39, 49s. 
55 Ibid., 65s. 
56 Ibid., 57: “[T]he adjective ‘political’ can be used to describe actions taken by reason of ideological convictions 
relating to the achievement of social justice.” 
57 i.e. Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Czech Republic and Malta 
(EUROPEAN TRADE UNION INSTITUTE, Fundamental Social Rights in the European Union. Comparative tables and 
documents, Brussels, 2003 at 29 & 33). 
58 F. FABBRINI, “Europe in need of a New Deal. On federalism, free market and the right to strike,” available from 
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proportionality requirement enforced by national courts, and is generally seen as a right of the 
trade unions rather than as an individual right. Finally, the United Kingdom represents the 
most restrictive model. Striking is not considered as a right, but instead as a statutory freedom. 
2. The nonexistent or limited character of EU jurisdiction 
53. In addition to being constitutive components of national autonomy, the various fields 
analyzed herein are areas where the European Union has no, or very limited, jurisdiction. The 
(quasi)-absence of European Union powers stems from both explicit and implicit exclusions. 
The former consist of Treaty provisions, which explicitly preclude the European legislator from 
harmonizing national regulations and/or policies. With respect to the latter, they derive from 
fundamental principles of European Union constitutional law. The purpose of the following 
paragraphs is twofold. They identify the nature of European Union action in each of the fields 
analyzed herein by distinguishing when they are subject to express Treaty exclusions, when the 
Treaty is silent or, alternatively, when there are no formal constitutional exclusions. In 
addition, they aim to review the current state of development of European Union acts of 
secondary legislation in each field. All in all, four cross-categories may be drawn: (a) express 
exclusions and absence of acts of secondary legislation; (b) silence of the Treaty and absence of 
acts of secondary legislation; (c) express exclusions but the existence of acts of secondary 
legislation; (d) no formal exclusion but the quasi-inexistence of acts of secondary legislation. 
54. Express exclusions and absence of acts of secondary legislation. The first category corresponds 
to fields where European Union action is explicitly excluded and for which no act of secondary 
legislation has been adopted. It comprises two of the fields analyzed herein, namely nationality 
and social rights. 
55. Matters relating to nationality are, in the European Union legal order, intrinsically 
linked to European Union citizenship, as evidenced by Article 20§1 TFUE: 
Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a 
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional 
to and not replace national citizenship. 
This provision was originally introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, together with a Declaration, 
according to which: 
[…] whenever in the Treaty establishing the European Community reference is made to 
nationals of the Member States, the question whether an individual possesses the 
nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely by reference to the national law of the 
Ch. 1. Section 1. Identification of the fields concerned by the power-based approach 47 
Member State concerned. Member States may declare, for information, who are to be 
considered their nationals for Community purposes by way of a declaration when 
necessary.59 
It results from both Article 20§1 TFEU and the Declaration that European Union citizenship 
is conditional upon national citizenship, and thus on the holding of the nationality of at least 
one Member State. This means that Member States have exclusive jurisdiction to set out the 
rules on nationality. As C. CLOSA points it out, European Union citizenship “has not 
superseded the preponderance of the concept of nationality of each Member State.”60 In this 
respect, the Declaration reaffirmed that nationality falls within the powers of Member States 
“by confirming that questions of nationality should be settled solely with reference to the 
national law of the Member State concerned.”61 This express exclusion of European Union 
action in matters relating to nationality is coupled with the absence of any act of secondary 
legislation in the field. 
56. The same holds true for the right to strike. It is expressly excluded from the sphere of 
European Union social policy powers. Article 153§5 TFEU, after enumerating the fields in 
which the European Union may exercise its complementary powers, stresses that: 
The provisions of this Article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to 
strike or the right to impose lock-outs. 
The fact that the Charter of Fundamental Rights recognizes the rights of collective bargaining 
and action in its Article 2862 does not have the effect of granting new powers to the European 
Union.63 It should be noted, however, that the European Commission has recently issued a 
                                                 
59 Declaration 2 Annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht. 
60 C. CLOSA, “The concept of Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union,” 29 CMLR 1137 (1992). 
61 S. O’LEARY, The evolving concept of Community Citizenship: From the free movement of persons to Union Citizenship, 
above, n. 4, 64. See also C. CLOSA, “The concept of Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union,” above, n. 60, 
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alia, C. CLOSA, “Citizenship of the Union and Nationality of Member States,” in Legal Issues of the Maastricht 
Treaty, (Eds.) D. O’KEEFE and P. M. TWOMEY, (London: Chancery Law Publishing, 1994), 109-119; K. 
HAILBRONNER, “Nationality in public international law and European law,” above, n. 4, 89s. 
62 Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: “Workers and employers, or their respective organizations, 
have, in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective 
agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their 
interests, including strike action.” 
63 Article 51§2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: “The Charter does not extend the field of application of 
Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers 
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Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within 
the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services.64 Since the 
Viking and Laval rulings65 have raised very controversial debates, this Proposal aims to clarify the 
interactions between fundamental social rights and the exercise of the freedom of establishment 
and to provide services. The proposed Regulation would be based on Article 352 TFEU, the so-
called flexibility clause. Nonetheless, its eventual adoption appears very uncertain: for the first 
time, twelve national Parliaments and Chambers have triggered the ‘yellow card mechanism’ 
after finding that such an adoption would breach the subsidiarity principle. The right to strike 
therefore remains within the hands of the Member States.66 
57. Silence of the Treaty and absence of acts of secondary legislation. The second category 
comprises the rules governing surnames, the rules governing the enforcement for the recovery of debts 
and the rules governing the compensation of civil war victims. In contrast to the previous category, 
the Treaty does not provide express exclusions; it is simply silent on these issues. In accordance 
with the conferral principle,67 it follows that the European Union does not hold regulatory and 
policy powers in these fields. In addition, it is also to be noted that no act of secondary 
legislation has been – up to now – adopted. Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social 
security systems even expressly excludes matters relating to the compensation of civil war 
victims from its material scope of application.68 
58. Express exclusion but existence of acts of secondary legislation. The first two categories follow 
the basic principles of European Union constitutional law: no express Treaty empowerment, no 
act of secondary legislation – even though this affirmation must be somehow mitigated as far as 
the right to strike is concerned. Things are somewhat more problematic when it comes to the 
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March 2012. 
65 Case C-438/05, Viking, [2007] ECR I-0779; Case C-341/05, Laval, [2007] ECR I-11767. 
66 But see, Infra, §§ 288s. 
67 Article 5§2 TFEU. 
68 Article 3§5 of Regulation 883/2004: “This Regulation shall not apply to social and medical assistance or to 
benefit schemes for victims of war or its consequences.” 
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third category, which consists of education and social security. Here, European Union action is 
not, strictly speaking, completely excluded. However, the powers of the European Union in 
these two fields are merely complementary.69 The Treaty expressly excludes harmonization, and 
it moreover contains provisions precluding the European Union from taking actions that could 
affect the core of national educational and health care policies. However, the European 
legislator has adopted acts of secondary legislation, which have direct or indirect effects on 
these fields. 
59. Until the Treaty of Maastricht, the treaties did not mention the term education. 
Together with the conferral principle, this should have meant that this field was reserved for 
the Member States to the exclusion of the Community.70 Nevertheless, the latter adopted 
several acts of secondary legislation having indirect effects on national educational policies 
and/or tending towards the building of a common educational policy.71 The Community used 
three main provisions as legal bases. First, Regulation 1612/68 on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Community was based on what is now Article 46 TFEU. It consisted of two 
provisions, which specifically concern education. Under Article 7(3), any Community worker is 
entitled “by virtue of the same right and under the same conditions as national worker [to have] 
access to training in vocational schools and retaining centers.” Article 12 grants Community 
workers’ children the right “to be admitted to [the State of residence] general educational, 
apprenticeship and vocational training courses under the same conditions as the nationals of 
that State.” This provision of the Regulation was challenged on the grounds that the 
Community had infringed on Member States’ powers in the field of education. In Casagrande,72 
the Court considered that the Community was entitled to take all measures necessary to give 
full meaning to the free movement principle. It justified the effects induced by the Regulation 
on national educational policies by the fact that, to be effective, the free movement of workers 
                                                 
69 On the notion of complementary powers, see, generally, R. SCHÜTZE, “Cooperative federalism 
constitutionalized: the emergence of complementary competences in the EC legal order,” 31: 2 Eur. Law Rev. 167-
184 (2006). 
70 K. LENAERTS, “Education in European Community law after ‘Maastricht’,” 31: 1 CMLR 7, 9 (1994); D. 
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Intersentia; Oxford, 2011), 149; A. P. VAN DER MEI, Free movement of persons within the Community: Cross-border 
access to public benefits, above, n. 34, 341. 
71 K. LENAERTS, “Education in European Community law after ‘Maastricht’,” above, n. 70, 10; A. P. VAN DER MEI, 
Free movement of persons within the Community: cross-border access to public benefits, above, n. 34, 340s. 
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required granting workers and their family members equal access to education. Allowing 
Member States to set out discriminatory criteria with respect to access to their education 
systems would otherwise deter workers from leaving their State of origin. Secondly, on the basis 
of Article 57(1) EEC – now Article 53 TFEU – the Community issued numerous directives for 
the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications. 
Several authors have shown that this led to “incursions in the Member States educational 
policies.”73 Finally, the Community also made use of Article 128 EEC to adopt acts that paved 
the way for the establishment of a common educational policy. This provision specifically 
concerned vocational training: 
The Council shall, acting on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee, lay down general principles for implementing a common 
vocational training policy capable of contributing to the harmonious development both of 
the national economies and of the common market. 
In Gravier, the Court referred to this provision to give a broad interpretation of the notion of 
vocational training, and to conclude that the conditions of access to vocational training fell 
within the scope of the Treaty.74 In the Erasmus case, the Court inferred from its previous case 
law that Article 128 EEC entitled the Council “to adopt legal measures providing for 
Community action in the sphere of vocational training and imposing corresponding obligations 
of cooperation on the Member States.”75 It thus recognized that this provision granted a 
regulatory power to the Community in the field of education.  
60. As noted by A. P. VAN DER MEI, “[w]ithin a relatively short time a European vocational 
training policy was established.”76 These various developments gave rise to substantial criticisms. 
Some Member States in particular feared that Community action would ultimately undermine 
their regulatory and policy autonomy in the field of education.77 This explains why the 
Maastricht Treaty brought important changes, which aimed to delineate more precisely between 
Community and national powers. First, it added to the Community’s objectives the 
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“contribution to education and training of quality”78 – this objective is however no longer 
among the EU objectives since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. Second, and maybe more 
importantly, the Maastricht Treaty replaced Article 128 EEC by Articles 126 and 127 EC – now 
Articles 165 and 166 TFEU – and inserted them into a Title called ‘Education, vocational 
training and youth’ – now Title XII ‘Education, vocational training, youth and sport’. Article 
165 TFEU concerns general education while Article 166 TFEU deals more specifically with 
vocational training. They both explicitly confer powers on the European Union in the field of 
education.79 However, these powers are limited in nature: they are complementary and 
supplementary, which means that the Union can only support and supplement Member State 
action,80 and that harmonization in the field of general education and vocational training is 
excluded.81 The Treaty moreover stresses that the European Union must fully respect “the 
responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organization of 
education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity/for the content and organization of 
vocational training.”82  As noted by M. DOUGAN, “the Maastricht reforms have been widely 
interpreted as a deliberate attempt by the Member States to curtail the Community’s ambitions 
in the field of education.”83 However, these reforms did not adversely affect the acquis 
communautaire that was built up before Maastricht. They quite had a reverse effect: 
The new Articles 126 and 127 EC consolidate the acquis communautaire with regard to 
educational and vocational-training policy by introducing a legally certain, constitutional 
basis for that policy and democratizing the relevant decision-making procedures.84 
In addition, the European Union can still base acts of secondary legislation on Articles 46 and 
53 TFEU to adopt educational measures necessary for the free movement of workers and the 
mutual recognition of diplomas. Similarly, the adoption of harmonizing measures under 
Articles 115, 116, or 352 TFEU may also have indirect effects on national educational 
                                                 
78 Article 3(p). 
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policies.85 Therefore, the express exclusions provided by the Treaty are not tantamount to 
absolute exclusions, since the European Union may adopt acts of secondary legislation that 
have indirect effects on national educational policies.86 
61. The sphere of health care, which forms part of national social security policies, has 
known developments that are similar, in several respects, to those of education. Until 
Maastricht, the Treaty of Rome did not confer specific powers on the Community in the field 
of public health.87 However, here again, “it was recognized from an early stage that Community 
law and policy could impact upon health(-related) issues in a variety of ways.”88 This led the 
Community to adopt a variety of acts in the realm of health. For instance, directives for the 
mutual recognition of diplomas were adopted to harmonize diplomas held by “health 
professionals, such as general practitioners, pharmacists and nurses.”89 The pursuance of 
Community policies such as consumer policy, environmental policy, and social policy also 
resulted in having indirect effects on national public health policies.90 Another example lies in 
the joint interpretation of Article 2 EEC, which included in the Community’s objectives the 
aim of “raising the standard of living,” and Article 235 EEC. It indeed gave rise to the adoption 
of the Europe against Cancer program in 1989 or the Europe against AIDS program in 1991.91 
In addition, some of the acts that were enacted during the pre-Maastricht period directly 
concerned the fields of social security and cross-border health care.  
62. The Community adopted Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72 on the coordination of 
social security systems. It chose as a legal basis what is now Article 48 TFEU, which entitles the 
European legislator to “adopt such measures in the field of social security as are necessary to 
provide freedom of movement for workers.” Regulation 1408/71 sets out the main rules of 
coordination while Regulation 574/72 comprises provisions on the practical implementation of 
Regulation 1408/71. As R. CORNELISSEN pointed out: 
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They do not seek to harmonize but only to coordinate the national social security systems. 
[…] they in no way affect the freedom of Member States to determine the rules of their own 
social security systems. The Member States are, in principle, completely free to decide who 
is to be insured, what benefits should be granted and under what conditions, how many 
contributions should be paid, how benefits should be calculated and for how long they 
should be granted. The Regulations, therefore, do not affect the distinctive features of the 
various national schemes.92 
Since then, Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009 have replaced Regulations 1408/71 and 
574/72 respectively, but the original underlying logic of the system of coordination has 
remained the same. They all aim to coordinate the granting of various benefits to workers and 
self-employed persons, such as the award, calculation and payment of pensions, unemployment 
benefits, family benefits and cross-border health care.93 Regarding the latter, Regulation 
883/2004 provides two distinct coordination mechanisms. First, Article 1994 gives persons who 
fall within the scope of the Regulation “from one Member State access to emergency medical 
treatment during a stay – for whatever purpose – in the territory of another Member State.”95 In 
this case, the institution of stay applies its own legislation, while the institution of affiliation 
bears the costs.96 Second, Article 2097 sets up a planned care mechanism in order to coordinate 
national rules in situations where patients go to other Member States for the specific purpose to 
receiving treatment at the expense of their home institutions. According to this provision, 
patients must first be granted a prior authorization and this authorization “shall be accorded 
where the treatment in question is among the benefits provided for by the legislation in the 
Member State where the person concerned resides and where he cannot be given such 
treatment within a time-limit which is medically justifiable, taking into account his current state 
of health and the probable course of his illness.”98 As a result, this provision gives a broad 
discretionary power to the institutions of affiliation since, in all other cases, they may refuse to 
grant authorizations.99  
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63. Despite the adoption of these various acts of secondary legislation, the fact remains that 
the European Union “does not have competence to develop a harmonized European-level 
public health policy.”100 This idea is reflected in the subsequent amendments of the Treaty. The 
Treaty of Maastricht introduced Article 129 EC, the first “explicit legal basis provision for 
health,”101 according to which the Community “shall contribute towards a high level of human 
health protection by encouraging cooperation between Member States, and, if necessary, 
lending support to their action” and “health protection requirements shall form a constituent 
part of the Community’s other policies.” In a similar way to what took place in the education 
field, Article 129 EC excluded harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member 
States.102 Therefore, the Community public health power that was established was limited in 
character since it was, once again, complementary.103 This was confirmed by the Amsterdam 
Treaty, which amended Article 129 and renumbered it Article 152. The latter contains detailed 
provisions on the role of the European Union with respect to public health.104 The Lisbon 
Treaty in turn renumbered it to Article 168 TFEU. It brought some slight changes to Article 
152, but conserved its structure and most important features by reaffirming the complementary 
character of European Union powers. Harmonization is still excluded and the European 
legislator may only take incentive measures. In addition, it states that: 
Union action shall respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of 
their health policy and for the organization and delivery of health services and medical 
care. The responsibilities of the Member States shall include the management of health 
services and medical care and the allocation of the resources assigned to them.105 
As noted by A. VAN DER MEI & L. WADDINGTON, this provision “reflects the reluctance of the 
Member States to allow the Community and its institutions to intervene in the organization 
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and financing of health care systems which they have always regarded as being within their 
exclusive domain.”106  
64. The picture would not be complete without mention of the Directive on the application 
of patients’ rights, which concerns, to a large extent, cross-border health care.107 This act of 
secondary legislation is inspired, for the most part, by the European Court of Justice case law 
on cross-border health care. It sets out rules on planned care that differ from those of 
Regulation 883/2004. Broadly speaking, it entitles patients to seek health care abroad without 
authorization, provided that care is received outside a hospital environment. As far as treatment 
in a hospital environment is concerned, it imposes limitations upon the discretionary power of 
Member States with respect to the granting of prior authorizations. The adoption of this 
Directive sparked much debate. Member States feared it would result in the undermining of 
their powers and jeopardize their regulatory and policy autonomy in the field of social security 
– not to mention the substantial financial implications that it might imply. Furthermore, some 
European Parliament Members were of the view that Article 114 TFEU (ex-Article 95 EC), the 
legal basis for adopting measures having as their object the establishment and functioning of 
the internal marker, was not appropriate.108 In light of these various concerns, it was decided to 
base the Directive on both Article 114 TFEU and Article 168 TFEU “which was said to strike a 
balance between the application of internal market law to health care services and the 
competences of the Member States for the organization and provision of health care 
services.”109 In view of the foregoing, it can be said that the Treaty grants only very limited 
powers to the European Union in the field of social security, since it expressly excludes 
harmonization in matters concerning public health and contains a specific clause preserving 
Member States’ powers. However, this has not precluded the European legislator from adopting 
several acts of secondary legislation, which primarily concern cross-border health care. 
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65. No formal exclusion but the quasi-inexistence of acts of secondary legislation. Direct taxation falls 
within the fourth category. This case is peculiar because the Treaty theoretically confers powers 
on the European Union in this field, but, in practice, Member States retain quasi-exclusive 
jurisdiction.110 There is no specific provision dealing with direct taxation; “positive 
harmonization therefore depends on the general harmonization provisions of Articles 114 and 
115 [TFEU].”111 Article 114§2 TFEU, which provides for qualified majority decisions, however 
expressly excludes direct taxation from its scope of application. As a result, any harmonization 
measure in this field must be based on Article 115 TFEU, which reads as follows: 
Without prejudice to Article 114, the Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance 
with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the internal market. 
Accordingly, European Union action in the field of direct taxation is subject to the unanimity 
rule. It may moreover only take the form of directives, to the exclusion of regulations, and 
harmonize national measures that directly affect the establishment or functioning of the 
internal market.112 The unanimity rule can be described as a ‘constitutional constraint.’ It has 
indeed had a paralyzing effect on the European Union decision-making process since any 
Member State can back out from the negotiation table at any time, thereby compelling the 
others to abandon the harmonizing project. This explains why, despite the many proposals 
issued by the European Commission, only four direct-tax directives have to date been adopted 
on the basis of Article 115 TFEU: Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the 
common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of 
different Member States (the Parent-Subsidiary Directive),113 Council Directive 90/434/EEC 
on the common system of taxation application to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and 
exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member States (the Tax Merger 
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Directive),114 Council Directive 2003/49/EC on a common system of taxation applicable to 
interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States 
(the Interest and Royalty Directive),115 and Council Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of 
savings income in the form of interest payments (the Saving Interests Directive).116 
66. All in all, the foregoing shows that European Union action in the various fields 
analyzed herein is weak, because these fields are areas where the European Union holds 
limited, if not nonexistent, jurisdiction. However, this does not mean that European Union law 
intrusions into national spheres of powers are completely excluded. An important range of 
European Union acts of secondary legislation that have been, or may be, adopted, affects 
significant fields. However, notwithstanding the existence of these undeniable effects, Member 
States remain principally responsible for governing and managing these fields from legal, 
political and budgetary perspectives. To conclude, as A. DASHWOOD has pointed it out, “it is 
made crystal clear that the power conferred [on the European Union] are ancillary to national 
powers.”117 
3. Boundary-based powers 
67. The closure principle. A final feature ties up the fields analyzed herein. Taken together, 
these areas turn out to relate to powers that do not only fall within the ambit of the Member 
States, but that also encompass national policies built upon the same basic principle: the 
principle of closure. From a legal perspective, this means that the territorial and personal scopes 
of these policies are strictly circumscribed. Put differently, the exercise of what the Court of 
Justice deems as the powers retained by Member States is based on legal criteria of inclusion 
and exclusion that are usually laid down by the Member States in a discretionary manner. 
Admittedly, Member States enjoy little freedom with respect to criteria of a territorial nature, 
since they cannot exercise their powers beyond their geographical borders without infringing 
upon the sovereignty of other states. Similarly, Member States are also constrained with respect 
to the setting of personal criteria since they cannot, theoretically, attach extraterritorial effects 
to the exercise of their powers. But they nonetheless enjoy wide discretion, to the extent that 
they may decide who, within their territorial borders, is subject to their policies – and they may 
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in particular draw important distinctions such as those between nationals and non-nationals, or 
residents and nonresidents. As a result, in these fields, the scope of Member States’ powers is 
confined to a geographical space, and applies to limited categories of persons. The geographical 
space generally corresponds to the territory of each state. The personal scope is less easily 
identifiable because states may base conditions of access on multiple conditions, ranging from 
nationality, residence, age, to conditions of resources, and so on. 
68. Boundaries. If the fields analyzed herein were only characterized by the principle of 
closure, the corresponding powers would ultimately not fundamentally differ from other 
national powers. The exercise of any national power is, after all, constrained, to the extent that 
it may not impinge upon the sovereignty of another state. But what essentially distinguishes 
powers concerned by the Court of Justice power-based approach from the powers involved in 
traditional free movement cases is that the preservation of their internal coherence, and, 
therefore, of their existence is consubstantial with Member States’ capacity to impose inclusion 
and exclusion rules or, in other words, to erect territorial and membership boundaries.118 
Territorial boundaries refer to the territorial scope, while membership boundaries pertain to 
the personal scope. The notion of boundaries can be understood as follows: 
Boundaries are sets of norms and rules that define the type and level of closure of a given 
collectivity vis-à-vis the exterior, gating access to the resources and opportunities of both the 
in-space and the out-space, and facilitating bonding dynamics among insiders.119 
In this respect, a distinction must be drawn between the territorial and membership boundaries 
that are essential to the survival of the state as political entity, and those that are crucial for the 
development and maintaining of the activities of the welfare state. 
69. The state as political entity – Nationality. The very essence of nationality policy is to 
distinguish between nationals and non-nationals, and therefore to identify who is to be 
included into or excluded from a closed community. The main purpose of nationality policy is 
accordingly to set up boundaries. In this respect, nationality laws consist almost exclusively of 
inclusion and exclusion rules. Consequently, suppressing boundaries in this field would simply 
render the concept of nationality meaningless. Without going that far, a redrawing of 
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boundaries has in any case the effect of substantially altering the understanding that was 
originally given to this concept. The important reform introduced by Germany in 2000 is a 
good illustration. Previously, German nationality policy was primarily based on the jus sanguini 
principle. This meant, among other things, that children of immigrants had the nationality of 
their parents, even though all resided on the German territory. The 2000 reform brought 
substantial changes into German law. Paragraph 4 of the law introduced for the first time the 
jus soli principle: “Children of a foreign parent acquire German citizenship under the condition 
that one parent has had a lawful residence in Germany for eight years and that he or she is in 
possession of a secure residence permit.”120 This reform sparked arduous debates in Germany 
because it basically introduced a new mode of acquisition of nationality, no longer exclusively 
reserved to German descendants.121 As a result, it had the effect of substantially broadening the 
scope of German inclusion rules with respect to nationality. 
70. The state as political entity – Direct taxation, enforcement for the recovery of debts, and rules 
governing surnames. The powers relating to the fields of direct taxation, enforcement for the 
recovery of debts, and rules governing surnames do not exclusively consist in setting out 
inclusion and exclusion rules, but this specific category of rules nonetheless carry out a 
fundamental function of closure. Rules concerning the enforcement for the recovery of debt are 
indeed primarily based on the principle whereby state’s power of execution of the laws is 
absolute inside and nil outside its borders. Direct taxation policies are another good example of 
closed systems. Direct taxation rules set out a great variety of mechanisms relating to the 
taxation of individuals, corporations, capital, and property. Such mechanisms however only 
apply to certain categories of taxpayers and revenue. In this respect, states may adopt unilateral 
laws to define these categories. They can follow two main principles. First, the principle of 
territoriality, under which states only impose income earned within their territory. Second, the 
principle according to which tax is imposed on taxpayers’ worldwide income. The concurrent 
adoption of unilateral rules yet often leads to phenomena of double taxation: the parallel 
exercise of two fiscal sovereignties may result in a taxpayer or revenue to be imposed twice. 
Together with the necessity to prevent tax evasion, this explains why states often conclude 
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bilateral tax agreements, which aim to coordinate and allocate national tax jurisdictions. 
Inclusion and exclusion rules again play a crucial role with respect to the fundamental purposes 
of taxation policies – i.e. raising government revenue and conducting redistributive policies 
based on social justice principles. Therefore, their redrawing may have two intertwined 
implications. It may undermine, or at least reshape, their internal coherence, which may 
ultimately lead to substantial reductions of income. As for the rules governing surnames, they 
are also based on inclusion and exclusion rules. They aim to identify persons who live on the 
same territory according to the same standards. In case of conflict of laws, most Member States 
apply individuals’ personal laws provided that the latter are not at odds with their public order. 
They may therefore exclude the application of any rule that does not meet minimum standards, 
which themselves reflect national policy choices. 
71. The state as welfare state. Welfare policies are also primarily built upon inclusion and 
exclusion rules. As noted by M. FERRERA, 
The welfare state is definitely a geographical space, with a recognizable territorial scope 
demarcated by administrative borders. But at the same time it is a membership space or, 
more precisely, a bundle of membership spaces.122 
Educational and health care systems, for instance, operate on a territorial basis, and only 
residents can have access to educational and health care facilities under equal conditions. As a 
result, in most Member States, nonresident students do not have the same rights as resident 
students with respect to tuition fees and/or financial support. Similarly, national social security 
schemes exclude from their scope any patient who is not affiliated, generally nonresident 
patients. In addition, they impose very strict conditions on affiliated patients who seek health 
care abroad. Inclusion and exclusion rules are crucial for the preservation of the internal 
coherence of these two closed systems. Two main reasons may be put forward. First, the 
                                                 
122 M. FERRERA, The boundaries of welfare: European integration and the new spatial politics of social protection, above, n. 
119, 6. See also F. W. SCHARPF, “Negative and positive integration in the political economy of European welfare 
states,” in Governance in the European Union, (Eds.) G. Marks et al, (London: Sage, 1996) 16, who insists on the 
importance of boundaries: “In the history of capitalism, the decades following the Second World War were 
unusual in the degree to which the boundaries of the territorial state had become coextensive with the boundaries 
of markets for capital, services, goods and labor. (…) since all effective competitors could be, and were, required to 
produce under the same regimes, the costs of regulation could be passed on to consumers. Hence the rate of 
return on investment was not necessarily affected by high levels of regulation and union power; capitalist 
accumulation was as feasible in the union-dominated Swedish welfare state as it was in the American free 
enterprise system. During this period, therefore, the industrial nations of Western Europe had the chance to 
develop specifically national versions of the capitalist welfare state. (…) It was not fully realized at the time, 
however, how much the success of market-correcting policies did in fact depend on the capacity of the territorial 
state to control its economic boundaries.” 
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existence of boundaries is essential for the financial sustainability of educational and health 
care policies. As seen earlier, the latter involve tremendous financial investments for each 
Member State. Their functioning moreover requires capacity planning. Consequently, it is 
technically impossible to offer a wider or unlimited access without imposing extra-financial 
burdens on the Member States and/or on students/students’ families and patients. Second, the 
fields of education and health care, like the other components of the welfare state, are 
institutionalized forms of solidarity, “serving both efficiency and social justice objectives.”123 
These two policies are indeed primarily based on redistribution mechanisms and provide 
students and patients with services well below their actual costs. In Europe, solidarity operates 
within closed communities and, as M. FERRERA points out, “[t]he establishment of 
redistributive arrangements played a crucial role in stabilizing the new form of political 
organization (the nation state) that gradually emerged in modern Europe.”124 Consequently, the 
redrawing of welfare boundaries may have the effect of altering the bonds that exist between a 
state and its community made of nationals and residents. It may also allow the entry of free 
riders who are not linked in any way with the state providing welfare benefits into redistributive 
schemes, and who moreover do not financially contribute to these schemes. Therefore, 
inclusion and exclusion rules are legal expressions of the principle of solidarity that binds a 
state to its population. The same logic of closure underlies the rules relating to the 
compensation of civil war victims, which relate to redistributive arrangements based on 
solidarity. Their scope is restricted to the nationals of a state who have suffered from a conflict 
internal to that state, and their conditions of application greatly depend on the state’s own 
historical past. The same holds true, finally, as far as national labor laws regulating the right to 
strike are concerned. Their spatial scope of application is indeed limited to the territory of a 
state, and their personal scope applies only to resident workers and employers. All in all, it 
appears that the various powers relating to the fields analyzed herein all share the following 
feature: their internal coherence and ultimately their very existence stem from, and are 
determined by, the principle of closure, together with the erection of boundaries. 
                                                 
123 M. FERRERA, The boundaries of welfare: European integration and the new spatial politics of social protection, above, n. 
119, 45. 
124 Ibid. See also J. HALFMANN “Welfare State and Territory,” in Immigration and Welfare: Challenging the Borders of 
the Welfare State, (Eds.) M. BOMMES & A. GEDDES, (London: Routledge, 2000). 
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72. The notion of powers retained by Member States. Several points may be drawn from the 
above. It appears, first of all, that the various fields analyzed herein are heterogeneous with 
respect to their substantive scopes. They cover very different subject matters, and they reflect 
the various key-policy choices made and implemented by Member States, depending on their 
own national traditions and interests.  
73. But, second of all, they also share a fundamental feature, pertaining to the fact that they 
all relate, in one way or another, to what are commonly considered as the ‘essential functions of 
the state,’125 or, in other words, to what allows Member States to be described as states. They 
pertain to either political functions that are crucial attributes of the nation-state, or social 
functions that are core parts of the activities of the welfare state. With respect to the latter, the 
various scholars who study the logic of the welfare state agree upon the fact that, today, the 
providing of welfare has become an essential feature of European states. In this regard, G. 
ESPING-ANDERSEN has noted that the welfare state “is a unique historical construction, an 
explicit redefinition of what the state is all about,”126 after stating that “[i]ts promise was not 
merely social policy to alleviate social ills and redistribute basic risks, but an effort to rewrite the 
social contract between government and the citizenry.”127 In other words: 
The European nation state has typically become a welfare state; the social components of 
citizenship are no less important than its civil and political components; the right to decide 
about the forms and substance of social citizenship in its turn has come to be considered a 
crucial aspect of national sovereignty.128 
Ultimately, it may be said that the various fields analyzed herein are part of what the Member 
States consider their constitutional identities.129 As a result, the application of European Union 
law in these fields raises significant issues, which relate to the risk of undermining core 
                                                 
125 Article 4§2 EU. 
126 G. ESPING-ANDERSEN, Social foundations of postindustrial economies, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
34. 
127 Ibid., 33. 
128 M. FERRERA, The boundaries of welfare: European integration and the new spatial politics of social protection, above, n. 
119, 11. Similarly, J. HALFMANN “Welfare State and Territory,” above, n. 124, 40 has shown that there exists a 
close link between nation states, citizenship and welfare state: “[s]tates had to make legal, financial and political 
‘investments’ in their populations to transform them into citizens. It is in this climate that the welfare state and the 
nation state provided solutions to the problem of identifying and binding individuals to the territorial state.” See 
also M. DOUGAN, “The spatial restructuring of national welfare States within the European Union: The 
contribution of Union citizenship and the relevance of the Treaty of Lisbon,” in (Eds.) R. NIELSEN et al., Integrating 
Welfare Functions into EU Law: From Rome to Lisbon, (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2009), 148, 154. 
129 A. ILIOPOULOU, “Entrave et citoyenneté de l’Union,” in L’entrave dans le droit du marché intérieur, (Ed.) L. 
AZOULAI, (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2011), 201, who refers to the Decision of 30 June 2009 of the German 
Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty.  
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components of Member States’ political and social autonomy. In other words, when the Court 
of Justice is called upon to rule on cases involving the powers that it deems ‘retained’ through 
the statement of its formulae, it faces peculiar and sensitive issues, absent from most of 
traditional free movement cases. This may at least partly explain why the Court singles out 
these powers, and gathers them under the denomination of ‘retained powers.’ This indeed 
seems to be the step preceding their subjection to the specific legal framework that I identify in 
Section 2 as well as in Chapters 2 and 3.  
74. Last but not least, it should be noted that the category of the powers retained by 
Member States, as identified above, far from being immutable, constitutes an open box. It 
evolves in line with the case law of the Court of Justice. The Court has indeed gradually 
extended it over time,130 which means that it may be inclined to subject new fields to its power-
based approach in the future. In other words, the notion of powers retained by Member States 
is not best, and even cannot be, captured by a rigidly abstract and theoretical definition. 
Instead, it should rather be viewed as encompassing what the Court of Justice itself refers to as 
being powers retained by Member States. 
75. But, notwithstanding the empirical dimension of the concept of retained powers, it is 
nonetheless possible to draw a pattern, which identifies which powers are likely to fall within 
this category. The Court indeed seems to subject to its power-based approach national powers 
that fulfill the following criteria: being a constitutive component of Member State autonomy 
over which the European Union has no, or very limited, jurisdiction, and the sustainability and 
viability of which depends on the existence of boundaries. 
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SECTION 2. THE CENTRALITY OF THE NOTION OF POWER IN THE ECJ REASONING 
76. This second section reviews the overall reasoning developed by the Court of Justice in 
free movement cases involving powers retained by Member States. Its purpose is to show that, 
in contrast to traditional free movement cases, its reasoning largely centers on the structural 
notion of power. This is evidenced by the fact that the Court distinguishes between national 
and European spheres of powers, which ultimately prompts it to play a coordinating role as far 
as these spheres are concerned.  
77. To this end, I start by identifying the components of the Court of Justice reasoning that 
are in line with its traditional approach. I then single out the varying factors, and I finally shed 
light on the resulting implications. 
1. The elements of continuity 
78. The same general legal framework. To begin with, the Court of Justice, while resorting to 
the power-based approach, does not operate a sharp break from its traditional rulings. Cases 
involving powers retained by Member States, just like any other free movement ruling, are 
divided into three main steps of reasoning: applicability, restriction and justification.1 
Therefore, whether the Court is dealing with the fields analyzed herein or not, it structures its 
reasoning according to the same overarching structure. The variations that characterize the free 
movement cases involving retained powers are thus to be found inside each traditional step of 
the Court of Justice reasoning. In addition, the Court takes as a starting point of the rulings 
involving powers retained by Member States the acquis already well established in its traditional 
free movement cases. It refers to the traditional definitions and scopes of both the four 
fundamental freedoms and European Union citizenship,2 which it has gradually built up in its 
                                                 
1 See Supra, § 20. 
2 See, inter alia, on the free movement of goods: Case C-120/95, Decker, [1998] ECR I-1831, 31 and its reference to 
Case 8/74, Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837; on the free movement of services: Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits & 
Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473, 53s; Case C-9/11, Waypoint Aviation, [2011] ECR I-9697, 21; Case C-281/06, Jundt, 
[2007] ECR I-12231, 28s; Case C-341/05, Laval, [2007] ECR I-11767, 56; on the freedom of establishment: Joint 
Cases 171 & 172/07, Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others, [2009] ECR I-4171, 22; Case C-418/07, Papillon, 
[2008] ECR I-8947, 15; on European Union citizenship: Case C-208/09, Wittgenstein, [2010] ECR I-13693, 53; 
Case C-135/08, Rottmann, [2010] ECR I-1449, 43-44; Case C-224/02, Pusa, [2004] ECR I-5763, 16s, and Case C-
73/08, Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735, 30s. 
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previous case law by interpreting the Treaty provisions from a teleological perspective.3 As is 
well known, this approach consists in interpreting the Treaty provisions in light of the 
objectives assigned to the European Union by the Treaties. In other words, “the Court of 
Justice considers the position of the rule and tries to determine its objective in the general 
scheme and system of the Treaty and of the chapter to which it belongs.”4 
79. Effects at least partially identical. It stems from the above that the Court’s power-based 
approach borrows some of its fundamental features from the Court’s traditional free movement 
rulings. It should thus be expected, as a result, that the effects of the rulings involving powers 
retained by Member States are at least partially identical to those of the Court’s traditional free 
movement cases. In particular, cases involving retained powers also revolve, to a substantial 
extent, around the recognition of individual rights: the Court has gradually granted taxpayers, 
patients, students, and European citizens specific rights pertaining respectively to taxation, 
social security, higher education, and matters relating to the free movement of the citizens of 
the European Union. This shows that the Court of Justice is just as keen as in its traditional 
cases to construct direct bonds between individuals and the European Union legal order, which 
has the ultimate effect of creating a legitimizing factor for European Union law and for the 
Court itself. 
2. The varying factors 
80. A reasoning centering on the notion of power. The Court, when faced with powers 
considered as retained by Member States, does not fundamentally depart from its traditional 
reasoning. On the contrary, it sticks to its overarching structure while at the same time altering 
some of its defining features. These variations all relate to the importance that the Court gives 
to the notion of power throughout its reasoning, coupled with the distinction drawn between 
the existence and the exercise of national powers, which pertains to the two fundamental 
dimensions of the notion of power. Before going into further details, it is necessary to define 
                                                 
3 On the Court’s teleological approach, see, for instance, R. MONACO, “Les principes d’interprétation suivis par la 
Court de justice des Communautés européennes,” in Mélanges offerts à Henri Rolin - Problèmes de droit des gens, (Paris: 
Pedone, 1964), 217, and P. PESCATORE, “Les objectifs de la Communauté européenne comme principes 
d’interprétation dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice. Contribution à la doctrine de l’interprétation 
téléologique des traités internationaux,” in Études de droit communautaire européen 1962-2007, (Coll. Droit de l’UE, 
Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2008), 385-386. 
4 P. LELEUX, “The role of the European Court of Justice in protecting individual rights in the context of the free 
movement of persons and services,” in Courts and Free markets, vol. 2, (Eds.) E. STEIN & T. SANDALOW, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982), 387. 
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more precisely the basic notion of powers, as well as the concepts pertaining to it, and then to 
shed light on the fundamental distinctions and processes relating to this notion. 
81. The notion of power and other concepts pertaining to it. The New Oxford American 
Dictionary defines the notion of power as the “authority that is given or delegated to a person 
or body.” As for powers of a legal nature, they may be described more specifically as the “ability 
to lay down a rule or decision that is binding on the addressee,”5 or as a “power to create 
norms.”6 They moreover refer to the ideas of “means and instruments for action,”7 while the 
concept of jurisdiction pertains to the “territory or sphere of activity [i.e. scope of action] over 
which the legal authority of a Court or other institution [such as states] extends.”8 Therefore, 
the two notions of power and jurisdiction are to be distinguished from the concept of 
sovereignty. The latter is fundamentally unique, indivisible, and superior to any other power.9 
To put it differently, it is “not itself bound by any laws,”10 it is an “unlimited power.”11 By 
contrast, the former imply the ideas of mandate12 and limitation.13 A legal power is, as a matter 
of fact, never absolute. Not only is it conferred or attributed,14 but it is also subject to the law. It 
is composed of several components.15 First, being an attribute,16 it necessarily involves an actor, 
                                                 
5 A. SOMEK, Individidualism: An essay on the authority of the European Union, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 17. 
6 Ibid., 19. See also, in the same vein, V. MICHEL, Recherches sur les compétences de la Communauté, (L’Harmattan, 
Paris, Coll. Logiques juridiques, 2003), 26. 
7 L. AZOULAI, “Introduction,” in Deconstructing federalism through competences, (EUI Working Papers LAW 
2012/06), 2. 
8 New Oxford American Dictionary. For a perspective based on public international law, see F. A. MANN, “The 
doctrine of jurisdiction,” 3 RCADI 1, 145 (1964-I). He distinguishes (i) the legislative jurisdiction: “the power of a 
State to apply its laws to cases involving a foreign element,” (ii) judicial jurisdiction: “the power of a State’s court to 
try cases involving a foreign element,” and (iii) enforcement jurisdiction: “the power of one State to perform acts in 
the territory of another State.” 
9 O. BEAUD, Théorie de la Fédération, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2007), 40. 
10 A. RAPACZYNSKI, “From sovereignty to process: The jurisprudence of federalism after Garcia,” Supreme Court 
Review 341, 347 (1985). 
11 O. BEAUD, “Compétence et souveraineté,” in La Compétence, (Ed.) AJDA, (Litec, Coll. ‘Colloques & Débats’ 
2008), 5, 14. 
12 Ibid. 
13 F. C. MAYER, “The debate on European powers and competencies. Seeing the trees but not the forest,” (available 
from http://www.whi-berlin.eu/documents/whi-paper1803.pdf), 4. 
14 Ibid. 
15 N. MACCORMICK, Institutions of Law, An Essay in Legal Theory, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2007), 156; 
G. TUSSEAU, “Theoretical deflation: the EU order of competences and power-conferring norms theory,” in The 
Question of competence in the European Union, (Ed.) L. AZOULAI, (Oxford, United Kingdom; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 39, 46; V. CONSTANTINESCO, Compétences et pouvoirs dans les Communautés européennes. 
Contribution à l’étude de la nature juridique des Communautés, (Paris, L.G.D.J., Bib. de droit international, t. LXXIV, 
1974), 71s. 
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a holder, who can legally exercise it. It is not, indeed, a legal norm, but rather a “relation-type 
notion,” useful to describe the interplay between a legal object and a subject.17 Second, a legal 
power “refers to the area of reality […] that an actor is empowered to govern.”18 This is what I 
describe as its ‘scope of application’ or jurisdiction. Its scope is itself circumscribed by three 
ranges of criteria: (i) territorial criteria, which define the geographical area over which the 
power holder may exercise its authority; (ii) material criteria, which pertain to the substantial 
domains over which the power holder may exercise its authority (e.g. the various 
aforementioned fields concerned by the European Court of Justice power-based approach); and 
(iii) personal criteria, which relate to those persons whose conduct is subject to the authority of 
the power holder. Last but not least, a legal power is subject to a procedure, which encompasses 
the various legal rules that the power holder must necessarily comply with to legally exercise it. 
82. Fundamental distinctions and processes relating to the notion of power. Fundamental 
distinctions and processes relate to the notion of power and allow for a better understanding of 
this concept. First of all, several typologies of powers may be drawn, depending on which of its 
components one emphasizes. The typology most commonly accepted to examine a legal order is 
based on which actor holds a power. It corresponds, for instance, to the typology established by 
the Treaties of the European Union. Two main types may then be distinguished. On the one 
hand, in case one single actor holds a power, i.e. if one single body holds jurisdiction to 
regulate a given area and/or a range of people, this power is considered as ‘exclusive.’ By 
contrast, on the other hand, if more than one actor hold a power, it follows that the power is 
deemed ‘shared’ between these actors. These actors may share the power according to different 
arrangements, such as, for instance, concurrence, collaboration, or hierarchy.19 Second of all, I 
have already alluded to the concept of division of powers. It consists in conferring to one – the 
power will be exclusive – or more – the power will be shared – actors powers that they will be 
legally entitled to exercise. An important issue relating to the division of authority among 
several actors is that of the settlement of jurisdictional conflicts. A legal order must not only 
                                                 
16 O. BEAUD, “Compétence et souveraineté,” in La Compétence, (Ed.) AJDA, (Litec, Coll. ‘Colloques & Débats’ 
2008), 15. 
17 Ibid., 11. 
18 G. TUSSEAU, “Theoretical deflation: the EU order of competences and power-conferring norms theory,” above, 
n. 15, 46. 
19 G. SCELLE, “Critique du soit-disant domaine de compétence exclusive,” RDILC, 365, 374 (1933); C. ROUSSEAU, 
“L’aménagement des compétences en droit international,” RGDIP 420, 459-460 (1930). 
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comprise rules coordinating the various power holders, but also set out how jurisdictional 
conflicts ought to be adjudicated – e.g. does the exercise by an actor of its power exclude the 
exercise of another actor’s power? Or may they exercise them concurrently? – and by whom – 
e.g. the judiciary or the political power? A final aspect pertaining to the notion of power that I 
refer to throughout my thesis is the fundamental distinction that must be kept in mind 
between the existence and the exercise of a power.20 The former relates to the three 
aforementioned territorial, material, and personal criteria, while the latter refers to the process 
during which the holder of a power makes use of it by producing the legal norms she is entitled 
to. As far as the exercise of a power is concerned, two modes must be distinguished, as shown 
by the following figure: 
 
 Discretionary exercise of power     Constrained exercise of power 
83. The arrow stands for the process of exercise of a given power, and reveals the degree of 
freedom enjoyed by its holder. What characterizes this process is the leeway that is granted to 
the power holder.21 Such a leeway pertains to two elements:22 (i) the decision to exercise a 
power. A power holder may exercise it at will or, on the contrary, be constrained to use it in 
certain circumstances and/or under certain conditions; (ii) the content of the legal rules 
resulting from the exercise of the power. In this regard, the power holder may again be subject 
to a greater or lesser degree of latitude, depending on the power-conferring norm she is subject 
to. As I have already pointed out, a legal power is never absolute, which concretely means that 
its exercise may never be entirely discretionary. Accordingly, a power may only tend to be 
discretionary. Similarly, powers that are wholly constrained in their exercise are rather rare. As a 
result, a distinction must be drawn between discretionary and constrained/limited powers. The 
criterion for distinguishing between the two lies in the absence or the vague character or 
                                                 
20 On the significance of the distinction see G. CAHIN, “La notion de pouvoir discrétionnaire appliquée aux 
organisations internationales,” 107 RGDIP 535, 539 (2003); C. ROUSSEAU, “L’aménagement des compétences en 
droit international,” above, n. 19; J. KLABBERS, “Restraints on the treaty-making powers of Member States deriving 
from EU law: Towards a framework for analysis,” in The European Union as an actor in international relations, (Ed.) E. 
CANNIZZARO, (Kluwer Law International, 2008), 151, 154. 
21 G. SCELLE, “Critique du soit-disant domaine de compétence exclusive,” above, n. 19, 379. 
22 G. CAHIN, “La notion de pouvoir discrétionnaire appliquée aux organisations internationales,” above, n. 20, 
544; G. SCELLE, “Critique du soit-disant domaine de compétence exclusive,” above, n. 19, 379-380. 
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presence of regulatory instruments governing their exercise. The first hypothesis pertains to 
discretionary powers while the second relates to constrained/limited powers.23 
84. A close reading of cases involving the powers retained by Member States reveals that the 
notion of power plays a crucial role in the Court’s reasoning, especially at the applicability and 
the justification stages. 
85. The applicability stage. The Court of Justice almost systematically uses formulae at the 
applicability stage. All the fields analyzed herein are concerned by this trend, even if the 
wording of the formulae varies, depending on which field is involved. Thus, in the field of 
nationality, the Court usually rules that: 
It is to be borne in mind here that, according to established case-law, it is for each Member 
State, having due regard to Community law, to lay down the conditions for the acquisition 
and loss of nationality. 
(…) 
Nevertheless, the fact that a matter falls within the competence of the Member States does 
not alter the fact that, in situations covered by European Union law, the national rules 
concerned must have due regard to the latter.24 
In the field of direct taxation, it rules that: 
[A]lthough direct taxation falls within their competence, Member States must none the less 
exercise that competence consistently with Community law.25 
Regarding rules governing surnames, it rules that: 
Although, as Community law stands at present, the rules governing a person’s surname are 
matters coming within the competence of the Member States, the latter must none the less, 
when exercising that competence, comply with Community law, in particular the Treaty 
provisions on the freedom of every citizen of the Union to move and reside in the territory 
of the Member States.26 
Regarding the enforcement for the recovery of debts, it rules that:  
[E]nforcement for the recovery of debts falls as a rule within the competence of the 
Member States, it is none the less the case that that competence must be exercised in 
compliance with Community law and, in particular, the Treaty provisions on freedom to 
move and reside within the territory of the Member States, as conferred by Article 18 EC.27 
                                                 
23 S. JOVANOVIC, Restriction des compétences discrétionnaires des Etats en droit international, (Paris, Pédone, 
1988), 109. 
24 Case C-135/08, Rottmann, [2010] ECR I-1449, 39 & 41. 
25 Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, [2005] ECR I-10837, 29. 
26 Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, [2003] ECR I-11613, 25. 
27 Case C-224/02, Pusa, [2004] ECR I-5763, 22. 
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In the field of education, it rules that: 
Whilst Community law does not detract from the power of the Member States as regards, 
first, the content of education and the organization of education systems and their cultural 
and linguistic diversity (Article 149(1) EC) and, secondly, the content and organization of 
vocational training (Article 150(1) EC), the fact remains that, when exercising that power, 
Member States must comply with Community law, in particular the provisions on the 
freedom to provide services.28 
In the field of social security, it rules that: 
Community law does not detract from the power of the Member States to organize their 
social security systems. 
In the absence of harmonization at Community level, it is therefore for the legislation of 
each Member State to determine, first, the conditions concerning the right or duty to be 
insured with a social security scheme and, second, the conditions for entitlement to 
benefits. 
Nevertheless, the Member States must comply with Community law when exercising that 
power.29 
As regards the compensation of civil war victims, it rules that: 
In that regard, it is important to bear in mind that, as Community law now stands, a 
benefit such as that in issue in the main proceedings, which is intended to compensate 
civilian war victims for physical or mental damage which they have suffered, falls within the 
competence of the Member States. 
However, Member States must exercise that competence in accordance with Community 
law, in particular with the Treaty provisions giving every citizen of the Union the right to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.30 
Regarding the right to strike, it rules that: 
Even if, in the areas which fall outside the scope of the Community’s competence, the 
Member States are still free, in principle, to lay down the conditions governing the 
existence and exercise of the rights in question, the fact remains that, when exercising that 
competence, the Member States must nevertheless comply with Community law.31 
Taken together, and despite their various wordings, the formulae convey the same two basic 
principles, which both revolve around the notion of power. They are, firstly, a way for the 
Court of Justice to single out the powers retained by Member States, and, by the same token, 
to acknowledge that these powers do remain in the ambit of Member States or, in other words, 
that Member States have exclusive jurisdiction to exercise them. The Court is ambivalent with 
                                                 
28 Case C-76/05, Schwarz, [2007] ECR I-6849, 70. 
29 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473, 44-46. 
30 Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen, [2006] ECR I-10451, 21-22. 
31 Case C-438/05, Viking, [2007] ECR I-0779, 40. 
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respect to the foundations of this principle. In the fields of nationality, direct taxation, 
surnames, recovery of debts, and compensation of civil war victims, it simply asserts it, without 
any additional justification. Things are, however, slightly different in the remaining fields. In 
the case of education, it seems to base the principle on the Treaty provisions which explicitly 
exclude harmonization at European Union level as far as the content of education and 
vocational training, as well as their organization, are concerned.32 The principle seems to stem, 
in the area of social security, from the fact that there is, to date, no harmonization at European 
Union level. Last but not least, the Court referred to the notion of ‘scope of the Community 
competence’ to infer that the right to strike, which falls outside this scope, remains within the 
ambit of Member States. However, secondly, immediately after stating the first principle, the 
Court of Justice mitigates it. Indeed, the formulae also express the idea that the European 
Union legal order is such as to compel Member States to comply with the law of free 
movement when exercising their retained powers. In short, if these powers fall within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of Member States, the latter may not exercise them in a purely 
discretionary manner or without taking into account their obligations deriving from European 
Union law. 
86. The justification stage. As in traditional free movement cases, the justification stage, which 
encompasses the proportionality test, plays a key role in cases involving powers retained by 
Member States. This is logically brought about by the Court’s broad interpretation of the scope 
of European Union law as well as of the concept of restriction.33 Yet, the approach endorsed by 
the Court, tinged with the notion of power, differs from its established case law in at least two 
important aspects. First, instead of focusing exclusively on the national measure at issue, the 
Court expands the spectrum of its control in such a way as to encompass the manner in which 
Member States exercise their retained powers. In the field of direct taxation, for instance, it 
expressly held that: 
                                                 
32 Articles 165 & 166 TFEU. 
33 See, e.g. N. REICH, “How proportionate is the proportionality principle in the internal market case law of the 
ECJ?,” in The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States, (Eds.) H.-W. MICKLITZ and B. de 
WITTE, (Cambridge; Antwerp: Intersentia; Oxford, 2011), 83-111; and C. BARNARD, “Derogations, Justifications 
and the Four Freedoms: Is State Interest Really Protected?,” in The Outer Limits of European Union Law, (Eds.) C. 
BARNARD & O. ODUDU, (Oxford: Hart, 2009), 273-305. 
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[A]s far as the exercise of the power of taxation so allocated is concerned, the Member 
States must comply with the Community rules, and, more particularly, respect the principle 
of national treatment.34 
Similarly, in the field of nationality, it ruled that: 
The fact nevertheless remains that, if the situation comes within the scope of Community 
law, the exercise by Member States of their retained powers cannot be discretionary. It is 
subject to the obligation to comply with the Community rules.35 
These two statements show that the Court of Justice does not only develop a reasoning focusing 
on the facts of the case at hand. It also gives general guidance regarding the conditions of 
exercise of the powers retained by the Member States. This leads, second, to the other peculiar 
feature of the Court’s approach. Indeed, the assessment of proportionality is also centered on 
the idea of adjustment, as expressly stated, for instance, in the field of social security:  
[T]he achievement of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty inevitably 
requires Member States to make some adjustments to their systems of social security.36 
As will be seen in Chapter 3,37 the assessment of proportionality is all about imposing 
adjustment requirements on Member States, which pertain to the conditions of exercise of 
their retained powers – thereby echoing the principles expressed in the formulae. 
87. The scope of the Court’s control. Accordingly, the scope of the control carried out by the 
Court is of a different nature when retained powers are involved. First, in traditional free 
movement cases, the Court is first and foremost interested in settling conflicts of norms. It does 
not directly rule on the issue relating to the interplay between national and European Union 
spheres of powers. Second, traditional free movement cases have significant underlying 
implications for the relationship between the European Union and its Member States, as they 
affect the division of powers between the two levels of government. As noticed by several 
authors, the Court’s decisions affects the vertical division of powers by allocating regulatory 
powers either to the Member States or to the European Union38 or, in sum, by establishing 
                                                 
34 Case C-385/00, De Groot, [2002] ECR I-11819, 94 (Emphasis added). 
35 Case C-192/99, Kaur, [2001] ECR I-1237, 20 (Emphasis added). 
36 Case C-490/09, Commission v. Luxembourg, [2011] ECR I-247, 45 (Emphasis added). See also Case C-385/99, 
Müller-Fauré & Van Riet, [2003] ECR I-4509, 102; and Case C-372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-4325, 121. 
37 See, Infra, Chapter 3, §§ 177s. 
38 J. SNELL, “Who’s got the power? Free movement and allocation of competences in EC law,” 22: 1 YEL 323 
(2003): “Decisions of the Court on the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital have an impact on 
[…] the vertical […] division of power in the Community. They allocate regulatory competences either to Member 
States or to the Community, and in this way partly determine the level of centralization in the Community.” 
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who, between the various entities, has the power to regulate.39 As a result, the scope of the 
Court’s control, in traditional free movement cases, concerns the division of powers between 
the European Union and its Member States. However, in cases involving powers retained by 
Member States, the Court explicitly focuses on the question of whether Member States have 
exercised their retained powers consistently with European Union law. Therefore, it does not 
address the issue as to whether they held a regulatory power in the first place – it simply assumes so. 
Accordingly, in cases involving powers retained by Member States, the scope of the Court’s 
control relates to the conditions of exercise of the national powers concerned by the power-
based approach. 
3. The resulting implications 
88. A structural approach to free movement cases involving powers seen as retained by Member States. 
The use made by the Court of Justice of the notion of power has the fundamental effect of 
bringing its approach closer to a structural approach, which consists in basing its reasoning on 
the constitutional and institutional links binding the European Union, the Member States, and 
the individuals. This is evidenced by the fact that the Court uses the same specific modus 
operandi – i.e. the use of the notion of power as well as the distinction between existence and 
exercise – in cases traditionally seen as relating to the division of authority between the 
European Union and the Member States. A first parallel may be drawn, in this respect, with the 
reasoning developed by the Court in Casagrande.40 This ruling is different from decisions 
involving retained powers of Member States, insofar as it is a case where the European Union 
had adopted a act of secondary legislation, and where it was the exercise of European powers 
that allegedly contravened the vertical division of powers between the European Union and the 
Member States. However, it also bears substantial similarities with cases concerned by the 
power-based approach. Member States challenged the legality of Article 12 of Regulation 
1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, which concerned access 
to education of children of European Union workers, on the grounds that “educational policy 
                                                 
39 M. P. MADURO, We the Court: the European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution: A critical reading 
of Article 30 of the EC Treaty, (Oxford: Hart, Evanston, Ill., USA : Distributed in the United States by Northwestern 
University Press, 1998), 1: “When reviewing national measures with an effect on trade under Article 30, the 
European Court of Justice must both decide whether there should be regulation and, if so, who will have the 
power to regulate. […] The extent of regulatory powers left to Member States will largely depend on the scope given 
to Article 30.” 
40 Case 9/74, Casagrande [1974], ECR 773. 
Chapter 1. The ECJ Power-Based Approach 
 
74 
and educational grants were within [their] competence.”41 Thus, they inferred the illegality of 
this provision from the fact that it affected the existence of their powers: since education fell 
within national spheres of powers, no European Union act of secondary legislation could 
pertain, directly or indirectly, to this field. The Court took a different view: 
[A]lthough educational and training policy is not as such included in the spheres which the 
Treaty has entrusted to the Community institutions, it does not follow that the exercise of 
powers transferred to the Community is in some way limited if it is of such a nature as to 
affect the measures taken in the execution of a policy such as that of education and 
training.42 
Admittedly, it acknowledged that educational and training policy fell within the ambit of the 
Member States or that, in other words, the Community was excluded from the personal scope 
of this power. But this recognition did not prevent it from further stating that, in case the 
exercise of Community powers conflicts with ‘the measures taken in the execution of Member 
States’ powers, the former must trump the latter. Here again, it required Member States to 
adjust the conditions of exercise of their powers in such a way as to allow the Community to 
exercise its own, and, in particular, by applying the non-discrimination principle.43 Therefore, 
similarly to cases involving powers retained by Member States, the distinction between the 
existence and the conditions of exercise of power played a crucial role in Casagrande. It is used 
by the Court as a quasi-justification to put limits upon the conditions of exercise of national 
powers and, accordingly, to circumscribe their discretionary character. The Court traditionally 
interprets cases involving similar issues to those raised in Casagrande, i.e. cases in which the 
legality of acts of secondary legislation is challenged on the grounds that they impinge upon 
national powers, through a structural perspective. The Court indeed inquires whether the 
European legislator has acted in accordance with the conferral principle, and ultimately seeks 
to coordinate national and European Union spheres of powers.44  
                                                 
41 Case 9/74, Casagrande [1974], ECR 773, 10. 
42 Ibid., 12. 
43 Ibid., 14: “As regards Article 12 of Regulation No 1612/68, although the determination of the conditions 
referred to is a matter for the authorities competent under national law, they must however be applied without 
discrimination between the children of national workers and those of workers who are nationals of another 
Member State who reside in the territory.” See J. H. H. WEILER, “The Transformation of Europe,” in The 
Constitution of Europe: Do the new Clothes have an Emperor? And other Essays on European Integration, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 47-50. 
44 See, for instance, two seminal cases: Case C-376/98, Germany v. European Parliament and Council, [2000] ECR I-
8419, and Case C-58/08, The Queen, on the application of Vodafone Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, [2010] ECR I-04999. 
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89. The Court of Justice also follows the same logic, based on the distinction between 
existence and exercise of power, in the field of external relations, as evidenced, for instance, by 
the Centro-Com judgment.45 This case concerned the EC Sanctions Regulation, which 
prohibited trade between the Community and the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, in 
accordance with the Resolution of the UN Security Council instituting a trade embargo. The 
Court of Justice was asked whether a national measure adopted by the United Kingdom was 
compatible with Article 113 EC, given that this measure went beyond the requirements of the 
EC Regulation implementing the Resolution.46 One of the main arguments put forward by the 
United Kingdom was that its measure could go beyond the Sanctions Regulation because it fell 
within Member States’ retained powers in the field of foreign and security policy.47 Thus, 
similarly to the facts of Casagrande, Centro-Com involved a act of secondary legislation. However, 
this time, focus was put on the national measure suspected to have impinged on European 
Union powers. The Court used, once again, the distinction between existence and exercise as a 
justification to impose obligations upon Member States when they exercise their foreign and 
security policy powers: 
The Member States have indeed retained their competence in the field of foreign and 
security policy. […] 
None the less, the powers retained by the Member States must be exercised in a manner 
consistent with Community law. […] 
[W]hile it is for the Member States to adopt measures of foreign and security policy in the 
exercise of their national competence, those measures must nevertheless respect the 
provisions adopted by the Community in the field of the common commercial policy 
provided for by Article 113 of the Treaty.48  
Cases relating to external relations are “looked at through a competence prism,”49 and, in the 
opinion of P. EEKHOUT, they are characterized by the fact that: 
Instead of a broad economically-oriented, teleological, and contextual approach to implied 
powers, the Court has preferred a more doctrinal, constitutional, and institutional 
approach, which focuses on the autonomy and protection of the EU legal order.50 
                                                 
45 Case C-124/95, The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com Srl v HM Treasury and Bank of England, [1997] ECR I-81. 
46 For further details, see, inter alia, C. VEDDER & H.-P. FOLZ, 35 C. M. L. Rev. 209–226 (1998); R. PAVONI, “UN 
Sanctions in EU and national law: the Centro-Com case,” 48 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 582 (1999). 
47 Case C-124/95, The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com Srl v HM Treasury and Bank of England, [1997] ECR I-81, 23. 
48 Ibid., 24, 25 & 27 respectively. 
49 P. EECKHOUT, “Bold constitutionalism and beyond,” in The Past and Future of EU Law: the Classics of EU Law 
Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty, (Eds.) M. P. MADURO & L. AZOULAI, (Oxford: Hart, 2010), 219. 
The same idea is expressed by G. DE BAERE, Constitutional principles of EU external relations, (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 10. 
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90. Of course, the Court of Justice has not totally jettisoned its traditional approach when 
powers retained by Member States are involved. It still interprets the four fundamental 
freedoms in light of the effects on the internal market brought about by the national measure. 
This also entails that it recognizes individual rights attached to European Union citizenship 
through a teleological and contextual approach. But it couples these approaches with a 
structural reasoning. The above has shown, indeed, that, in cases involving powers retained by 
Member States, the “reference to the state competences has been reintroduced and 
legitimized.”51 Within the framework of its power-based approach, the Court of Justice relies on 
structural arguments, defined by C. L. BLACK, in the context of US Constitutional law, as 
implementing a “method of inference from the structures and relationships created by the 
Constitution in all its parts or in some principal part.”52 P. BOBBITT has added, in the same 
vein, that these arguments “embody a macroscopic prudentialism […] arising from general 
assertions about power and social choice.”53 The aforementioned formulae used by the 
European Court of Justice are nothing more than assertions about power. They moreover 
reveal that, in the eyes of the Court, the relationship between the European Union and the 
Member States, as established by the treaties, is such as to justify compliance with European 
Union law when Member States exercise their retained powers. Likewise, when the Court of 
Justice imposes requirements upon the Member States at the justification stage,54 it takes into 
account the constitutional features and the institutional balance of the European Union. As a 
result, the Court sees the conflicts characterizing the cases involving the powers retained by 
Member States as genuine conflicts of powers. Therefore, it ends up playing a role consisting in 
coordinating the national and European Union spheres of powers. 
91. The Court’s specific focus on Member States. The second implication of the shift in the 
Court of Justice reasoning is intrinsically linked to the previous one. Since the Court adopts a 
more structural-oriented approach, more concerned with the relationship between national and 
European Union spheres of powers, it focuses more specifically on Member States than in 
                                                 
50 P. EECKHOUT, EU External Relations Law, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 118. 
51 L. AZOULAI, “The European Court of Justice and the duty to respect sensitive national interests,” in Judicial 
activism at the European Court of Justice: causes, responses and solutions, (Eds.) M. DAWSON, B. DE WITTE & E. MUIR, 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013), 167, 184. 
52 C. L. BLACK, Structure and relationship in constitutional law, (Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 7. 
53 P. BOBBITT, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 74. 
54 See, Infra, §§ 177s. 
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traditional free movement cases. As recalled earlier,55 in the latter, the Court tends to put great 
emphasis on the bonds between individuals and the European Union through the recognition 
of individual rights. In this respect, it is often led to instrumentalize national legal systems and 
policies in order to create or deepen these bonds. It thus adopts an economic-oriented 
approach, focused on the integration of national markets, when it recognizes individual 
economic rights. Similarly, its reasoning is more social-oriented when the facts of the case 
pertain to social issues. These trends are not absent from the reasoning of the Court when 
powers retained by Member States are involved. However, as a result of the adoption of a 
structural approach, the Court of Justice pays more attention to the relationships: (i) between 
Member States and individuals; (ii) between Member States and the European Union; and (iii) 
among Member States. As seen in Section 1, the powers concerned by the Court’s power-based 
approach are constitutive components of Member State autonomy. Accordingly, the Court 
must be wary of not undermining the bonds between Member States and the members of their 
political and social communities, for it could, otherwise, imperil their autonomy. 
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 1. 
92. On the one hand, this first chapter has identified the fields concerned by the Court of 
Justice power-based approach. Even if the Court does not laid down explicit criteria for 
distinction, Section 1 has revealed that the fields analyzed herein nonetheless share common 
significant structural features. Not only do they fall within the ambit of Member States, but 
they are also based on the same structural principles. They are indeed built upon the principle 
of closure and the erection of boundaries, which take the form of inclusion and exclusion rules. 
On the other hand, Section 2 has demonstrated that, when the Court of Justice singles out 
powers retained by Member States, it operates a shift, by reasoning in structural terms, the 
notion of power and the distinction between existence and exercise playing a defining role. All 
things considered, the Court seems to adjudicate the disputes involving what it sees as powers 
retained by Member States from a structural perspective, thereby brining them, to a certain 
extent, closer to traditional constitutional cases than traditional free movement cases. 
93. Identifying the original legal framework applied by the Court to national retained powers. While 
Chapter 1 has provided an overview of the Court of Justice power-based approach, Chapters 2 
                                                 
55 See, Supra, § 79. 
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and 3 look more closely at its two other fundamental features. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
applicability stage of the cases involving powers retained by Member States, while Chapter 3 
analyzes their justification stage. 
  
CHAPTER 2. THE EXTENSION OF EU LAW SCOPE OF 
APPLICATION 
 
INTRODUCTION OF CHAPTER 2. 
94. This chapter sheds light on the second defining feature of the Court of Justice power-
based approach. This feature takes the form of an extension of the scope of application of 
European Union law through the distinction between existence and exercise of the powers 
retained by Member States. 
95. The function of the scope of application in free movement cases. The applicability stage is the 
first step of free movement cases. It invariably precedes the restriction and justification stages, 
and gives the Court of Justice an opportunity to examine whether the national measure that is 
suspected of breaching the free movement principle falls within the scope of European Union 
law. The inquiry of the Court of Justice the applicability of the fundamental freedoms and 
European Union citizenship provisions has a decisive function within the European Union 
legal order. It is the means through which the Court enforces the enumerated powers principle, 
which holds that all the powers not conferred on the European Union by the Treaty remain 
within the hands of Member States. In case of positive intervention by the institutions of the 
European Union, the latter must respect the enumerated powers principle and, therefore, 
demonstrate that the Treaty contains an appropriate legal basis for the adoption of an act of 
secondary legislation.1 Similarly, in free movement cases, the majority of which correspond to 
cases where the institutions of the European Union have not intervened, the Court checks 
whether there exist connecting factors between the personal, material, spatial, and temporal 
                                                 
1 S. PRECHAL, S. DE VRIES & H. VAN EIJKEN, “The principle of attributed powers and the ‘scope of EU law’,” in 
The Eclipse of Legality in Europe, (Eds.) L. BESSELINK, F. PENNINGS & S. PRECHAL, (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer 
Law International, 2011), 213-214. See also C. BARNARD, The substantive law of the EU: The four freedoms, (Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 568s; G. DE BURCA & P. CRAIG, EU Law: Text, cases and materials, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 73s. 
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scopes of the potentially applicable fundamental freedom – or European Union citizenship 
provision – and the national measure.2 If one of the connecting factors is missing, the Court 
concludes that European Union law is inapplicable. The directly applicable Treaty provisions 
have, as a matter of principle, a limited scope, for otherwise it would negate the enumerated 
powers principle. The rules used to determine the applicability of European Union law are 
therefore intrinsically linked to the European principle of legality or, in other words, to the rule 
of law, understood, as S. PRECHAL et al. put it, as “the requirement that any act of government 
that imposes unilateral obligations on citizens must have a basis in law, that is, must have a 
statutory basis.”3  
96. The traditional issues raised in cases involving powers retained by Member States. Some of the 
cases involving powers retained by Member States raise ‘traditional’ applicability issues. 
Education and social security cases based on the freedom to provide services have sparked, in 
particular, significant debates with respect to the notion of remuneration.4 These cases make 
clear that the Court of Justice is indifferent to the nature of the national powers involved in 
free movement cases, and that the four economic freedoms as well as the provisions on 
European Union citizenship may apply to national welfare services. In education cases, Member 
States have argued that educational activities did not amount to an economic activity because 
they were not provided for remuneration. They have developed a similar line of reasoning in 
social security cases where they have claimed that the freedom to provide services could not 
apply to hospital and non-hospital medical services – either because they are provided in kind,5 
or subsequently reimbursed to patients,6 or provided by national health services, which are 
wholly funded from taxation.7 In other words, in both cases, Member States’ arguments 
amount to claiming that the inapplicability of European Union law should stem from the fact 
that education and health care systems are not subject to the market. The Court came up with 
different answers in the two fields.  
                                                 
2 H. D. JARASS, “A Unified Approach to the Fundamental Freedoms,” in Services and Free Movement in EU Law, 
(Eds.) M. ANDENAS & W.-H. ROTH, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 142. 
3 S. PRECHAL, S. DE VRIES and H. VAN EIJKEN, “The principle of attributed powers and the ‘scope of EU law’,” 
above, n. 1, 214. 
4 For a general overview, see G. DAVIES, “Welfare as a service,” 29 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 27-40 (2002). 
5 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473, 48; Opinion in Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré & Van 
Riet, [2003] ECR I-4509, 24. 
6 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473, 49. 
7 Opinion in Case C-372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-4325, 43. 
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97. Education cases. Regarding first the field of education, the Advocate General in Gravier 
suggested for the first time to draw a distinction between state education and education 
provided by a private organization in order to subject only the latter to the provisions on the 
freedom to provide services.8 The Court of Justice did not discuss this issue, and decided, on 
the basis of Article 7 EEC – now Article 18 TFEU, that the ‘minerval,’ an additional fee 
applied to nonresident students in Belgium, was contrary to European Union law. The same 
fee was at stake in Humbel, a subsequent case, which gave the opportunity to the Court to 
distinguish between national education systems and private organizations providing education. 
It indeed held that the former does not provide services for remuneration: 
First of all, the State, in establishing and maintaining such a system, is not seeking to 
engage in gainful activity but is fulfilling its duties towards its own population in the social, 
cultural, and educational fields. Secondly, the system in question is, as a general rule, 
funded from the public purse and not by pupils or their parents.9 
Conversely, establishments of higher education essentially funded out of private funds are 
deemed to provide services for remuneration.10 Thus, in education cases, the Court of Justice 
uses two criteria when assessing whether the remuneration requirement is fulfilled: i) the 
source of funding: whether the private financing of a school covers a large proportion of its 
costs; and ii) the purpose of the activity: whether the school intends to make an economic 
profit.11 As a result, the Court accepted at least partially the line of reasoning developed by 
Member States.  
98. Social security cases. This is not the case with respect to social security rulings. In this 
field, the Court has long decided that medical activities fall within the scope of the freedom to 
provide services.12 It subsequently confirmed its early rulings in cases where the national social 
security system itself was accused of infringing the freedom to provide services. In a series of 
judgments, the Court held that, under certain circumstances, the fact that coverage of cross-
                                                 
8 Opinion in Case 293/83, Gravier, [1985] ECR 593, 603. 
9 Case 263/86, Humbel, [1988] ECR 5365, 18. 
10 See Case C-109/92, Wirth, [1993] ECR I-6447, 17: “However, as the United Kingdom has observed, whilst most 
establishments of higher education are financed in this way, some are nevertheless financed essentially out of 
private funds, in particular by students or their parents, and which seek to make an economic profit. When 
courses are given in such establishments, they become services within the meaning of Article 60 of the Treaty. 
Their aim is to offer a service for remuneration.” This reasoning was, for instance, confirmed in Case C-76/05, 
Schwarz, [2007] ECR I-6849, 39-45. 
11 See Opinion in Case C-76/05, Schwarz, [2007] ECR I-6849, 35. 
12 Cases 286/82 & 26/83, Luisi & Carbone, [1984] ECR 377, 16 and Case C-159/90, Society for the Protection of 
Unborn Children Ireland, [1991] ECR I-4685, 16-21. 
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border health care by the state of affiliation was made conditional upon obtaining prior 
authorization restricted the free movement principle. The Member States challenged the 
applicability of European Union law and, in so doing, they based their arguments on the 
relationship between the patients and their social security system of affiliation. They inferred 
that affiliated patients either do not pay medical services or that they are reimbursed in their 
states of affiliation.13 However, the Court of Justice followed a very different line of reasoning. 
It ignored the aforementioned relationship and focused instead on the fact that the patients 
who resorted to cross-border health care did pay for receiving medical treatment, as evidenced, 
for instance, by this statement: 
[T]he medical treatment at issue in the main proceedings, which was provided in Member 
States other than those in which the persons concerned were insured, did lead to the 
establishments providing the treatment being paid directly by the patients.14 
Therefore, the Court is simply indifferent to the nature of the relationship that links patients 
and their systems of affiliation. It held in Watts, a case involving the British National Health 
System, that in order to rule on the applicability of the freedom to provide services, there was: 
[N]o need in the present case to determine whether the provision of hospital treatment in 
the context of a national health service such as the NHS is in itself a service within the 
meaning of those provisions.15 
As a result, the Court of Justice successively ruled that the freedom to provide services applies, 
irrespective of whether patients are affiliated to a reimbursement system,16 a benefit-in-kind 
system,17 or a national health service,18 and regardless of whether they receive non-hospital,19 
hospital,20 or whether they receive medical care while traveling abroad.21  
99. All in all, the Court found that the freedom to provide services is applicable (or partially 
applicable) to fields as peculiar as education and social security. This gives rise to a substantial 
                                                 
13 The Advocate General in Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473, 30s shared this view. 
14 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473, 55. 
15 Case C-372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-4325, 91. The Advocate General expressed a similar view. See his opinion 
at 53-55. 
16 Case C-120/95, Decker, [1998] ECR I-1831 & Case C-158/96, Kohll, [1998] ECR I-1931. 
17 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré & Van Riet, [2003] 
ECR I-4509. 
18 Case C-372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-4325. 
19 Case C-120/95, Decker, [1998] ECR I-1831 & Case C-158/96, Kohll, [1998] ECR I-1931. 
20 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré & Van Riet, [2003] 
ECR I-4509; Case C-372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-4325. 
21 Case C-211/08, Commission v. Spain, [2010] ECR I-5267. 
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extension of the scope of the economic freedom. However, even if the outcome of the approach 
developed by the Court is remarkable, the reasoning followed by the Court with respect to the 
scope of the traditional notion of remuneration is in itself not unusual. Indeed, it is in line 
with its traditional extensive interpretation of the scope of the four freedoms and European 
Union citizenship provisions.22 
100. The specific issues raised in cases involving powers retained by Member States. By contrast, most 
of the cases involving retained powers raise specific issues that are absent from traditional free 
movement cases, since the Court of Justice deems European Union law applicable in fields 
where the European Union has no, or very limited, or ‘unexercised’ jurisdiction. In this respect, 
some of the Member States, supported by certain scholars, see the applicability of European 
Union law as the materialization of illegitimate intrusions into national spheres of powers. 
They often challenge the applicability of European Union law on peculiar grounds. In 
substance, they claim that the inapplicability of European Union law should stem from the 
limited jurisdiction of the European Union in the fields analyzed herein. As a result, the 
applicability stage turns out to be a significant issue in cases concerned by the power-based 
approach. This is moreover confirmed by the fact that, as opposed to traditional free movement 
cases, the Court of Justice systematically addresses the issue of applicability. 
101. Outline of Chapter 2. The purpose of this second chapter is to show that, without 
fundamentally departing from its traditional approach, the Court extends the scope of 
application of European Union law significantly and in an original way when it is called upon 
to rule on cases involving powers retained by Member States. In Section 1, I shed light on the 
arguments developed by Member States, which are first and foremost based on the lack of 
jurisdiction of the European Union in the fields analyzed herein. In Section 2, I investigate the 
line of reasoning adopted by the Court of Justice, and I demonstrate that, except in the field of 
education, the Court deals with the arguments of Member States by dissociating the scope of 
application of European Union law from the scope of European Union powers. 
                                                 
22 As acknowledged by the Court of Justice itself on many occasions. See, for instance, Case 66/85, Lawrie-Blum, 
[1986] ECR 2121, 16: “Since freedom of movement for workers constitutes one of the fundamental principles of 
the Community, the terms ‘worker’ in Article 48 may not be interpreted differently according to the law of each 
Member State but has a Community meaning. Since it defines the scope of that fundamental freedom, the 
Community concept of a ‘worker’ must be interpreted broadly.” 
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SECTION 1. THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD BY MEMBER STATES 
102. In this first section, I review the various arguments developed by Member States in cases 
involving their retained powers. To this end, I first describe their overall strategy, and I then 
focus on the content of their arguments. All in all, they reflect a dual understanding of the 
interplay between the European Union and the national legal orders. 
1. Overall litigation strategy of the Member States 
103. “The more, the merrier.” To begin with, the applicability stage is a highly contested issue 
when powers retained by Member States are involved. Suffice to think, for instance, of 
Rottmann23 in the field of nationality, Watts24 in the field of social security, Bidar25 in the field of 
education, Viking Line26 in the field of social rights, or Garcia Avello27 in the field of the rules 
governing surnames. The applicability of European Union law to these areas was in each case 
very contentious. In this respect, not only do Member States almost systematically challenge the 
idea that European Union law applies to matters where they retain principal responsibility, but 
they are do so in large numbers. In cases involving powers retained by Member States, many 
governments submit written observations before the Court of Justice.28 This feature is of 
significant importance. It is first a sign of Member States’ concern that their vital interests are at 
stake, and of their determination to protect their interests – and in particular their financial 
interests, as will be seen in the following Chapter.29 Second, this also reflects Member States’ 
attempt to influence the Court of Justice’s decision-making process. M.-P. GRANGER30 has 
explored the latter issue, and it appears that governments resort increasingly to this strategy, the 
                                                 
23 Case C-135/08, Rottmann, [2010] ECR I-1449. 
24 Case C-372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-4325. 
25 Case C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119. 
26 Case C-438/05, Viking, [2007] ECR I-0779. 
27 Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, [2003] ECR I-11613. 
28 See, for instance, Opinion in Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré & Van Riet, [2003] ECR I-4509, 23-24: No less than 
twelve Member States submitted observations. 
29 See Infra, §§ 168s. 
30 M.-P. GRANGER, “When governments go to Luxembourg…: the influence of governments on the Court of 
Justice,” 29 Eur. Law Rev. 1-31 (2004); M.-P. GRANGER, “Les stratégies contentieuses des Etats devant la Cour,” in 
Dans la fabrique du droit européen: scènes, acteurs et publics de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, 
(Eds.) A. VAUCHEZ & P. MBONGO, (Coll. Droit de l’Union européenne, Brussels: Bruylant, 2009), 64-124. See 
also U. EVERLING, “The Member States of the European Community before their Court of Justice,” 9 ELRev. 
(1984) 215-241; M. BULTERMAN & C. WISSELS, “Strategies developed by – and between – national governments to 
interact with the ECJ,” in Judicial activism at the European Court of Justice: causes, responses and solutions, (Eds.) M. 
DAWSON, B. DE WITTE & E. MUIR, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013), 264-278. 
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aim of which is at least to put the Court under the pressure to develop a sound and convincing 
reasoning.31 
2. Correspondence between scope of application and scope of powers 
104. Reliance on the conferral principle. A second decisive feature of the strategy developed by 
Member States in cases involving their retained powers relates to the fact that they have brought 
similar arguments before the Court of Justice in the various fields analyzed herein. Altogether, 
these arguments boil down to claiming that, since the European Union has no, or very limited, 
jurisdiction in these fields, European Union law should not apply to measures taken in the 
exercise of these national powers. This is illustrated by Tas-Hagen, a case involving the 
compensation of civil war victims. The United Kingdom government argued that the Treaty 
provisions on European Union citizenship could not apply because: 
[R]eliance on Article 18(1) EC presupposes that the situation concerned relates to a matter 
covered by Community law and that Community law is also applicable in that respect 
‘ratione materiae.’32 
Member States have developed the same type of reasoning in most of the fields, such as social 
security,33 direct taxation,34 nationality,35 social rights,36 the compensation of civil war victims,37 
or the enforcement for the recovery of debts.38 In addition, it is significant that national courts 
themselves happen to express doubts as to the hypothetical applicability of European Union 
law in fields where European Union action is excluded or inexistent, such as direct taxation: 
Noting that direct taxation falls within the exclusive powers of the Member States, the 
national court expresses doubts as to the possibility of applying Article 48 to national 
legislation in this sphere. In particular, ‘… nowhere does the EEC Treaty confer express 
authority to harmonize the direct taxes of the Member States.’39 
In addition to their similarity, Member States’ arguments are also specific to the fields involving 
powers retained by Member States, and are usually not used in traditional free movement cases. 
Member States have designed several strategies in order to challenge the applicability of 
                                                 
31 M.-P. GRANGER, “Les stratégies contentieuses des Etats devant la Cour,”, above, n. 30, 87. 
32 Opinion in Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen, [2006] ECR I-10451, 28. 
33 See, for instance, Case C-158/96, Kohll, [1998] ECR I-1931, 16. 
34 See, for instance, Case C-204/90, Bachmann, [1992] ECR I-249, 10. 
35 See, for instance, Case C-135/08, Rottmann, [2010] ECR I-1449, 37. 
36 See, for instance, Case C-438/05, Viking, [2007] ECR I-0779, 39s. 
37 See, for instance, the Opinion in Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen, [2006] ECR I-10451, 28. 
38 See the Opinion in Case C-224/02, Pusa, [2004] ECR I-5763, 12. 
39 Opinion in Case C-279/93, Schumacker, [1995] ECR I-225, 16. 
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European Union law. These strategies revolve, in one way or another, around the conferral 
principle.  
105. Thus, unsurprisingly, Member States have based some of their arguments on Treaty 
provisions excluding explicitly European Union action. For instance, one of the arguments 
brought before the Court in Bidar, a case on higher education involving the financial support of 
incoming students, relied on Article 149 EC (now Article 165 TFEU), the first paragraph of 
which only confers complementary action to the European Union.40 Similarly, in Laval, the 
Danish government referred to Article 137§5 EC (now Article 153§5 TFEU), according to 
which Article 153 TFEU “shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or 
the right to impose lock-outs.” The same government inferred from this provision that “the 
Community has no power directly or indirectly to regulate” the right to take collective action.41 
Likewise, in Rottmann, the Member States made reference to Declaration 2, annexed to the 
Maastricht Treaty, and claimed that nationality matters fell within the powers retained by 
Member States.42 The silence of the Treaty has also been used to infer the inapplicability of 
European Union law, as evidenced by the aforementioned statement of the national court in 
Schumacker.43 Last but not least, Member States have resorted to arguments which, although 
based on the conferral principle, are nonetheless of a less formalistic nature. They have 
asserted, on numerous occasions, that the inapplicability of European Union law flows from 
the impossibility to establish a connecting factor between the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty and the material scope of the national measure at issue. This 
reasoning was well summarized by the Advocate General in Morgan & Bucher, another case on 
higher education involving the refusal by Germany to confer a study grant on resident students 
willing to study abroad: 
Several of the written observations (…) claim that the European Union has no jurisdiction 
over study grants granted by the Member States. Since Community matters are not 
involved, the rights conferred by Article 18 EC are unconnected with the facts of the 
questions referred for a preliminary ruling and no reply should be given to the national 
court.44 
                                                 
40 Opinion in Case C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119, 37. 
41 Opinion in Case C-341/05, Laval, [2007] ECR I-11767, 48. See also Opinion in Case C-438/05, Viking, [2007] 
ECR I-0779, 20 and Case C-438/05, Viking, [2007] ECR I-0779, 39. 
42 Case C-135/08, Rottmann, [2010] ECR I-1449, 37. 
43 Case C-279/93, Schumacker, [1995] ECR I-225. 
44 Opinion in Cases C-11/06 & 12/06, Morgan & Bucher, [2007] ECR I-9161, 79 (Emphasis added). 
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This statement shows once again that, in the eyes of Member States, the applicability of 
European Union law, to be established, must be linked to the existence of powers held by the 
European Union in the field involved. In other words, they see the scope of application of 
European Union law as strictly corresponding to the scope of the powers of European Union 
law.  
106. The roots of Member States’ line of reasoning. This specific line of reasoning does not find 
its roots in cases involving powers retained by Member States. Member States have, as a matter 
of fact, maintained similar positions in other cases. A review of the Court of Justice case law 
shows that it goes back to an early ruling, Commission v. France, decided in 1969 in the field of 
state aid.45 This case concerned a preferential rediscount rate for exports granted by the Banque 
de France to French exported products alone. In two decisions, the European Commission 
authorized this aid, but made it conditional upon several requirements that France failed to 
comply with.46 The Commission subsequently launched infringement proceedings. Against this 
background, the French government advanced the following argument: 
[T]he French Republic alleges that “the rules of the Treaty are deficient in the monetary 
sphere” and states that the fixing of the discount rate falls directly within monetary policy 
which is a matter in which the Member States alone are competent and that therefore by 
starting the proceedings […] the Commission acted unlawfully by arrogating to itself 
jurisdiction which the Treaty denies it.47 
Thus, as early as 1969, a Member State was using the conferral principle with the view to 
challenge the applicability of European Union law. Indeed, it already linked the lack of 
European Union jurisdiction directly with the inapplicability of European Union law. 
107. The expression of a dual understanding. Altogether, the various arguments developed by 
Member States reflect the same understanding of the interplay between the respective legal 
orders of the European Union and of the Member States. This understanding implies the need 
for a strict correspondence between the applicability of European Union law in a given field, 
and the existence of European powers in the very same field.48 This type of argument may be 
                                                 
45 Cases 6 & 11/69, Commission v. France, [1969] ECR 523. 
46 Ibid., 1-8. 
47 Ibid., 10. See also Ibid., 12: the French government defends the view that the Commission acted within a 
“sphere which belongs exclusively to the jurisdiction of the Member States.” 
48 See Case C-341/05, Laval, [2007] ECR I-11767, 86: “The Danish and Swedish governments submit that the 
right to take collective action in the context of negotiations with an employer falls outside the scope of Article 49 
EC, since, pursuant to Article 137(5) EC, as amended by the Treaty of Nice, the Community has no power to 
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described as “dual.” It indeed relies on the assumption that the respective spheres of 
jurisdiction of the European Union and of the Member States are independent from each 
other, and that there is and should be a strict dissociation between the two. Thus, this is 
tantamount to claiming that each entity – i.e. the European Union and the Member States – 
should be supreme only within its own spheres of powers. This reveals Member States’ view 
that they should enjoy absolute freedom to define and exercise their retained powers. They 
understand their powers as being discretionary, the exercise of which should not be constrained 
by the European legality principle or, in other words, should fall outside the Court of Justice 
own jurisdiction. The conditions of such an exercise should therefore only be subject to 
domestic judicial review. Accordingly, the arguments developed by Member States in cases 
involving their retained powers also reflect their understanding of the primacy principle. 
Fundamentally, Member States argue that European Union law should trump national laws 
only within the spheres of European Union powers, while Member States should be supreme 
within the spheres of their retained powers – this entails that the European Union primacy 
principle should not apply to spheres where the Member States have exclusive jurisdiction. 
They therefore promote a strict interpretation of the primacy principle, which coincides with 
the definition given by J. H. H. WEILER: 
The principle of supremacy can be expressed, not as an absolute rule whereby Community 
(or federal) law trumps Member State law, but instead as a principle whereby each law is 
supreme within its sphere of competence.49 
In response to these arguments, the Court of Justice has accepted that the scope of the powers 
of the European Union can be used as a yardstick to define the scope of application of 
European Union law only on very few occasions. Indeed, it has developed, for the most part, a 
different way of reasoning, thereby expressing a different understanding of the interplay 
between the respective legal orders of the European Union and of the Member States. 
                                                 
regulate that right.” See also D. RITLENG, “Les États membres face aux entraves,” in L’entrave dans le droit du marché 
intérieur, (Ed.) L. AZOULAI, (Brussels: Bruylant, 2011), 304. 
49 J. H. H. WEILER, “The Transformation of Europe,” in The Constitution of Europe: Do the new Clothes have an 
Emperor? And other Essays on European Integration, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1999, 21. 
Ch. 2. Section 2. The Court of Justice line of reasoning 89 
SECTION 2. THE COURT OF JUSTICE LINE OF REASONING 
108. In all the rulings analyzed herein, the Court finds that European Union law is 
applicable. The purpose of this Section is to assess how it proceeds to justify the applicability of 
European Union law in fields where the European Union has nonetheless no, or very limited, 
jurisdiction. To this end, I first shed light on the defining feature of the assessment of the 
Court of Justice in the applicability stage of cases involving powers retained by Member States. 
This assessment is based on the distinction between existence and exercise of power. I then 
discuss the implications of such an approach, and I demonstrate that it leads to the disjunction 
of the scope of application of European Union law from the scope of the powers held by the 
European Union. 
1. A reasoning based on the distinction between existence and exercise of power 
109. Apart from some of the rulings decided in the field of education, the Court of Justice 
constantly rejects the arguments developed by Member States. It systematically rules that 
European Union law is applicable. In doing so, it follows an interesting and consistent 
approach, based on the distinction between existence and exercise of the powers retained by 
Member States. As mentioned earlier, this approach consists in stating formulae at the 
applicability stage. It moreover consists in looking into the effects of the national measures right 
from the assessment of applicability. 
a. Two concurrent approaches in the education field 
110. The Court of Justice has developed different strategies at the applicability stage of cases 
involving the field of education. Education has indeed undergone many changes over the years. 
The Court initially developed an approach based on the correspondence between European 
Union jurisdiction and the applicability of European Union law, thereby echoing the 
arguments traditionally developed by the Member States. Nowadays, it still follows this 
approach to some extent, but it also happens to base its reasoning on the stating of formulae. 
111. The correspondence between the scope of application of EU law and the scope of EU powers. 
Interestingly, at the outset of its case law on education, i.e. in the 1980s, the Court of Justice 
linked the applicability of European Union law with the scope of the powers held by the then 
European Community, and made the former conditional upon the latter. This is well 
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illustrated, for instance, by Gravier,1 one of the rulings involving the ‘minerval’ Belgian fee, 
imposed in this case on nonresident students registered in Belgium for a four-year course in a 
non-university institute of higher education, to the exclusion of resident students. The Court 
was called upon to decide whether access to, and participation in, courses of vocational training 
fell within the scope of the Treaty. To address this issue, it determined whether a link between 
European Union powers and vocational training could be found. It eventually held that: 
[A]lthough educational organization and policy are not as such included in the spheres 
which the Treaty has entrusted to the Community institutions, access to and participation 
in courses of instruction and apprenticeship, in particular vocational training, are not 
unconnected with Community law.2 
The Court established such a connection on the basis of European Union primary and 
secondary law. It referred to Article 128 EEC,3 which empowered the Community to “establish 
general principles for the implementation of a common policy of occupational training,” as 
well as to various acts of secondary legislation adopted in pursuance of this power, such as 
regulations, Council decisions and resolutions.4 Such reasoning boils down to understanding 
national and European Union powers as belonging to two distinct spheres, which may not 
interfere with one another. There are, on one end of the spectrum, national retained powers – 
educational organization and policy – where Member States enjoy absolute freedom, and 
which fall outside the reach of European Union law. On the other end of the spectrum, 
another sphere can be found, which comprises the powers of the European Union – the 
vocational training regulatory powers held by the Community –, which corresponds to the 
scope of application of European Union law. In Gravier, the broadening of the scope of 
European Union law stemmed from an extensive interpretation of the scope of European 
Union powers.  
                                                 
1 Case 293/83, Gravier, [1985] ECR 593. 
2 Ibid., 19 (Emphases added). 
3 Ibid., 21. 
4 Ibid., 20s: Articles 7 and 12 of Regulation 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on Freedom of 
movement for workers within the Community, Council Decision 63/266/EEC of 2 April 1963 laying down 
principle for implementing a common vocational training policy capable of contributing to the harmonious 
development both of the national economies and of the common market, the ‘general guidelines’ laid down by the 
Council in 1971 for drawing up a Community program on vocational training, the resolution of the Council and 
of the Ministers for education meeting the Council of 13 December 1976 concerning measures to be taken to 
improve the preparation of young people for work and to facilitate their transition from education to working life 
and the Council Resolution of 11 July 1983 concerning vocational training policies in the European Community 
in the 1980s. 
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112. It is noteworthy that the Court happened to use the very same approach, based on the 
correspondence between European Union powers and the scope of application of European 
Union law, to rule out the applicability of European Union law. In Lair5 and Brown,6 the 
question was posed whether nonresident students could qualify for educational grants. The 
Court of Justice answered in the negative on the following grounds: 
At the present stage of development of Community law assistance given to students for 
maintenance and for training falls in principle outside the scope of the EEC Treaty for the 
purposes of Article 7. It is, on the one hand, a matter of educational policy, which is not as 
such included in the spheres entrusted to the Community institutions and, on the other, a 
matter of social policy, which falls within the competence of the Member States in so far as 
it is not covered by specific provisions of the EEC Treaty.7 
It based once again its reasoning on the idea of separate and exclusive spheres, and on the 
conferral principle. Here, a restrictive interpretation of European Union powers led to 
excluding the application of European Union law. The Court subsequently reversed these 
rulings through the same line of reasoning. Bidar,8 decided in 2005, raised the issue of whether 
financial assistance granted to students for maintenance costs and training continued to fall 
outside the reach of European Union law. The plaintiff argued that the extension of the scope 
of application of European Union law resulted from the extension of Community powers in 
the field of education.9 And, indeed, the Court of Justice, following its Advocate General,10 
referred to Articles 3(1)(g) and 149 EC (now Article 165 TFEU) and concluded that European 
Union law applied to financial assistance for students.11  
113. All in all, in the field of education, the Court of Justice continued to exclusively follow 
this initial approach until Commission v. Austria, decided in 2005.12 This case involved Austrian 
provisions imposing on holders of secondary education diplomas obtained in other Member 
States conditions that were different than those applicable to holders of Austrian diplomas. 
The Court agreed with the European Commission that the reasoning developed in Gravier 
                                                 
5 Case 39/86, Lair, [1988] ECR 3161. 
6 Case 197/86, Brown, [1988] ECR 3205. 
7 Case 39/86, Lair, [1988] ECR 3161, 15; and Case 197/86, Brown, [1988] ECR 3205, 18 (Emphases added). 
8 Case C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119. 
9 Opinion in Case C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119, 35. 
10 See in particular its Opinion in Case C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119, 50: “The inclusion of these provisions 
on education is therefore indicative of the fact that the subject of assistance within maintenance costs now falls 
within the substantive scope of the EC Treaty.” 
11 Case C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119, 38s. 
12 Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969. 
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applied to the facts of the case, and it rejected the Austrian contention whereby the Austrian 
measure concerned the recognition of secondary education diplomas, a field falling within the 
powers retained by Member States.13 Therefore, in the first series of cases decided in the field of 
education, the Court of Justice reasoning is based on the same rationale as that developed by 
the Member States. There seemed to be a consensus on the assumption that the scope of 
application of European Union law was to be established with respect to the same benchmark 
that was used for determining the scope of European Union powers. 
114. The emergence of the distinction between existence and exercise of power. The Court of Justice 
subsequently departed from its original standpoint and, as a result, from Member States’ 
understanding of the interplay between the European Union and national legal orders. In 
Commission v. Austria itself, Advocate General JACOBS developed an original line of reasoning – 
to which the Court did not allude in its ruling. He proceeded with the assessment of European 
Union law applicability and, in so doing, he wondered whether the Austrian measure fell 
within the scope of the Treaty, or within the powers retained by Member States in the field of 
education. Following the Court’s traditional approach, he concluded that European Union law 
was applicable in this case.14 But he added an interesting statement, which reads as follows: 
[E]ven if the contested national provisions were, as the Republic of Austria claims, to fall 
within the sphere of competences retained by Member States in the field of education, 
Member States are still bound to exercise their retained powers in a manner consistent 
with Community law, which includes respect for the principle of equal treatment.15 
The Advocate General referred, for the first time in the field of education, to the distinction 
between existence and exercise of power. Stating this distinction boiled down to asserting that 
even if the European Union had no jurisdiction in the matter at hand, Member States should 
still comply with European Union law when exercising their powers. In other words, this was a 
way of saying that there was no need for establishing a formal correspondence between 
European Union powers and the scope of application of European Union law. Thus, the 
Advocate General used this distinction in such a way as to go beyond possible limitations 
inherent to the limited scope of the Treaty. He therefore initiated the first move towards a 
more pragmatic approach at the applicability stage of education cases. The Court of Justice, in 
turn, took over the distinction in the form of formulae employed in Schwarz and Commission v. 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 28-34. 
14 Opinion in Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969, 15-18. 
15 Ibid., 19 (Emphasis added). 
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Germany.16 However, it did not state them at the applicability stage, but at the justification stage 
of its rulings.17 It is only in a subsequent case, Morgan & Bucher,18 decided in 2007, relating to 
the financial assistance of students studying abroad, that it used a formula stating the 
distinction between existence and exercise at the applicability stage. 
115. The current lack of consistency in the Court of Justice approach. Four cases were decided in 
the field of education after Morgan & Bucher, and a close look shows that the Court of Justice 
does not consistently adopt one approach over another. In Förster, which related once again to 
students’ financial assistance, both the Advocate General and the Court applied the findings of 
Bidar at the applicability stage, without even specifically addressing the issue of power.19 Nor 
does Zanotti20 include the formula. This case pertained to gross tax deduction of the costs of 
attending a university course in another Member State. In Zanotti the Court of Justice primarily 
focused on the issue of whether the Treaty provision on the freedom to provide services 
applied.21 Things are however different as far as Bressol22 is concerned. It was decided in 2010 
and it involved a Belgian Decree regulating the number of students in certain programs in the 
first two years of undergraduate studies in higher education. While the Advocate General 
followed an approach based on the correspondence between European Union powers and the 
scope of application of European Union law,23 the Court of Justice combined two perspectives. 
It stated the formula based on the distinction between existence and exercise of power,24 and it 
moreover showed that, according to previous case law, access to higher education fell within the 
material scope of the Treaty.25 Last but not least, mentioned should also be made of Commission 
v. Austria, decided in 2012.26 The measure at issue in this case granted price reductions for local 
public transport under conditions that nonresident students could generally not fulfilled. The 
Court first held that, under Bidar,27 Grzelczyk,28 and D’Hoop,29 the Austrian measure fell within 
                                                 
16 Case C-76/05, Schwarz, [2007] ECR I-6849; Case C-318/05, Commission v. Germany, [2007] ECR I-6957. 
17 Case C-76/05, Schwarz, [2007] ECR I-6849, 70; Case C-318/05, Commission v. Germany, [2007] ECR I-6957, 86. 
18 Cases C-11/06 & 12/06, Morgan & Bucher, [2007] ECR I-9161, 24. 
19 See Opinion in Case C-158/07, Förster, [2008] ECR I-850, 41 (but see also at 55 where the Advocate General 
alludes to the responsibilities of the Member States), and Case C-158/07, Förster, [2008] ECR I-8507, 36s. 
20 Case C-56/09, Zanotti, [2010] ECR I-4517. 
21 Ibid., 29s. 
22 Case C-73/08, Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735, 28. 
23 Opinion in Case C-73/08, Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735, 33s. 
24 Case C-73/08, Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735, 28. 
25 Ibid., 30s. 
26 Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969. 
27 Case C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119. 
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the material scope of the Treaty in that it concerned the maintenance costs of students. It did 
not state the traditional education formula.30 However, it did state a formula relating to social 
security,31 in response to Austria’s contention that the measure should be seen as a family 
benefit for the purposes of Regulation 1408/71.  
116. Implications. The example of education is very useful for a better understanding of the 
overall reasoning of the Court of Justice. The rulings decided in this field reflect the various 
options that may be chosen by the Court when it is called upon to rule on the applicability of 
European Union law in fields falling within powers deemed as retained by Member States. 
Each approach described above has its own implications, which reveal different policy 
orientations that may be adopted by the Court. On the one hand, the initial approach of the 
Court of Justice, based on the correspondence between European Union jurisdiction and the 
scope of application of European Union law, is twofold. It first comprises a rather formal 
dimension. The applicability of European Union law is made conditional upon Treaty 
provisions empowering the European Union and/or the existence of acts of secondary 
legislation. As a result, broadening the scope of European Union law implies construing the 
Treaty provisions and/or acts of secondary legislation extensively. Thus, the expansion of the 
scope of application of European Union law seems to be limited – at least formally – by the 
conferral principle: the scope of application of European Union law does not go beyond the 
scope of the powers held by the European Union. But this approach also brings to light, at the 
same time, a flexible aspect. It may indeed lead the judge to either broaden the scope of 
European Union law or to circumscribe it by admitting that it is limited. On the other hand, 
the Court’s approach based on the distinction between existence and exercise of power seems 
much more far-reaching than the initial one. This way of reasoning, as will be seen below, 
fundamentally implies dissociating the ambit of European Union law from European Union 
jurisdiction, the former being broader than the latter. It moreover implies that the conferral 
principle is no longer used as a yardstick. However, despite the unlimited potential of this 
approach, it also somewhat constrains the Court of Justice. The latter is indeed led to 
                                                 
28 Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, [2001] ECR I-6193. 
29 Case C-224/98, D’Hoop, [2002] ECR I-6191. 
30 Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969, 42-43. 
31 Ibid., 47: “Although Member States retain the power to organize their social security schemes, with the result 
that, in the absence of harmonization at European Union level, it is for them to determine the conditions 
concerning the right or duty to be insured with a social security scheme as well as the conditions for entitlement to 
benefits, in exercising those powers, they must none the less comply with the law of the European Union.” 
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systematically rule out Member States’ arguments based on the inapplicability of European 
Union law, and to conclude that European Union law is applicable, regardless of the field 
involved. Quite paradoxically, it leaves it with little room for applying its power of discretion 
with respect to the applicability stage. 
b. The other fields: the quasi-systematic use of the formulae 
117. Apart from the field of education, the Court of Justice has constantly rejected the 
arguments developed by Member States based on the correspondence between the scope of 
application of European Union law and the scope of the powers held by the European Union. 
In so doing, it has followed an interesting and consistent approach, based on the distinction 
between existence and exercise of the powers retained by Member States. As seen earlier, this 
approach consists in stating formulae at the applicability stage, which express the idea that even 
if certain fields fall within national retained powers, Member States must nonetheless comply 
with European Union law when they exercise them. The analysis of the Court of Justice case 
law shows that the formulae, which rest upon the distinction between existence and exercise of 
power, fulfill the same function, have a common origin, and rest on common conceptual 
foundations. 
118. The function of the formulae. In the various fields analyzed herein, the formulae generally 
emerged in response to Member States’ challenge of the applicability of European Union law, 
on the grounds that they retained main responsibility. Therefore, the formulae fulfill a precise 
function in the Court of Justice reasoning.32 The Court uses them in support of the application 
of European Union law, as confirmed by the Court itself in Rottmann: 
The proviso that due regard must be had to European Union law […] enshrines the 
principle that, in respect of citizens of the Union, the exercise of that powers, in so far as it 
affects the rights conferred and protected by the legal order of the Union […] is amenable 
to judicial review carried out in the light of European Union law.33 
                                                 
32 See, in this respect, A. MAITROT DE LA MOTTE, “L’entrave fiscale,” in L’entrave dans le droit du marché intérieur, 
(Ed.) L. AZOULAI, (Brussels: Bruylant, 2011), 103, who makes the same observation as far as the formula in direct 
taxation is concerned. He indeed underlines that the use of the formula is not insignificant, but corresponds, on 
the contrary, to a method found by the Court of Justice to solve the difficulties relating to the ‘meeting’ of 
European law with national tax laws. See also L. AZOULAI, “La formule des compétences retenues des Etats 
membres devant la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne,” in Objectifs et compétences dans l’Union européenne, (Ed.) 
E. NEFRAMI, (Brussels: Bruylant, 2013, Droit de l'Union Européenne), 341, 343. 
33 Case C-135/08, Rottmann, [2010] ECR I-1449, 48. 
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The formulae are conferred a function of justification, as evidenced, for instance, by the 
Opinions under Schumacker and Laval.34 In the former case,35 pertaining to direct taxation, the 
Advocate General first applied a formal reasoning, comparable to that of the Court of Justice 
in its early education rulings and to Member States’ arguments. He indeed started from the 
premise that the then Article 95 EEC (now Article 114 TFEU) did not apply to matters 
relating to income tax. But he further added that it was nonetheless possible to rely on Article 
100 EEC (now Article 115 TFEU), even though unanimity was required, and inferred that 
European Union law was applicable.36 However, he did not stop there and, on top of his initial 
demonstration, he continued with an argument based on the distinction between the existence 
and the exercise of power: 
Social security, direct taxation or, for example, the conditions for the award of university 
diplomas are matters for the Member States. They are nevertheless required to adopt, in 
those areas, rules which respect the great freedoms laid down by Community law.37 
This argument thus seems to be used as a means to go beyond what formal reasoning would 
allow, subject to the inherent limitations of the restricted scope of European Union powers. In 
other words, the Advocate General saw this argument as irrefutable. And, true, up to now, no 
national government has ever managed to come up with arguments powerful enough to 
counter this line of reasoning.  
119. Similarly, in Laval, the Advocate General discussed the relationship between Article 
137§5 EC and the hypothetical application of European Union law to the facts of the case. In 
his opinion, Article 137§5 EC was to be read exclusively in conjunction with the other 
paragraphs of Article 137, and should not “determine the scope of all provisions of the 
Treaty.”38 And, in the same manner as Advocate General LÉGER in Schumacker, he expressed the 
view that: 
That said, even if Article 137(5) EC were interpreted as reserving exclusive competence to 
the Member States regarding regulation of the right to resort to collective action, that 
provision would not mean that, in the exercise of that competence, the Member States did 
                                                 
34 See also the Opinion in Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969. 
35 Case C-279/93, Schumacker, [1995] ECR I-225. 
36 Opinion in Case C-279/93, Schumacker, [1995] ECR I-225, 17s. 
37 Ibid., 24. 
38 Opinion in Case C-341/05, Laval, [2007] ECR I-11767, 55. 
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not need to satisfy themselves that the fundamental freedoms of movement provided for by 
the Treaty are respected within their territory.39 
The use of the formulae as a justification of the applicability of European Union law is 
consistent in all the fields analyzed herein, except the education domain. National 
governments generally stop challenging the applicability of European Union law once the 
Court of Justice has made it clear that it would systematically reject claims based on the lack of 
power on the part of the European Union. Nevertheless, rulings relating to national retained 
powers almost always contain formulae, even when the applicability issue is not specifically 
addressed. Thus, on top of their justification function, formulae also seek to recall the basic 
principle according to which the exclusive character of the powers retained by Member States 
does not give grounds for the inapplicability of European Union law. 
120. The common origin of the formulae. I have already set forth the various wordings of the 
formulae in Chapter 1.40 It turns out that the whole of the formulae reported above have a 
common origin. True, they appeared at different periods of time. The most recent formula 
appeared in the field of nationality, in Rottmann, decided in 2010.41 In the areas relating to 
education and the right to strike, the Court started to state the formulae in 2007, in Morgan & 
Bucher42 and Viking Line43 respectively. The formula relating to the compensation of civil war 
victims was first stated in 2006, in Tas-Hagen;44 the one pertaining to the enforcement for the 
recovery of debts dates from the Pusa45 case handed down in 2004. As for the rules governing 
surnames, the formula appeared in the 2003 Garcia Avello46 ruling. In the case of cross-border 
health care, the formula emerged earlier, in 1998, in Decker & Kohll.47 In the end, it seems that 
the first ‘consolidated’ formula was used within the field of direct taxation, in the 1995 
Schumacker48 case. However, as they emerged, the Court reasoned by analogy, by making cross-
references to formulae that were previously used in other areas. Thus, the Court of Justice 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 59. 
40 See, Supra, § 85. 
41 Case C-135/08, Rottmann, [2010] ECR I-1449, 39 & 41. 
42 Cases C-11/06 & 12/06, Morgan & Bucher, [2007] ECR I-9161. 
43 Case C-438/05, Viking, [2007] ECR I-0779. 
44 Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen, [2006] ECR I-10451. 
45 Case C-224/02, Pusa, [2004] ECR I-5763. 
46 Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, [2003] ECR I-11613. 
47 Case C-120/95, Decker, [1998] ECR I-1831; Case C-158/96, Kohll, [1998] ECR I-1931. 
48 Case C-279/93, Schumacker, [1995] ECR I-225. 
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referred to Garcia Avello49 in Rottmann50 and Pusa.51 It also alluded, whether directly or 
indirectly, to the cross-border health care formula in Garcia Avello,52 Morgan & Bucher53 and 
Viking Line.54 As for Decker & Kohll,55 they comprise a direct reference to Schumacker.56 
Accordingly, this shows that the Court has transferred, and adapted, the direct taxation 
formula and its underlying principles to the other fields analyzed herein. The Court of Justice 
not only asserts formulae in the framework of its power-based approach. L. AZOULAI has 
shown, in this respect, that it is a significant feature of, and that it plays an important role for, 
the entirety of its case law – in this context it is sufficient to think, for instance, of the seminal 
Dassonville formula.57 But the use of the formulae at the applicability stage of the rulings 
involving powers retained by Member States is nonetheless a defining component of the power-
based approach. It is indeed a sign that the Court applies a similar line of reasoning to assess 
the applicability of European Union law in the various fields at issue. 
121. The conceptual foundations of the formulae. One might think, at this stage, that the 
formulae only serve a rhetorical function. But the European Court of Justice case law shows, 
instead, that they rest on deep-rooted conceptual foundations. In this respect, it is noteworthy 
that the first formula, as used in Schumacker,58 makes reference to another ruling, which forms 
part of the seminal Factortame cases: Commission v. United Kingdom of 4 October 1991.59 The 
facts are well known. They involved several fishing companies, incorporated under the laws of 
                                                 
49 Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, [2003] ECR I-11613. 
50 Case C-135/08, Rottmann, [2010] ECR I-1449. 
51 Case C-224/02, Pusa, [2004] ECR I-5763. 
52 The ‘Garcia Avello formula’, Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, [2003] ECR I-11613, 25, refers to Case C-336/94, 
Dafeki, [1997] ECR I-6761, and Case C-135/99, Elsen, [2000] ECR I-409. Dafeki concerned German provisions 
under which certificates of civil status are accorded different probative value, depending on whether they are 
German or foreign. At 16-20, the Court acknowledged that there was differences and variations between the 
national legal orders but nonetheless set limits on Member States, stating that the “exercise of the rights arising 
from the freedom of movement of workers must be effective.” The Elsen case, at 33, contained the social security 
formula and a direct reference to Decker & Kohll. 
53 The Morgan formula refers to the Schwarz formula, used at the justification phase and that in turn refers to Case 
C-372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-4325, a social security case. 
54 The Viking formula refers to the Decker & Kohll formula, as well as to direct taxation cases that comprise the 
formula. 
55 Case C-120/95, Decker, [1998] ECR I-1831; Case C-158/96, Kohll, [1998] ECR I-1931. 
56 Case C-279/93, Schumacker, [1995] ECR I-225. 
57 Case 8/74, Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837, 5: “All trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of 
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade are to be considered as measures 
having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.” See L. AZOULAI, “La fabrication de la jurisprudence 
communautaire,” in Dans la fabrique du droit européen: scènes, acteurs et publics de la Cour de la justice des Communautés 
européennes, (Eds.) P. MBONGO & A. VAUCHEZ, (Brussels: Bruylant, 2009), 153, 163-165. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Case C-246/89, Commission v. United Kingdom [1991] ECR I-4585. 
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the United Kingdom, whose most of directors and shareholders were Spanish nationals. The 
passage of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 prevented them from reregistering their fishing 
vessels in the United Kingdom – this law was passed to combat “quota hopping” i.e. the 
practice whereby fishing companies flew British flags to benefit from its fishing quotas, but 
which, in reality, lacked any genuine link with this country. These days more remembered for 
its implications for the primacy principle, the powers of national courts and the British 
principle of parliamentary supremacy, the Factortame series also contains important 
consequences with respect to cases involving powers retained by Member States. The Court 
held in Commission v. United Kingdom that: 
[A]s Community law stands at present, it is for the Member States to determine, in 
accordance with the general rules of international law, the conditions which must be 
fulfilled in order for a vessel to be registered in their registers and granted the right to fly 
their flag, but, in exercising that power, the Member States must comply with the rules of 
Community law.60 
This statement is highly reminiscent of the formulae used by the Court in free movement cases 
involving powers retained by Member States. In a similar way, the Court based the justification 
of the applicability of European Union law to an area – the registration of vessels – where the 
then European Economic Community had no jurisdiction by relying on the distinction 
between the existence of the powers and their conditions of exercise.  
122. In this regard, it is worth examining the opinion of Advocate General MISCHO, who 
strongly influenced the Court’s rulings. MISCHO devoted specific paragraphs to the “scope of 
the competence of the Member States with regard to the registration of fishing boats.”61 The 
first steps of his reasoning consist in distinguishing between the existence and the exercise of 
Member States’ powers.62 What is very interesting here is how he came up with this distinction. 
Indeed, he inferred from previous cases relating to Member States’ monetary powers that: 
                                                 
60 Ibid., 15. 
61 Opinion in Case C-246/89, Commission v. United Kingdom [1991] ECR I-4585, 5-24. 
62 Ibid., 5-6: 
“5. It is uncontested that as Community law stands at present competence to determine the conditions for the 
registration of fishing boats is vested in the Member States. The Court confirmed this in its judgment of 19 
January 1988 in Pesca Valentia (Case 223/86 Pesca Valentia v Minister for Fisheries and Forestry, [1988] ECR 83, 
paragraph 13), in which it held that although the Community regulations on fisheries refer to fishing vessels 'flying 
the flag' of a Member State or 'registered' there, they leave those terms to be defined in the legislation of the 
Member States.” 
“6. This does not mean, however, that the Member States may exercise that competence in complete liberty 
without regard to the principles of Community law.” 
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Consequently, without having to decide whether the right of registration is a retained 
power or whether the Community could legislate at any time in that field, it must be held 
that in exercising that competence the Member States must comply with the general rules 
of the Treaty.63 
His conclusion is based on reasoning by analogy. He suggested that what applied in the field of 
monetary policy also held true for the registration of vessels. Indeed, he referred to an assertion 
made by the Court on several occasions in cases pertaining to the field of monetary policy:  
[T]he fact that Member States retain certain monetary powers does not entitle them to take 
unilateral measures prohibited by the Treaty.64 
123. Such a principle, according to which Member States may not rely on the retained 
character of their powers to take unilateral measures in the monetary policy field, goes back to 
the aforementioned Cases 6 & 11/69 Commission v. France.65 These decisions have had decisive 
implications for the enshrinement of the distinction between existence and exercise of national 
powers in the Court’s case law. As two commentators noted at the time, they reflect “a clash of 
two concepts on the nature of the economic integration in the Communities.”66 The French 
Republic, as seen above, relied on a “premise of a complete sovereignty in the monetary field” 
while the European Commission argued that “these powers had to be exercised in such a 
manner that no conflict could arise with the exigencies of the Common Market.”67 The Court 
adopted the view of the European Commission view and held that: 
The exercise of reserved powers cannot therefore permit the unilateral adoption of 
measures prohibited by the Treaty.68 
This assertion is of major importance. For the first time, the European Court of Justice had to 
answer the question as to whether the exclusive character of the powers retained by Member 
States automatically legitimated possible encroachments upon powers of the then European 
Economic Community when the former were being exercised. The Court answered negatively 
by putting forward two main arguments. First, admitting unilateral actions would negate 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 8. 
64 Case 127/87, Commission v. Greece, [1988] ECR 3333, 7, quoted in MISCHO’s opinion at 7. See also Case 57/86, 
Greece v. Commission, [1988] ECR 2855, 9: “As regards the argument that the repayment of interest is merely 
monetary in character, it is sufficient to point out that the Court has held […] that the exercise by the Member 
States of the powers retained by them in the monetary field do not permit them unilaterally to adopt measures 
prohibited by the Treaty.” 
65 Cases 6 & 11/69, Commission v. France, [1969] ECR 523. 
66 BRINKHORST L.J. & VEROUGSTAETE I.M., 7 C. M. L. Rev. 486 (1970). 
67 Ibid. 
68 Cases 6 & 11/69, Commission v. France, [1969] ECR 523, 17. 
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European powers.69 Accordingly, this would be at odds with the principle of effectiveness. 
Second, this would be contrary to the principle of loyal cooperation.70 In other words, the 
Court refused to recognize the existence of a “nucleus of sovereignty that Member States c[ould] 
invoke, as such, against the Community.”71  
124. This way of reasoning very much resembles the approach developed by the Court of 
Justice in De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg, decided in 1961 in the framework of the 
European Coal and Steel Community.72 This case also concerned the field of state aid. The 
Federal Republic of Germany had granted an aid to miners in the form of tax benefits. 
Unsurprisingly, the Court started by alluding to the conferral principle: 
Under the Treaty, those sectors of the economy of the Member States which do not come 
within the province of the Community are not subject to the decisions of the High 
Authority.73 
The Court subsequently found that social policy and fiscal policy fell within these sectors, but, 
interestingly enough, it also noted that Member States could detrimentally affect the conditions 
of competition in the coal or steel industry through the exercise of their retained powers.74 It 
went on by adding that “in order to safeguard the existence of the Common Market,” 
European Institutions should be able to shape the exercise of national retained powers.75 
Following this line of reasoning, it finally held that the then Article 67, which endeavored to 
“ensure the establishment, maintenance and observance of normal competitive conditions,” 
was: 
[D]esigned to enable the jurisdiction of the Community to impinge on national sovereignty 
in cases where, because of the power retained by the Member States, this is necessary to 
                                                 
69 Ibid., 15: “Articles 108(3) and 109(3) confer powers of authorization or intervention on the Community 
institutions which would be otiose if the Member States were free, on the pretext that their action related only to 
monetary policy, unilaterally to derogate from their obligations under the provisions of the Treaty and without 
being subject to control by the institutions.” 
70 Ibid., 16: “the solidarity which is at the basis of these obligations as of the whole of the Community system in 
accordance with the undertaking provided for in Article 5 of the Treaty, is continued for the benefit of the states 
in the procedure for mutual assistance provided for in Article 108 where a Member State is seriously threatened 
with difficulties as regards its balance of payment.” 
71 Terms borrowed from K. LENAERTS, “Constitutionalism and the many faces of federalism,” 38: 2 The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 220 (1990). See also, by the same author, K. LENAERTS, Le juge et la Constitution aux 
États-Unis d’Amérique et dans l’ordre juridique européen, (Brussels: Bruylant, 1988), 482s. 
72 Case 30/59, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen, [1961] ECR 1. 
73 Ibid., 23. 
74 Ibid., 24. 
75 Ibid., 24. 
Chapter 2. The Extension of EU Law Scope of Application 
 
102 
prevent the effectiveness of the Treaty from being considerably weakened and its purpose 
from being seriously compromised.76 
Accordingly, the idea was already present in 1961 that intrusions into national spheres of 
powers are necessary to preserve the effectiveness of European Union law.  
125. This inquiry into the roots of the formulae used in contemporary free movement cases 
involving powers retained by Member States is revealing. It shows, first of all, that the principles 
embodied in these formulae were originally developed in cases pertaining to the field of state 
aid. These principles are therefore not an exclusive feature of free movement cases involving 
retained powers. The Court of Justice has, instead, imported them from other fields – and 
adapted them. This is confirmed by the fact that, nowadays, it also follows this reasoning in a 
range of external relations cases. Centro-com,77 which concerned sanctions adopted by the 
European Union against Serbia and Montenegro, and in particular the decision of the Bank of 
England to preclude a British bank from transferring money from a Yugoslav account to a 
company governed by Italian law, is a good illustration. After explicitly referring to Cases 6 & 
11/69,78 the Court held that: 
Consequently, while it is for Member States to adopt measures of foreign and security 
policy in the exercise of their national competence, those measures must nevertheless 
respect the provisions adopted by the Community in the field of the common commercial 
policy provided for by Article 113 of the Treaty.79 
Thus, not only did the reasoning developed in the 1961 and 1969 rulings pave the way for the 
approach prevailing in free movement cases involving powers retained by Member States, it also 
laid the foundations of cases pertaining to other fields of European Union law. Second of all, 
this inquiry also shows that, taken together, the formulae reflect the Court’s understanding of 
European integration and its ongoing willingness to preserve the jurisdiction of the European 
Union. Member States may not ignore the obligations arising from the Treaty, by acting 
unilaterally, if the exercise of their retained powers jeopardizes the integrity of European powers 
and, ultimately, the European integration process. 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 24 (Emphasis added). 
77 Case C-124/95, The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com Srl v HM Treasury and Bank of England, [1997] ECR I-81. See, 
Supra, § 89. 
78 Ibid., 25. 
79 Ibid., 27. It is interesting to note that the Court of Justice developed this specific way of reasoning in response to 
the argument developed by the UK whereby “the national measures at issue in the main proceedings were taken by 
virtue of its national competence in the field of foreign and security policy and that performance of its obligations 
under the Charter and under resolutions of the United Nations falls within that competence.” (See Case C-
124/95, The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com Srl v HM Treasury and Bank of England, [1997] ECR I-81, 23). 
Ch. 2. Section 2. The Court of Justice line of reasoning 103 
c. An effect-based approach 
126. The approach developed by the Court of Justice at the applicability stage of cases 
involving powers retained by Member States distinguishes itself from traditional free movement 
cases in another respect. Indeed, the distinction drawn between existence and exercise of power 
reveals that the Court thinks in terms of effects not only at the restriction stage, but also in the 
course of the assessment of whether European Union law is applicable to the facts of the case.  
127. Traditional cases. As recalled earlier,80 in free movement cases, the traditional assessment 
of the applicability of European Union law consists in inquiring whether there exist connecting 
factors between the personal, material, spatial, and temporal scopes of the fundamental 
freedom and the national measure at hand. As far as the material scope is concerned, the Court 
examines whether a link between the object of the national measure and the material scope of 
the fundamental freedom can be established. Thus, for instance, for the Treaty provision on 
free movement of goods to apply, the Court verifies that the national measure that is suspected 
of infringing Article 34 TFEU does regulate goods that meet the definition given by the Court 
of Justice in its previous case law i.e. that the regulated goods are “products which can be valued 
in money and which are capable, as such, of forming the subject of commercial transactions.”81 
In terms of powers, this means that the Court verifies that the object of the national power at 
hand can be linked with the material scope of one of the fundamental freedoms. If not, the 
Court rules out the applicability of European Union law. 
128. Cases involving powers retained by Member States. A review of the cases involving powers 
retained by Member States shows that the Court proceeds differently at the applicability stage. 
The Court of Justice does not seek to establish a link between the respective objects of the 
national measures taken in the exercise of retained powers and the material scope of one of the 
fundamental freedoms. Instead, it systematically starts from the premise that the various fields 
analyzed herein fall within the ambit of national powers. To take one example, in the field of 
nationality, it states, for instance, that “it is for each Member State […] to lay down the 
conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality.”82 However, as seen earlier, it also 
                                                 
80 See, Supra, §§ 95s. 
81 Case 7/68, Commission v. Italy, [1968] ECR 423. 
82 And, in the field of direct taxation: “direct taxation falls within their competence;” surnames: “the rules 
governing a person’s surname are matters coming within the competence of the Member States”; enforcement for 
the recovery of debts: “enforcement for the recovery of debts falls as a rule within the competence of the Member 
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constantly mitigates this assertion and adds directly afterwards that Member States must comply 
with European Union law while exercising their powers. The Court of Justice is not interested 
in the retained powers themselves, but in the effects that their exercise may have on the 
fundamental freedoms. Symmetrically, this implies that the Court is not interested in the object 
of the national measures adopted in the exercise of such powers, but in their effects. Therefore, 
the Court somehow acknowledges that the national measures taken in the exercise of retained 
powers have an object distinct from the material scope of the fundamental freedoms, which 
explains why the assessment of applicability differs from traditional cases. This emerges clearly 
from the following statement of Decker, the first case on cross-border health care. Alluding to 
Duphar,83 where it was held for the first time that European Union law was applicable to the 
field of social security, the Court recalled that: 
The Court has held that measures adopted by Member States in social security matters 
which may affect the marketing of medical products and indirectly influence the 
possibilities of importing those products are subject to the Treaty rules on the free 
movement of goods.84 
As it results from this statement, the applicability of European Union law does not stem from 
the existence of a link between the object of the national measure and the material scope of the 
fundamental freedom, but from the effects caused by the national measure on the free 
movement of goods.85 In other words, for European Union law to be applicable, it is enough 
for the Court to find that the exercise of national retained powers affects one of the 
fundamental freedoms. This is a significant departure from its traditional approach. This 
effect-based line of reasoning is indeed reminiscent of the approach traditionally followed at 
                                                 
States”; education: “Community law does not detract from the power of the Member States as regards, first, the 
content of education and the organization of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity […] and, 
secondly, the content and organization of vocational training”; social security: “Community law does not detract 
from the power of the Member States to organize their social security systems”; compensation of civil war victims: 
“a benefit […] which is intended to compensate civilian war victims for physical or mental damage […] falls within 
the competence of the Member States;” and the right to strike: “in the areas which fall outside the scope of the 
Community’s competence, the Member States are still free, in principle, to lay down conditions governing the 
existence and exercise of the [right to strike].” 
83 Case 238/82, Duphar, [1984] ECR 523. 
84 Case C-120/95, Decker, [1998] ECR I-1831, 24. (Emphases added) See also, in the same vein, the Opinion in 
Case C-204/90, Bachmann, [1992] ECR I-249, 25: “it is only to the extent to which such rules have an impact on 
those freedoms that they come within the scope of Community law.” 
85 See, in the same direction, D. RITLENG, “Les Etats membres face aux entraves,” in L’entrave dans le droit du marché 
intérieur, (Ed.) L. AZOULAI, (Brussels: Bruylant, 2011), 305. 
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the restriction stage of free movement cases.86 Usually, the Court remains neutral and does not 
prejudge the restrictive character of the national measure at the applicability stage. Only once 
the applicability of European Union law is established does it examine the possible restrictive 
effects of the measure. However, by relying on the effects of the measure at the applicability 
stage in free movement cases involving powers retained by Member States, the Court alters its 
line of reasoning and thinks in terms of effects with anticipation. This is supported by the fact 
that in cases on retained powers, it generally does not dwell at length on the restriction stage. 
This peculiarity of the Court’s approach ultimately results in blurring the dividing line between 
the first two steps of its reasoning. 
2. A reasoning leading to the disjunction of the scope of application of European Union 
law from the scope of EU powers 
129. The predominant approach of the Court of Justice at the applicability stage of free 
movement cases involving powers retained by Member States results in a substantial extension 
of the scope of application of European Union law, which raises significant concerns with 
respect to Member State autonomy. 
a. The tremendous extension of the scope of application of European Union law 
130. The scope of application of EU law is broader than and distinct from the scope of EU powers. 
The Court of Justice’s particular approach at the applicability stage of free movement cases 
involving powers retained by Member States makes it very clear that the scope of application of 
European Union law is broader than the scope of European Union powers. Advocate General 
KOKOTT’s Opinion under Tas-Hagen,87 a case relating to the conditions of compensation of civil 
war victims, is quite interesting in this respect. The Advocate General dedicated a substantial 
part of her opinion to the analysis of the meaning and reach of the Court’s applicability stage 
reasoning. She noted, in particular, the following: 
Union citizens can assert their right to free movement even if the matter concerned or the 
benefit claimed is not governed by Community law.88 
[T]he classic fundamental freedoms apply also to matters in respect of which the Treaty 
grants the Community no powers or otherwise contains rules.89  
                                                 
86 See, e.g., Case 16/83, Prantl, [1984] ECR 1299; Case C-284/93 Alpine Investments BV, [1995] ECR I-1141; Case 
C-76/90, Säger, [1991] ECR I-4221; Case C-415/93, Bosman, [1995] ECR I-4921. 
87 Opinion in Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen, [2006] ECR I-10451. 
88 Ibid., 33. 
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She subsequently added that: 
[I]t would be equally inconsistent with the notion of Union citizenship as the fundamental 
status of all Union citizens, which they enjoy irrespective of any economic activity, if the 
Member States did not have to observe Union citizens’ right to free movement in all areas 
but merely in individual matters in respect of which the Treaty grants the Community 
specific powers or other rules of Community law exist.90 
In light of these rather straightforward statements, it is possible to make several observations. 
First, they show that, in the Advocate General’s eyes, no distinction needs to be drawn 
between rulings involving the economic freedoms and those involving European Union 
citizenship. The same paradigm should apply in both cases. Second, she openly acknowledges 
that scope of application of European Union law and scope of European Union powers are to 
be distinguished – which confirms what A. DASHWOOD already noted back in 1996: 
What I mean by ‘Community powers’ are the authorizations the Treaty has given the 
institutions to do things. Discovering the limits of those authorizations is not the same as 
discovering the limits of the Treaty’s scope of application.91 
As far as free movement cases involving powers retained by Member States are concerned, 
“discovering the limits of the Treaty’s scope of application” consists in focusing on the effects 
of the national measure at hand: the Court of Justice deems European Union law applicable as 
soon as the exercise of national powers affects the fundamental freedoms or, in other words, as 
soon as a measure affects the exercise of the fundamental freedoms. Accordingly, not only is 
the scope of application of the provisions relating to the fundamental freedoms and European 
Union citizenship broader that the scope of European Union powers, but it is also distinct.  
131. This need for distinguishing between scope of European Union law and scope of 
European Union powers is also expressed in the literature relating to the law of the external 
relations of the European Union. As pointed out earlier,92 the Court of Justice also happens to 
distinguish between existence and exercise of external powers. A range of authors have noticed 
that it increasingly relies on the scope of European Union law, seen as distinct from the scope 
of European Union powers in the field of external relations, in order to impose obligations of a 
new kind on Member States. These authors show that European Union law imposes 
                                                 
89 Ibid., 35. 
90 Ibid., 38. 
91 A. DASHWOOD, “The limits of European Community powers,” Eur. Law Rev. 114 (1996). 
92 See, Supra, § 89. 
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obligations on Member States not only when the exclusive powers of the European Union or 
the powers shared between the Member States and the European Union are at stake, but also 
when national external retained powers are involved.93 M. CREMONA, in particular, refers to 
examples such as the “bilateral agreements concluded by a Member State on its own account” 
or the “agreement to which the Community (as well as the Member States) is a party.”94 In the 
field of external relations, the duty of cooperation therefore requires Member States to comply 
with the Union interest, seen as covering the scope of the law of the external relations of the 
European Union, and not only the scope of European Union external powers.95 Here again, 
the former is to be understood as being broader than, and distinct from, the latter.  
132. All in all, the examples of the power-based approach and of the external relations of the 
European Union reveal that the Court of Justice is quick to distinguish between the scope of 
European Union law and the jurisdiction held by the European Union to conclude on the 
applicability of European Union law. And it does so with respect to the various fields of the law 
of the European Union, such as the law of free movement or the law of external relations. 
133. The Court’s understanding of the interplay between the European Union and national legal 
orders.96 As seen in Section 1, following a dual understanding of the interplay between the 
European and national legal orders, the Member States are of the view that European Union 
and national powers fall within two exclusive and autonomous spheres of powers which should 
be strictly separated out. Each entity – the European Union and the Member States – is 
supreme within its own spheres of powers. Therefore, such a perspective calls for a strict 
interpretation of the principle of primacy. However, free movement cases involving powers 
retained by Member States, as well as external relations cases involving powers of the same 
nature, reveal that the Court’s understanding of the interplay between the European Union 
                                                 
93 See, inter alia: G. DE BAERE, Constitutional principles of EU external relations, (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 258; R. HOLDGAARD, External Relations Law of the European Community: Legal Reasoning and 
Legal Discourses, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2008), 125s; M. CREMONA, “Defending the 
Community interest: The duties of cooperation and compliance,” in EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional 
Fundamentals, (Eds.) M. CREMONA & B. DE WITTE, (Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2008), 125-169; E. 
NEFRAMI, “The duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its scope through its application in the field of EU external relations,” 
47: 2 C. M. L. Rev. 342 (2010). 
94 M. CREMONA, “Defending the Community interest: The duties of cooperation and compliance,” above, n. 93, 
153. 
95 This is the main argument of M. CREMONA in “Defending the Community interest: The duties of cooperation 
and compliance,” above, n. 93. See also E. NEFRAMI, “The duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its scope through its 
application in the field of EU external relations,” above, n. 93, 333s. 
96 See, Infra, §§ 422s. 
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and national legal orders is fundamentally different. Indeed, by applying European Union law 
requirements to fields not falling directly within European Union powers, the Court of Justice 
considers European and national spheres of powers inextricably intertwined. In other words, it 
acknowledges that there are different spheres of powers, but it also assumes that they may 
interact. The exercise of the powers retained by Member States does have effects on European 
Union powers, which justifies the applicability of European Union law. For if Member States 
could act unilaterally within their own spheres of powers, they would be likely to affect the 
jurisdiction of the European Union and to ultimately jeopardize them. It is on this basis that 
Advocate General KOKOTT justified, in Tas-Hagen, the intrusions of European Union law into 
national spheres of powers: 
[T]he fact that [EU law] can produce its effects primarily in fields which are not (yet) 
harmonized is consistent with the spirit and purpose of the fundamental freedoms and 
precisely an expression of their direct applicability. To make the application of a 
fundamental freedom subject to the existence of a harmonizing measure would ultimately 
be to deprive it of direct effect.97 
According to this statement, disconnecting the scope of European Union law from the scope 
of European Union powers is necessary to preserve the direct effect – and hence the 
effectiveness – of the fundamental freedoms. Such an understanding entails that Member 
States may not claim to be supreme within their own spheres of powers. Even when they 
exercise their retained powers, they must comply with the obligations derived from European 
Union law, and, therefore, with the primacy principle. In other words, as M. CREMONA 
pointed out with respect to the field of external relations, the objectives of the Treaty are to be 
attained “through action not only of the Community itself but also by the Member States.”98 
However, it may be feared that the Court of Justice’s approach in free movement cases 
involving powers retained by Member States – as well as in the field of external relations – 
results in the undermining of Member State autonomy. 
                                                 
97 Opinon under Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen, [2006] ECR I-10451, 36. 
98 M. CREMONA, “Defending the Community interest: The duties of cooperation and compliance,” above, n. 93, 
126. A. DASHWOOD, “The limits of European Community powers,” above, n. 91, 114, already noted that “the 
Member States, too, have a part to play through the observance of rules that require them sometimes to take 
action, but more often to refrain from exercising, or from exercising fully, powers that would normally be available 
to them as incidents of sovereignty.” 
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b. The risk of eroding Member State autonomy 
134. A Pandora’s box? The Court of Justice faces a very sensitive dilemma. On the one hand, 
allowing Member States to act unilaterally within the spheres of their retained powers would 
jeopardize the effectiveness of European Union law, and therefore the exercise of European 
Union powers, as well as individual rights deriving from the fundamental freedoms and 
European Union citizenship provisions. And yet, on the other hand, continuously extending 
the scope of European Union law results in a substantial extension of European legality,99 
which may ultimately result in the entrenching of an unlimited scope of application of 
European Union law. The Court of Justice approach, based on the distinction between the 
existence and exercise of powers, does indeed inevitably pave the way for the applicability of 
European Union law: it seems quite impossible to come up with arguments capable of 
countering the reasoning whereby the exercise of national powers may affect European Union 
powers. As L. AZOULAI puts it, “there is virtually no area of economic and social life which 
escapes, in principle, the effect of the Treaty rules.”100 In other words, any matter may 
potentially fall within the scope of application of the economic freedoms and/or European 
Union citizenship provisions. Accordingly, this approach goes against the commonly accepted 
idea that European integration is only a partial phenomenon, in the sense that it only covers 
limited sectors of activity. According to this view, it is not meant to encompass the entirety of 
the traditional roles of a state.101 
135. The obligation to justify national policy choices. Admittedly, broadening the scope of 
application European Union law by applying the free movement principle each time a national 
measure has effects on European Union rules does not necessarily result in finding that the 
measure is contrary to European Union law. But the Court of Justice’s way of reasoning does 
have significant implications for the Member States. Indeed, as will be shown in the following 
chapters, free movement cases involving powers retained by Member States are characterized, 
like traditional free movement cases, by the fact that the Court of Justice makes a very broad 
                                                 
99 This phenomenon of constant extension of the scope of EU law has been considerably amplified since the 
introduction of European Union citizenship, as shown by E. SPAVENTA, “Seeing the wood despite the trees? On 
the scope of Union citizenship and its constitutional effects,” 45 C. M. L. Rev. 13-45 (2008). 
100 L. AZOULAI, “The Court of Justice and the social market economy: The emergence of an ideal and the 
conditions for its realization,” 45:5 C. M. L. Rev. 1340 (2008). 
101 P. PESCATORE, “Fédéralisme et intégration: Remarques liminaires,” (1973) in Études de Droit Communautaire 
Européen 1962-2007, (Brussels: Bruylant, 2008), 454. 
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interpretation of the notion of restriction and concludes, in the vast majority of cases, that the 
national measure at issue is restrictive. Logically, the European judge then subjects the national 
measure to the proportionality test, which may be very intrusive. At this stage, Member States 
bear the burden of proof. They must demonstrate that their measures are justified by legitimate 
goals recognized by the Court itself, and that they are moreover necessary and proportionate. 
This often boils down to requiring Member States to justify national policy choices in fields 
where the European Union has nonetheless no, or very limited, jurisdiction. This approach, 
based on the disjunction of the scope of application of European Union law from the scope of 
European Union powers, therefore leads the Court to indirectly rule on Member States own 
policy choices that are embodied in their national measures.102 The fear that Member State 
autonomy is weakened by these intrusions into national spheres of jurisdiction is all the more 
significant since, as seen in the previous chapter, powers retained by Member States pertain to 
core components of Member State political and social autonomy. 
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 2. 
136. Chapter 2 has shed light on the second fundamental feature of the Court of Justice’s 
power-based approach. It has set out the various paradigms relating to the determination of the 
scope of application of European Union law. According to the Member States, and to certain 
cases involving the field of education, there is a correspondence between scope of application 
and scope of European Union powers. However, the Court’s current prevailing approach 
consists in dissociating the two, and in applying European Union law each time a national 
measure adopted within the exercise of powers retained by Member States has effects on 
European powers. 
137. The concerns raised by the Court of Justice original approach. The predominant line of 
reasoning of the Court of Justice raises several ranges of issues. These issues pertain, first of all, 
to the grounds on which the Court of Justice approach may be justified. The example of the 
field of education sheds light on a fundamental difference between the various approaches that 
may be taken by the Court. An approach based on the correspondence between national and 
                                                 
102 Several authors have pointed this out. See, for instance, L. AZOULAI, “Le rôle constitutionnel de la CJCE tel 
qu’il se dégage de sa jurisprudence,” Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 35 (2008), who talks about a “cadre de 
comparution.” See also D. RITLENG, “Les Etats membres face aux entraves,” above, n. 85; K. LENAERTS, 
“L’encadrement par le droit de l’Union européenne des compétences des Etats membres,” in Mélanges Jacquet, 
(Paris: Dalloz, 2010); V. MICHEL, Recherches sur les compétences de la Communauté, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003). 
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European powers has the advantage of being rooted in the principle of conferral. However, the 
approach based on the distinction between existence and exercise of power as well as on the 
effect of national measures may only be justified by the abstract principles of effectiveness and 
effet utile, which may seem, in the eyes of the lay man, as much looser and much more difficult 
to capture than the rather formal conferral principle.103 Second of all, these issues also pertain 
to the fear of seeing Member State autonomy undermined. Admittedly, the idea of applying 
European Union law to spheres composed of powers retained by Member States is not new. It 
goes back to early cases decided in the 1960s.104 But the fundamental new factor to be taken 
into account is that this approach continuously spreads to new areas relating to the core of 
Member State political and social autonomy. The Court’s approach may therefore be described 
as increasingly intrusive. 
138. Assessing the nature of the intrusions of EU law into national spheres of powers. While Chapter 
2 has shown how the Court of Justice broadens the scope of application of European Union 
law in such a way as to enable intrusions into national spheres of powers relating to Member 
States autonomy, Chapter 3 focuses more specifically on the nature of these intrusions. The 
third main feature of the Court’s power-based approach is characterized by the fact that the 
Court of Justice carries out a ‘mutual adjustment resolution.’ 
                                                 
103 See, on the rationale behind the power-based approach, Infra, §§ 360s. 
104 In this regard, P. PESCATORE already alluded to it as early as 1972: P. PESCATORE, Le droit de l’intégration: 
Emergence d’un phénomène nouveau dans les relations internationales selon l’expérience des Communautés européennes, 
(Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1972). 
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INTRODUCTION OF CHAPTER 3. 
139. Purposes of Chapter 3. Chapter 3 focuses on the third and last fundamental feature of the 
Court of Justice’s power-based approach. This feature relates to the issue as to how, in practice, 
the Court settles jurisdictional disputes involving the free movement principle and the powers 
deemed as retained by Member States. My main point here is that this settlement can be best 
described as a ‘mutual adjustment resolution.’ This concept aims to reflect the two fundamental 
components of the Court of Justice approach. On the one hand, the Court softens its 
traditional approach in several significant respects. However, on the other hand, it compels 
Member States to comply with European Union law by imposing constraining and particular 
obligations, that I designate as ‘adjustment requirements.’  
140. Approach. Chapter 3 is in line with the approach I have followed so far. It consists in 
drawing comparisons between cases involving retained powers and traditional free movement 
cases. I assume, once again, that the Court of Justice uses its traditional ‘free movement 
concepts,’ but that it alters them in such a way as to cope with the specific issues raised by cases 
involving powers retained by Member States. While Chapter 1 covered the overall reasoning of 
the Court, and Chapter 2 pertained to the applicability stage, Chapter 3 deals more specifically 
with the restriction and justification stages of the rulings analyzed herein.  
141. Outline of Chapter 3. In Section 1, I start by identifying the first facet of the Court of 
Justice’s ‘mutual adjustment resolution.’ To this end, I show that, when retained powers are 
involved, the Court adjusts its own approach towards more flexibility than in traditional free 
movement cases. In Section 2, I focus on the second facet of the Court’s approach, by shedding 
light on the content of the adjustment requirements placed upon Member States.  
SECTION 1. THE COURT OF JUSTICE SELF-IMPOSED ADJUSTMENTS 
142. A review of the cases involving powers retained by Member States reveals that the Court 
of Justice tends to be more flexible than it generally is with respect to the two steps of the 
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justification stage, i.e. the admission of justifications, and the assessment of proportionality. In 
this context, Section 1 shows that the Court combines two complementary types of leeway, 
which relate to the nature of the acceptable grounds of justification, and to the intensity of the 
assessment of proportionality respectively. 
143. The proportionality test. Before going into further details, I shall recall the main features of 
the proportionality test, which I refer to frequently in the following paragraphs. Authors 
generally describe the structure of the proportionality inquiry as being divided into the three 
following steps:1 (i) the suitability test, which consists in articulating the State’s interest2 or, in 
other words, in verifying whether the ends of the measure justify the means;3 (ii) the necessity 
test, under which the Court weighs the competing European Union and national interests, and 
focuses on the question of whether there exist less restrictive measures;4 and, finally, (iii) the 
proportionality test stricto sensu, according to which a measure is deemed disproportionate if the 
restriction it causes is “out of proportion to the intended objective or the result achieved.”5 In 
addition, scholars normally agree that, as far as traditional free movement cases are concerned, 
“the proportionality principle does not have just one specific form, but is, on the contrary, 
flexible.”6 The review of national measures may be strict, rather deferential, or somewhere 
between the two.7 The Court generally takes into account several factors, which explains why 
the intensity of the proportionality test varies from case to case. They relate to the nature of the 
                                                 
1 See Case C-55/94, Gebhard, [1995] ECR I-4165, 37: “[N]ational measures liable to hinder or make less attractive 
the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfill four conditions: they must be applied 
in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they 
must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what 
is necessary in order to attain it.” 
2 G. DE BÚRCA, “The principle of proportionality and its application in EC Law,” 13 YEL 105, 113 (1993). 
3 C. BARNARD, “Derogations, Justifications and the Four Freedoms: Is State Interest Really Protected?,” in The 
outer limits of European Union law, (Eds.) C. BARNARD & O. ODUDU, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 282; J. H. 
JANS, “Proportionality revisited,” 27: 3 LIEI 239, 240 (2000). 
4 G. DE BÚRCA, “The principle of proportionality and its application in EC Law,” above, n. 2, 113; C. BARNARD, 
“Derogations, Justifications and the Four Freedoms: Is State Interest Really Protected?,” above, n. 3, 282; J. H. 
JANS, “Proportionality revisited,” above, n. 3, 240. 
5 J. H. JANS, “Proportionality revisited,” above, n. 3, 241; G. DE BÚRCA, “The principle of proportionality and its 
application in EC Law,” above, n. 2, 113. However, as noted by W. VAN GERVEN, “The effect of proportionality 
on the actions of Member States of the European Community: National viewpoints from continental Europe,” in 
The principle of proportionality in the laws of Europe, (Ed.) E. ELLIS, (Oxford/Portland: Hart 1999), 37, the Court 
often only refers to the first two elements of the proportionality test. 
6 J. H. JANS, “Proportionality revisited,” above, n. 3, 263. See also G. DE BÚRCA, “The principle of proportionality 
and its application in EC Law,” above, n. 2, 111; N. HÖS, “The principle of proportionality in the Viking and Laval 
cases: An appropriate standard for judicial review?,” (EUI Working Papers, Law 2009/6), 5. 
7 G. DE BÚRCA, “The principle of proportionality and its application in EC Law,” above, n. 2, 111. 
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interests involved as well as their subject matter,8 and to the seriousness of the infringement 
caused by the national measure.9 They reflect the two main concerns kept in mind by the 
Court. First, the Court takes into account the sensitive division of powers between the judiciary 
and the legislature.10 It is likely to adopt a deferential approach when a case involves key-policy 
choices that only the legislator, democratically accountable, can reasonably make and enforce. 
On the contrary, it is prone to scrutinize legal issues more rigorously.11 Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, the Court of Justice also takes into account the federal dimension that 
characterizes the division of powers between the European Union and its Member States.12 All 
in all, G. DE BÚRCA has summarized the Court’s approach as follows: 
The more important the Community interest, and the more restrictive the impact of the 
measure upon it, the more likely the Court is to look closely for a less restrictive measure, 
but this will also depend on the nature of the State’s aim in adopting the measure.13 
Therefore, the Court makes various uses of the proportionality principle. For instance, it may 
develop an economic cost/benefit analysis, a ‘not manifestly appropriate’ test or the ‘no less 
restrictive means’ test, the latter being the sign of strict scrutiny.14 It may also decide to leave 
the actual assessment of proportionality to the national courts, which is a sign of a rather 
deferential approach.15  
144. I have divided Section 1 into two parts. The first paragraph sets out specific examples 
illustrating the Court of Justice’s flexible assessment of proportionality when powers retained by 
Member States are involved. The second paragraph attempts to draw a more general pattern 
characterizing the entirety of the power-based approach. 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 114; N. HÖS, “The principle of proportionality in the Viking and Laval cases: An appropriate standard for 
judicial review?,” above, n. 6, 6; J. H. JANS, “Proportionality revisited,” above, n. 3, 246. 
9 N. HÖS, “The principle of proportionality in the Viking and Laval cases: An appropriate standard for judicial 
review?,” above, n. 6, 6; J. H. JANS, “Proportionality revisited,” above, n. 3, 264; G. DE BÚRCA, “The principle of 
proportionality and its application in EC Law,” above, n. 2, 148. 
10 J. H. JANS, “Proportionality revisited,” above, n. 3, 264. 
11 G. DE BÚRCA, “The principle of proportionality and its application in EC Law,” above, n. 2, 111. 
12 Ibid., 112. 
13 Ibid., 146, 147. See also T. TRIDIMAS, “Proportionality in Community law: Searching for the appropriate 
standard of scrutiny,” in The principle of proportionality in the laws of Europe, (Ed.) E. ELLIS, (Oxford/Portland: Hart 
1999), 76-77. 
14 N. HÖS, “The principle of proportionality in the Viking and Laval cases: An appropriate standard for judicial 
review?,” above, n. 6, 5. 
15 J. H. JANS, “Proportionality revisited,” above, n. 3, 255. For another typology, see, for instance, N. REICH, “How 
proportionate is the proportionality principle in the internal market case law of the ECJ?,” in The European Court of 
Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States, (Eds.) H.-W. MICKLITZ & B. DE WITTE, (Cambridge; Antwerp: 
Intersentia; Oxford, 2011), 101. 
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1. Specific examples of flexible assessment of proportionality 
145. To begin with, the Court of Justice has, in some cases involving powers retained by 
Member States, either granted full discretion to Member States, tolerated restrictions on access, 
or recognized that Member States should enjoy broad margins of appreciation. This departs 
from most of its traditional free movement cases, even if flexible assessments of proportionality 
are nevertheless not entirely absent from notable decisions16 relating, for instance, to the fields 
of lotteries,17 waste regulation,18 public distribution of medicinal products,19 or supply of 
petroleum products.20 
146. The recognition of full discretion. This first hypothesis, which consists in recognizing that 
Member States have full discretion in a given area, is very marginal in the Court of Justice’s 
traditional case law. It has concerned, so far, only one case on powers retained by Member 
States. This decision, Kaur,21 related to the issues of attribution of nationality and the content 
of the rights attached to it. Mrs. Kaur was born in Kenya in 1949, and hence became citizen of 
the United Kingdom and colonies. British law subsequently changed, and she became a British 
Overseas citizen. However, this status did not confer the right to enter or remain in the United 
Kingdom. Accordingly, she could not exercise any right derived from European Union law. She 
claimed that European Union citizenship required the United Kingdom to change the criteria 
for attribution as well as the content of nationality in such a way as to allow her to move and 
reside freely within the European Union.22 The Advocate General took a different view and 
argued that European Union law was not applicable to the facts of the case because the 
requirement of a cross-border element was lacking.23 The Court reached a similar conclusion 
but used a very different line of reasoning. It relied entirely on a 1972 Declaration annexed to 
the Treaty of accession of the United Kingdom, further to which this Member State was to 
define unilaterally the category of United Kingdom nationals falling within the scope of the 
                                                 
16 See, for instance, L. AZOULAI, “The European Court of Justice and the duty to respect sensitive national 
interests,” in Judicial activism at the European Court of Justice: causes, responses and solutions, (Eds) M. DAWSON, B. DE 
WITTE & E. MUIR, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013), 167, 184-185. 
17 Case C-275/92, Schindler, [1994] ECR I-1039. 
18 Case C-2/90, Commission v. Belgium, [1992] ECR I-4471. 
19 Case C-369/88, Delattre, [1991] ECR I-1487. 
20 Case 72/83, Campus Oil, [1984] ECR 2727. 
21 Case C-192/99, Kaur, [2001] ECR I-1237. See H. TONER, 39 C. M. L. Rev. 881-893 (2002). 
22 Opinion in Case C-192/99, Kaur, [2001] ECR I-1237, 26. 
23 Ibid., 33. 
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European Union Treaties.24 In other words, the Court refused to place any limitation on the 
discretion enjoyed by the United Kingdom with respect to the rules on acquisition of 
nationality. 
147. The Court of Justice latitude with respect to restrictions on access. The second hypothesis, also 
marginal, pertains to cases in which the Court has shown some latitude with respect to 
restrictions on access. These cases relate to the issue of access to higher education in Austria 
and Belgium respectively. These Member States both apply the principle of unrestricted access 
to their higher educational systems, which implies, as seen earlier, that access is open to any 
holder of a secondary-school certificate.25 However, these two countries used to reserve the 
application of this principle for their own residents. The Court found that these two national 
rules violated the free movement principle. Indeed, Austria imposed different conditions on 
the holders of secondary education diplomas obtained in other Member States.26 As for 
Belgium, it adopted a Decree regulating the number of students in certain programs in the first 
two years of undergraduate studies in higher education.27 This Decree laid down a numerus 
clausus for enrolment by nonresidents, and defined residents as individuals having both their 
principal residence in Belgium, and the right of permanent residence in Belgium. Surprisingly 
enough, the Court of Justice has not wholly excluded the possibility for Member States to 
maintain restrictions of this nature – even though it has subjected this possibility to many 
substantive and procedural requirements.28  
148. In Commission v. Austria, the Court accepted the justification based on the safeguarding 
of the homogeneity of the Austrian higher or university education system.29 The reason why it 
found the measure disproportionate is because: 
[N]o estimates relating to other courses have been submitted to the Court […]. The 
Republic of Austria has conceded that it does not have any figures [proving that the 
existence of the Austrian education system in general in the safeguarding of the 
homogeneity of higher education in particular would be jeopardized]. Moreover, the 
                                                 
24 Case C-192/99, Kaur, [2001] ECR I-1237, 23-27. See §27: “in order to determine whether a person is a national 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the purposes of Community law, it is necessary 
to refer to the 1982 Declaration which replaced the 1972 Declaration.” 
25 See, Supra, § 51. 
26 Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969. See, e.g. C. RIEDER, 43 CMLR 1711-1726 (2006). 
27 Case C-73/08, Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735. 
28 See, Infra, §§ 181s. 
29 Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969, 50s. 
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Austrian authorities have accepted that the national legislation in question is essentially 
preventive in nature.30 
Therefore, had Austria been able to provide statistical evidence showing that the flow of 
nonresident students risked jeopardizing the organization of its higher educational system, the 
Court would probably have been inclined to give this Member State more leeway with respect 
to the conditions of access. Nonetheless, this risk must be not only potential, but also actual.31  
149. Nor has the Court wholly precluded the possibility of Belgium restricting access to its 
educational system in Bressol, where it has adopted a similar approach. Here, Belgium relied on 
a justification based on public health. It argued that implementing unrestrictive access for 
nonresidents would cause a “significant reduction in the quality of teaching in the medical and 
paramedical courses,”32 as well as a “shortage of qualified medical personnel throughout the 
territory.”33 The Advocate General herself acknowledged that: 
It is conceivable that circumstances might arise in which a real, serious and imminent 
threat to the quality of university education in a specific sector was shown to exist. The 
court might, in such a case, wish to re-examine whether indirectly discriminatory measures 
to counter such a threat are in principle capable of objective justification.34 
As for the Court, it held that: 
[W]hen specifically assessing the circumstances of the case in the main proceedings, the 
referring court must take into account the fact that, where there is uncertainty as to the 
existence of extent of the risks to the protection of public health in its territory, the 
Member State may take protective measures without having to wait for the shortage of 
health professionals to materialize […]. The same applies with regard to the risks of the 
quality of education in that field.35 
150. Thus, the Court has admitted that two main grounds could, under specific 
circumstances, justify restrictions on access in the field of education. Member States must 
demonstrate that giving full effect to free movement rights would put the organization of their 
educational system at risk or would imperil public health. Therefore, in Commission v. Austria 
and Bressol, the Court departed from its traditional approach, according to which restrictions 
on access are generally considered as causing the most serious threats to the free movement 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 65. 
31 N. NIC SHUIBHNE & M. MACI, “Proving public interest: the growing impact of evidence in free movement case 
law,” 50 C. M. L. Rev. 965, 983-984 (2013). 
32 Case C-73/08, Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735, 56. 
33 Ibid., 59. 
34 Opinion in Case C-73/08, Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735, 112. 
35 Case C-73/08, Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735, 70. 
Ch. 3. Section 1. The Court of Justice self-imposed adjustments 119 
principle.36 The flexible character of the Court’s approach is all the more surprising that the 
Austrian and Belgian measures amounted to indisputable differences in treatment. They indeed 
clearly aimed at preventing nonresident students from accessing their educational systems 
under the same conditions as residents. 
151. The margin of appreciation doctrine. The last particular hypothesis where the Court of 
Justice has given more leeway to the Member States than it usually does, the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, is more common than the two previous ones. This doctrine consists in 
recognizing that Member States have margins of appreciation. The Court makes use of it in 
both positive integration cases and traditional free movement cases.37 As far as cases involving 
powers retained by Member States are concerned, it has used it in two main instances. It has 
first applied the principles stemming from Omega38 in Wittgenstein,39 a case on rules governing 
surnames, which concerned the Austrian constitutional rule prohibiting the bearing of any title 
of nobility. A German national whose surname included a former title of nobility had adopted 
an Austrian national in Germany. In this latter country, existing titles become part of the family 
name. The Austrian authorities refused to acknowledge the title of nobility, and obliged the 
Austrian national to change her name in Austria. The Court found that the Austrian measure 
infringed European Union citizenship provisions. While reviewing proportionality, it recalled 
that the concept of public policy as justification was to be interpreted strictly.40 However, in a 
similar fashion to Omega, it held that: 
The fact remains, however, that the specific circumstances which may justify recourse to 
the concept of public policy may vary from one Member State to another and from one 
area to another. The competent national authorities must therefore be allowed a wide 
margin of discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty.41 
                                                 
36 C. BARNARD, The substantive law of the EU: The four freedoms, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
776. 
37 See e.g. M. FOROWICZ, “State Discretion as a Paradox of EU Evolution,” (EUI Working Paper MWP) 2011/27; J. 
A. SWEENEY, “A ‘margin of appreciation’ in the internal market: Lessons from the European Court of Human 
Rights,” 34: 1 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 27-52 (2007). 
38 Case C-36/02, Omega, [2004] ECR I-9609. 
39 Case C-208/09, Wittgenstein, [2010] ECR I-13693. 
40 Ibid., 86. 
41 Ibid., 87. And it added, at 91: “it is not indispensable for the restrictive measure issued by the authorities of a 
Member State to correspond to a conception shared by all Member States as regards the precise way in which the 
fundamental right or legitimate interest in question is to be protected and that, on the contrary, the need for, and 
proportionality of, the provisions adopted are not excluded merely because one Member State has chosen a system 
of protection different from that adopted by another State.” 
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Wittgenstein thus shows that the Court is inclined to recognize wide margins of discretion for 
Member States when “morally and culturally sensitive matters are at issue.”42  
152. The Court of Justice has also used this doctrine in such a way as to reflect the necessity 
of respecting the division of powers between the European Union and its Member States. This 
is particularly striking in cases relating to the compensation of civil war victims, where the 
Court has twice acknowledged that: 
With regard to benefits that are not covered by Community law, Member States enjoyed a 
wide margin of appreciation in deciding which criteria are to be used when assessing the 
degree of connection to society, while at the same time complying with the limits imposed 
by Community law.43 
This statement confirms that the absence of European Union power justifies the existence of a 
wide margin of appreciation for Member States. To hold otherwise would result in the 
imperilment of the organization of the system of such benefits and could indeed create a legal 
loophole where neither the Member States, nor the European Union could lay down award 
criteria, or, if the Court were to define such criteria itself, in judicial activism, i.e. the 
substitution of the Court for the legislator. 
153. The Court has made a similar use of the margin of appreciation doctrine in other fields 
analyzed herein, even if it has not always phrased it in a similar manner.44 In Rottmann, the 
Court recognized that Member States can, as a matter of principle, withdraw a decision of 
naturalization obtained by deception.45 Similarly, as far as students’ financial support is 
concerned, Member States are free to lay down award conditions – provided that they are non-
discriminatory.46 Likewise, they can require cross-border patients to obtain prior authorizations 
in order to receive treatment in hospital environment or in non-hospital environment if such 
                                                 
42 J. A. SWEENEY, “A ‘margin of appreciation’ in the internal market: Lessons from the European Court of Human 
Rights,” above, n. 37, 28. 
43 Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen, [2006] ECR I-10451, 36; Case C-499/06, Nerkowska, [2008] ECR I-3993, 38. See also 
the Opinion in Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen, [2006] ECR I-10451, 41, 61. 
44 M. FOROWICZ, “State Discretion as a Paradox of EU Evolution,” above, n. 37, 3: “The European Court of 
Justice has used synonymously various concepts which appear to have the approximate meaning of discretion.  
Some of the terms used include “margin of appreciation”, “discretion”, “margin of discretion”, “power of 
discretion”, “discretionary power”, “it is for”, “free to determine” or “latitude”.” 
45 As seen earlier, the Court has indeed recognized in Case C-135/08, Rottmann, [2010] ECR I-1449, 59 that: “it is 
not contrary to European Union law, in particular to Article 17 EC, for a Member State to withdraw from a citizen 
of the Union the nationality of that State acquired by naturalization when that nationality has been obtained by 
deception.” 
46 See e.g. Case C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119. 
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treatments involve the use of major medical equipment.47 Thus, even if, admittedly, the Court 
imposes adjustment requirements upon Member States,48 it allows them, at the same time, to 
maintain entry/exit barriers. Another good illustration of this trend is direct taxation. In Gilly,49 
the appellants claimed that the Franco-German Convention entailed discriminatory taxation. 
France was their state of residence and the state of employment of Mr. Gilly. As for Mrs. Gilly, 
she worked in Germany and her income was taxed in this latter country. In accordance with the 
Convention between the two Member States, France taxed the whole of their income but 
granted them the right to a tax credit equal to the amount of the French tax in respect of tax 
paid abroad. The appellants argued that it was contrary to European Union law because this tax 
credit was inferior to the actual taxes that Mrs. Gilly had to pay in Germany. Both the Advocate 
General and the Court of Justice rejected their claim on the grounds that the “unfavorable 
consequences” arising from the application of the Convention were: 
[T]he result in the first place of the differences between the tax scales of the Member States 
concerned, and, in the absence of any Community legislation in the field, the 
determination of those scales is a matter for the Member States.50 
The adjustment requirements imposed upon Member States do not amount to compelling 
them to alter their tax rates. Instead, they are free to determine the latter in a discretionary 
manner – provided that they do not discriminate between, for instance, residents and 
nonresidents.51 
2. General pattern characterizing the power-based approach 
154. Aside from the examples I have just mentioned, it is possible to identify a more general 
pattern reflecting the flexibility displayed by the Court of Justice. This pattern relates to the 
nature of the acceptable grounds of justification, and their assessment. 
155. Traditional free movement cases. As a general rule, Member States may rely on two main 
categories of justifications to justify measures that are deemed restrictive by the Court. Initially, 
                                                 
47 See e.g. Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-512/08, Commission v. France, 
[2010] ECR I-8833. 
48 See, Infra, §§ 177. 
49 Case C-336/96, Gilly, [1998] ECR I-2793. 
50 Ibid., 47. See the Opinion in Case C-336/96, Gilly, [1998] ECR I-2793, 19. 
51 This is confirmed by a case relating to corporate tax law. In Case C-311/97, Royal Bank of Scotland, [1999] ECR I-
2651, above, the Court condemned a Greek tax provision according to which foreign companies were taxed at a 
40% rate while domestic companied were taxed at a 35% rate. The Court was indifferent to the level of the tax, 
but took into account the fact such level did not equally burden domestic and foreign companies. 
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they could only refer to the derogations expressly laid down in the Treaty.52 These derogations 
may be invoked with respect to discriminatory as well as indistinctly applicable measures. 
However, the Court has always interpreted them very restrictively.53 They are therefore limited 
in scope. Member States may also justify their measures on the basis of mandatory 
requirements, a concept that was introduced in the seminal Cassis de Dijon case.54 The Court 
created this second category concurrently with the obstacle approach, as a way to 
counterbalance the substantial extension of the scope of restrictions, which, from then on, 
encompassed both discriminatory and indistinctly applicable measures.55 Public interest 
justifications give more latitude to Member States, since they allow them to protect a wider 
range of interests than express derogations. However, they may theoretically only be admitted if 
the restrictive measure is indirectly discriminatory or indistinctly applicable. The Court having 
never laid down precise criteria, the conditions for raising a public interest justification are 
quite unclear.56 Overall, it would appear to be rather liberal, since it rarely rejects grounds put 
forward by the Member States before entering the proportionality stage.57  
156. The analysis of the Court’s traditional free movement cases nonetheless tends to show 
that the justifications admitted so far share three main features despite the variety of interests 
that they aim to protect. First, they must respect values that are shared and protected by a vast 
majority of Member States. Most of the justifications admitted encompass interests that are not 
protected at the European Union level, but that could, at some point, be protected at such a 
level. In this respect, it is often contended that there exists a functional link between the 
recognition of a public interest justification and the conferring of new harmonizing powers to 
                                                 
52 See Article 36 TFEU (derogations regarding the free movement of goods), Article 45§3 TFEU (derogations 
regarding the free movement of workers), Article 52 TFEU (derogations regarding the freedom of establishment), 
Article 62 TFEU (derogations regarding the freedom to provide services) and Article 65 TFEU (derogations 
regarding the free movement of capital). 
53 E. SPAVENTA, “On discrimination and the theory of mandatory requirements,” 3 The Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 457, 466 (2000). 
54 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon), [1979] ECR 649. 
55 See L. W. GORMLEY, “The genesis of the rule of reason in the free movement of goods,” in The rule of reason: 
rethinking another classic of European legal doctrine, (Ed.) A. A. M. SCHRAUWEN, (Groningen: Europa Law Pub., 
2005), 19-33; C. BARNARD, The substantive law of the EU. The Four Freedoms, above, n. 36, 116; J. SCOTT, 
“Mandatory or imperative requirements in the EU and the WTO,” in The law of the single European market: 
Unpacking the premises, (Eds.) C. BARNARD & J. SCOTT, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002), 269; V. HATZOPOULOS, 
“Exigences essentielles, impératives ou impérieuses: une théorie, des théories ou pas de théorie du tout?,” 34 Revue 
Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 191 (1998). 
56 V. HATZOPOULOS, “Exigences essentielles, impératives ou impérieuses: une théorie, des théories ou pas de théorie 
du tout?,” above, n. 55, 191s. 
57 Ibid., 191s; V. HATZOPOULOS, “Recent developments of the case law of the ECJ in the field of services” 37 C. M. 
L. Rev. 43, 78 (2000). 
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the European legislator.58 All in all, authors generally agree to describe the function of 
justifications as a means to temporarily protect interests that will subsequently be safeguarded at 
some point at the European Union level.59 This leads to the identification of their second 
common feature. For justifications to be admitted, they must quite logically be compatible with 
the underlying principles and aims of the Treaty. Finally, they must not pursue economic aims. 
According to a well-enshrined principle, “[i]t is settled case-law that economic grounds can never 
serve as justification for obstacles prohibited by the Treaty.”60 The Court’s stand on this issue is 
based on the basic idea that: 
If Member States were able to rely on economic grounds […] they could stop the free 
movement the moment its impact is felt. Allowing Member States to limit free trade for 
economic reason would defeat the objective of the EC Treaty to replace purely national 
markets with a more efficient European one.61  
157. Free movement cases involving retained powers. The Court of Justice case law involving 
powers retained by Member States reveals that the recognized justifications depart from the 
general framework laid down above in several important respects. Listing the justifications that 
the Court has recognized so far helps shed light on their peculiarities: 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 M. FALLON, Droit matériel général de l’Union européenne, (Brussels: Bruylant-Academia; Athens: Sakkoulas, 2002), 
146. Case C-200/96, Metronome Musik, [1998] ECR I-1953 constitutes, for instance, a good illustration of a 
‘communitarization’ of interests previously recognized by the Court’s negative integration case law.58 In this case, 
the legality of Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right, and on certain 
rights relating to copyright in the field of intellectual property was challenged on the grounds that it was contrary 
to fundamental rights and constitutional law, in particular the freedom to pursue a trade or profession. The Court 
rejected the argument on the basis that: “Those objectives [the economic and cultural development of the 
Community and the guarantee that authors and performers can receive appropriate income and amortize their 
investments] in fact conform with the objectives of general interest pursued by the Community. It should be borne 
in mind, in particular, that the protection of literary and artistic property, which is a category of industrial and 
commercial property within the meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty, constitutes a ground of general interest which 
may justify restrictions on the free movement of goods […].” (At 23) Thus, the Court inferred that the Directive at 
hand was legal mainly because it aimed to protect the same interests as those encompassed by a mandatory 
requirement. 
59 See L. GORMLEY, “The genesis of the rule of reason in the free movement of goods,” above, n. 55, 23: “The rule 
of reason is a reflection of the lacunae that (still) exist in the present state of interpretation of the Community. 
Thus the Court has sought to ensure that interests or values which are clearly compatible with the basic aims of the 
Treaty do not go unprotected in the period before their protection has been assured at the Community level.” See 
also M. FALLON, Droit matériel général de l’Union européenne, above, n. 58, 140. 
60 Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, [2002] ECR I-4731, 52. (Emphasis added) 
61 J. SNELL, “Economic aims as justification of restrictions on free movement,” in The rule of reason: rethinking 
another classic of European legal doctrine, Ed. A.A.M. SCHRAUWEN, (Groningen: Europa Law Pub., 2005), 48. 
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 Acceptable Grounds of Justification 
(i) 
Nationality 
Protection of the special relationship of solidarity and good faith between a Member State and its 
nationals and also the reciprocity of rights and duties [Case C-135/08, Rottmann, [2010] ECR I-1449, 
51]. 
(ii)  
Direct 
Taxation 
Effectiveness of fiscal supervision [Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon), [1979] ECR 649, 8]; 
Coherence of the tax system [Case C-204/90, Bachmann, [1992] ECR I-249, 21]; 
Prevention of tax avoidance by preventing wholly artificial arrangements [Case C-264/96, Imperial 
Chemical Industries (ICI), [1998] ECR I-4695, 26]; 
Balanced allocation of tax jurisdiction [Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, [2005] ECR I-10837, 46]. 
(iii)  
Rules 
governing 
surnames 
Principle of immutability of surnames as a means designed to prevent risks of confusion as to identity 
or parentage of persons [Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, [2003] ECR I-11613, 40s]; 
Objective of integration [Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, [2003] ECR I-11613, 40s]; 
Nationality is an objective criterion which makes it possible to determine a person’s surname with 
certainty and continuity and which ensures that persons of a particular nationality are treated in the 
same way and that the surnames of persons of the same nationality are determined in an identical 
manner [Case C-353/06, Grunkin & Paul, [2008] ECR I-7639, 30]; 
Constitutional identity in conjunction with public policy [Case C-208/09, Wittgenstein, [2010] ECR I-
13693, 83]; 
Protection of the national language [Case C-391/09, Vardyn & Wardyn, [2011] ECR I-3787, 87]. 
(iv) 
Enforcement 
for the 
recovery of 
debt 
N/A. 
(v)  
Cross-border 
health care 
Control of health expenditure, balancing the budget of the social security system / possible risk of 
undermining a social security system’s financial balance [Case C-158/96, Kohll, [1998] ECR I-1931]; 
Guarantee of the quality of medical services, balanced medical and hospital service open to all insured 
people [Case C-158/96, Kohll, [1998] ECR I-1931]; 
Maintenance of treatment capacity or medical competence on national territory is essential for public 
health, and even the survival of, the population [Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR 
I-5473, 70]. 
(vi)  
Higher 
education 
Ensuring that the grant of assistance to cover the maintenance costs of students from other Member 
States does not become an unreasonable burden which could have consequences for the overall level of 
assistance which may be granted by that State [Case C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119, 56]; 
Safeguarding the homogeneity of the higher university education system [Case C-147/03, Commission v. 
Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969, 50], which must be examined in the light of the public health argument 
[Case C-73/08, Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735, 54]; 
Objective of ensuring that students complete their courses in a short period of time, thus contributing 
to the financial equilibrium of the education system of the MS concerned [Cases C-11/06 & 12/06, 
Morgan & Bucher, [2007] ECR I-9161, 36]. 
(vii) 
Compensati-
on of civil 
war victims 
Aim of solidarity [Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen, [2006] ECR I-10451, 35]; 
Ensuring that there is a connection between the society of the Member State concerned and the 
recipient of a benefit [Case C-499/06, Nerkowska, [2008] ECR I-3993, 37]; 
Necessity to verify that the recipient continues to satisfy the conditions for the grant of that benefit 
[Case C-499/06, Nerkowska, [2008] ECR I-3993, 37]; 
Desire to provide a benefit that takes into account differences between Member States such as 
differences in the cost of living [Case C-221/07, Zablocka, [2008] ECR I-9029, 39]; 
Need to ensure effective monitoring of the employment and social situation of beneficiaries [Case C-
221/07, Zablocka, [2008] ECR I-9029, 39]. 
(viii)  
Right to take 
collective 
action 
Right to take collective action for the protection of workers of the host State against possible social 
dumping [Case C-341/05, Laval, [2007] ECR I-11767, 103]. 
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This table shows that the acceptable grounds of justification relating to the eight fields analyzed 
herein may be divided into three categories. First, these grounds comprise at least two 
justifications that are of the same nature as grounds traditionally accepted in negative 
integration cases. The ‘prevention of risks of confusion as to identity or parentage of persons’ 
and ‘ensuring that persons of a particular nationality are treated in the same way and that the 
surnames of persons of the same nationality are determined in an identical manner’ comply 
with the three usual criteria that are necessary for the admission of justifications. They 
correspond to values shared by Member States, which could even be potentially protected at 
European Union level.62 They are moreover compatible with the principles and aims laid down 
in the Treaty, and they do not pursue economic aims. However, the two other categories are 
specific to cases involving powers retained by Member States. They aim to protect the essential 
functions of the state, and economic interests respectively. 
a. Flexible assessment of justifications relating to essential functions of the State 
158. Meaning. The second category encompasses grounds of justification that correspond to 
objectives aiming to preserve functions that are essential to the state, taken as an autonomous 
entity, which holds an existence independent from that of the European Union. It first 
comprises the last category – as will be seen below, economic grounds essentially aim to protect 
national budgetary interests. In addition, it is also composed of justifications seeking to preserve 
Member States’ political functions and/or social functions. 
159. The preservation of the state’s political functions – Rules governing surnames. As shown by the 
following examples, the justifications accepted by the Court of Justice reflect the need for 
safeguarding the survival of Member States as independent and autonomous political entities. 
Member States have relied on such grounds of justification in many of the fields analyzed 
herein. In Wittgenstein,63 the Court of Justice accepted for the first time the argument whereby 
the Austrian constitutional rule aimed to protect the constitutional identity of the state, read in 
conjunction with public policy: 
                                                 
62 See Article 81§2 TFEU in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters: “For the purposes of paragraph 1, the 
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt 
measures, particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market, aimed at ensuring: […] (c) 
the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States concerning conflict of laws and of jurisdiction.” 
63 Case C-208/09, Wittgenstein, [2010] ECR I-13693. 
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[I]n accordance with Article 4(2) TEU, the European Union is to respect the national 
identities of its Member States, which include the status of the State as a Republic.64 
It concluded that: 
By refusing to recognize the noble elements of a name such as that of the applicant in the 
main proceedings, the Austrian authorities responsible for civil status matters do not 
appear to have gone further than is necessary in order to ensure the attainment of the 
fundamental constitutional objective pursued by them.65 
Several factors may have influenced the reasoning of the Court of Justice. First, the fact that 
the Austrian rule has a constitutional status within the Austrian legal order must have been of 
significant importance. This constitutional rule moreover reflects Austria’s own historical past. 
Second, it is also notable that the Austrian rule at issue is unconditional. Contrary to Garcia 
Avello and Grunkin & Paul,66 the Austrian legal order does not comprise any procedure that 
would allow nationals or non-nationals to bear a title of nobility. Therefore, Wittgenstein shows 
that, as far as rules governing surnames are concerned, the Court’s power-based approach does 
not require Member States to set up arrangements that do not already exist in their legal 
systems. Instead, it requires them to extend the possibility to rely on existing mechanisms to 
non-nationals or nonresidents.  
160. This is confirmed by the latest case decided in this field, Vardyn & Wardyn.67 The central 
issue of this decision was whether a person who belongs to an ethnic minority or a national of 
another Member State may invoke European Union law for the purposes of requiring the 
authorities of a Member State to use his/her mother tongue, contrary to the constitutional 
principles in force in that State for safeguarding the official national language. The facts of 
Vardyn & Wardyn indeed involved the refusal of the Lithuanian authorities to modify several 
civil documents of a Lithuanian national and a Polish national according to the Polish 
alphabet. The Court applied a ‘serious inconvenience test’68 and ruled that most of these 
refusals69 did not constitute a restriction on the right to move and reside freely. In a very 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 92 (Emphasis added). 
65 Ibid., 93 (Emphasis added). 
66 Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, [2003] ECR I-11613; Case C-353/06, Grunkin & Paul, [2008] ECR I-7639. See, 
Infra, § 217. 
67 Case C-391/09, Vardyn & Wardyn, [2011] ECR I-3787. 
68 See H. VAN EIJKEN, 49 C. M. L. Rev. 809, 816s (2012). 
69 Namely the refusal to revise the name of the wife on her birth certificate and her name on the marriage 
certificate, the refusal to revise entries in civil documents and the omission of the Polish diacritical marks in the 
husband’s name. 
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unusual way, it left it to the national court to decide whether the refusal of the Lithuanian 
authorities to amend the marriage certificate “in order that the joint surname of the husband 
and wife is entered both uniformly and in a manner which complies with the spelling rules” of 
Poland, the husband’s Member State of origin amounted to a restriction. The Court of Justice 
gave some guidance to the national court in case it were to find a restriction. In this regard, it 
referred once again to Article 4(2) TEU.70 It indeed regarded the protection of the Member 
State’s official language as falling within its national identity and held that: 
[I]t will be for the national court to decide whether such refusal reflects a fair balance 
between the interests in issue, that is to say, on the one hand, the right of the applicants in 
the main proceedings to respect for their private and family life and, on the other hand, 
the legitimate protection by the Member State concerned of its official national language 
and its traditions.71 
Accordingly, the Court adopted a very cautious approach, both at the restriction and 
proportionality stages. It nonetheless did not completely depart from the principles stemming 
from Garcia Avello and Grunkin & Paul, and noted that: 
[T]he surnames of nationals of the other Member States may, in Lithuania, be written 
using characters of the Roman alphabet which do not exist in the Lithuanian alphabet.72 
Thus, contrary to the absolute Austrian rule that was at issue in Wittgenstein, the Lithuanian 
law did not wholly preclude the use of characters of the Roman alphabet, which could tend to 
increase the appellants’ chances of success.  
161. The approach undertaken by the Court is, in this respect, very peculiar. The Court is 
indeed generally inclined to assess very strictly the proportionality of measures that lay down 
absolute or almost absolute exclusions and/or prohibitions. A recent illustration can be found 
in Anton Las.73 In this ruling, a Belgian rule was at issue, according to which cross-border 
employment contracts concluded in the Dutch-speaking part region were to be drafted in 
Dutch exclusively. The Court acknowledged that: 
According to the fourth subparagraph of Article 3(3) TEU and Article 22 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Union must respect its rich cultural and 
linguistic diversity. In accordance with Article 4(2) TEU, the Union must also respect the 
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national identity of its Member States, which includes protection of the official language or 
languages of those States.74 
However, it nevertheless found that the national measure was contrary to the free movement of 
workers because it was too absolute. It noted, in particular, that less restrictive means than an 
absolute obligation were available, such as a piece of legislation that “would also permit the 
drafting of an authentic version of such contracts in a language known to all the parties 
concerned.”75 By contrast, in the cases involving powers retained by Member States, the Court 
has developed an opposite approach. It justified the disproportionate character of the national 
measures in Garcia Avello and Grunkin & Paul on the grounds that the national legal orders at 
issue comprised mechanisms that could have allowed the appellants to see their surnames 
recognized. Conversely, it considered that the measures in Wittgenstein and Vardyn & Wardyn 
were proportionate because the Austrian and Lithuanian legal orders did not contain such pre-
existing arrangements. Thus, the Court endorses a deferential approach when Member States 
rely on interests that are highly related to their national identity – the constitutional identity, 
the protection of the national language – and that are, in addition, unconditionally protected 
by their legal systems – through the implementation of intangible principles. 
162. The preservation of the state’s political functions – Nationality and direct taxation. Many other 
cases analyzed herein confirm the Court’s tendency to give substantial weight to justifications 
aiming to protect the political functions of the state. They concern, in particular, the peculiar 
relationships that bind each Member State with its own population, as well as the Member 
States’ specific and unique conceptions of such relationships. This is perceptible in the field of 
nationality. As seen earlier,76 the Court recognized in Kaur that the United Kingdom had full 
discretion to determine its own nationals and their status. It thus acknowledged that this 
Member State could, in accordance with international law, and “in the light of its imperial and 
colonial past,” unilaterally define: 
[S]everal categories of British citizens whom it has recognized as having rights which differ 
according to the nature of the ties connecting them to the United Kingdom.77 
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In Kaur, the Court thus refused to interfere with the specific relationships that connect 
individuals to the United Kingdom. In Rottmann, it furthermore added that: 
A decision withdrawing naturalization because of deception corresponds to a reason 
relating to the public interest. In this regard, it is legitimate for a Member State to wish to 
protect the special relationship of solidarity and good faith between it and its nationals and 
also the reciprocity of rights and duties, which form the bedrock of the bond of 
nationality.78 
These two cases accordingly show that the Court of Justice wishes to preserve the political 
autonomy and independence of Member States by granting them a large or full discretion to 
define the ‘special’ relationship that bonds them to their population. As underlined by 
Advocate General POIARES MADURO in Rottmann: 
With nationality, the State defines its people. What is at stake, through the nationality 
relationship, is the formation of a national body politic.79 
163. Similarly, in the field of direct taxation, the Court of Justice has recognized justifications 
that are intrinsically linked to Member States’ tax jurisdiction and their ability to exercise their 
powers. Justifications such as the ‘effectiveness of fiscal supervision’ or ‘the prevention of tax 
avoidance by preventing wholly artificial arrangements’ indeed aim at enabling Member States 
to effectively subject the taxpayers to their taxing jurisdiction, despite the fact that they are 
involved in a cross-border situation.80 
164. The preservation of the state’s social functions. Justifications relating to the essential 
functions of the state also seek to protect national solidarity mechanisms. The Court has 
accepted the ‘necessity to demonstrate a certain degree of integration into the society of the 
host state’ in the field of education, the ‘maintenance of treatment capacity or medical 
competence on national territory is essential for the public health, and even the survival of, the 
population’ in the field of cross-border health care, the ‘aim of solidarity’ in the field of 
compensation of civil war victims and the ‘right to take collective action for the protection of 
workers of the host state against possible social dumping.’ This set of justifications concerns the 
conditions under which Member States grant social benefits, understood in the broad sense of 
the term. In cases relating to cross-border health care, education, and the compensation of civil 
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war victims, the Court has never challenged the principle that for social benefits to be granted, 
there must exist a specific relationship between the Member State providing them and the 
beneficiaries. Thus, despite the substantial requirements imposed upon Member States in the 
field of cross-border health care, the Court of Justice has repeatedly held that: 
[I]t is […] for the legislation of each Member State to determine, first, the conditions 
concerning the right or duty to be insured with a social security scheme […] and, second, 
the conditions for entitlement to benefits […].81 
And, as a matter of principle, patients must be previously affiliated to a social security scheme 
in order to claim cross-border health care rights. European Union law does not call into 
question the conditions of affiliation to a national social security scheme, which are solely for 
the Member States to define.  
165. This idea is even more evident in cases relating to students’ financial support. In Bidar, 
the Court held for instance that it is: 
[L]egitimate for a Member State to grant such assistance only to students who have 
demonstrated a certain degree of integration into the society of that State.82 
It accordingly followed its Advocate General, for whom “the link is to be found in the degree 
of affinity which the applicant for this assistance has with the educational system and the 
degree of his integration into society.”83 In Bidar, the Court found that the British condition to 
be ‘settled’ was disproportionate because it wholly precluded nationals from other Member 
States from acquiring this status.84 However, in Förster, it found that a five-year requirement 
was legitimate.85 Member States may impose the same kind of requirement with respect to 
financial support to study abroad.86 Therefore, European Union law does not require Member 
States to break the links that bind them, as welfare states, to their beneficiaries. In other words, 
the Court of Justice does not call into question the fact that Member States set out award 
conditions that reflect the special relationship existing between themselves and individuals who 
receive social benefits.  
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166. The same holds true with respect to the relationship between Member States and civil 
war victims. In Nerkowska, for instance, the Court held that: 
It is thus lawful for a Member State to restrict, by means of conditions related to the 
nationality or to the place of residence of the person concerned, the compensation granted 
to civilian victims of war or repression to persons who are regarded as showing a certain 
degree of connection to the society of that Member State.87 
Here again, the Court acknowledges that Member States may restrict the benefit of an 
allowance to individuals sharing specific bonds with their societies. This shows that it is 
inclined to take into account the fact that social benefits, which fall within the powers retained 
by Member States, are often inextricably linked to the specific relationship that exists between 
a State and its population. In other words, in the framework of its power-based approach, the 
Court of Justice concedes that solidarity is first and foremost national. In the European Union, 
Member States are, as a matter of fact, the sole entities carrying out redistributive policies. 
167. All in all, the set of justifications relating to the essential functions of the state is 
primarily centered on the political and social bonds existing between Member States and their 
community of individuals and/or their territory. Even more importantly, these justifications 
aim to protect the specific features, peculiar to each Member State, of these relationships. In 
other words, they relate to the need to protect and preserve Member States understood as 
autonomous political entities.88 
b. Flexible assessment of justification relating to economic interests 
168. The last category of justifications corresponds to hypotheses where the Court, despite its 
well-established principle, has accepted justifications that in fact protect economic interests. These 
justifications can be found in the fields of direct taxation, compensation of civil war victims, 
cross-border health care, and education.  
169. Direct taxation. As far as direct taxation is concerned, the Court has never acknowledged 
that they could amount to economic aims.89 However, as V. HATZOPOULOS points out, “the 
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legitimate interest pursued by tax measures will be economic in nature, since it pertains to the 
organization and the levy of taxes within a Member State.”90 The initial approach of the Court 
in this field was very strict. The Court found, for instance, that a national measure was justified 
in only one of the cases relating to personal income taxation.91 But, a closer look at cases 
involving corporations – based on the freedom of establishment – reveals that the Court has 
gradually softened its approach since it accepted, in Marks & Spencer,92 the justification relating 
to the balanced allocation of tax jurisdiction.93 Since then, Member States have relied on this 
ground in fourteen other cases, and the Court found in six of them that the national measures 
were proportionate.94 Cases in which the justification has been accepted share a common 
feature. They all involve national measures relating to the relief or consolidation of group 
companies. These tax mechanisms exist in most Member States, and consist in granting a group 
of companies the right to be fiscally treated as one company. They notably allow groups to 
move their profits and losses within the group freely. However, they are generally granted to 
domestic groups only. In all the cases where Member States relied on the preservation of the 
balanced allocation of taxing jurisdiction to justify their tax mechanisms, the plaintiffs claimed 
that the benefit of these mechanisms should have been extended to groups that are established 
in several Member States – through subsidiaries or permanent establishments. However, each 
time, the Court has held that the national mechanisms could be justified in light of the 
balanced allocation of tax jurisdiction. In this regard, it stated that: 
That element of justification may be allowed (…) where the system in question is designed 
to prevent conduct capable of jeopardizing the right of the Member States to exercise their 
taxing powers in relation to activities carried on in their territory.95 
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The Court thus closely associates the justification with the rights of Member States to exercise 
their taxing jurisdiction and to allocate in a discretionary manner their taxing jurisdictions.  
170. However, far from accepting any Member State’s claim based on the balanced allocation 
of the power to impose taxes between Member States, it has set a fundamental condition for 
the justification to apply. This condition is linked to what can be described as a symmetry 
requirement, according to which Member States must deal with profits and losses 
symmetrically. In Marks & Spencer, since the United Kingdom did not take into account the 
profits incurred by the nonresident subsidiaries of resident parent companies, the Court did 
not require this Member State to take into account the latter’s losses. It developed a similar line 
of reasoning in Lidl Belgium, which involved losses incurred by nonresident permanent 
establishments. When the Court rules on the balanced allocation of tax jurisdiction, its 
underlying motives seem to be at least partly economic. It admittedly recalled in Marks & 
Spencer that: 
[T]he reduction in tax revenue cannot be regarded as an overriding reason in the public 
interest which may be relied on to justify a measure which is in principle contrary to a 
fundamental freedom.96 
But, on the other hand, it noticed on several occasions that: 
To give companies the right to elect to have their losses taken into account in the Member 
State in which they are established or in another Member State would seriously undermine 
a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States, since the 
tax base would be increased in the first State, and reduced in the second, by the amount of 
the losses surrendered.97 
And it added in OyAA: 
[T]o accept that an intra-group cross-border transfer, […], may be deducted from the taxable 
income of the transferor would result in allowing groups of companies to choose freely the 
Member State in which the profits of the subsidiary are to be taxed, by removing them 
from the basis of assessment of the latter and, where that transfer is regarded as taxable 
income in the Member State of the parent company transferee, incorporating them in the 
basis of assessment of the parent company.98 
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Thus, the balanced allocation of tax jurisdiction is a way for the Court to prevent European 
group companies from forum shopping, for it would otherwise undermine the allocation of tax 
jurisdiction between Member States, thereby risking a decrease in their tax revenue. 
171. Compensation of civil war victims. In the same way as the field of direct taxation, the Court 
has never acknowledged that the justifications aimed to protect financial interests. But the 
grounds relating to the ‘necessity to verify that the recipient continues to satisfy the conditions 
for the grant of that benefit,’ the ‘desire to provide a benefit that takes into account differences 
between Member States such as differences in the cost of living,’ and the ‘need to ensure 
effective monitoring of the employment and social situation of beneficiaries’ allow Member 
States to constrain the conditions under which such benefits are granted, and therefore to 
control public spending. 
172. Cross-border health care. Since Kohll, the Court has recognized that the ‘risk of 
undermining the financial balance of a social security system’ constitutes an overriding reason 
in the general interest.99 It has even acknowledged that it amounted to protecting economic 
interests: 
It must be recalled that aims of a purely economic nature cannot justify a barrier to the 
fundamental principle of freedom to provide services […]. However, it cannot be excluded 
that the risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of the social security system 
may constitute an overriding reason in the general interest capable of justifying a barrier of 
that kind.”100  
Together with two other justifications,101 this ground has allowed Member States to maintain 
the obligation to obtain prior authorizations, thereby restricting the exercise of free movement 
rights, in several hypotheses. Soon after Decker and Kohll,102 the Court indeed acknowledged in 
Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms that national measures requiring prior authorizations for treatments 
received in hospital environment abroad were proportionate. It underlined that: 
[B]y comparison with medical services provided by practitioners in their surgeries or at the 
patient's home, medical services provided in a hospital take place within an infrastructure 
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with, undoubtedly, certain very distinct characteristics. It is thus well known that the 
number of hospitals, their geographical distribution, the mode of their organization and 
the equipment with which they are provided, and even the nature of the medical services 
which they are able to offer, are all matters for which planning must be possible.103 
Even if the Court did not expressly mentioned it, the reason for ensuring planning, as far as 
treatments received in hospital environment are concerned, lies in the fact that they require 
tremendous financial investments from Member States. The Court did not go as far as to 
prohibit prior authorizations because this could have had substantial financial implications, 
and this could have ultimately risked jeopardizing the organization of national social security 
schemes. Therefore, in the field of cross-border health care, the underlying concerns behind 
the main distinctions established by the Court104 are also of an economic nature.  
173. This is confirmed by a recent decision, Commission v. France.105 In this case, the 
Commission issued infringement proceedings against France on the grounds that this Member 
State maintained a prior authorization requirement with respect to medical services provided 
outside a hospital setting involving the use of major medical equipment. Following its Advocate 
General, the Court dismissed the Commission’s action and held that: 
[T]he French Republic and the United Kingdom, taking as an example positron emission 
tomography, used in the detection and treatment of cancer, have emphasized that that 
equipment represents costs of hundreds of thousands, even millions, of euro, in both its 
purchase and in its installation and use.106 
If persons insured under the French system could, freely and in any circumstances, obtain 
at the expense of the competent institution, from service providers established in other 
Member States, treatment involving the use of major medical equipment corresponding to 
that listed exhaustively in the Public Health Code, the planning endeavors of the national 
authorities and the financial balance of the supply of up-to-date treatment would as a result 
be jeopardized.107 
That possibility could lead to under-use of the major medical equipment installed in the 
Member State of affiliation and subsidized by it or yet to a disproportionate burden on that 
Member State’s social security budget.108 
Member States’ financial interests have motivated the entirety of the Court’s reasoning in a 
striking manner. In this decision, the Court gave up what was thought as a well-established 
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distinction between hospital environment and non-hospital environment.109 As a result, it is 
presently more accurate to say that Member States may maintain prior authorization 
requirements so long as the treatments covered by such obligations involve substantial 
financial investments. 
174. Education. The Court has also been inclined to protect Member States’ financial 
interests in the field of education, but to various extents. It was relatively explicit with respect to 
students’ financial support in Bidar: 
[A]lthough the Member States must, in the organization and application of their social 
assistance systems, show a certain degree of financial solidarity with nationals of other 
Member States, it is permissible for a Member State to ensure that the grant of assistance to 
cover the maintenance costs of students from other Member States does not become an 
unreasonable burden which could have consequences for the overall level of assistance 
which may be granted by that State.110 
Member States’ financial solidarity is conditional upon the degree of integration of incoming 
students into their society. Therefore, the Court did not place Member States under an 
absolute obligation to grant assistance to non-nationals/nonresidents. It gave them some 
leeway to refuse to grant assistance. Likewise, it accepted in Morgan & Bucher, a case concerning 
the exportation of financial support in the form of grant to study abroad, the justification 
based on the “unreasonable burden which could lead to a general reduction in study 
allowances granted in the Member State of origin.”111 It moreover limited the scope of the 
export of financial support in the form of tax relief: 
The Court has already held that, in order to avoid an excessive financial burden it is 
legitimate for a Member State to limit the amount deductible in respect of tuition fees to a 
given level, corresponding to the tax relief granted by that Member State, taking account of 
certain values of its own, for attendance at educational establishments situated in its 
territory.112 
175. Turning now to the conditions of access to a higher educational system, so far, the 
Court has never accepted a justification based on economic grounds. However, it does not 
seem to reject this specific ground of justification on principle. In Bressol, the Member States 
relied on Bidar and contended that allowing nonresidents to benefit from unrestricted access 
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would entail excessive burdens on the financing of higher education.113 Advocate General 
SHARPSTON unequivocally rejected this claim, and stressed that there was a fundamental 
difference between access to financial aid to cover the costs of education and access to 
education itself.114 In relation to the latter, she argued that: 
[T]he possibility for a student from the European Union to gain access to higher or 
university education in another Member State under the same conditions as nationals of 
that Member State constitutes the very essence of the principle of freedom of movement 
for students guaranteed by the Treaty. What the Court held as regards residence 
requirements for financial assistance in Bidar cannot therefore be transposed to the present 
case.115 
The Court ultimately also rejected Belgium’s justification,116 but on different grounds than 
those of the Advocate General. It based its reasoning on the fact that the financial burden was 
not “an essential reason which justified the adoption” of the contested measure. It underlined 
that: 
[T]he financing of education is organized through a ‘closed envelope’ system in which the 
overall allocation does not vary depending on the total number of students.117 
In other words, the Court took into account the fact that opening the access of the educational 
system would not have an impact on the financing of education. But, conversely, it can also be 
inferred from this statement that, were the Member States able to demonstrate a risk on the 
financing of education, the Court of Justice could be inclined to accept economic grounds, 
even when an issue as fundamental as access is at stake. 
176. Thus, in the fields of direct taxation, compensation of civil war victims, cross-border 
health care, and education, the Court breaks with its traditional approach and accepts that the 
proportionality of national measure can be assessed in light of economic grounds. As J. SNELL 
pointed out: 
[I]n certain circumstances, the constitutional structure of the Union as a divided power 
system may mandate a more permissive approach towards economic aims. Member States 
remain solely or primarily responsible for many important policy areas. Sometimes the only 
reasonable practical way of discharging these responsibilities involves the adoption of 
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measures the immediate aim of which is economic but that ultimately serve as a means for 
pursuing a legitimate public interest aim.118 
Therefore, the flexible character of the Court’s approach with respect to the acceptable 
grounds of justification and their assessment may be explained by several factors. First, the 
constitutional division of authority in the European Union is such that it is necessary to 
recognize a wider margin of appreciation for the Member States. Second, and maybe even 
more importantly, the survival of a State as political entity depends on its ability to raise 
revenue. Similarly, welfare policies, such as health care and education, are essential attributes 
of the European Union Member States.119 Comparable conclusions can be drawn with respect 
to justifications relating to the essential functions of the state. Both sets of justifications 
ultimately reflect the need for preserving Member State autonomy. 
                                                 
118 J. SNELL, “Economic aims as justification of restrictions on free movement,” above, n. 61, 49. 
119 A. ILIOPOULOU, “Entrave et citoyenneté de l’Union,” above, n. 83, 210. 
Ch. 3. Section 2. The adjustments required from Member States 139 
SECTION 2. THE ADJUSTMENTS REQUIRED FROM MEMBER STATES 
177. The second dimension of what I have called the ‘mutual adjustment resolution,’ which 
characterizes free movement cases involving powers retained by Member States, relates to the 
obligations placed upon Member States. These obligations are the other side of the coin; they 
mirror the Court of Justice ‘self-imposed adjustments.’ They also are the reflection of the 
flexible dimension of the Court’s power-based approach. The purpose of this second section is 
to identify their nature, as well as their defining features. In a nutshell, the obligations placed 
upon Member States can be described as ‘adjustment requirements.’ They are only rarely 
unconditional, and they reflect, most of the time the need to take into account Member States’ 
political, social, and economic interests as they were depicted in Section 1. Therefore, they 
consist in requiring Member States to make series of adjustments in such a way as to comply with 
European Union law. But, conversely, neither do they compel Member States to exercise their 
powers where they have decided not to, nor do they prevent them from exercising their powers 
in situations where they have decided they would. 
178. I have drawn a typology of the various adjustments required from Member States. This 
typology takes into account two interrelated variables: the types of obligations imposed on 
Member States, as well as the variations in the intensity of the proportionality test carried out 
by the Court. I have divided it into two main categories: substantive and procedural adjustment 
requirements. 
1. Substantive adjustment requirements 
179. At first glance, the content of the substantive requirements imposed on Member States 
in cases involving their retained powers could be seen as not substantially differing from 
traditional free movement cases. Obligations resulting from the Court of Justice constructions 
relate, for instance, to the imperatives of opening and recognition, which are cornerstones of 
free movement law. However, a closer look reveals that the Court imposes these obligations in a 
way that differs from its traditional approach, as shown by the following illustrations. 
a. Obligations to open 
180. The first range of adjustment requirements imposed on Member States in the 
framework of the power-based approach relates to the obligations of opening. Under certain 
circumstances, the Court of Justice has compelled Member States to ‘open’ their higher 
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education systems to nonresident students, to ‘open’ financial assistance to outgoing students, 
to ‘open’ their social security schemes in such a way as to allow outgoing patients to receive 
treatments abroad, and to ‘open’ their tax systems in order to take into account taxpayers 
involved in cross-border situations within the European Union. In order to shed light on the 
specific features of these obligations, I distinguish between two factors that tend to limit their 
reach: the preservation of the sustainability of national systems, and the degree of integration 
into society. 
i. Obligations subject to the preservation of the sustainability of national 
systems 
181. Access to higher education. The Court of Justice has long established the principle of equal 
access to education and vocational training, thereby compelling Member States to adjust the 
conditions of access to higher education with respect to nonresident students. This principle 
originally stems from cases involving the Belgian higher educational system, where the Court 
ruled that Belgium could not impose additional fees, the ‘Minerval,’ solely on nonresidents. At 
that time, only one Treaty provision pertained explicitly to education. It was Article 128 EEC,1 
which related to vocational training.2 One of the main issues raised in cases such as Forcheri,3 
Gravier,4 Blaizot,5 or Commission v. Belgium6 concerned the delineation of the scope of the notion 
of ‘vocational training.’ The Court interpreted the latter extensively, such as to encompass 
further educational establishment approved and subsidized by a Ministry of national 
education,7 non-university institutes of higher education,8 and university studies.9 It ruled that, 
as far as access to courses offered by these institutions was concerned, Member States could not 
impose higher tuition fees upon nonresident students.  
                                                 
1 Article 128 EEC: “The Council shall, acting on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee, lay down general principles for implementing a common vocational training 
policy capable of contributing to the harmonious development both of the national economies and of the 
common market.” 
2 See, Supra, §§ 49s. 
3 Case 28/83, Forcheri, [1984] ECR 1425. 
4 Case 293/83, Gravier, [1985] ECR 593. 
5 Case 24/86, Blaizot, [1988] ECR 379. 
6 Case 42/87, Commission v. Belgium, [1988] ECR 5445; Case C-47/93, Commission v. Belgium, [1994] ECR I-1593. 
7 Case 28/83, Forcheri, [1984] ECR 1425. 
8 Case 293/83, Gravier, [1985] ECR 593. 
9 Case 24/86, Blaizot, [1988] ECR 379. 
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182. More contemporary cases have specified the extent to which Member States must adjust 
the conditions of access to their higher educational systems, and the content of the obligations 
to guarantee equal access. They concern Austria and Belgium respectively. As seen earlier,10 
these two Member States have opted for the principle of unrestricted access, but they imposed 
additional conditions on nonresident students. The Court ruled in both Commission v. Austria 
and Bressol that the national measures restricted the free movement principle. Austria relied on 
several grounds of justification, relating to the need to safeguard the homogeneity of the 
Austrian higher or university education system and the need to prevent abuse of Community 
law. The Advocate General and the Court of Justice accepted them in principle, but they found 
that the Austrian measure was nonetheless disproportionate. Advocate General JACOBS 
underlined that: 
To accept the justifications relied on by Austria would amount to allowing Member States 
to compartmentalize their higher education systems.11 
The Court echoed its Advocate General, ruling that: 
[I]t need merely be observed that the possibility for a student from the European Union, 
who has obtained his secondary education diploma in a Member State other than Austria, 
to gain access to Austrian higher or university education under the same conditions as 
holders of diplomas awarded in Austria constitutes the very essence of the principle of 
freedom of movement for students guaranteed by the Treaty.12 
These statements confirm the idea that restrictions on access, which have a very detrimental 
effect on the principle of free movement, are subject to a strict proportionality test. This 
explains why the Advocate General adopted a ‘no less restrictive means’ test, and went as far as 
to suggest alternative measures. He even acknowledged that: 
Clearly the adoption of these less discriminatory measures would require change to the 
current system of unrestricted public access.13 
Yet, the Court of Justice did not endorse such a strict approach. It did reject Austria’s line of 
reasoning,14 but on different grounds. Rather, it focused on procedural aspects,15 and took the 
view that Austria had not provided evidence that the homogeneity of the Austrian education 
system would be jeopardized if access were to be equally granted to residents and nonresidents. 
                                                 
10 See, Supra, §§ 147s. 
11 Opinion in Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969, 53. (Emphasis added) 
12 Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969, 70. (Emphasis added) 
13 Opinion in Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969, 53 (Emphasis added). 
14 Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969, 66. 
15 Ibid., 65. 
Chapter 3. A Mutual Adjustment Resolution 
 
142 
It turns out that, if the creation of restrictions on access is ‘essentially preventive in nature,’ 
then Member States must adjust the conditions of access to their open educational systems in 
such a way as to grant any student from the European Union holding a secondary-school 
diploma a right of access. The Advocate General put forward several alternatives, which are 
worth stating because they give an idea of the reach and content of the adjustments that 
Member States could be required to implement. In the Advocate General’s view, Member 
States could, for instance, establish an entry examination or a minimum grade, or check the 
correspondence of the foreign qualifications with those required from holders of Austrian 
diplomas.16 Therefore, the effects of Commission v. Austria are likely to be very burdensome, 
since they might ultimately lead Austria to significantly alter the conditions of access to its 
education system.  
183. In Bressol, Advocate General SHARPSTON followed a very strict approach, reminiscent of 
Advocate General JACOBS’ Opinion under Commission v. Austria. She first recalled that: 
Individual Member States may wish to maintain unlimited access to higher education. 
They are of course at perfect liberty to do so. If so, they must however be prepared to offer 
unlimited free access for all EU students regardless of nationality.17 
The Advocate General confirmed that Member States are at liberty to organize their higher 
education systems, and, in particular, to set out conditions on access. However, she stressed 
that these conditions may not be discriminatory. And, if the replacement of discriminatory 
conditions is too burdensome for Member States, they must be ready to give up the 
unrestricted access principle.18 By contrast, the Court of Justice followed an approach that 
seems, to say the least, more equivocal.19 On the one hand, it acknowledged that the quotas set 
up by Belgium could be justified in light of the protection of public health. It moreover did not 
really assessed proportionality, and left it almost entirely to the national court: “it is for the 
referring court to establish that there are genuine risks to the protection of public health.”20 
On the other hand, the Court of Justice specified how the national court must carry out the 
                                                 
16 Opinion in Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969, 52. See also Case C-147/03, Commission v. 
Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969, 61. 
17 Opinion in Case C-73/08, Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735, 106. 
18 Ibid., 108. 
19 For different points of view, see, for instance, S. GARBEN, “Case C-73/08, Bressol, Chaverot and Others v. 
Gouvernement de la Communauté française,” 47 C. M. L. Rev. 1493, 1508 (2010); S. GROSBON, “Libre circulation 
et systèmes de sélection universitaire: une équation complexe,” RAE-LEA 640 (2009-2010). 
20 Case C-73/08, Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735, 66. 
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proportionality test. It reaffirmed that such risks must be actual, supported by detailed 
statistical data,21 and that Member States bear the burden of proof.22 The assessment of 
proportionality also requires national courts to check the suitability of the national measures.23 
The Court finally invited the national courts to engage into a ‘no less restrictive means’ test.24 
In particular, if it stems from statistical evidence that the restriction on access of nonresident 
students is necessary, Member States may nevertheless not arbitrarily select these students. In 
this respect, the Court pointed out that “nonresident students […] are selected […] by drawing 
lots which, as such, does not take into account their knowledge or experience,”25 and it 
required the national court to assess whether the non-taking into account of students’ personal 
skills was necessary.  
184. Thus, in Commission v. Austria and Bressol, the Court of Justice’s stance on conditions on 
access to national education systems is not entirely clear. In Commission v. Austria, the Court 
patently rejected the argument put forward by Austria, even if it opened the door to the 
possibility of justifying the restrictive measure. In Bressol, it confirmed that European Union law 
might ultimately compel Member States to alter the basic principle they have opted for with 
respect to access.26 However, it held that: 
Admittedly, it cannot be excluded from the outset that the prevention of a risk to the 
existence of a national education system and to its homogeneity may justify a difference in 
treatment between some students.27 
It moreover only set out broad guidelines to be followed by the national court. All in all, 
proportionality was assessed pretty strictly in Commission v. Austria, and subsequently turned 
into being more deferential – despite the fact that, in both Commission v. Austria and Bressol, 
the national measures overtly discriminated between residents and nonresidents. But both 
cases are characterized by the fact that the Court placed great emphasis on the need to preserve 
and safeguard the sustainability of educational systems. As a result, Member States are required 
to adjust their criteria if they do not comply with the equal treatment principle, but only to the 
extent that this does not alter the organization of their education systems. 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 71-73. 
22 Ibid., 74. 
23 Ibid., 75-76. 
24 Ibid., 79. 
25 Ibid., 80. 
26 Ibid., 29. 
27 Ibid., 53. 
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185. Higher education: Exportation of financial assistance. The same holds true with respect to 
exportation of financial assistance. Schwarz28 and Commission v. Germany29 involved a German 
tax mechanism, whereby payments of school fees to certain private schools established in 
Germany, but not payments to schools located in the rest of the Community territory, could be 
treated as special expenditure, leading to a reduction of income tax. Schwarz concerned two 
parents who sent their children to a school in Scotland for exceptionally gifted children. The 
German authorities refused to grant them a tax relief on the grounds that the school was not 
established in Germany. The Court of Justice found that the German legislation amounted in 
both cases to unjustified restrictions. It used the same technique as in other cases involving 
powers retained by Member States by imposing adjustment requirements upon the exercise of 
national educational powers, as shown by the Advocate General in Schwarz: 
Community law recognizes that the Member States have discretion in organizing their 
national education. […] As a consequence, the Member States may lay down their own 
criteria, based on national ideas, which they expect the schools to fulfill in order to 
perform this function.30 
There cannot therefore be any objection from the point of view of Community law […] to 
linking indirect state assistance through the grant of tax advantages of the fulfillment of 
these criteria, against which schools in other EC countries must also be measured.31 
Thus, the Court’s rulings had the effect of compelling Germany to open its tax mechanism in 
such a way as to encompass EU cross-border situations. Here again, Member States are at 
liberty to set out their own criteria. They must however comply with the non-discrimination 
principle, and they are precluded, in this respect, from automatically excluding cross-border 
situations.32 The Court seems to have been influenced by a significant feature of the German 
mechanism to conclude that it was in breach of European Union law. This mechanism, as a 
matter of fact, did not aim to subsidize German schools, but German taxpayers. But the Court 
would have probably reached a very different conclusion had the German tax advantage 
                                                 
28 Case C-76/05, Schwarz, [2007] ECR I-6849. 
29 Case C-318/05, Commission v. Germany, [2007] ECR I-6957. 
30 Opinion in Schwarz, Case C-76/05, Schwarz, [2007] ECR I-6849, 45 (Emphasis added). 
31 Ibid., 46 (Emphasis added). 
32 Case C-76/05, Schwarz, [2007] ECR I-6849, 72: “that article makes the deductibility of part of the school fees 
subject to the approval, authorization or recognition in Germany of the private school concerned, without fixing 
an objective criterion allowing it to be determined which types of school fees charged by German schools are 
deductible.” 
At 73: “It follows that any private school established in a Member State other than the Federal Republic of 
Germany, merely by reason of the fact that it is not established in Germany, is automatically excluded from the tax 
advantage at issue in the main proceedings, whether or not it meets criteria such as the charging of school fees of 
an amount that does not give rise to the selection of pupils according to parental means.” 
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concerned German schools. In Schwarz and Commission v. Germany, the extension of the scope 
of the tax arrangement could ultimately not have amounted to compelling a Member State to 
directly finance the educational system of another Member State. As a result, the obligation to 
open is once again not unconditional. It is subject to the need to preserve the financing of 
national education systems. This obligation of opening has been confirmed in Zanotti. This 
case concerned deductions from gross tax of the costs of attending a university course provided 
in another Member State. The Court applied the findings of Schwarz and Commission v. 
Germany and recalled that: 
In the absence of harmonization measures, it is for the Member States, in exercising their 
powers, to lay down the criteria for calculating deductible university tuition fees, provided 
that the relevant rules comply with the provisions of the EC Treaty and, in particular, in a 
case such as that in the main proceedings, do not dissuade taxpayers resident in Italy, from 
attending university courses offered by establishments situated in other Member States.33 
186. Cross-border health care. As seen earlier,34 national security schemes are based on the 
principle of territoriality. Patients may only receive treatment on the territory of their Member 
State of affiliation. This principle is however not inflexible. Even before the Court of Justice 
initiated its case law relating to cross-border health care, most of Member States’ legal systems 
provided for mechanisms whereby, in case of scheduled treatments, and under strict 
conditions, patients could receive treatment abroad. These conditions notably included the 
obligation to be granted an authorization before receiving cross-border treatments. In this 
respect, national authorities used to grant these authorizations to patients discretionarily.35 It is 
precisely on this point that national laws and practices have been challenged before the Court 
of Justice. To this end, patients have relied on the freedom to provide services in a vast majority 
of cases. Decker and Kohll36 were the first rulings where the Court was called upon to rule on the 
compatibility of measures relating to cross-border health care with the free movement principle. 
Decker concerned a Luxembourg national who purchased a pair of spectacles with corrective 
lenses from an optician established in Belgium.37 The Luxembourg authorities refused to 
reimburse him on the grounds that he had not obtained prior authorization. The Court ruled 
                                                 
33 Case C-56/09, Zanotti, [2010] ECR I-4517, 64. 
34 See, Supra, § 49. 
35 See, Supra, §§ 61s my points on Regulation 883/2004. 
36 Case C-120/95, Decker, [1998] ECR I-1831; Case C-158/96, Kohll, [1998] ECR I-1931. See VAN DER MEI A. P. 
“Cross-border access to medical care within the European Union – Some reflections on the judgments in Decker 
and Kohll,” 5 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 277-297 (1998). 
37 It is to be noted that Case C-120/95, Decker, [1998] ECR I-1831 is based on the free movement of goods. 
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that this amounted to an unjustified restriction. The facts of Kohll were slightly different from 
those of Decker. This time, Luxembourg authorities refused to authorize the appellant’s 
daughter to receive dental treatment in Germany. The appellant thus directly challenged their 
refusal, which the Court once again found to be contrary to European Union law.  
187. Following these two initial decisions, the Court of Justice clarified the reach, as well as 
the meaning, of the newly recognized principles. The clarification concerned, on the one hand, 
the scope of application of European Union law. In Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms,38 it was 
confirmed that European Union law applied to facts involving a compulsory sickness insurance 
scheme. In Müller-Fauré & Van Riet,39 the Court came up with the same solution with respect to 
compulsory insurance schemes providing only benefits-in-kind. Last but not least, it also 
included the British National Health Service in Watts.40 Consequently, any national social 
security scheme, regardless of its peculiarities, must comply with the rulings of the Court of 
Justice. In addition, the Court made it clear in Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms that treatments 
provided both outside hospital environment – as it was the case in Decker and Kohll – and in 
hospital environment fall within the scope of European Union law.  
188. On the other hand, the Court has brought clarifications with respect to the limits 
placed upon Member States’ discretionary powers by imposing specific adjustment 
requirements. The effects of Decker and Kohll are, at first glance, far-reaching. These two cases 
preclude Member States from exercising their powers to impose obligations relating to the prior 
obtaining of authorizations. However, this extensive requirement to open national social 
security schemes is limited in scope. It only concerns the purchase of medical goods and 
treatments received abroad in non-hospital environment. The Court did not go that far in cases 
pertaining to hospital environment41 and treatments received in non-hospital environment 
                                                 
38 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473. See, e.g., E. STEYGER, “National health care 
systems under fire (but not too heavily),” Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2002) 29(1): 97-107. 
39 Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré & Van Riet, [2003] ECR I-4509. See, e.g., A. P. VAN DER MEI, “Cross-border access 
to medical care: Non-hospital care and waiting lists,” 31: 1 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 57-67 (2004); M. 
FLEAR, 41 CMLR 209-233 (2004). 
40 Case C-372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-4325. See, e.g., S. VAN RAEPENBUSCH, “L’état de la jurisprudence de la 
CJCE relative au libre accès aux soins de santé à l’intérieur de l’Union européenne après l’arrêt du 16 mai 2006, 
Watts, C-372/04,” Gazette du Palais, vendredi 8, samedi 9 décembre 2006, 8-14; L. AZOULAI, “En attendant la 
justice sociale, vive la justice procédurale! À propos de la libre circulation des patients dans l’Union (CJCE 16 mai 
2006, Watts, Aff. C-372/04),” Revue de droit sanitaire et social 843-851 (2006); M. COUSINS, “Patient mobility and 
national health systems,” 34: 2 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 183-193 (2007). 
41 E.g. Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473. 
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involving the use of major medical equipment.42 In these instances, Member States may still 
require patients to obtain prior authorizations. In Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms, it held, for 
example, that: 
[A] requirement that the assumption of costs, under a national social security system, of 
hospital treatment provided in another Member State must be subject to prior 
authorization appears to be a measure which is both necessary and reasonable.43 
In other words, they are still at liberty to exercise their regulatory powers. But they are 
nevertheless subjected to a specific range of adjustment requirements.  
189. The Court has indeed carried out strict proportionality tests with respect to the 
conditions under which Member States may limit the grant of prior authorizations. In a similar 
way to the other fields analyzed herein, it seeks to circumscribe Member States’ arbitrariness: “a 
scheme for prior authorization cannot legitimize discretionary decisions which are liable to 
negate the effectiveness of provisions of Community law.”44 The following statement reveals the 
exact content of the adjustments required from Member States. It pertains to the substantive 
conditions under which national authorities may grant or refuse prior authorizations: 
[I]n order for a prior administrative authorization scheme to be justified […] it must, in any 
event, be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known in advance, in 
such a way as to circumscribe the exercise of the national authorities’ discretion, so that it 
is not used arbitrarily.45 
Member States are thus compelled to comply with the principles of objectivity and non-
discrimination. The Court has controlled the proportionality of several substantive conditions 
laid down by Member States in light of these principles. For instance, the Netherlands set out a 
rule whereby prior authorizations could only be granted in relation to treatments considered as 
‘normal’ in the professional circles concerned.46 The Court regarded this requirement as being 
too general, and as being, accordingly, open to several interpretations, thereby creating 
uncertainty.47 It compelled the Dutch authorities to interpret this condition “on the basis of 
what is sufficiently tried and tested by international medical science,” and to apply the criteria 
                                                 
42 Case C-512/08, Commission v. France, [2010] ECR I-8833; Case C-255/09, Commission v. Portugal, [2011] ECR I-
547. 
43 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473, 80. See also Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré & Van 
Riet, [2003] ECR I-4509; and Case C-372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-4325. 
44 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473, 90. See also Case C-372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-
4325, 115. 
45 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473, 90. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., 91-92. 
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objectively, and regardless of the place of establishment of the treatment providers.48 In Müller-
Fauré & Van Riet, it acknowledged that national authorities could subject an authorization to a 
condition relating to the necessity of cross-border treatments, as long as treatments were not 
provided by the state of affiliation with undue delay.49 Cases involving cross-border health care 
therefore impose substantial requirements upon Member States. The Court seems to start 
from a premise similar to that of cases on higher education. It does not preclude Member 
States of their powers if the removal of obstacles jeopardizes the organization, functioning 
and/or financing of national social security systems. However, it strictly supervises the 
conditions under which Member States may maintain mechanisms restricting the free 
movement principles by subjecting them to the aforementioned adjustment requirements, and 
by controlling whether individual conditions comply, in practice, with European Union law. 
190. Direct taxation. The Court of Justice has also imposed significant obligations on Member 
States with respect to their taxing powers. Here again, Member States are compelled to treat 
cross-border situations no less favorably than purely internal situations, provided that this does 
not jeopardize the sustainability of national tax systems. Broadly speaking, they must comply 
with the equal treatment principle in respect of (i) residents’ foreign-source income, and (ii) 
nonresidents’ domestic-source income. In other words, they must open their tax systems to 
cross-border situations. This results in obligations to grant the same tax advantages to residents 
receiving foreign income, and to nonresidents receiving domestic income, provided that 
residents and nonresidents are found objectively comparable.50 The following illustrations show 
that four main areas of national tax systems are affected by the Court of Justice case law: exit tax 
arrangements, individual income taxation, corporate income taxation, and dividend taxation. 
191. Direct taxation. (i) Exit taxes. Exit taxes “serve to secure taxation in respect of unrealized 
income accrual (tax deferrals) which may otherwise escape taxation in the accrual jurisdiction as 
a result of the taxpayer (and all other connecting factors, especially the source of income) 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 94-97. 
49 Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré & Van Riet, [2003] ECR I-4509, 89. 
50 K. LENAERTS & L. BERNARDEAU “L’encadrement communautaire de la fiscalité directe,” 33 Cahiers de Droit 
Européen 19, 42 (2007); S. KINGSTON, “A light in the darkness: recent developments in the ECJ’s direct tax 
jurisprudence,” 44:5 CMLR 1321, 1331 (2007); D. WEBER, “In search of a (new) equilibrium between tax 
sovereignty and the freedom of movement within the EC,” 34 Intertax Vol. 585, 587 (2006). 
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leaving that jurisdiction.”51 Thus, they have the effect of imposing additional burden on 
individuals or companies wishing to move to other Member States, and, as such, the Court of 
Justice has seen them as ‘outbound’ restrictions.52 Nonetheless, the Court does not require 
Member States to remove them entirely from their tax systems, but rather to adjust the 
conditions under which emigrating taxpayers must pay exit taxes, as shown by N. v. Inspecteur.53 
This case concerned an individual taxpayer transferring his residence from the Netherlands to 
the United Kingdom. The Dutch administration subjected the granting of deferment of the exit 
tax to the provision of guarantees, and did not take full account of reductions in value capable 
of arising after the transfer of residence. The Court found that this system was 
disproportionate, but it accepted, as a matter of principle, the conservatory assessment.54 As a 
result, as far as individuals’ emigration is concerned, Member States are precluded from 
requiring payments or security for future payment. They must moreover take into account post-
emigration decreases in value. The Court did not go as far with respect to companies. In 
National Grid Indus,55 it held that exit taxes could be justified. It started by confirming that 
requirements relating to conservatory assessments were proportionate. It went on by adding 
that Member States may not subject emigrating companies to immediate payment. Instead, 
choice must be given to companies between immediate payment of exit taxes or deferred 
payment. However, in the case of deferred payment, Member States may subject companies to 
both interest calculation and security for later payment. They are moreover not compelled to 
take into account post-emigration decreases in value. The main reason why the Court seems to 
have softened its original approach lies in its concern to preserve the sustainability of national 
tax systems which, in the case of exit taxes, requires to preserve the right of the home state to 
exercise its taxing jurisdiction: 
The transfer of the place of effective management of a company of one Member State to 
another Member State cannot mean that the Member State of origin has to abandon its 
right to tax a capital gain which arose within the ambit of its powers of taxation before the 
transfer […]. [An exit tax system] is intended to prevent situations capable of jeopardizing 
the right of the Member State of origin to exercise its powers of taxation in relation to 
                                                 
51 B. J. M. TERRA & P. J. WATTEL European Tax Law, (6th Ed., Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 2012), 955. 
52 See e.g. Case C-9/02, De Lasteyrie du Saillant, [2004] ECR 2409, 46 (individuals); Case C-64/11, Commission v. 
Spain, [2013] To be published (companies). 
53 Case C-470/04, N., [2006] ECR I-7409. 
54 Ibid., 46. 
55 Case C-371/10, National Grid Indus, [2011] ECR I-12273. 
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activities carried on in its territory, and may therefore be justified on grounds connected 
with the preservation of the allocation of powers of taxation between the Member States.56 
192. Direct taxation. (ii) Individual income taxation. The Court of Justice case law also compels 
Member States to adjust individual income taxation rules. This trend concerns the taxation of 
nonresidents, as well as well as the taxation of residents. As far as nonresidents are concerned, 
the Court has ruled that the equal treatment principle applies to, for instance: tax scales – 
residents and nonresidents must be subjected to the same tax scale;57 the repayment of payroll 
tax exceeding the final income tax liability;58 the tax burden of nonresident providers of 
services;59 withholding taxes on the pension of nonresident retired civil servants;60 and the 
taking into account of negative income from real estate.61 Likewise, nonresidents must be 
granted the same income-related deductions or credits as residents,62 as well as the same 
deductions relating to the expenses incurred in earning their income.63 To put it differently, 
Member States must grant nonresidents the same tax advantages as residents each time 
nonresidents and residents are in objectively comparable situations. Similarly, residents must be 
granted the same deductions if they pay contributions to foreign pension funds or foreign life 
insurance companies.64 Last but not least, Member States must extend the benefit of tax 
advantages aiming to stimulate investment to residents investing or borrowing abroad.65  
193. Therefore, the Court of Justice subjects Member States to substantial obligations of 
opening when it comes to personal income tax. As soon as it finds that residents and 
nonresidents are in comparable situations, it tends to overturn national measures. Bachmann is 
one of the few exceptions where it upheld a national tax arrangement on the grounds that it 
fulfilled the need to maintain the coherence of a national tax system.66 This case concerned a 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 46. 
57 Case C-107/94, Asscher, [1996] ECR I-3089. 
58 Case C-175/88, Biehl, [1990] ECR I-1779. 
59 Case C-234/01, Gerritse, [2003] ECR I-5933. 
60 Case C-520/04, Turpeinen, [2006] ECR I-10685. 
61 Case C-152/03, Ritter-Coulais, [2006] ECR I-1711; Case C-182/06, Lakebrink, [2007] ECR I-6705; Case C-
527/06, Renneberg, [2008] ECR I-7735. 
62 See e.g. Case C-175/88, Biehl, [1990] ECR I-1779; Case C-279/93, Schumacker, [1995] ECR I-225; Case C-
234/01, Gerritse, [2003] ECR I-5933. 
63 See e.g. Case C-345/04, Centro Equestre da Leziria Grande Lda, [2007], ECR I-1425. 
64 See e.g. Case C-150/04, Commission v. Denmark, [2007] ECR I-1163; Case C-522/04, Commission v. Belgium, 
[2007] ECR I-5701. 
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Belgian law according to which the deductibility for income tax purposes of insurance 
contribution was made conditional upon the contributions being paid in Belgium. The Court 
pointed out that there was a “connection between the deductibility of contributions and the 
liability to tax of sums payable by the insurers under pension and life assurance contracts.”67 It 
moreover added that the loss of revenue resulting from the deductions was offset by the 
taxation of pensions, annuities or capital sums, and concluded that this arrangement could be 
justified.68 However, the Court only accepted the cohesion justification once in the field of 
personal income tax,69 and it even seems to have reversed its Bachmann findings in Commission 
v. Denmark, a case decided in 2007.70 In this case, it held that Denmark breached the free 
movement of workers and the freedom of establishment by implementing a tax arrangement 
whereby tax deductions and tax exemptions with respect to life insurance and pensions were 
granted only to taxpayers who had contracted with institutions established in Denmark. 
194. Direct taxation. (iii) Corporate income taxation. As far as corporate income taxation is 
concerned, a distinction might be drawn between obligations incumbent on host states and 
obligations incumbent on home states. As soon as host states subject both resident companies 
and branches of nonresident parent companies to corporation tax, they must comply with the 
equal treatment principle when implementing tax schemes and granting tax benefits.71  
195. As for home states, they must adapt, to some extent, group taxation schemes and 
Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC) legislations.72 In this respect, the Court starts from the 
premise that parent companies, which are systematically resident in the home state, regardless 
of whether they hold foreign or domestic subsidiaries/branches, are comparable.73 Papillon gives 
a good illustration of the type of obligations that Member States must comply with in relation 
to group taxation schemes.74 This case involved a French tax consolidation scheme available to 
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parent companies and their subsidiaries, provided that the former held more than 95% of the 
shares of the latter. Société Papillon was denied the benefit of the consolidation scheme on the 
grounds that it held more than 95% of the shares of a sub-subsidiary through an intermediate 
100% subsidiary established in another Member State. France argued that this scheme could be 
justified by the balanced allocation of tax jurisdiction and the need to ensure the coherence of 
the tax system. The Court rejected France’s line of reasoning. It first noted that cross-border 
loss compensation was not at issue and thus did not accept the first justification.75 It then 
acknowledged that if France was compelled to ‘open’ its consolidation scheme, this could affect 
the coherence of that regime. But less restrictive measures existed that could ensure that losses 
would not be taken into account twice.76 In pursuance of Directive 77/799/EC concerning 
mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct 
taxation, France could indeed request the information needed relating to the parent’s 
subsidiary located in another Member State.77  
196. Adjustments required from Member States with respect to group of companies are 
subject to significant limitations.78 They may not, in particular, result in compelling Member 
States to accept cross-border loss relief if they do not have jurisdiction with respect to losses and 
if, symmetrically, they do not exercise their tax jurisdiction on the corresponding profits 
generated by nonresident subsidiaries/branches. This limitation stems from Mark & Spencer, 
where the United Kingdom company argued that the United Kingdom tax administration 
should allow deductions of foreign subsidiary losses on the ground that it allowed such 
deduction with respect to losses of foreign branches and losses of resident subsidiaries. The 
Court held that: 
[T]o give companies the option to have their losses taken into account in the Member State 
in which they are established or in another Member State would significantly jeopardize a 
balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States, as the taxable 
basis would be increased in the first State and reduced in the second to the extent of the 
losses transferred.79 
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It moreover added that Member States could prevent losses to be taken into account twice,80 
and that limiting the benefit of group relief to companies subject to United Kingdom tax was 
necessary to avoid the risk of tax avoidance.81 The Court subsequently decided that the Marks 
& Spencer limitation applied to losses generated by foreign branches where, in pursuance of a 
bilateral treaty, the parent company’s state excluded from its tax jurisdiction the losses and 
profits of foreign branches.82 Therefore, Member States are relieved of their obligations to 
extend tax advantages to cross-border groups of companies if such an extension had the effect 
of jeopardizing the balanced allocation of their taxing jurisdictions. This is another reflection 
of the Court of Justice concern with respect to the need to safeguard the sustainability of 
national tax systems. 
197. Direct taxation. (iv) Dividend taxation. As far as dividends are concerned, the Court of 
Justice does not subject Member States to the same requirements, depending on whether 
inbound or outbound dividends are involved. It results from decisions such as Lenz83 or 
Manninen84 that Member States are required to prevent economic double taxation85 of inbound 
dividends if they do so with respect to internal dividends. However, Member States do not have 
to undo double juridical taxation,86 as shown, for instance, by Kerckhaert-Morres.87 In this case, 
Belgium had decided to tax both domestic and foreign dividends at a flat income tax rate of 
25% without credits. The plaintiffs complained, on the grounds that they were subjected to 
both the 15% French withholding tax, and the Belgian 25% income tax. Since Belgium did not 
credit its own withholding tax, the Court of Justice ruled that it could not be compelled to 
grant a tax advantage that did not exist with respect to internal dividends. Indeed, it held that: 
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In circumstances such as those of the present case, the adverse consequences which might 
arise from the application of an income tax system such as the Belgian system […] result 
from the exercise in parallel by two Member States of their fiscal sovereignty.88 
The Court of Justice case law relating to inbound dividends is particularly interesting as it 
shows that, if the Court may compel Member States to extend existing tax advantages in such a 
way as to comply with the equal treatment principle, it does not require them, however, to set 
up tax advantages in order to remove the ‘adverse consequences’ arising from the parallel 
exercise of two taxing jurisdictions. As for outbound dividends, Member States are required to 
treat nonresident shareholders no less favorably than resident shareholders, regardless of 
whether economic double taxation89 or juridical economic taxation are at issue.90 
198. The above demonstrates that, as far as the fields of education, social security, and direct 
taxation are concerned, European Union law imposes significant adjustment requirements 
upon Member States. They all relate to the obligations to open national systems in such a way 
as to take into account EU cross-border situations. However, these obligations are systematically 
limited by the need to preserve the sustainability, i.e. the internal coherence, of national 
systems. The following shows that the degree of integration into society is another factor 
capable of limiting the obligations to open. 
ii. Obligations subject to the degree of integration into society 
199. Higher education: Nonresident students’ financial assistance. Traditionally, most Member 
States excluded nonresident students from the grant of financial assistance. The Court’s case 
law has undergone significant changes in this respect. At the outset, the Court decided that 
students’ financial assistance did not fall within the scope of European Union law. In Lair and 
Brown it indeed ruled that: 
[A]t the present stage of development of Community law assistance given to students for 
maintenance and for training falls in principle outside the scope of the EEC Treaty for the 
purposes of Article 7.91 
In Raulin, it drew an important distinction between grants covering costs of access – i.e. 
enrolment and tuition fees – and grants allowing students to enjoy financial independence. It 
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found that the former were subject to the non-discrimination principle,92 and confirmed that 
Member States were free to regulate the latter. In case an individual challenged the conditions 
of award of a grant covering both, the Court added that: 
It is for the national courts to determine what proportion of the financial assistance 
granted is intended to cover the costs of access to vocational training.93 
Therefore, these first cases recognized that Member States enjoyed a wide margin of discretion 
to set out award conditions, even when such conditions overtly discriminated between 
residents and nonresidents.  
200. But the Court of Justice clearly departed from this initial stance in Bidar and Förster.94 
This change followed two important decisions, which involved broader issues relating to the 
conditions of award of social benefits. Grzelczyk95 concerned a non-Belgian EU national who 
studied in Belgium, and who challenged the Belgian authorities’ refusal to grant him a social 
benefit in the form of minimum subsistence allowance – the ‘minimex’ – that was nonetheless 
guaranteed by Belgian law to Belgian nationals. Belgium contested the applicability of 
European Union law by relying on the previous Court of Justice case law on education.96 But 
the Court rejected this line of reasoning.97 It took into account the specific facts of the case: the 
applicant had himself taken care of his costs of maintenance, accommodation and studies 
during the first three years of his studies. However, the pursuance of his fourth year no longer 
enabled him to take over jobs. This led the Court to compel Belgium to grant him the 
minimex, and thus to broaden the scope materiae personae of the award conditions. It proceeded 
in a similar fashion in D’Hoop.98 This time, Belgium refused to grant a ‘tideover allowance’ 
intended for young unemployed people seeking their first job on the ground that the applicant 
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– a Belgian national – had not attended secondary school in Belgium. The Court considered 
that this amounted to a breach of European Union citizenship provisions and thus compelled 
Belgium, once again, to broaden the scope of award conditions. Grzelczyk and D’Hoop did not 
specifically pertain to students’ financial assistance. They nonetheless paved the way for the 
defining move that occurred in Bidar.99  
201. This case concerned a French national who attended high school as well as university in 
the United Kingdom. While this Member State granted him assistance in relation to his tuition 
fees, it refused him a loan for maintenance costs on the grounds that he was not ‘settled’ in the 
United Kingdom.100 The Court, following its Advocate General, reversed its previous case law 
and found that students’ financial assistance fell within the scope of the Treaty.101 It also 
considered that the settled-status requirement breached European Union citizenship 
provisions.102 Therefore, for the first time, a Member State was compelled to extend the benefit 
of student financial support in order to comply with European Union law. The Court’s 
reasoning imposed new adjustment requirements on Member States, thereby restricting 
national discretionary powers. In this respect, it subjected Member States’ powers relating to 
the award of students’ financial assistance to both negative and positive obligations. The Court 
underlined that Member States might not “require the students concerned to establish a link 
with [their] employment market.”103 More importantly, neither may they “preclude any 
possibility of a national of another Member State” from obtaining a status that would allow 
them to benefit from financial assistance.104 Positive obligations consist in compelling Member 
States to grant assistance – provided it does not become an unreasonable financial burden – if 
the students concerned are able to demonstrate a certain degree of integration into their 
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society. In this regard, the Court specified that this could be “regarded as established by a 
finding that the student has resided in the host Member State for a certain length of time.”105 
Bidar nonetheless gave rise to certain uncertainties relating to the assessment of the degree of 
integration.  
202. The Court of Justice settled some of them in Förster.106 This case concerned a German 
national studying in the Netherlands. She performed paid work in this country, and 
subsequently became economically inactive. She applied for financial assistance, but the Dutch 
authorities rejected her application on the grounds that she neither retained the status of a 
Community worker, nor fulfilled the requirement of lawful residence in the Netherlands for a 
continuous period of at least five years. It is to be noted that Mrs. Förster moved to the 
Netherlands for the sole purpose of pursuing higher education. Despite the fact that the factual 
background of Förster is different than Bidar’s, the Court held that the principles stemming 
from Bidar were applicable.107 It rejected the Member States’ argument whereby a distinction 
should be drawn between individuals who move to another Member State with the primary 
objective of pursuing studies there – and who should be subject to Directive 93/96 – and 
individuals who settle in another Member State for other reasons, and subsequently decide to 
take up studies – and who may rely on European Union citizenship provisions.108 The Court 
moreover confirmed that Member States may not place non-nationals in a situation where they 
are wholly precluded from enjoying the right to assistance to cover their maintenance costs. 
They must take into account the students’ actual degree of integration.109 However, the Court 
did not follow its Advocate General with respect to the conditions of assessment of the degree 
of integration. Advocate General MAZÁK seemed to have endorsed Mrs. Förster’s claim that: 
Member States should assess in each individual case whether the person concerned 
demonstrates a sufficient degree of integration into society of the host Member State, 
account being taken of personal factors.110 
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He indeed considered that criteria used by Member States to grant financial assistance could 
not be “so general in scope that [they] systematically exclude students.” They “must be 
indicative of the degree of integration into society.”111 The Advocate General understood the 
latter obligation as precluding the Netherlands from imposing a five-year residence 
requirement on the grounds that “it can reasonably be assumed that a number of students may 
have established a substantial degree of integration into society well before the expiry of that 
period.”112 He thus implied that Member States should assess the personal situations of 
students on a case-by-case basis, and not by using automatic criteria. Nonetheless, the Court 
concluded that the five-year residence requirement imposed by Dutch authorities was 
proportionate.113 There is thus a discrepancy between Bidar and Förster. The former seemed to 
strictly restrict Member States’ assessment of the ‘degree of integration’ by imposing on them 
the obligation to grant financial assistance on a case-by-case basis. But the latter gives more 
leeway to national authorities, which are allowed to set out general criteria, such as a five-year 
residence requirement. These criteria, by definition, do not systematically enable students to 
demonstrate that they are actually integrated into their host society. 
203. Higher education: Financial assistance of students studying abroad. The field of higher 
education has also raised issues relating to the exportation of social benefits. Here, cases 
concern students willing to study abroad who are denied the right to export financial support 
offered by their home state. The obligations placed upon home states mirror in some respects 
those that have been imposed upon Member States hosting nonresident students. The first 
case, Wirth, was decided in the early nineties.114 A German national, resident in Germany, took 
over musical studies in the Netherlands, due to the lack of places available in Germany. He 
requested an educational grant but the German authorities turned it down. As noted by the 
Advocate General, this was the first case in which a home country was accused of 
discriminating.115 The Court applied the principles stemming from Lair and Brown,116 and held 
that: 
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[A]t the present stage of development of Community law assistance given to students for 
maintenance and for training falls in principle outside the scope of the Treaty.117 
It thus refused to put any limitation on Member States’ discretion. But it reversed its position, 
after Bidar118 was decided, in Schwarz and Commission v. Germany.119  
204. In Morgan & Bucher,120 a subsequent case, two German students, willing to take over 
studies in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands respectively, were refused grants 
specifically designed for students studying abroad. In the case of Ms Morgan, it was on the 
grounds that the course of study was not the continuation of the original course. As for Ms 
Bucher, it was because she had not been permanently resident in a border location. The Court 
found in both cases that the German rules amounted to unjustified restrictions. Advocate 
General COLOMER strictly assessed the proportionality of the German rule by engaging into a 
‘no less restrictive means’ test.121 The Court also found that the requirement whereby students 
should spend one year at an establishment of higher education in Germany before being 
entitled to receive assistance for an education or training course attended in another Member 
State was disproportionate. On the one hand, it found that most of the grounds of justification 
laid down by Germany were inconsistent or inappropriate.122 On the other hand, it accepted 
Germany’s argument whereby Member States can subject the award of a grant to study abroad 
to the proof that the students demonstrate a certain degree of integration in order to safeguard 
the financing of their education systems.123 But it nevertheless held that the condition imposed 
by the rule at issue was too general and too exclusive: 
[T]he degree of integration into its society which a Member State could legitimately require 
must, in any event, be regarded as satisfied by the fact that the applicants in the main 
proceedings were raised in Germany and completed their schooling there.124 
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This statement has therefore the effect of substantially extending the scope ratione personae of 
the German rule. It entitles almost any German national to benefit from grants to study 
abroad. It is notable that, as far as students’ financial support is concerned, requirements 
imposed on home states differ in some respects from those imposed on host states. As seen 
earlier, in case of entry restrictions, the Court does not compel Member States to take into 
account the personal circumstances of nonresident students. However, the statement above 
indicates that home states must take into consideration factors such as whether their students 
have been raised and/or completed their schooling on their territory, i.e. elements that relate 
to personal circumstances. The requirement imposed on home states is accordingly more 
burdensome. 
205. Compensation of civil war victims. Three cases deserve attention in this field. They all 
involved national regulations subjecting the recipients of this type of benefit to a residence 
condition. Tas-Hagen125 pertained to a rule enacted by the Netherlands requiring the 
beneficiaries to reside in that Member State at the time they submitted their application. In 
Nerkowska,126 the Polish legislation required beneficiaries to reside on the national territory 
throughout the period of payment of the benefit. As for Zablocka,127 it concerned a German law 
that excluded from its scope the payment of certain benefits to surviving spouses of civil war 
victims when the latter were domiciled in the territory of certain specific Member States. The 
Court of Justice regarded each of these measures as being contrary to European Union 
citizenship provisions. It nonetheless accepted the idea that Member States may limit the grant 
of these social benefits on the basis of the solidarity principle. This results in the obligation put 
on individuals to demonstrate a certain degree of integration into society.128 But discretion does 
not mean arbitrariness and the Court limited, once again, the freedom enjoyed by Member 
States. As Advocate General SHARPSTON pointed out in Tas-Hagen, “the residence requirement 
may not be ‘too general and exclusive’.”129 In this context, the Court put emphasis on the fact 
that: 
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[A] criterion requiring residence cannot be considered a satisfactory indicator of the degree 
of connection of applicants to the Member State granting the benefit when it is liable […] 
to lead to different results for persons resident abroad whose degree of integration into the 
society of the Member State granting the benefit is in all respects comparable.130 
Applying this principle to the facts of Tas-Hagen, the Court found that the Dutch criterion was 
not “a satisfactory indicator of the degree of attachment of the applicant to the society.”131 The 
condition imposed by this Member State notably excluded all the people who had lived and 
worked there for a long period of time but who subsequently decided to spend their retirement 
abroad.132 It reached the same conclusion in Nerkowska.133 Another ground of justification 
relating to the need to ensure effective monitoring was also accepted. However, the Court 
developed a ‘no less restrictive means’ approach and underlined, for instance, in Nerkowska, 
that nothing precludes Member States from requesting their nationals to undergo a check on a 
regular basis.134 In addition, it ruled that such an objective could not justify that residence in 
certain Member States only excluded the recipients from the benefits offered by Germany.135 
Therefore, in cases relating to the compensation of civil war victims, the counter-limit 
pertaining to the degree of integration of individuals into society is strictly assessed. 
b. Obligations to take into account personal circumstances 
206. Besides the obligations to open, the Court has also placed obligations to take into 
account personal circumstances on Member States. These obligations concern the 
aforementioned fields in which the Court uses the degree of integration into society criterion, 
as well as the fields of nationality, direct taxation, cross-border health care, and the enforcement 
for the recovery of debts. They prevent Member States from automatically excluding EU cross-
border situations. If they want to do so, they must justify their decisions on the basis of 
personal assessments – i.e. if the personal skills of a student justify a refusal to admit her into 
university; if a student willing to study abroad cannot demonstrate a sufficient degree of 
integration into the society of the home state; if a host state cannot be reasonably expected to 
take into account the ‘personal and family circumstances’ of nonresidents because they do not 
receive most of their income on its territory; if the personal circumstances of a patient do not 
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justify the necessity to receive treatment abroad; if a civil war victim cannot provide evidence of 
a sufficient degree of integration into the society of her home state or if the personal 
circumstances of an individual are such as to not prevent a Member State from withdrawing its 
decision of naturalization/its nationality. 
207. Nationality. Rottmann136 involved an individual who originally had Austrian citizenship. 
He took up residence in Germany and was eventually naturalized in this country. This caused 
him to lose his Austrian nationality in accordance with Austrian nationality law. However, 
German authorities later on withdrew his naturalization on the grounds that he had acquired 
German nationality by deception. He indeed hid at that time that an arrest warrant had been 
issued against him. The applicant claimed that such a decision was in breach of European 
Union law because it would result in the loss of European Union citizenship, and the rights 
attached to it. Both the Advocate General and the Court concluded that European Union law 
was applicable to the facts of the case.137 They moreover acknowledged in substance that: 
[I]t is not contrary to European Union law, in particular to Article 17 EC, for a Member 
State to withdraw from a citizen of the Union the nationality of that State acquired by 
naturalization when that nationality has been obtained by deception.138 
However, the Court of Justice added two important statements, absent from the Opinion of 
Advocate General POIARES MADURO. First, it submitted the withdrawal decision to the 
proportionality principle.139 It followed, in this regard, an ambivalent approach. On the one 
hand, it referred several times to the national court, which is a sign of quite a deferential 
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approach.140 But, on the other hand, it gave several important guidelines with respect to the 
review of the decision to withdraw naturalization. National courts should indeed take into 
account several elements: 
[T]he consequences that the decision entails for the person concerned and, if relevant, for 
the members of his family with regards to the loss of the rights enjoyed by every citizen of 
the Union. In this respect it is necessary to establish, in particular, whether that loss is 
justified in relation to the gravity of the offence committed by that person, to the lapse of 
time between the naturalization decision and the withdrawal decision and to whether it is 
possible for that person to recover his original nationality.141 
The Court seems to suggest that, even when a decision of naturalization has been acquired by 
deception, national authorities may not automatically withdraw their decision. Instead, they 
must take into account the personal background of the individual concerned by the decision. 
Second, the Court of Justice underlined that the principles stemming from its judgment: 
“apply both to the Member State of naturalization and to the Member State of the original 
nationality.”142 In other words, the limitations put on Member States’ discretion with respect 
to the withdrawal of naturalization affect symmetrically national discretionary powers relating 
to the conditions of loss of nationality. Therefore, both home states and host states are subject 
to the obligation to take into account the individual’s personal circumstances. 
208. Direct taxation: Individual income taxation. Cases relating to individual income taxation 
have raised significant issues as to the fiscal treatment to be given to nonresidents. The Court of 
Justice recognizes, as a matter of principle, that, as far as direct taxation is concerned, the 
situations of residents and nonresidents are not comparable.143 It has however decided since 
Biehl144 that the state of employment of nonresidents must grant them the same tax benefits as 
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residents, provided that they receive most of their income in the source state. It explained in 
Schumacker that in relation to tax benefits, Member States must adjust their national tax systems 
in such a way as to take into account the ‘personal and family circumstances’ of nonresidents. 
For, otherwise, neither the state of residence, nor the state of employment, would take into 
account such personal and family circumstances.145 Following this, the Court had several 
occasions to clarify under which circumstances host states must take into account nonresidents’ 
personal circumstances.  
209. It started by extending the scope of the Schumacker principle in Wielockx,146 where it held 
that it also applied to nonresident self-employed persons. In Gschwind, it ruled for instance that 
earning 42% of the total income in the state of employment did not entitle the nonresident 
worker to claim the same tax benefits as resident workers.147 It thus upheld the German 
measure at issue, whereby national treatment would be granted to nonresidents if they earned 
more than 90% of their total income in the source state. In Wallentin,148 the Court confirmed 
that if a taxpayer receives all of his income in a Member State where he does not habitually 
resides, the latter must take into account his personal and family circumstances in such a way as 
to grant him a tax allowance. This holds all the more true for taxpayers who did not receive any 
taxable income in their state of residence, even though they worked in another Member State 
for a short period of time. The Court of Justice also broadened the scope of the obligations put 
on the states of employment. In Ritter Coulais, it followed its Advocate General, according to 
whom: 
[N]on-residents’ ability to pay tax, which depends not only on account being taken of their 
personal and family circumstances, but also on account being taken of their total income 
and losses, should not be assessed differently by the competent authorities on the sole 
ground of place of residence, where resident and nonresident taxpayers alike receive all or 
virtually all their taxable income in the taxing State.149 
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The Court definitely confirmed this extension in Lakebrink.150 For the purposes of determining 
the tax rate applicable to income taxable in Luxembourg, Luxembourg authorities did not take 
into account income losses from the letting of properties located in other Member States and 
belonging to a European Union national who, although not resident in Luxembourg, did 
receive the major part of his taxable income in this Member State. The Court concluded that 
this mechanism was discriminatory,151 and ruled that:  
[T]he ground […] on the basis of which the Court made its finding of discrimination in 
Schumacker concerns […] all the tax advantages connected with nonresident’s ability to pay 
tax which are not taken into account either in the State of residence or in the State of 
employment […] since the ability to pay tax may indeed be regarded as forming part of the 
personal situation of the nonresident within the meaning of the judgment in 
Schumacker.152 
Thus, states of employment must grant the same tax advantages to resident and nonresidents 
workers, so long as they are connected with the taxpayers’ ability to pay taxes and provided that 
they are not taken into account twice. Therefore, the Court places residents and nonresidents 
almost on the same footing.  
210. This requirement may even lead the Court to compel Member States to revise the terms 
of the tax conventions they bilaterally conclude with each other. In Renneberg,153 the Court 
indeed held that the principles stemming from Schumacker and the following cases applied to a 
situation where the failure to take into account the personal situation of nonresidents was the 
result of the application of a tax convention. Here, in accordance with the Convention 
concluded between Belgium and the Netherlands, rental income losses in respect of a property 
located in Belgium of a Belgian resident could not be taken into account by the Netherlands, 
the state of employment. Both the Court and its Advocate General contended that the 
Netherlands should nevertheless grant the same tax benefits to residents and nonresidents i.e. 
they should be able to take into account such losses. As summarized by Advocate General 
MENGOZZI: 
Member States which are parties to a bilateral tax convention should […] be under a 
genuine obligation to prevent a situation in which aspects of the ability to pay tax of a 
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taxpayer of one of those Member States […] are not taken into account by either of those 
States.154 
Accordingly, not only are Member States under an obligation to comply with European Union 
law when they adopt unilateral tax regulations, but also when they enter into international tax 
agreements.  
211. Another aspect of the case law relating to direct taxation deserves attention. The Court 
of Justice underlined in Zurstrassen155 that the state of residence is under the obligation to take 
into account the personal and family circumstances of taxpayers even if this entails to take into 
consideration cross-border elements. Here, the appellant’s spouse and children were resident in 
Belgium, while he was resident in Luxembourg. The latter state taxed him as a single person 
because his family was not resident. The Court held that Luxembourg was the: 
[O]nly State which can take account of Mr. Zurstrassen’s personal and family circumstances 
since he is not only resident in that State but, additionally, is paid almost the entire earned 
income of the household there.156 
This case confirms that the defining criterion that Member States must take into account when 
granting tax benefits is no longer that of residence. Rather, they must assess whether taxpayers 
receive most of their income on their territory or not. Cases decided in the field of direct 
taxation accordingly have significant effects on the exercise of Member States’ powers. They 
have imposed an important range of obligations relating to the personal circumstances of 
taxpayers, which have become increasingly burdensome. 
212. Cross-border health care. Likewise, in the field of cross-border health care, the Court has 
emphasized, on several occasions, on the obligation to take into account the personal 
circumstances of patients. Thus, in Watts it held that: 
[A] refusal to grant prior authorization cannot be based merely on the existence of waiting 
lists enabling the supply of hospital care to be planned and managed on the basis of 
predetermined general clinical priorities, without carrying out in the individual case in 
question an objective medical assessment of the patient’s medical condition, the history 
and probable course of his illness, the degree of pain he is in and/or the nature of his 
disability at the time when the request for authorization was made or renewed.157 
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It results from this statement that Member States are free to define predetermined general 
clinical priorities. But they must adjust these priorities according to a set of factors pertaining 
to patients’ personal conditions. In any case, they are required to justify their decisions on the 
basis of detailed arguments relating to patients’ personal circumstances. 
213. Enforcement for the recovery of debts. The enforcement for the recovery of debts also relates 
to the issue of exportation of benefits. In Pusa,158 a Finnish national receiving a Finnish 
invalidity pension lived and paid income tax in Spain. He challenged a Finnish regulation on 
the grounds that the attachment order on his pension, relating to a debt in Finland, did not 
take into account the taxes paid in Spain. The Court ruled that, if it turned out that the 
appellant’s income tax paid in Spain was not taken into account, this would amount to an 
unjustified restriction.159 It thus placed the obligation upon home states to adjust their 
respective laws on enforcement in such a way as to take into account the tax payable in other 
Member States i.e. debtors’ ability to meet their basic needs. However, the Court also imposed 
obligations even in the case where they do take into consideration taxes paid abroad. It indeed 
subjected the condition “under which the debtor is required to prove that he has paid or must 
pay within a given period in his State of residence a specified amount as tax on his pension”160 
to the requirement that the national rules must “not make it impossible in practice or 
excessively difficult to exercise the right to have the proper amount taken of the tax in 
question.”161 
c. Obligations of recognition 
214. Another range of substantive requirements imposed on Member States relates to the 
obligations of recognition. It concerns the field of nationality and the rules governing 
surnames. 
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215. Nationality. It should first be recalled that the exercise of the rights conferred by free 
movement provisions is conditional upon the holding of the nationality of one of the Member 
States. As Advocate General LÉGER pointed out, 
The nature of the ties connecting a person to a Member State determines in large measure 
the rights which that person may enjoy under Community law. This reality is expressed 
through the term national of a Member State, which is a concept central to the 
Community legal order, since possession of that status determines many of those rights as 
derived from the general principles of Community law.162 
In contrast to the free movement of goods, individuals must hold the nationality of at least 
Member State in order to enjoy the rights derived from the free movement principle, including 
European Union citizenship. As a result, the holding of the nationality of at least one Member 
State constitutes the ‘key of access to the European legal order.’ In this context, it is not 
surprising that the European Court of Justice had to rule on several occasions on cases raising 
issues relating to nationality. It confirmed each time that rules governing nationality fall within 
the powers retained by Member States.163 However, it stressed in Micheletti, first case pertaining 
to this field, that: 
[I]t is for each Member State, having due regard to Community law, to lay down the 
conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality.164 
In Micheletti, the plaintiff was the holder of two nationalities, granted by Argentina and Italy 
respectively. He applied for a permission to establish himself in Spain as a dentist holding the 
nationality of another Member State. However, the Spanish authorities refused to recognize his 
Italian nationality on the ground that Argentina, a non-member country, was his habitual place 
of residence. This case thus concerned the conditions of recognition of nationality. The Court, 
following its Advocate General, held that: 
[I]t is not permissible to interpret Article 52 of the Treaty to the effect that, where a 
national of a Member State is also a national of a non-member country, the other Member 
States may make recognition of the status of Community national subject to a condition 
such as the habitual residence of the person concerned in the territory of the first Member 
State.165 
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Therefore, the Court rejected the habitual place of residence criterion, which is however 
usually accepted in public international law. In other words, it shaped the conditions of 
recognition of nationality. The obligation of recognition is far-reaching, since it has the effect 
of preventing Member States from laying down any other criterion than the holding of the 
nationality of one of the Member States of the European Union. 
216. Rules governing surnames. Cases relating to rules governing surnames provide another 
example of the obligation of recognition. In the four cases relating to this field,166 European 
Union citizens resident in a given Member State were denied the right to have their names 
changed or recognized according to laws and practices of other Member States. Garcia Avello167 
involved children born in Belgium, holding both Belgian and Spaniard nationalities. Belgian 
authorities refused to register their surnames following the Spanish tradition of having two 
surnames – that of the father and that of the mother. The Court found that this refusal 
restricted European Union citizenship provisions and rejected all the justifications put forward 
by Belgium. It indeed compelled this Member State to adapt its conception of the principle of 
the immutability of surnames in such a way as to implement the principle of mutual 
recognition: 
[W]ith regard to the principle of the immutability of surnames as a means designed to 
prevent risks of confusion as to identity of parentage of persons […] it is not so 
indispensable to the point that it could not adapt itself to a practice of allowing children 
who are nationals of one Member State and who also hold the nationality of another 
Member State to take a surname which is composed of elements other than those provided 
for by the law of the first Member State and which has, moreover, been entered in an 
official register of the second Member State.168 
One decisive factor that the Court of Justice seems to have taken into consideration to reach 
this conclusion lies in the fact the Belgian practice at issue already allowed “derogations from 
application of the Belgian system of handing down surnames in situations similar to that of the 
children of the applicant in the main proceedings.”169 As a result, the principle of the 
immutability of surnames as implemented by Belgian authorities was not intangible. In other 
words, the Court did not require Belgium to introduce an ad hoc mechanism, but to extend the 
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existing grounds of derogations. In this sense, it followed Advocate General JACOBS who 
stressed that: 
Belgium has a procedure whereby surnames can be changed if sufficiently serious grounds 
are present. The only point of which Belgian practice appears to conflict with Community 
law lies in the systematic refusal to consider a situation such as that of Mr. Garcia Avello 
and his children as constituting such grounds.170 
217. Advocate General SHARPSTON and the Court developed a very similar line of reasoning 
in Grunkin & Paul.171 This case involved a child born in Denmark, from two German nationals, 
who also held German nationality but who was a Danish resident. He was registered in 
Denmark under the surname ‘Grunkin-Paul.’ The German authorities refused to recognize his 
surname on the grounds that the law of the state of nationality applies to surnames, and that 
German law did not allow the bearing of double-barreled surnames. Unsurprisingly, the 
Advocate General and the Court of Justice disagreed with the German line of reasoning. They 
both started from the premise that the German legal order did not wholly exclude the 
possibility to bear double-barreled surnames. Accordingly, recognizing the Danish practice 
entails to extend the scope of existing procedures. The Advocate General stated, in this respect, 
that: 
[M]y approach would not require any major change to Germany’s substantive or choice of 
law rules in the field of names, but would simply require them to allow greater scope for 
recognizing a prior choice of name validly made in accordance with the law of another 
Member State. To that extent, it involves no more than an application of the principle of 
mutual recognition which underpins so much of Community law.172 
The Court shared this view, and held that: 
German law does not wholly preclude the possibility of conferring double-barreled 
surnames on children of German nationality. As the German government confirmed at the 
hearing, where one of the parents has the nationality of another State, the parents may 
choose to form the child’s surname in accordance with the law of that State.173 
Therefore, the application of European Union law to national rules governing surnames 
requires Member States to recognize laws and practices in force in other Member States by 
extending the scope of existing procedures of recognition. However, as already noted with 
respect to Wittgenstein and Vardyn & Wardyn, this obligation of recognition is limited in scope. 
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It indeed only applies when national legal orders already contain a procedure allowing 
recognition. Thus, it consists in extending the scope of these existing procedures, but it does 
not compel Member States to introduce ad hoc mechanisms of recognition.  
218. Nationality and surnames compared. Consequently, obligations placed upon Member 
States with respect to the rules governing surnames are less burdensome than those imposed in 
the field of nationality. But the various obligations of recognition all differ from the principle 
of recognition, as it is traditionally understood in traditional free movement cases. While the 
latter concerns national regulatory systems, the former consists in compelling Member States to 
unilaterally recognize foreign legal acts. 
d. Obligations to adjust international agreements 
219. Last but not least, mention must also be made of obligations placed on Member States 
to adjust their own international agreements. 
220. Adjustment requirements apply to Member States’ external retained powers. The scope of the 
adjustment requirements imposed on the exercise of Member States’ retained powers is not 
limited to Member States’ internal powers, but also encompasses their external powers. Thus, 
the Court of Justice has constrained, on several occasions, the exercise of Member States’ taxing 
powers with respect to the implementation of bilateral tax treaties. Gilly,174 decided in 1998, 
concerned a German national, employed in Germany in the public sector, and residing in 
France with her husband, a French national employed in France. In pursuance of the France-
Germany tax treaty, she was taxed both in Germany on income received there, and in France 
on her total income. The same convention also stipulated that France had to provide Mrs. Gilly 
with double taxation relief through a tax credit. This mechanism did not fully prevent double 
taxation though, because the German tax rate was higher than the French rate. The Court of 
Justice, for the purposes of assessing whether this tax arrangement laid down by a bilateral tax 
treaty, regarded the treaty as national law. The Court is therefore indifferent to the nature of 
the national measure, be it a unilateral rule or a bilateral treaty. However, it did not agree with 
the plaintiffs that the implementation of the tax treaty was restricting the free movement of 
workers. The Court took the view that the fact that Mrs. Gilly was subjected to a higher tax 
than French residents employed in France was the result of a divergence in the level of taxation 
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between France and Germany, which were both free to “define the criteria for allocating their 
powers of taxation as between themselves, with a view to eliminating double taxation,”175 and to 
determine such level of taxation.176  
221. However, in a subsequent case, Saint-Gobain, the Court of Justice ruled that the 
implementation of a tax treaty created a non-justifiable restriction, thereby constraining 
Member States’ external tax powers.177 This decision concerned the German-US tax treaty, 
which provided for double tax relief for US dividends. This tax advantage was only granted to 
companies residing in Germany, which had the effect of excluding branches of nonresident 
companies. In order to justify this difference in treatment between branches of resident 
companies and branches of nonresident companies, Germany argued that Member States 
should be recognized exclusive and discretionary powers with respect to the conclusion and 
implementation of tax treaties:  
[T]he conclusion of bilateral treaties with a non-member country does not come within the 
sphere of Community competence. Taxation of income and profits falls within the 
competence of the Member States, which are therefore at liberty to conclude bilateral 
double-taxation treaties with non-member countries.178 
The Court reiterated the principle stemming from Gilly, but it added that “[a]s far as the 
exercise of the power of taxation so allocated is concerned, the Member States nevertheless 
may not disregard Community rules.”179 It went on by stating that: 
The national treatment principle requires the Member State which is party to the treaty to 
grant to permanent establishments of nonresident companies the advantages provided for 
by that treaty on the same conditions as those which apply to resident companies.180 
In other words, European Union law requires Member States to extend the benefits provided 
for in tax treaties concluded with third countries to permanent establishments of nonresident 
companies.  
222. Following Saint-Gobain, one could legitimately question whether the European Court of 
Justice would introduce most-favored-nation treatment with respect to tax treaty benefits. It 
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answered negatively in the D. case.181 This case concerned a German national and resident, 
whose assets consisted of assets in Germany and 10% of real property in the Netherlands. He 
was subject, in this latter country, to net wealth tax as nonresident taxpayer. Since he was not 
resident, he was not granted a tax allowance, contrary to residents who were eligible. Neither 
Belgium nor Germany had a net wealth tax at that time. However, under the Belgium-
Netherlands tax treaty, Belgian residents were entitled to a tax allowance. There was not such 
provision in the Germany-Netherlands tax treaty. In this respect, the plaintiff claimed that his 
situation was comparable to that of a Belgian nonresident and that he was discriminated 
against since he was not entitled to benefit from a tax allowance. The Court rejected his 
argument, on the grounds that “the fact that those reciprocal rights and obligations apply only 
to persons resident in one of the two contracting Member States is an inherent consequence of 
bilateral double taxation conventions.”182  
223. Therefore, the adjustments required from Member States with respect to their tax 
treaties are limited in scope. Member States must indeed extend the benefits of tax advantages 
to residents, but not to nonresidents. This was confirmed in Gottardo, a case concerning a 
bilateral social security convention between Italy and Switzerland.183 Under this convention, 
Italian authorities took into account, for the purpose of entitlement to old-age benefits, periods 
of insurance completed in Switzerland, a non-member country. However, this benefit was 
denied to Mrs. Gottardo, on the sole ground that she was not an Italian national. The Court 
ruled that this amounted to inequality of treatment, and after referring to Saint-Gobain it held 
that: 
[W]hen a Member State concludes a bilateral international convention on social security 
with a non-member country which provides for account to be taken of periods of insurance 
completed in that non-member country for acquisition of entitlement to old-age benefits, 
the fundamental principle of equal treatment requires that that Member State grant 
nationals of other Member States the same advantages as those which its own nationals 
enjoy under that convention unless it can provide objective justification for refusing to do 
so.184 
                                                 
181 Case C-376/03, D. v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, [2005] ECR I-5821. See e.g. D. WEBER, “Most-Favoured-
Nation Treatment under Tax Treaties Rejected in the European Community: Background and Analysis of the D 
case. A proposal to include a most-favoured-nation clause in the EC Treaty,” 33: 10 Intertax 429-444 (2005). 
182 Case C-376/03, D. v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, [2005] ECR I-5821, 61. 
183 Case C-55/00, Gottardo, [2002] ECR I-413. 
184 Ibid., 34. 
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In the same manner as it took the view in Saint-Gobain that the granting of benefits to 
nonresident companies did not compromise Germany’s obligations towards the United States, 
it stressed the fact, in Gottardo, that its ruling would not compromise Italian commitments vis-
à-vis Switzerland.185 
224. The confirmation of other rulings decided in the field of external relations. Saint-Gobain and 
Gottardo are reminiscent of other rulings pertaining to the core of Member States’ external 
powers, understood as powers that are not external counterparts of internal powers, such as 
direct taxation or social security. I have already referred to Centro-Com in Chapter 2. I have 
shown that, in order to establish that European Union law was applicable to a United 
Kingdom measure falling within United Kingdom foreign policy powers, the Court of Justice 
used the same strategy as in cases involving internal powers retained by Member States.186 In 
this case, the application of European Union law also resulted in compelling the United 
Kingdom to comply with its international obligations differently, “since effective application of 
the sanctions can be ensured by other Member States’ authorization procedures, as provided for 
in the Sanctions Regulation.”187 The Court of Justice admitted that the scope of the adjustment 
requirements imposed on the United Kingdom could be limited if they had the effect of 
preventing this Member State from performing “its obligations towards non-member countries 
under an agreement concluded prior to entry into force of the Treaty or prior to [its] 
accession.”188  
225. The Open Skies judgments also deserve to be mentioned.189 Whereas Saint-Gobain and 
Gottardo imposed obligations on Member States at the stage of implementation of their bilateral 
agreements, the Open Skies cases pertain to the conditions of conclusion of international 
                                                 
185 Ibid., 37. 
186 See, Supra, § 125. 
187 Case C-124/95, The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com Srl v HM Treasury and Bank of England, [1997] ECR I-81, 48. 
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(Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2008), 133-134, 347-348. 
189 Cases C-466/98, C-467/98, C-468/98, C-469/98, C-471/98, C-472/98, C-475/98, C-476/98, “Open Skies 
Judgments,” [2002] ECR I-9427. See P. J. SLOT & J. DUTHEIL DE LA ROCHÈRE, 40 C. M. L. Rev. 697-713 (2003). 
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agreements falling within Member States’ retained powers.190 Eight Member States, including 
Germany, had amended, in the framework of their air transport powers, bilateral agreements 
with the United States, which granted traffic rights and laid down other rights and obligations. 
These agreements contained clauses on the ownership and control of airlines, as well as 
minority shareholders provisions. Under the former, airlines that could be granted operating 
authorizations and technical permissions had to be substantially owned and effectively 
controlled by a contracting party or by nationals of the contracting party or both. Under the 
latter, the United States could waive its right to withhold or revoke the necessary authorizations 
to airlines designated by, for instance, Germany, if German natural or legal persons did not 
hold more than 50% of the capital. Unsurprisingly, the Court found that these agreements 
contravened the freedom of establishment, since non-national airlines from other Member 
States were excluded from the Open Skies agreements.191 However, unlike cases such as Saint-
Gobain and Gottardo, the Member States parties to these agreements could not themselves 
adjust the conditions of their implementation, since the bilateral treaties enabled the United 
States to breach European Union law.192 Therefore, as R. HOLDGAARD points out, “Member 
States could not ensure at the level of implementation that their international commitments 
complies with internal Community law. If this is the case, Member States cannot assume the 
international commitment.”193 To put it differently, “[e]ach Member State concerned therefore 
had to revise its Open Skies agreement to ensure their compliance with the EC provisions on 
freedom of establishment.”194 To sum up: 
In all these cases, although Member States have not lost the competence to conclude 
bilateral agreements, their freedom of action was constrained, either in effectively 
extending the implementation of the agreement to other Community nationals, or in being 
required to insist that the third country extended the benefits of the agreement to 
Community nationals established in their territories. In effect, the ostensibly bilateral 
agreement acquires a Community dimension.195 
                                                 
190 R. HOLDGAARD, External Relations Law of the European Community: Legal Reasoning and Legal Discourses, above n. 
188, 132, 135. 
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Accordingly, the aforementioned cases are another manifestation of the consistency in the 
Court of Justice approach. Not only does it impose adjustment requirements on Member 
States’ internal retained powers, but also on their external retained powers. These cases also 
confirm that the Court of Justice tends to apply the same reasoning when powers retained by 
Member States are involved, regardless of whether the powers are internal or external, and 
regardless of whether it interprets the fundamental freedom provisions or other treaty 
provisions, such as Article 207 TFEU on the commercial policy of the European Union or 
Article 351 TFEU relating to Member States’ prior international agreements. 
2. Procedural requirements 
226. Aside from the substantive adjustments required from Member States, the Court of 
Justice has also imposed obligations of a procedural nature in three of the fields analyzed 
herein: cross-border health care, higher education, and direct taxation. Interestingly enough, 
these obligations echo procedural requirements that the Court of Justice has imposed on 
Member States in traditional free movement cases. In Commission v. Germany, for instance, the 
Court held that traders must be entitled to apply for an authorization to maker products 
lawfully manufactured and marketed in another Member State “under a procedure which is 
easily accessible to them and can be concluded within a reasonable time,”196 and that it must be 
moreover open to them “to challenge before the Courts an unjustified failure to grant 
authorization.”197 
227. Cross-border health care. From a procedural perspective,198 a prior authorization scheme 
will be deemed proportionate if it is: 
[B]ased on a procedural system which is easily accessible and capable of ensuring that a 
request for authorization will be dealt with objectively and impartially within a reasonable 
time and refusals to grant authorization must also be capable of being challenged in judicial 
or quasi-judicial proceedings.199 
                                                 
196 Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, [1987] ECR 1227, 45. 
197 Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, [1987] ECR 1227, 46. 
198 See, in this respect, P. KOUTRAKOS, “Health care as an economic service under EC law,” in Social welfare and EU 
law, (Eds.) M. DOUGAN & E. SPAVENTA, (Hart publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2005), 117s; L. 
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dans l’Union (CJCE 16 mai 2006, Watts, Aff. C-372/04),” above, n. 40, 843-851. 
199 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473, 90; Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré & Van Riet, 
[2003] ECR I-4509, 83; Case C-372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-4325, 116. The Court added in Case C-372/04, 
Watts, [2006] ECR I-4325, 117: “refusals to grant authorization, or the advice on which such refusals may be based, 
must refer to the specific provisions on which they are based and be properly reasoned in accordance with them. 
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Member States must comply with four main procedural principles: objectivity, transparency, 
reasonable time principle, and the right to appeal. In Watts, for instance, the Court 
unequivocally condemned the British National Health Service because it did not set out “the 
criteria for the grant or refusal of the prior authorization.”200 
228. Higher education: Financial assistance of nonresident students. Similarly, in the field of higher 
education, the Court of Justice subjected Member States to the obligation of adopting criteria 
that are clear and known in advance:201 
[S]uch as to guarantee a significant level of legal certainty and transparency in the context 
of the award of maintenance grants to students.202 
This last statement is reminiscent of Advocate General GEELHOELD’s opinion in Bidar: 
Member States […] must ensure that the criteria and conditions for granting such assistance 
do not discriminate directly or indirectly between their own nationals and other EU 
citizens, that they are clear, suited to attaining the purpose of the assistance, are made 
known in advance and that the application is subject to judicial review.203 
229. Direct taxation. Last but not least, Commission v. Luxembourg,204 decided in 1995, gave the 
Court the opportunity to place a last range of obligations on Member States in the field of 
direct taxation. Here, the Court found that Luxembourg had not drawn the necessary legal 
conclusions from Biehl205 because it had not amended its legislation accordingly. As the 
Advocate General pointed out: 
[W]here a Member State’s legislation is incompatible with Community law, it must enact a 
clear amendment to that legislation in order to remedy the incompatibility.206 
Where a tax arrangement is clearly set out in a specific national provision with respect to 
residents, Member States must adopt a similar provision with respect to nonresidents. 
                                                 
Likewise, courts or tribunals hearing actions against such refusals must be able, if they consider it necessary for the 
purpose of carrying out the review which it is incumbent on them to make, to seek the advice of wholly objective 
and impartial independent experts.” 
200 Case C-372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-4325, 118. 
201 Ibid., 56. 
202 Ibid., 57. 
203 Opinion in Case C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119, 32 (Emphases added). 
204 Case C-151/94, Commission v. Luxembourg, [1995] ECR I-3685. 
205 Case C-175/88, Biehl, [1990] ECR I-1779. 
206 Opinion in Case C-151/94, Commission v. Luxembourg, [1995] ECR I-3685, 17. This was confirmed by the Court 
at 21: “although the special situation of temporary residents may objectively justify the adoption of specific 
procedural arrangements to enable the competent tax authorities to determine the tax rate applicable to national 
income, it cannot justify the exclusion of that category of taxpayer from the entitlement, otherwise by means of a 
non-contentious procedure, to repayment of tax, where excess amounts of tax deducted are repayable as of right to 
permanent residents.” 
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Therefore, it stems from Commission v. Luxembourg that Member States are here again under the 
procedural obligations of clarity and transparency. 
230. The positive character of the adjustment requirements. Section 2 has shed light on the 
content of the obligations placed upon Member States when they exercise their retained 
powers. They are of two main types: substantive and procedural, and they consist in imposing 
adjustment requirements on Member States. They are moreover not unconditional, thereby 
reflecting the need to take into account Member States’ fundamental interests or, in other 
words, the need to preserve Member State autonomy. In addition, they differ from the 
obligations imposed by the traditional free movement cases in one fundamental respect. In 
traditional free movement cases, the Court of Justice imposes prohibitions on Member States, 
by interpreting the free movement provisions as negative rules.207 Put differently, it sees the free 
movement provisions as setting out bans on a certain range of Member States’ conduct. By 
contrast, the above has shown that, far from systematically imposing negative obligations, free 
movement cases involving national retained powers rather impose positive obligations upon 
Member States. As noted by S. PRECHAL et al., the Court indeed engages into: 
[P]rocesses in which provisions aimed at the regulation of powers of the Member States – 
the ‘negative’ rules like Treaty freedoms and general principles of law – turn into power 
creating norms, in the sense that they are used to create new, positive obligations for the 
Member States.208 
231. In a nutshell, adjustment requirements all amount to dictating to Member States how to 
take into account EU cross-border situations, even in sensitive fields relating to the core of their 
political, social, and economic autonomy. In this respect, Section 2 has revealed that they are 
not equally burdensome for Member States. Their constraining character varies, depending on 
the intensity of the Court’s assessment of proportionality. In a first range of cases, the Court 
has allowed Member States to maintain restrictive measures, but only to a certain extent, and 
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provided that certain detailed conditions, laid down by the Court itself, are met. In the field of 
cross-border health care, for instance, Member States may require prior authorizations with 
respect to hospital environment and non-hospital environment involving the use of major 
medical equipment, but they must adjust their legislation in a way that complies with 
substantive requirements, such as the taking into account of patients’ personal circumstances 
and procedural requirements. Similarly, Member States are compelled to take into account 
individual taxpayers’ ability to tax. They are also required to adapt the conditions of award of 
certain social benefits, such as student financial support or benefits relating to the 
compensation of civil war victims. These conditions must comply with the equal treatment 
principle, and they must in any case enable students demonstrating a certain degree of 
integration, or civil war victims sharing specific bonds with they home country, to be included 
into national social schemes. The Court of Justice has imposed more burdensome adjustment 
requirements in another range of cases. It is noteworthy, for instance, that it assessed 
proportionality rigorously in Micheletti.209 It imposed a quasi-unconditional obligation of 
recognition. This may be at least explained to a certain extent by the fact that this ruling did 
not involve a substantive area of nationality law. The Spanish measure was moreover in breach 
of a fundamental principle of the European Union legal order, the principle of mutual 
recognition. The Court also followed a hard line approach in cases relating to cross-border 
treatments outside hospital settings, and not involving the use of major medical equipment, 
since Member States may no longer impose prior authorization requirements. The same holds 
true for cases relating to direct taxation. The Court has almost always systematically overturned 
national measures, except when they are necessary to safeguard the sustainability of national tax 
systems. By contrast, at the other end of the spectrum, Rottmann210 recognized that Member 
States retain discretionary powers to withdraw a decision of naturalization obtained by 
deception, or to issue a decision of loss of nationality, implying that substantive areas of 
nationality law are less affected by European Union law than procedural ones. But the Court 
has nonetheless required both home and host states to take into account the personal 
circumstances of the individual concerned. In cases relating to corporate income taxation, it 
applied a rather flexible proportionality test with respect to group relief mechanisms. Indeed, it 
accepted that they could be reserved for groups the companies of which were established on the 
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territory of the same Member State, provided that the symmetry requirement was complied 
with. 
232. The far-reaching effects of the adjustment requirements. To put it differently, the Court of 
Justice approach may be literally described, to borrow N. Reich’s words, as ‘quasi-legislative:’ 
“the Court uses the ‘proportionality’ principle to impose measures of a legislative nature on 
Member States.”211 Cases involving powers retained by Member States are characterized by the 
fact that the Court of Justice, most of the time, enters into very detailed analyzes at the 
proportionality stage and, even when it recognizes that Member States enjoy discretion, it tends 
to describe how they ought to comply with European Union law. Therefore, its approach may 
appear very intrusive, and as interfering with national key-policy choices. 
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 3. 
233. A ‘mutual incorporation of interests.’ This third chapter has identified the last fundamental 
feature of the Court of Justice power-based approach, which can be described as a ‘mutual 
adjustment resolution.’ This specific way of settling jurisdictional disputes between the 
European Union and its Member States reflects the need to strike a balance between European 
Union and national interests, when the national interests involved are crucial to preserve 
Member State autonomy, and even their existence as independent polities. On the one hand, 
Member States are compelled to incorporate European Union interests into their legal systems 
in order to take into account EU cross-border situations, through constraining substantive and 
procedural adjustment requirements. On the other hand, the Court of Justice is more inclined 
than in traditional free movement cases to give weight to national interests, which pertain to 
the core of Member State political, social, and economic autonomy. In sum, this ‘mutual 
adjustment resolution’ consists in a ‘mutual incorporation of interests.’ 
234. The issues raised by the ‘mutual adjustment resolution.’ However, the Court of Justice’s 
‘mutual adjustment resolution’ is not without certain issues or questions. First, it raises 
concerns as to the legitimacy of the European judge to impose such detailed and 
comprehensive obligations upon Member States. Indeed, in cases involving retained powers, 
the Court sometimes seems to behave more like a legislator than a judicial adjudicator. The 
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second range of issues pertains to Member State autonomy. One might indeed wonder whether 
the Court of Justice approach may ultimately undermine Member States’ political, social, and 
economic crucial interests. 

  
CHAPTER 4. THE ECJ POWER-BASED APPROACH 
JURISDICTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION OF CHAPTER 4. 
235. Purpose of Chapter 4. When individuals challenge national mechanisms relating to the 
powers retained by Member States, they seek, in substance, to challenge the boundaries of such 
arrangements. However, as seen earlier, the existence of boundaries in the form of inclusion 
and exclusion rules is essential for the preservation of the internal coherence of national 
retained powers,1 and, therefore, for the safeguard of the political and social autonomy of 
Member States. The Court’s power-based approach thus raises the issue as to whether it has the 
effect of undermining national autonomy, and/or whether it ultimately results in the 
broadening of the scope of European Union powers. As K. LENAERTS points out: 
[E]ach federal system is constantly faced with the task of keeping the appropriate balance 
between the autonomy of the component entities […] and the effectiveness of the central 
government […].2 
That being said, the purpose of the present chapter is to shed light on the implications of the 
Court of Justice’s power-based approach for the actors in European integration by focusing on 
their respective spheres of jurisdiction. 
236. Approach. The approach followed is twofold. First of all, in line with the general 
analytical framework of the thesis, Chapter 4 primarily focuses on two of the actors of 
European integration: the Member States and the European Union respectively, to the 
exclusion of individuals. I only deal with the implications generated by the Court’s approach 
for the latter – i.e. the recognition of new political, economic, and social individual rights – 
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incidentally.3 Second of all, the first section of this chapter comprises a constitutional 
comparative law dimension, the purpose of which is to help identify the distinctive effects that 
follow cases involving powers retained by Member States. In order to do so, I rely on the 
fundamental assumption that traditional free movement cases bring about preemptive effects on 
national laws deemed to restrict the free movement principle. It might seem odd, at first glance, 
to refer to the notion of preemption to describe cases which, by definition, involve direct 
constitutional conflicts between Treaty provisions and national laws. However, I maintain that 
the effects of the traditional free movement case law of the Court of Justice do not 
fundamentally differ from the effects of cases usually analyzed in light of the ‘classic’ 
preemption doctrine. Since the preemption doctrine is rooted in the US legal order, I rely on 
US constitutional theory to support this assumption, and in particular to substantiate the 
concept of ‘preemptive effects.’ 
237. Outline of Chapter 4. Chapter 4 is divided into two sections. First, I assess the issue as to 
whether the common assumption according to which the Court power-based approach is 
tantamount to a disempowerment of Member States. Second, I turn to the European Union 
and, in particular, to the fact that negative integration has been followed by (un)successful 
attempts at positive integration in fields relating to cross-border health care and the right to 
strike. Does this mean, as a result, that a possible effect of the Court’s approach is the 
empowerment of the European Union?  
SECTION 1. THE APPARENT DISEMPOWERMENT OF MEMBER STATES 
238. V. CONSTANTINESCO asserted long ago that the modification of the conditions of the 
exercise of a power ultimately impacts both the substance of this power, and the division of 
powers between the two levels of government: 
[A]ny alteration of the conditions of exercise of power inevitably affects the latter. […] The 
shift from a discretionary power towards a constrained power is not without consequences 
but, on the contrary, it does reshape the power, not to say the division of powers.4 
                                                 
3 See, Supra, §§ 19s. 
4 V. CONSTANTINESCO, Compétences et pouvoirs dans les Communautés européennes. Contribution à l’étude de la nature 
juridique des Communautés, Paris, L.G.D.J., Bib. de droit international, t. LXXIV, 1974, 77. (“toute modification du 
mode d’exercise de la compétence rejaillit inévitablement sur celle-ci. […] La substitution d’une compétence liée à 
une compétence discrétionnaire n’est donc pas un changement sans conséquences mais au contraire constitue un 
réaménagement véritable de la compétence voire de la répartition des compétences.”) See also K. LENAERTS 
“L’encadrement par le droit de l’Union européenne des compétences des Etats membres,” in Mélanges Jacquet, 
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Against this backdrop, the purpose of the present section is to assess whether this statement is 
verified with respect to the cases concerned by the power-based approach. One of the first 
reactions that one may have when looking at the cases involving powers retained by Member 
States is to claim that they amount to “a loss of sovereign powers.”5 However, a closer look 
reveals, in my view, that things are in fact more intricate than they might at first seem. For if 
they do have the effect of reshaping the personal and territorial scopes of Member States’ 
powers, the cases concerned by the power-based approach also simultaneously bring to light (i) 
that Member States are not deprived of their powers; (ii) the concern of the Court of Justice to 
protect the integrity of the material scope of the retained powers. To this end, I rely on the 
traditional distinction between the substance – formed of the personal, territorial, and material 
scopes – and the exercise of a power, as well as on the effects induced by the power-based 
approach on the substance of the powers retained by Member States. I claim that these effects 
are distinct from the preemptive effects usually brought about by traditional free movement 
cases. 
1. A brief exposé of the preemptive effects of traditional free movement cases 
239. Identifying the effects of traditional free movement cases calls for revisiting the usual 
paradigms of interpretation of traditional free movement cases. I do not, of course, deny the 
merits of other ways of interpreting these cases.6 But I am of the view that analyzing them in 
light of the doctrine of preemption allows for an assessment of the effects of the application of 
European Union law on national powers, which ultimately leads to a somewhat more accurate 
understanding of the relationship between the European Union and its Member States. To this 
end, I start by reviewing the existing literature relating to the doctrine of preemption in both 
US constitutional law – where the doctrine originated – and European Union constitutional 
law. Then, in light of this preliminary assessment, I provide an analysis of traditional free 
movement cases through the lens of the doctrine of preemption. 
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a. The ‘classic’ preemption doctrine 
240. General definition of preemption. As one US scholar points out, preemption directly 
pertains to the vertical relationship between different levels of government. It is a “key 
mechanism for ordering relations among different levels government.”7 Simply put, saying that 
US federal law, or European Union law, preempts state, or Member State, law means that the 
former trumps, supersedes, or displaces the latter,8 either to a certain extent or wholly.9 In other 
words, the preemption doctrine relates to the ability of US federal law, or European Union law, 
to preclude the corresponding powers of the states, or Member States.10 Before going into 
greater detail, a fundamental distinction must be drawn. It pertains to the relationship between 
the concepts of preemption and supremacy/primacy. Primacy constitutes a tool to resolve 
conflicts of norms, while preemption is a mechanism aiming at settling jurisdictional disputes 
between the European Union and its Member States – or, in the US legal order, between the 
federal government and the states.11 
241. US Constitutional law. Historically, the US Supreme Court began to shape the doctrine 
of preemption at the outset of the 20th century.12 The Lochner Court13 applied the preemption 
principle for the first time in two landmark cases: Southern Railway Co v. Reid, decided in 1912,14 
and Southern Railway v. Railroad Commission of Indiana, decided in 1915.15 It stated in the latter 
that federal power “is such that when exercised it is exclusive, and ipso facto, supersedes existing 
state legislation on the same subject.”16 The year 1933 marks a turning point in the Supreme 
Court line of reasoning. In Mintz v. Baldwin, the Court took congressional intent as the 
determining factor to establish whether or not federal law preempted state law.17 The years 
following this decision are, in this respect, characterized by a reversal of the presumption: 
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13 The Lochner era corresponds to the years 1887-1937. See S. GARDBAUM, “The breadth vs. the depth of 
Congress’s Commerce power: The curious history of preemption during the Lochner era,” in Federal Preemption: 
States’ powers, national interests, (Eds.) R. A. EPSTEIN & M. S. GREVE, (Washington DC, AEI Press, 2007). 
14 Southern Railway Co v. Reid 222 U.S. 424 (1912). 
15 Southern Railway v. Railroad Commission of Indiana 236 U.S. 439 (1915). 
16 Ibid., 446. 
17 Mintz v. Baldwin 289 U.S. 346 (1933). 
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Congress is deemed not to have intended to displace state law, unless otherwise stated. As the 
Supreme Court stated in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., decided in 1947 and seen as the 
“canonical statement of modern preemption doctrine:”18 
[I]n a field which the States have traditionally occupied […] we start with the assumption 
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act 
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.19 
242. The contemporary preemption doctrine. Nowadays, American scholars distinguish between 
different categories of preemption. These categories reveal two factors. First, they place 
emphasis on the intent of Congress to displace state law: Is such intent express or implied? 
Second, they also shed light on the extent to which state law is displaced, i.e. the extent to 
which states are deprived of their lawmaking powers. The typologies drawn up by the various 
authors vary to a certain degree,20 but it is nonetheless possible to mention four most often 
quoted categories. First, authors systematically refer to express preemption. As the name 
suggests, this category corresponds to cases where Congress has expressly declared its intention 
to displace state law. It may do so either by including a preemption clause or a savings clause 
into the text of a statute.21 Assessing express preemption requires the Supreme Court to make 
statutory constructions.22 Second, authors single out conflict preemption, which covers 
situations where state law conflicts with federal law to such an extent that “it is physically 
impossible to comply with both federal and state requirements.” It is in the framework of 
conflict preemption that the distinction between preemption and supremacy may seem blurred, 
because the Supreme Court resolves such conflicts through the application of the Supremacy 
Clause.23 Third, scholars also distinguish obstacle preemption. It corresponds to cases where 
state law does not conflict with specific provisions of a federal statute, but with its purposes and 
objectives. In the same way as conflict preemption, federal law only displaces conflicting state 
laws.24 Last but not least, the final category generally quoted is that of field preemption. It 
                                                 
18 R. A. EPSTEIN & M. S. GREVE, “Conclusion: Preemption doctrine and its limits,” in Federal Preemption: States’ 
powers, national interests, (Eds.) R. A. EPSTEIN & M. S. GREVE, (Washington DC, AEI Press, 2007), 315. 
19 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 331 U.S. 218 (1947) 230. 
20 R. SCHÜTZE, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism. The changing structure of European law, (Oxford University Press, 
2009), 99, ft. 97. 
21 T. W. MERRILL, “Preemption and institutional change,” above, n. 7, 738. 
22 V. D. DINH, “Reassessing the law of preemption,” above, 9, 2100. 
23 Ibid., 2102; J. GOLDSMITH, Statutory foreign affairs preemption, (J. M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 
116 (2nd Series)), 23-24; T. W. MERRILL, “Preemption and institutional change,” above, n. 7, 739. 
24 V. D. DINH, “Reassessing the law of preemption,” above, n. 9, 2105; J. GOLDSMITH, “Statutory foreign affairs 
preemption,” above, n. 23, 24; T. W. MERRILL, “Preemption and institutional change,” above, n. 7, 739. 
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involves cases where Congress has not explicitly expressed its intent to preempt.25 The effects of 
field preemption go beyond conflict and obstacle preemptions, because federal law is deemed to 
displace state law even if state law does not conflict with either a statutory provision or the 
purposes and objectives of the statute.26 This type of preemption has therefore the effect of 
depriving states of their lawmaking powers in an entire area. It may accordingly have significant 
implications for the states. It furthermore potentially confers tremendous powers to the 
Supreme Court, since it relies on a judicial assessment of congressional intent. In Rice v. Santa 
Fe Elevator Corp., the Supreme Court restricted the effects of field preemption to two instances: 
“[t]he scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,”27 or “the Act of Congress may touch a 
field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to 
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”28 
243. EU Constitutional law. While US preemption doctrine is nowadays deep-seated – even if 
it still gives rise to significant jurisdictional controversies between the states and the federal 
state – the Court of Justice of the European Union has never explicitly referred to the concept 
of preemption in its case law.29 A range of scholars nonetheless refers to this notion in the 
European context, and claims that the exercise by the European Union of its powers may have, 
under certain circumstances, preemptive effects.30 
244. “The emergent doctrine of European Union preemption.” M. WAELBROECK is the first author 
who attempted to theorize the European preemption doctrine.31 He distinguished between two 
                                                 
25 L. H. TRIBE, American Constitutional Law, (New York: N.Y.: Foundation Press, 2000), 1176. 
26 V. D. DINH, “Reassessing the law of preemption,” above, n. 9 2105; J. GOLDSMITH, “Statutory foreign affairs 
preemption,” above, n. 23, 24. This is what L. H. TRIBE, American Constitutional Law, above, n. 25, 1176 designates 
as “implied preemption”: “Congress, through the structure or objectives of its enactments, has by implication 
precluded a certain kind of state regulation in the area.” 
27 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 331 U.S. 218 (1947) 230. 
28 Ibid. 
29 See R. SCHÜTZE, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism. The changing structure of European law, above, n. 20, 190-191; 
S. WEATHERILL, “Pre-emption, harmonization and the distribution of competence to regulate the Internal 
Market,” in The Law of the Single European Market. Unpacking the premises, (Eds.) C. BARNARD & J. SCOTT, (Hart 
Publishing, 2002), 58. 
30 Thus, as early as 1981, J. H. H. WEILER, “The Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism,” 1 
Yearbook of European Law 267, 277 (1981) already spoke of the possibility for the then European Community to 
preempt Member States “from taking any action at all.” 
31 M. WAELBROECK, “The emergent doctrine of Community pre-emption – Consent and re-delegation,” in Courts 
and Free Markets: Perspectives from the United States and Europe, (Eds.) E. STEIN & T. SANDALOW, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982), Vol. 2. 
Ch. 4. Section 1. The apparent disempowerment of Member States 189 
types of preemption: the ‘conceptualist-federalist’ approach and the ‘pragmatic’ approach. 
Under the former, the existence of European Union powers automatically excludes Member 
States’ powers. In the same way as what prevailed under the Lochner era in the United States, 
European Union powers are seen as necessarily exclusive. The latter approach is different, as it 
assumes that European Union and national powers are concurrent. The Court thus accepts 
that Member States exercise their powers so long as this exercise does not conflict with 
European Union jurisdiction. After this initial analysis, the majority of the few scholars who 
focused on preemption issues drew on US preemption doctrine. These scholars have indeed 
modeled EU types of preemption after the US preemption doctrine, by directly importing US 
preemption types.32 Despite their added value, these different attempts do not fully reflect, 
however, the developments in relation to governance as they occur in the context of the 
European Union. 
245. Developments affecting harmonization in the European Union legal order. An important 
change in philosophy has affected the approach to harmonization in the European Union. The 
early years of the Community were characterized by the fact that the Community institutions, 
when exercising their regulatory powers, harmonized Member States rules in an exhaustive 
manner. Since then, this original approach has been abandoned to a large extent, and has been 
replaced by an approach based on minimum harmonization, partial harmonization, and 
optional harmonization. Nowadays, European Union powers are no longer seen as latently 
exclusive but, instead, as shared with Member States. The example of minimum harmonization 
is striking. While the European Union sets minimum standards, Member States are free to 
impose stricter ones.33 This explains why A. ARENA contends that harmonization models 
should be seen as markers of preemption types, and should replace US ones.34 An exception 
should however be made of exhaustive harmonization. Once such an act of secondary 
legislation has been adopted, Member States are entirely precluded of their powers. It thus 
corresponds to field preemption. Minimum harmonization does not go as far as field 
                                                 
32 See, inter alia, E. D. CROSS, “Preemption of Member State law in the European Economic Community: A 
framework for analysis,” 29 C. M. L. Rev. 447-472 (1992); R. SCHÜTZE, “Supremacy without preemption? The very 
slowly emergent doctrine of Community preemption,” 43 C. M. L. Rev. 1023 (2006); A. GOUCHA SOARES, 
“Preemption, conflicts of powers and subsidiarity,” above, n. 10. 
33 C. BARNARD, The substantive law of the EU: The four freedoms, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
662s. 
34 A. ARENA, The Doctrine of Union Preemption in the EU Single Market: Between Sein and Sollen, (Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 03/10), 67s. 
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preemption, since Member States may concurrently exercise their powers, but it does not allow 
them to adopt lower standards. Partial harmonization does not preclude Member States from 
adopting measures not covered by European Union measures. As for optional harmonization, 
it preempts Member States’ powers to the extent that cross-border situations are concerned. 
246. After having provided a brief overview of the doctrine of preemption in the American 
and European contexts, I will now rely on the notion of preemption to reassess the traditional 
paradigms of interpretation of traditional free movement cases. 
b. The paradigms of interpretation of traditional free movement cases revisited 
247. Scholars do not explicitly acknowledge that free movement provisions have a 
preemptive dimension, but they do frequently underline that the case law of the Court of 
Justice relating to these provisions is likely to have significant implications for Member States’ 
regulatory capacity.35 The purpose of the present paragraph is twofold. First, it aims to show 
that the notion of preemption provides a useful tool to analyze free movement cases and, in 
particular, their implications for the interplay between European and national spheres of 
powers when no act of secondary legislation has been adopted. Second, it aims to reappraise the 
traditional ways of interpreting free movement cases. 
                                                 
35 W. VAN GERVEN, “Constitutional aspects of the European Court’s case law on Articles 30 and 36 EC as 
compared with the US Dormant Commerce Clause,” in Mélanges en l’honneur de Michel Waelbroeck, (Eds.) M. DONY 
& A. DE WALSCHE, (Brussels, Bruylant, 1999), 1638: this scholar describes the provisions on the free movement 
of goods as “constitutional restrictions on state economic regulation,” or (1632) the now Article 34 TFEU as “a 
toll for policing the borderline between legitimate and illegitimate regulation.” In the same vein, R. DEHOUSSE, 
“Integration v. Regulation? On the dynamics of regulation in the European Community,” 30: 4 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 385 (1992), once put emphasis on the fact that the current Article 45 TFEU has “had a strong 
impact on the Member States’ room for maneuver.” Likewise, J. SNELL “Who’s got the power? Free movement and 
allocation of competences in EC law,” 22: 1 YEL 323 (2003) underlines that “[a] decision that a national measure 
amounts to a restriction on free movement allocates the competence to regulate to the Community.” Authors have 
also developed the “regulatory gap theory,” which sees negative integration as not sufficiently counterbalanced by 
positive integration. See, in the first place, F. W. SCHARPF, “Negative and positive integration in the political 
economy of European welfare states,” in Governance in the European Union, (Eds.) G. Marks et al, (London: Sage, 
1996), 15-39. He speaks at 15 of a “competency gap.” J. H. H. WEILER, “The Transformation of Europe,” in The 
Constitution of Europe: Do the new Clothes have an Emperor? And other Essays on European Integration, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 67 already referred to a “regulatory gap.” See also, inter alia, R. DEHOUSSE, 
“Integration v. Regulation? On the dynamics of regulation in the European Community,” 30: 4 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 385 (1992); N. BERNARD, “La libre circulation des marchandises, des personnes et des services dans 
le Traité CE sous l’angle de la compétence,” Cahiers de Droit Européen 11-45 (1998). Last but not least, when free 
movement cases are analyzed through the principle of mutual recognition, emphasis is put on the horizontal 
effects of European Union on the respective regulatory capacities of host and home states. 
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248. The cons. To my knowledge, free movement cases have never been explicitly analyzed in 
light of the preemption doctrine. Some authors have nonetheless directly or indirectly 
expressed arguments against this idea. These arguments may be summarized as follows. At least 
two authors are of the view that preemption is a legislative, and not a constitutional 
phenomenon. While the former concerns conflicts between national laws and European Union 
acts of secondary legislation, the latter would cover direct conflicts between national measures 
and Treaty provisions,36 such as those involved in free movement cases. L. W. GORMLEY 
underlines, in this respect, that “specific Union action […] is necessary to generate the result of 
preemption.”37 In other words, preemption would only materialize through the adoption of acts 
of secondary legislation. Similarly, R. SCHÜTZE restricts the scope of his analysis to legislative 
preemption, on the grounds that “the European Court of Justice has – in parallel with the U.S. 
Supreme Court – moved to an intent rationale for the doctrine of preemption.”38 Another 
argument put forward is of a more technical nature. It pertains to the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice in preliminary rulings. In free movement cases, the Court cannot 
invalidate national measures. It can only require Member States to disapply them “to the extent 
of the inconsistency” with European Union law. To put it differently, “[t]he national norm may 
still be operative in areas that are not covered by European law.”39 Therefore, Member States 
are not, technically, under the obligation to remove national laws that are deemed to be in 
violation of free movement provisions. Despite these two powerful sets of arguments, I 
nonetheless argue that the settlement of conflicts involving Treaty provisions may have, under 
specific conditions, comparable effects to that of conflicts involving acts of secondary 
legislation.40 To this end, I first focus on the US legal order. 
249. Constitutional preemption in the US legal order. In the US legal order, constitutional 
preemption covers two types of situation: cases where the US Constitution explicitly excludes 
                                                 
36 A. ARENA, The doctrine of Union Preemption in the EU Single Market: Between Sein and Sollen, above, n. 34, 11. 
37 L. W. GORMLEY, “Free movement of goods and preemption of state power,” in A Constitutional Order of States? 
(Essays in Honour of Alan Dashwood), (Eds.) A. ARNULL et al., (Oxford; Portland Or.; Hart Publishing, 2011), 371. 
38 R. SCHÜTZE, “Supremacy without preemption? The very slowly emergent doctrine of Community preemption,” 
above, n. 32, 1039. 
39 A. VERHOEVEN, The European Union in search of a democratic and constitutional theory, (The Hague; London; 
Kluwer Law International, 2002), 310. See also L. W. GORMLEY, “Free movement of goods and preemption of 
state power,” above, n. 37, 371. 
40 M. WAELBROECK, “The emergent doctrine of Community pre-emption – Consent and re-delegation,” above, n. 
31, for instance, did not distinguish between legislative and constitutional preemptions in his analysis. See also E. 
D. CROSS, “Preemption of Member State law in the European Economic Community: A framework for analysis,” 
above, n. 32, 453. 
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state action, as well as cases where the US Constitution implicitly deprives states of their 
lawmaking powers. 
250. Explicit constitutional provisions. H. A. FREEMAN has pointed out that “[o]ne avenue by 
which the states may be precluded from acting in some given area is by the express command 
of the Constitution.”41 The US Constitution includes provisions that explicitly preclude state 
action. Article 1, Section 10 is, in this respect, the most straightforward since it is entitled 
“Powers Prohibited of States.”42 Several Amendments to the Constitution also significantly 
limit state action, such as the 13th Amendment, which abolished slavery, as well as the 14th 
Amendment. Last but not least, the 15th Amendment deprives the states – as well as the federal 
state – of the power to deny or abridge the right of US citizens to vote. All in all, these 
provisions “‘preempt’ certain state action.”43 
251. The dormant Commerce Clause. In addition, US constitutional theorists sometimes admit 
that constitutional preemption may as well stem from negative implications of constitutional 
grants of powers, the first of which being the dormant Commerce Clause. It is the closest US 
equivalent to the economic freedoms of the European Union legal order.44 Since the US 
Constitution does not explicitly prohibit states from discriminating against or from excessively 
burdening interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has inferred such prohibitions from the 
Commerce Clause, even if taken literally it only grants Congress the power to regulate 
commerce, without alluding to the states.45 For various authors, the prohibitions derived from 
the dormant Commerce Clause may be described as constitutional preemption, since the 
deprivation of the states’ powers flows from the Constitution itself.46 Admittedly, a 
fundamental difference exists between the traditional preemption doctrine set out above and 
the dormant Commerce Clause. As already noted by R. SCHÜTZE with respect to the European 
                                                 
41 H. A. FREEMAN, “Dynamic federalism and the concept of preemption,” 21 DePaul L. Rev. 630, 632 (1971-1972). 
See also A. HILL, “The law-making power of the federal courts: Constitutional preemption,” 67 Columbia L. Rev. 
1024, 1030-1031 (1967). 
42 “No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin 
Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill 
of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.” 
43 H. A. FREEMAN, “Dynamic federalism and the concept of preemption,” above, n. 41, 633. 
44 See, in this respect, W. VAN GERVEN, “Constitutional aspects of the European Court’s case law on Articles 30 
and 36 EC as compared with the US Dormant Commerce Clause,” above, n. 35. 
45 The Commerce Clause reads as follows: The Congress shall have power “To regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes” (Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution). 
46 See, for instance, N. ORKIN, “Constitution preemption, Goldstein v. California, and other aspects of preemption,” 
16 PTC J. Res. & Ed. 15 (1974). 
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Union legal order, the former “rests on an imputation of intent to Congress” while the latter 
“rests on an imputation of intent to the Constitution.”47  
252. However, the ‘classic’ preemption doctrine and the dormant Commerce Clause share 
fundamental features. First, they are two sides of the same coin: “[b]oth doctrines work to 
preserve the United States as a single integrated commercial market in the face of state 
legislation that threatens to create multiple markets of suboptimal scale.”48 They are indeed 
assessed by the Supreme Court against a backdrop of the same basic assumptions, notably the 
fact that one of the main purposes of the US Constitution is to establish an integrated 
market.49 In other words, they are both mechanisms governing the vertical relationship between 
the federal government and the states as they both “define states’ constitutional authority to 
regulate in areas of concurrent jurisdiction.”50 Second, several authors have pointed out that 
the traditional preemption doctrine and the dormant Commerce Clause are similar in their 
effects. Here it is worth quoting V. D. DINH at length: 
The law of preemption should not be analyzed as conceptually discrete and distinctive 
doctrines, but rather can be properly assessed only as part of a spectrum of interrelated 
mechanisms whereby federal law displaces state law. The spectrum includes not only the 
core statutory preemption doctrines but also mechanisms whereby state law is displaced 
even without any relevant congressional action.51 
This author draws a spectrum consisting of doctrinal mechanisms through which federal law 
displaces state law, the variable being whether Congress has acted or not.52 He sets out express 
preemption, which corresponds to “congressional action par excellence,” conflict preemption, 
obstacle preemption, field preemption, federal common law and, finally, dormant commerce. 
He justifies the soundness of this spectrum with reference to the fact that these various 
doctrines all have preemptive effects. They are indeed all capable of displacing state law. 
Focusing specifically on the dormant Commerce Clause, V. D. DINH claims that it “can be 
seen as a variation of field and obstacle preemption,” since the Supreme Court considers that 
                                                 
47 T. W. MERRILL, “Preemption and institutional change,” above, n. 7, 733. 
48 Idem. 
49 Ibid., 745. 
50 C. M. SHARKEY, “Against freewheeling, extratextual obstacle preemption: Is justice Clarence Thomas the lone 
principled federalist?,” 5: 1 NYU Journal of Law & Liberty (2010); NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 
10-20, 70-71. 
51 V. D. DINH, “Reassessing the law of preemption,” above, n. 9, 2097. 
52 Ibid., 2098. See also C. M. SHARKEY, “Against freewheeling, extratextual obstacle preemption: Is justice 
Clarence Thomas the lone principled federalist?,” above, n. 50, 71, who talks about a “continuum” between 
federal preemption and dormant Commerce Clause. 
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federal law displaces state law either because the latter stands as an obstacle, or because it falls 
within a “regulated field of national interest.”53 Thus, if focus is put on the effects of US 
constitutional doctrines, preemption should not be limited to situations involving an act 
adopted by Congress. Similarly to V. D. DINH’s analysis, J. GOLDSMITH found, for instance, 
that in the field of foreign relations, “dormant” preemption, which “operates like statutory 
preemption without a statute,” could occur in three cases: dormant foreign affairs preemption, 
dormant foreign commerce clause, and federal common law of foreign relations.54 
253. Constitutional preemptive effects of free movement cases in the EU legal order. The purpose of 
the remainder of this section is to show that the same conclusions can be drawn with respect to 
the European Union legal order. To this end, I shed light on the preemptive dimension of free 
movement provisions before showing that the European Court of Justice case law on free 
movement gives rise to two preemption types. 
254. Preemptive dimension of free movement provisions. Just like the US preemption doctrine and 
the dormant Commerce Clause are two sides of the same coin, the European Union emergent 
doctrine of preemption and the provisions relating to the economic freedoms and European 
Union citizenship are complementary within the European Union legal order. Thus, positive 
and negative integrations both pursue the same purpose: economic unity, through the 
establishment of the single market.55 Likewise, European Union citizenship is a step towards 
political unity in the European Union, and as such requires both the adoption of acts of 
secondary legislation and the enforcement of the rights defined in Article 21 TFEU even in the 
absence of such acts. A close look at the Treaty provisions on free movement shows that they 
include an explicit preemptive dimension. Unlike the Commerce Clause, all free movement 
provisions make it plain that discriminations relating to European Union citizenship, the free 
movement of goods, persons, services, and capital “shall be prohibited,”56 even in the absence 
of European Union acts of secondary legislation. The Court of Justice has specified on 
                                                 
53 V. D. DINH, “Reassessing the law of preemption,” above, n. 9, 2111. 
54 J. GOLDSMITH, “Statutory foreign affairs preemption,” above, n. 23, 22-23. 
55 Case 15/81, Schul, [1982] ECR 1409: “The concept of a common market as defined by the Court in a consistent 
line of decisions involves the elimination of all obstacles to intra-community trade in order to merge the national 
markets into a single market bringing about conditions as close as possible to those of a genuine internal market.” 
56 European Union citizenship: Article 21 TFEU read in conjunction with Article 18 TFEU; Free movement of 
goods: Articles 34 and 35 TFEU; Free movement of workers: Article 45 TFEU – this provision refers to the 
“abolition of any discrimination”; Freedom of establishment: Article 49 TFEU; Freedom to provide services: 
Article 56 TFEU; Free movement of capital: Article 63 TFEU. 
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numerous occasions that such prohibitions applied regardless of whether European Union acts 
of secondary legislation had been adopted or not.57 These provisions therefore deprive Member 
States of their power to discriminate. Not only do they require them not to adopt 
discriminatory measures, but they also require them to abolish measures that are discriminatory 
in character. The following paragraph shows that the constructions employed by the Court of 
Justice have made full use of this preemptive dimension of the Treaty provisions. 
255. Preemption types. Here, I argue that traditional free movement cases generate two distinct 
types of preemptive effects, depending on the nature of the national measure subject to the 
Court’s scrutiny. To this end, I rely on the fundamental distinction established in Cassis de 
Dijon58 between discriminatory and indistinctly applicable measures. Since conflicts between 
free movement provisions and discriminatory laws and conflicts between free movement 
provisions and indistinctly applicable measures are of a different nature, they give rise to 
distinct preemptive effects. In this respect, US preemption doctrine is particularly useful in 
identifying the two types of conflicts.  
                                                 
57 See, for instance, Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon), [1979] ECR 649. 
58 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon), [1979] ECR 649. The Court of Justice gradually recognized that the 
provisions relating to both the four traditional freedoms and European Union citizenship have direct effect 
(Goods: Case 74/76, Iannelli, [1977] ECR 557; workers: Case 41/74, Van Duyn, [1974] ECR 1337; freedom of 
establishment: Case 2/74, Reyners, [1974] ECR 631; services: Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen, [1974] ECR 1299; 
freedom of capital: Joined Cases C-163, 165 & 250/94, Sanz de Lera, [1995] ECR I-4821; European Union 
citizenship: Case C-413/99, Baumbast, [2002] ECR I-7091). This initial step allowed the Court to interpret these 
provisions very extensively. Nowadays, the Court finds that two main types of national measures amount to 
restrictions. First, national measures are deemed contrary to EU law when they are directly discriminatory or, in 
other words, when their application results in creating differences in treatment based on nationality. The same 
holds true with respect to indirectly discriminatory national measures. They are not based on nationality, but on 
other criteria, such as the place of residence (See, for instance, Case 15/69, Ugliola, [1969] ECR 363, 6). They 
nonetheless have the effect of placing heavier burdens on non-nationals. The Court’s approach was originally 
based on the principle of non-discrimination alone. This method broadly consists in undertaking a comparison, 
“requiring out-of-state goods, persons, services, and capital to enjoy the same treatment as their in-state 
equivalents.” (C. BARNARD, The substantive law of the EU: The four freedoms, above, n. 33, 18) Thirdly, in the seminal 
Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon cases, the Court of Justice substantially broadened the scope of the notion of 
restriction. It held in the former that: “All trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade are to be considered as measures having an 
effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.” (Case 8/74, Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837, 5) Even indistinctly 
applicable measures could be deemed contrary to the provisions relating to the free movement of goods. Following 
these two cases, the Court gradually extended this so-called ‘obstacle-based approach,’ which focuses on the effects 
of the national measures rather than on their object, to the other freedoms. It did so as regards the freedom to 
provide services in Säger (Case C-76/90, Säger, [1991] ECR I-4221), the free movement of workers in Bosman (Case 
C-415/93, Bosman, [1995] ECR I-4921), the freedom of establishment in Gebhard (Case C-55/94, Gebhard, [1995] 
ECR I-4165), and the free movement of capital in Könle (Case C-302/97, Könle, [1999] ECR I-3099). 
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256. Constitutional conflict preemption. Also described as “distinctly applicable measures,” 
discriminatory measures distinguish between European Union citizens, goods, workers, self-
employed, companies, services, and capital, which cross a border and those who/which do not, 
to the detriment of the former. They correspond to a basic form of protectionism. As a result, 
they directly conflict with free movement provisions since they directly breach the explicit 
prohibitions to discriminate. When the Court of Justice deems these measures to be contrary to 
European Union law, it therefore prohibits Member States from discriminating or, to put it 
differently, it deprives them of their power to discriminate. This corresponds to what US 
preemption doctrine describes as ‘conflict preemption,’ since it is “physically impossible” to 
comply simultaneously with national requirements and European Union free movement law.  
257. Constitutional obstacle preemption. The second hypothesis where the application of the 
free movement provisions generates preemptive effects corresponds to cases where indistinctly 
applicable measures are involved. This time, preemption occurs not because national laws are 
in direct conflict with the content of free movement provisions – since they are not, strictly 
speaking, discriminatory. Rather, national laws are preempted because, similarly to obstacle 
preemption under the US preemption doctrine, they “stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment” of the purposes and objectives of the free movement provisions. This is 
clearly reflected in cases where the Court of Justice first applied its obstacle approach, which 
includes indistinctly applicable measures within the scope of the prohibitions laid down by the 
free movement provisions. With respect to the freedom to provide services, for instance, the 
turning point occurred, as is well know, in Säger.59 Under German law, specific services 
provided to patent owners could only be provided by patent agents having a qualification. This 
measure, though indistinctly applicable, had nonetheless the effect of making it more difficult 
for companies established in other Member States to provide this type of services. Against this 
background, the Court of Justice held that: 
It should first be pointed out that Article 59 of the Treaty requires not only the elimination 
of all discrimination against a person providing services on the ground of his nationality 
but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national 
providers of services and to those of other Member States, when it is liable to prohibit or 
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otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services established in another Member 
State where he lawfully provides similar services.60 
It justified this substantial expansion and this departure from the literal meaning of what is 
now Article 56 TFEU by stating that: 
In particular, a Member State may not make the provision of services in its territory subject 
to compliance with all the conditions required for establishment and thereby deprive of all 
practical effectiveness the provisions of the Treaty whose object is, precisely, to guarantee 
the freedom to provide services.61 
This statement demonstrates that the approach followed by the Court of Justice is comparable 
to that of the Supreme Court when it applies the doctrine of obstacle preemption. The 
European Court indeed seeks to safeguard the full effectiveness of the Treaty provision – or, as 
US constitutional theory would put it, its “accomplishment” – the object – or “purpose” or 
“objective” – of which is to guarantee the freedom to provide services.62 
258. The preemptive effects of constitutional conflict preemption. Constitutional conflict 
preemption occurs in free movement cases involving direct or indirect discrimination, which 
may not be justified by the derogations laid down by the Treaty. A few examples show to what 
extent European Union law precludes Member States of their power to discriminate. 
Historically, the Court of Justice case law first concerned the free movement of goods. From an 
early date the Court prevented Member States from treating imported or exported goods less 
favorably than domestic products. As C. BARNARD shows, for instance, it deprived Member 
States of their power to impose additional requirements on the imported/exported goods, to 
adopt rules limiting channels of distribution or to give preference to domestic goods.63 The 
same goes for the three other economic freedoms: direct, as well as indirect, discrimination, is 
prohibited. Direct discrimination corresponds, for the most part, to discrimination based on 
nationality. Thus, Reyners involved a Belgian law according to which only nationals could 
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62 For another illustration in relation to the freedom of establishment see, for instance, Case C-415/93, Bosman, 
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become lawyers.64 The Court found that this measure breached the free movement principle, 
meaning, in terms of power, that the application of European Union law had the effect of 
preempting Belgian law. To comply with European Union law, Belgium indeed had no other 
choice than to remove its discriminatory provision. Likewise, the Court of Justice case law also 
prohibits indirect discriminations. Indirectly discriminatory measures are based on criteria 
other than nationality, such as residence or language, but have in fact the same results as 
directly discriminatory measures. For instance, in Commission v. Italy,65 the Court found that, 
with respect to entrance museum rates, Italian authorities could not grant advantageous rates to 
people residing within the territories of these authorities because this disadvantaged 
nonresident tourists from other Member States. Therefore, this line of reasoning had the effect 
of depriving the Italian Republic of its ability to distinguish between residents and 
nonresidents.  
259. The preemptive effects of constitutional obstacle preemption – Free movement of goods. 
Constitutional obstacle preemption encompasses rulings involving indistinctly applicable 
measures, which may not be justified by overriding reasons of legitimate interest. A few 
examples shed light on its peculiar effects. To begin with, it is worth revisiting Cassis de Dijon66 
in light of the notion of preemption. Under German law, fruit liqueurs could be marketed as 
such only if they contained at least 25% of alcohol. A German importer was barred from 
importing a French product whose the alcohol content was between 15 and 20%. He invoked 
the free movement of goods principle and asked the German Court to set this rule aside. The 
Court of Justice held that “[i]n the absence of common rules relating to the production and 
marketing of alcohol, […] it is for the Member States to regulate all matters relating to the 
production and marketing of alcohol and alcoholic beverages on their own territory,”67 
meaning that an absence of legislative preemption entails, as a matter of principle, absence of 
constitutional preemption. However, it immediately added that: 
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Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities between the 
national laws […] must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognized as being 
necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements.68 
In other words, constitutional obstacle preemption may occur, even in the absence of 
legislative preemption, if national laws are not justified by mandatory requirements. Thus, the 
effects of the Court’s findings in Cassis de Dijon on Germany’s regulatory capacity were very 
constraining. In order to conform to European Union law, Germany was compelled to remove 
its indistinctly applicable rule. In addition, it should be noted that the main effect of the 
application of Article 34 TFEU is depriving host states, and not home states, of their regulatory 
powers. According to the principle of mutual recognition, all products lawfully produced and 
marketed on the territory of a Member State are allowed to move freely within the European 
Union, without being subjected to regulatory burdens in addition to those imposed by the 
home Member State.69 Accordingly, the preemptive effects of Article 34 TFEU are twofold.70 
They are first horizontal, since they deprive host states of their regulatory powers.71 But they 
also are vertical in the sense that they pave the way for legislative preemption or, in other 
words, for harmonization at European Union level. 
260. The preemptive effects of constitutional obstacle preemption – Other freedoms. When 
interpreting the provisions on the free movement of persons and services, the Court also 
follows an obstacle-based approach. Admittedly, the restrictive nature of indistinctly applicable 
measures is not assessed through the same test as in the context of the free movement of goods 
– even though it is still a test based on the effects of national laws.72 But Articles 45, 49, and 56 
TFEU also have preemptive effects. In case of restrictions on exit, home states are precluded of 
the power to adopt indistinctly applicable measures restricting outgoing moves. In case of 
restrictions on entry, a distinction should be drawn. The preemptive effects of the freedom to 
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provide services are similar to those of the free movement of goods. Since the principle of 
mutual recognition applies, they primarily concern the regulatory capacity of host states. 
However, provisions on the free movement of persons induce preemptive effects on national 
laws adopted by both home and host states. This is well illustrated, for instance, in Caixabank, a 
case based on the freedom of establishment.73 French law prohibited the remuneration of sight 
accounts. The Court of Justice held that this measure was a non-justified restriction on the 
freedom of establishment with respect to foreign companies pursuing activities in France via a 
subsidiary. It concluded that: 
Article 43 EC precludes legislation of a Member State which prohibits a credit institution 
which is a subsidiary of a company from another Member State from remunerating sight 
accounts in Euros opened by residents of the former Member State.74 
This ruling clearly barred France, the home state, from exercising its power to prohibit the 
remuneration of sight accounts. It should be noted that traditional free movement cases based 
on European Union citizenship should be put aside. The Court is surely moving towards a 
‘restriction approach,’ catching indistinctly applicable measures in this field too. However, the 
cases where it followed such an approach all involve powers retained by Member States,75 the 
effects of which are in turn identified in the following paragraph. 
261. Discrete and common features. The above has thus shed light on the fact that traditional 
free movement cases are the source of different preemption types, which vary in degree. Since 
constitutional conflict preemption only pertains to discriminatory measures, its scope is 
narrower than the scope of constitutional obstacle preemption. The latter has the effect of 
imposing greater constraints on Member States than the former, since it pertains to indistinctly 
applicable measures. However, the two preemption types share a basic common feature, which 
reveals a fundamental aspect of the Court of Justice’s assessment of free movement cases. In 
both cases, the Court seeks to determine whether Member States can legitimately exercise their 
regulatory powers. Admittedly, the Court, when it appraises the justification stage, is led to look 
into how Member States have exercised their powers, but it always does so with a view to 
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answering the question as to whether Member States had the power to regulate in the first place. 
To go back to the example of Caixabank, the reasoning developed by the Court of Justice is 
tantamount to claiming that France did not have the power to prohibit foreign companies 
pursuing activities in France via a subsidiary from remunerating sight accounts. To comply with 
European Union law, France had no other choice than to merely remove this prohibition. In 
other words, under the constitutional conflict and obstacle preemption models, the only way 
Member States can comply with the free movement principle is to relinquish their regulatory 
powers. 
2. The lack of preemptive effects of the cases involving powers retained by Member 
States 
262. In what follows, I defend the view that, in contrast to traditional free movement cases, 
cases concerned by the power-based approach lack preemptive effects. If they do affect the 
substance of the powers retained by Member States, they do so differently. Instead of depriving 
Member States of their powers, they result in reshaping the personal and territorial scopes of 
the latter, but only to the extent that this does not jeopardize their material scopes. 
a. The non-alteration of the decision to assert jurisdiction 
263. The limited reach of adjustment requirements. If adjustment requirements can be described 
as positive obligations of a constraining character,76 they have, however, at the same time, a 
limited reach. Indeed, they do not amount to rules governing the decision of a Member State to 
assert, or not to assert, jurisdiction over a subject matter. The decision to assert jurisdiction 
fundamentally belongs to the Member States, and, as such, it remains discretionary. To put it in 
more concrete terms, this means, for instance, that the case law of the Court of Justice does not 
oblige Member States to set up from scratch mechanisms relating to student financial assistance 
or to the compensation of civil war victims. It is only to the extent that these social benefits 
already exist that they can be possibly made available to individuals exercising their European 
Union free movement rights. Similarly, adjustment requirements do not require Member States 
to lay down new tax advantages, which would be specifically aimed at compensating residents or 
nonresidents engaged in European Union cross-border situations who would be under more 
burdensome tax obligations than the persons not exercising their free movement rights. In a 
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similar vein, the Court does not expect Member States to introduce specific arrangements in 
order to allow European Union citizens to change surnames according to other Member States’ 
laws or practices. The initial decision to set them up belongs to national authorities. To put it 
differently, it is only once that it is established that Member States have asserted jurisdiction 
that the Court of Justice power-based approach comes into play, and might require Member 
States to adjust their national arrangements. 
264. The example of direct taxation. The example of direct taxation will help clarify what I mean 
by the decision to assert jurisdiction. Scholars focusing on the Court of Justice case law relating 
to direct taxation often base their demonstrations on the distinction between assumption of 
taxing jurisdiction and exercise of taxing jurisdiction.77 They generally accept that, while the 
former remains within the hands of Member States, the latter must comply with European 
Union law requirements.78 In this respect, it is useful to quote B. J. M. TERRA & P. J. WATTEL 
at length. They define Member States’ obligations to comply with European Union law as 
follows: 
If a Member State assumes the same jurisdiction over the cross-border position (the 
nonresident or the foreign-source income) as it does over the domestic position (the 
resident or the domestic income), then it must subsequently also exercise that jurisdiction 
so assumed in the same manner as in domestic positions. […] The scope of taxation to 
which residents are subjected, is the outer limit for subjection of nonresidents, and the 
scope of taxation to which domestic income is subjected, is the outer limit for subjection of 
foreign-source income.79 
This statement confirms that European Union law does not compel Member States to exercise 
their taxing jurisdiction. This entails, as the Court has acknowledged on numerous occasions, 
that Member States are free to determine the factors and criteria necessary for the definition of 
their taxing jurisdiction. It is only once they have done so that they are subjected to the 
European Union free movement principle. The examples relating to cross-border loss relief 
and dividend taxation concretize this idea.  
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265. As far as companies are concerned, most Member States have set up group taxation 
schemes enabling groups of companies to be treated, from a fiscal perspective, as a single entity. 
Through these means, companies belonging to the same group can offset profits and losses 
both horizontally and vertically. However, these advantages are most of the time reserved for 
groups the companies of which are all located in the same Member State. This limitation was 
directly challenged for the first time in the aforementioned Marks & Spencer case.80 As seen 
earlier, this decision concerned the refusal of United Kingdom tax authorities to allow the 
United Kingdom parent to deduce the losses of its EU nonresident subsidiaries. The Court 
decided that this refusal, so long as it did not involve the definitive losses, could be justified in 
light of three justificatory elements: the need for the preservation of the allocation of the power 
to impose taxes between the Member States, the risk of tax avoidance, and the danger that 
losses would be deducted twice. The Court reached this conclusion after taking into account a 
decisive feature. Indeed, not only had the UK decided not to exert its taxing jurisdiction with 
respect to foreign subsidiaries’ losses (hence its refusal to take them into account), but it also 
had unilaterally refused to exercise its taxing powers on foreign subsidiaries’ corresponding 
profits. In this regard, the Court noted that: 
[T]he preservation of the allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States 
might make it necessary to apply to the economic activities of companies established in one 
of those States only the tax rules of that State in respect of both profits and losses.81 
This statement boils down to claiming that European Union law may not compel a Member 
State to exercise its taxing jurisdiction where it has unilaterally – or through a tax treaty – 
decided not to. The same reasoning subsequently led the Court of Justice, in Lidl Belgium, to 
agree with Germany’s refusal to allow a resident parent company to (temporarily) deduct the 
losses of its Luxembourg branch. Indeed, in accordance with the Germany-Luxembourg tax 
treaty, Germany had not extended its taxing jurisdiction to the profits and losses generated in 
Luxembourg.82 However, if European Union law does not constrain Member States with 
respect to the assertion of taxing jurisdiction through connecting factors such as residence, 
nationality, territory or asset location, the Court of Justice insists on the obligation of 
coherence, which is placed on the Member State refusing cross-border loss relief. Member 
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States are not under the obligation to take into account foreign losses provided that they also 
disregard corresponding profits.83 There must be symmetry in the taking into account of losses 
and profits, as the Court implied in Lidl Belgium: 
[T]he objective of preserving the allocation of the power to impose taxes between the two 
Member States concerned, which is reflected in the provisions of the Convention, is 
capable of justifying the tax regime at issue in the main proceedings, since it safeguards 
symmetry between the right to tax profits and the right to deduct losses.84 
266. This very symmetry requirement explains why, for instance, the Court of Justice has 
recently overturned a Member State’s refusal to take into account losses that did not have a 
genuine cross-border origin. In Philips Electronics,85 the United Kingdom refused the transfer, by 
means of group relief, of losses incurred by the United Kingdom branch of a Netherlands 
company, to a United Kingdom group company, on the grounds that they could have been 
used abroad – the Dutch legislation indeed provided for a temporary use of foreign branches’ 
losses by the parent company. The Court held that neither the transfer of losses, nor the fact 
that losses could be used twice, would affect the taxing jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. It 
first recalled that the objective of preserving the allocation of powers between the Member 
States was “designed […] to safeguard the symmetry between the right to tax profits and the 
right to deduct losses.”86 However, since the United Kingdom had asserted jurisdiction with 
respect to both losses and profits of the UK branch of the Netherlands company: 
[T]he power of the host Member State […] to impose taxes is not at all affected by the 
possibility of transferring, by group relief, and to a resident company, the losses sustained 
by a permanent establishment situated in its territory.87 
[Likewise,] the risk that those losses may be used both in the host Member State where the 
permanent establishment is situated and also in the Member State where the nonresident 
company has its seat has no effect on the power of the Member State where the permanent 
establishment is situated to impose taxes.88 
What was at issue in Philips Electronics was the way the United Kingdom exercised its taxing 
jurisdiction, and not its sovereign power to decide whether to exercise its jurisdiction.  
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267. The same distinction between the assertion and exercise of taxing jurisdiction underlies 
the Court of Justice’s reasoning with respect to dividend taxation. As shown earlier,89 as far as 
inbound dividends are concerned, the Court of Justice requires Member States to undo 
economic double taxation, but it does not impose such requirement with respect to juridical 
double taxation. Kerckhaert-Morres90 concerned the second hypothesis. Belgium had decided to 
subject both domestic and foreign dividends to a 25% income tax. The plaintiffs were also 
subjected to a French 15% withholding tax. They argued that the French withholding tax was 
more burdensome for them since it was not offset in Belgium. The Court did not agree and 
found that there was no restriction because Belgium treated domestic and foreign dividends 
indistinctively. It went on by noting that the plaintiffs’ situation was the result of the exercise in 
parallel by two Member States of their fiscal sovereignty.91 To be sure, Belgium exercised its 
taxing jurisdiction consistently: it taxed dividends in the same way, regardless of their origin, 
and, in any case, it did not grant any tax credit. Consequently, adjusting the conditions of 
exercise of Belgium’s tax powers could not offset the plaintiffs’ heavier burdens. These burdens 
could only be alleviated if one of the Member States involved was required to alter the way it 
asserted its tax jurisdiction. Yet, as noted by the Court: 
Community law, in its current state and in a situation such as that in the main 
proceedings, does not lay down any general criteria for the attribution of areas of 
competence between the Member States in relation to the elimination of double taxation 
within the Community.92 
268. Things are different with respect to inbound dividends, which are subject to economic 
double taxation. In Manninen,93 Finland had decided to exercise its taxing jurisdiction on 
inbound dividends by granting shareholders who received dividends a tax credit in order to 
offset the corporation tax paid by the company distributing the dividends. However, it 
restricted the award of this tax advantage to shareholders receiving dividends paid by resident 
companies, while it subjected shareholders of nonresident companies to a 29% income tax. In 
contrast to Belgium in Kerckhaert-Morres, Finland did not treat domestic and foreign dividends 
in the same way, despite the fact that it had asserted its taxing jurisdiction. Therefore, the 
Court of Justice took the view that this was constitutive of an unjustified restriction. Its 
                                                 
89 See, Supra, § 197. 
90 Case C-513/04, Kerckhaert-Morres, [2006] ECR I-10967 
91 Ibid., 20. 
92 Ibid., 22. 
93 Case C-319/02, Manninen, [2004] ECR I-7477. 
Chapter 4. The ECJ Power-Based Approach Jurisdictional Implications 
 
206 
decision therefore resulted in requiring Finland to exercise its taxing power differently, in such 
a way as to subject the two categories of dividends to the same tax obligations. This could be 
achieved through the extension of the tax credit to shareholders of nonresident companies, or 
the complete removal of the tax advantage (which would place it in the same situation as 
Belgium in Kerckhaert-Morres). 
269. The lack of preemptive effects of adjustment requirements. The above has established that free 
movement cases involving powers retained by Member States differ fundamentally from 
traditional free movement cases. In the former, the application of the free movement principle 
does not amount to compelling Member States to assert, or not to assert, jurisdiction. As a 
result, unlike the obligations imposed on Member States in traditional free movement cases, 
adjustment requirements do not have the effect of depriving Member States of their retained 
powers. To put it differently, the power-based approach lacks preemptive effects. Two basic 
features characterizing adjustment requirements may therefore seem to conflict with each other. 
On the one hand, adjustment requirements must be regarded as positive obligations imposed 
upon Member States,94 thereby reflecting the constraining and far-reaching nature of the Court 
of Justice’s approach. On the other hand, they also seem less burdensome than obligations 
usually imposed on Member States in traditional free movement cases, since they do not 
deprive Member States to be deprived of their powers. Ultimately, these two conflicting features 
reflect clearly the ‘mutual adjustment resolution’ operated by the Court of Justice. The 
interpretation of free movement provisions prompts it to impose positive obligations on 
Member States in new and sensitive areas, but it simultaneously adapts its own approach by not 
attaching preemptive effects to the adjustment requirements. 
b. Identification of the effects induced by the power-based approach 
270. If, admittedly, Member States remain free to assert, or not to assert, jurisdiction, the 
intrusions of European Union law into their retained spheres of powers nonetheless affects the 
substance of the latter. In this respect, it must be borne in mind that the fields analyzed herein 
are built upon the same basic principles: the building of boundaries and the principle of 
closure.95 Consequently, one fundamental aspect of the exercise of the powers retained by 
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Member States is made up of the enactment of inclusion and exclusion rules, which must 
themselves comply with the personal and territorial scopes of these powers.96 The personal 
scope is generally circumscribed with reference to the criteria of nationality or residence, while 
the territorial scope usually corresponds to the geographical territory of each Member State.97 
271. The reshaping of the personal and territorial scopes of the powers retained by Member States. The 
alteration of the conditions of exercise of the powers retained by Member States, as identified 
in the previous chapter,98 induces two types of implications: (i) on the one hand, the 
application of European Union law consists in compelling Member States to include 
individuals exercising their free movement rights into national arrangements from which they 
were hitherto excluded; and/or (ii) on the other hand, the application of free movement law 
leads Member States to broaden the scope of their geographical inclusion rules by attaching 
extra-territorial effects to the exercise of their powers. As a result, the Court of Justice’s power-
based approach boils down to compelling Member States to broaden the scope of their personal 
and territorial inclusion rules, thereby narrowing the scope of the corresponding personal and 
territorial exclusion rules. Since the inclusion and exclusion rules adopted in the exercise of the 
powers retained by Member States must comply with the personal and territorial scopes of these 
powers, the redrawing of the former necessarily entails the reshaping of the latter. Therefore, 
the power-based approach brings about ‘bottom up effects,’ whereby the substance of the 
powers retained by Member States is modified through the alteration of their conditions of 
exercise. 
272. The effects of the power-based approach limited by the concern to safeguard the integrity of the 
material scope of the retained powers. I am of the view that the Court of Justice is well aware of the 
potential destructive effects of its power-based approach, which explains why it is inclined to 
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mitigate these effects when necessary. What follows goes against the tide, and intends to 
demonstrate that the cases involving powers retained by Member States affect the personal and 
territorial scopes of these powers, but only to the extent that they do not jeopardize their 
material scopes. In other words, these rulings make it clear that the Member States play a 
defining role that ought to be safeguarded by, and within, the European Union legal order. 
273. Nationality. As far as the field relating to nationality is concerned, the issue at stake is 
whether the power-based approach results in an autonomization of European Union citizenship 
from Member States’ nationalities. Article 20 TFEU makes it crystal clear that European Union 
citizenship is “derived and complementary in character in relation to nationality:”99 
Every person holding the nationality of a Member state shall be a citizen of the Union. 
Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship. 
Most authors agree that the Court’s case law has the effect of interfering into a field that was 
traditionally considered as falling within Member States’ exclusive spheres of action.100 Some of 
them are of the view that the Court’s stand challenges the contingent character of European 
Union citizenship by “reversing the relationship between the possession of a nationality of a 
Member State and Union citizenship,”101 and maintain that Member States have lost control of 
their nationality policies.102 The ultimate effect of the rulings decided in the field of nationality 
would be to prevent Member States from determining who their nationals are and, eventually, 
to bar them from defining their own body politic. In other words, these authors argue that the 
reshaping of the conditions of membership identified above leads to a detrimental erosion of 
the material scope of nationality powers. However, this standpoint should be tempered. The 
assessment of the legal impact of European Union law upon the material scope of nationality 
powers calls for careful distinctions. Kaur103 established that the original decision to grant 
nationality exclusively belongs to Member States, and that European Union law has no 
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incidence at all over this matter. Therefore, European Union law might impact nationality 
policies only once an individual has been granted the nationality of at least one Member State of 
the European Union. In other words, “Member States seem to be at absolute liberty to 
distribute their nationalities.”104 Furthermore, as A. TRYFONIDOU rightly points it out, only the 
“decisions of the Member States which lead to the denial of the existence of EU rights”105 fall 
within the ambit of the Court of Justice scrutiny. In this respect, Micheletti106 and Chen107 made 
it clear that Member States are under an absolute obligation to recognize nationalities granted 
by other Member States of the European Union. As for Rottmann,108 it is only to the extent that 
the concurrent exercise of two Member States jurisdictions lead to statelessness, and thus to the 
impossibility of exercising EU rights previously enjoyed by this individual, that Member States 
are encouraged to alter their traditional way of implementing nationality policies. Accordingly, 
the Court of Justice control is not about compelling Member States to assert or to renounce 
their jurisdiction. As E. MEISSE puts it, ultimately, European Union law is in line with the 
limitations set out long ago by public international law, according to which: 
It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be 
recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, 
international custom, and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to 
nationality.109 
If the limitations induced by European Union law are more far-reaching and effective than 
those emanating from public international law, it is because of the level of sophistication of the 
European Union legal system, which is greater than that of public international law.110 
274. Direct taxation. It is not uncommon for cases decided in the field of direct taxation to be 
considered as impairing Member States’ power to tax. Indeed, a number of authors point out 
                                                 
104 D. KOCHENOV, above, n. 100, 1840. 
105 A. TRYFONIDOU, “The impact of EU law on nationality laws and migration control in the EU’s Member 
States,” 25: 4 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 358, 366 (2011). See also D. KOSTAKOPOULOU, 
“The European Court of Justice, Member State autonomy and European Union citizenship: conjunctions and 
disjunctions,” in The European Court of Justice and The Autonomy of the Member States, (Eds.) B. DE WITTE & H.-W. 
MICKLITZ, (Leiden: Intersentia, 2012), 175-203. 
106 Case C-369/90, Micheletti, [1992] ECR I-4239. 
107 Case C-200/02, Chen, [2004] ECR I-9925. 
108 See J. SHAW, “Concluding thoughts: Rottmann in context,” in “Has the Court of Justice challenged Member 
State sovereignty in nationality law?,” J. SHAW (Ed), (EUI RSCAS Working Papers, 2011/62), 33. 
109 Article 1 of the Hague Convention of 12 April 1930 on certain questions relating to the conflict of nationality 
laws (Emphasis added). 
110 E. MEISSE, “Le droit de la nationalité à l’épreuve de l’intégration communautaire,” in L’Union européenne: Droit, 
politique, démocratie, (Ed.) G. DUPRAT, (Paris, PUF, Coll. Politique d’aujourd’hui, 1996), 132. 
Chapter 4. The ECJ Power-Based Approach Jurisdictional Implications 
 
210 
that, as a result of the Court of Justice’s power-based approach, Member State autonomy is 
undermined,111 or at least that it is impacted profoundly.112 It must be conceded that direct 
taxation rulings compel Member States, at least to a certain extent, to rethink the way they 
exercise their taxing jurisdiction. The reshaping of their inclusion and exclusion rules moreover 
results in the alteration of traditional tax concepts and tax distinctions, which used to be 
defined and drawn by the Member States in a discretionary manner. Decisions relating to the 
taxation of workers have, in particular, the effect of challenging the traditional distinction 
between residents and nonresidents by requiring Member States to take into account 
nonresident taxpayers’ personal circumstances. In a similar vein, cases on ‘purely artificial 
arrangements’113 have forced Member States to reconsider how to combat international tax 
avoidance. However, the Court of Justice’s approach in the field of direct taxation does not 
adversely affect the material scope of national taxing powers. As I have already stressed it 
earlier,114 the vast majority of the Court’s rulings do not compel Member States to assert or, on 
the contrary, to relinquish their taxing jurisdiction. Proof is provided by the fact that the Court 
does not allocate taxing jurisdictions among Member States.115 As a result, European Union 
taxpayers may not resort to European Union law when they suffer from unfavorable 
consequences flowing from the concurrent exercise of Member States’ taxing jurisdictions.  
275. Admittedly, the Court seems to have ruled in a contrary manner in several cases, but it 
was probably more of a slip-up than the inception of a genuine trend in its case law.116 Mention 
can be made, for instance, of Bosal Holding BV117 and Marks & Spencer,118 in which the 
interpretation of European Union law by the Court ultimately led to the redrawing of national 
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taxing jurisdictions. In these cases Member States were indeed required to “assume taxing 
jurisdiction where they had symmetrically decided not to do so.”119 In Bosal Holding BV, a 
Dutch tax regulation provided that a parent company resident in the Netherlands could deduct 
costs incurred by a nonresident holding only if it could demonstrate that such costs were 
indirectly instrumental in making profits taxable in the Netherlands. The Member State argued 
that this measure did not infringe the freedom of establishment on the grounds that it did not 
assert its taxing jurisdiction over the holding.120 It went on by stressing that: 
[T]he costs in connection with activities abroad, including financing costs and costs in 
relation to holdings, should be set off against the profits generated by those activities and 
the deduction of those costs is linked solely to the making or non-making of profits outside 
the Netherlands.121 
The Court rejected this argument. It did not focus on whether resident and nonresident 
subsidiaries were in comparable situations, but rather on Dutch parent companies which, 
whether they owned resident or nonresident subsidiaries, were not, in any case, subject to tax 
with respect to the profits of their subsidiaries.122 Thus, the Court’s refusal to take into account 
the situation of resident and nonresident companies led it to compel a Member State to allow 
its company to take into account negative income occurred in another Member State, although 
it had not asserted a symmetrical taxing jurisdiction over the profits generated by the 
nonresident subsidiary, its distributions, or its capital gains.123  
276. The Court of Justice reached a similar outcome, though in a different context, in Marks 
& Spencer. As seen earlier,124 this case addressed the issue of cross-border loss relief.125 The 
United Kingdom based its refusal to grant a parent company the possibility to set off losses 
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incurred by its nonresident subsidiaries on arguments similar to those developed by the 
Netherlands in Bosal Holding BV.126 The Court admitted, as a matter of principle, that: 
[T]he preservation of the allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States 
might make it necessary to apply to the economic activities of companies established in one 
of those states only the tax rules of that state in respect of both profits and losses.127 
However, the Court reviewed the national measure in light of three justifications, namely the 
balanced allocation of taxing jurisdiction, the danger that losses be used twice and the risk of 
tax avoidance, and decided that it went beyond what was necessary if it turned out that the 
subsidiaries’ losses could never be taken into account.128  
277. Accordingly, in these two cases, the Court of Justice altered the allocation of Member 
States’ taxing jurisdictions. It ultimately constrained the ability of the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom to assert jurisdiction, thereby ignoring their choice not to do so in the first 
place. This therefore affected their ability to assert, or not to assert, their taxing jurisdiction. 
However, with the exception of these rather singular rulings, the Court of Justice’s case law 
relating to the field of direct taxation is consistent with the idea that European Union law does 
not undermine Member States’ ability to lay down the connecting factors for the allocation of 
their taxing jurisdiction. Following Marks & Spencer, the Court confirmed on several occasions 
that national group taxation rules may distinguish between groups whose companies are all 
resident in the same Member State, and groups whose companies are resident in several 
Member States. In Oy AA,129 for instance, it ruled that a national tax scheme which subjects 
deductions of intra-group financial transfers from subsidiaries’ taxable incomes to the condition 
that the parent company be resident in the same Member State complies with the freedom of 
establishment. Similarly, in X Holding BV,130 the Court decided that a Member State could 
restrict the possibility for a parent company to form a single tax entity with its subsidiaries to 
parent companies owning resident subsidiaries only. It stressed the fact that: 
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[A]cceptance of the possibility of including a nonresident subsidiary in such an entity 
would have the consequence of allowing the parent company to choose freely the Member 
State in which the losses of that subsidiary are to be taken into account.131 
Or, to put it differently, such an acceptance would amount to the Member State of residence 
of the parent company being required to extend its taxing jurisdiction to non-subject-to-tax 
entities. The same reasoning underlies the rulings relating to the taxation of dividends.132 All in 
all, except in a few decisions, it can be said that the Court of Justice starts from the premise 
that the Member States are responsible for allocating their taxing jurisdictions. They are 
required by European Union law to make subjects-to-tax involved in cross-border situations 
benefit from the same tax arrangements as those involved in purely internal matters only to the 
extent that this does not challenge the assertion or non-assertion of their taxing jurisdiction. 
278. Rules governing surnames. Cases involving national rules governing surnames are also 
subject to criticism, on the basis that they would limit Member States’ autonomy in the field of 
personal status,133 or that they would boil down to “introducing a different concept of national 
membership.”134 However, a close look at the Court of Justice case law reveals that, here again, 
the European judge takes into account national concerns,135 and is careful not to undermine 
the substance of the powers retained by Member States. Indeed, the cases where it imposed the 
most far-reaching requirements upon Member States, Garcia Avello136 and Grunkin & Paul,137 
were cases where, on the one hand, the national legal systems at stake provided for the 
possibility to recognize other forms of names than the usual national names and, on the other 
hand, the Member States did not claim that the national measures represented a core national 
interest. Conversely, the Court of Justice took into account, in Wittgenstein138 and Vardyn & 
Wardyn,139 that the national measures related to the state’s constitutional identity, to objective 
considerations of public policy, and to the principle of equal treatment, as well as to the 
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preservation of a national language, and to the nation’s identity respectively. It thus once again 
protected the capacity of Member States to define their political community by setting out 
conditions of membership, and to safeguard interests that they themselves deem worth 
protecting at the national level. 
279. The jeopardizing of welfare powers? Admittedly, European Union law puts increasing 
limitations upon national welfare powers, which were previously exercised in a discretionary 
fashion.140 In this respect, several authors, alongside some Member States, fear that European 
Union law might endanger the sustainability of national welfare policies, and even give rise to a 
‘race to the bottom.’141 Among them, G. DAVIES has probably developed the sharpest criticism: 
The logic of the state is that citizens, or residents, contribute via taxation and receive via 
services of various kinds. To insist that all services must be provided without reference to 
borders is to render the state incoherent. It breaks the link between obligation and benefit, 
and makes national budget control impossible.142 
Two main sets of concerns have been raised.143 First of all, the Court of Justice’s approach 
would go against principles of social justice. It would primarily favor financially privileged 
European Union citizens, i.e. those who can afford moving to other Member States. In the case 
of cross-border health care, only the wealthiest could exercise the rights recognized by the 
Court’s decisions,144 while in the case of education, poor taxpayers would end up paying for 
wealthy incomers – whether access or financial support is concerned.145 The Court’s approach 
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would create inequalities among Member States. Some of them being more likely than others 
to attract cross-border patients, this would bring about a phenomenon of overcapacity while 
leading to undercapacity in States sending patients.146 Likewise, Member States, such as the 
United Kingdom, Ireland or Belgium, are net receivers in terms of flows of students, and face, 
therefore, more practical and financial burdens than Member States sending students.147 
Second of all, the Court of Justice approach would result in imposing significant financial 
burdens on Member States. It would impair their planning capacities with respect to cross-
border health care,148 which are vital149 for the preservation of health care policies. The same 
goes with respect to education: the Court’s case law would give rise to uncontrolled flows of 
students.150 The following paragraphs review, in turn, the various fields analyzed herein in 
order to assess whether the Court of Justice does in fact undermine the material scope of 
national welfare powers, thereby putting the sustainability of national welfare policies at risk. 
280. Cross-border health care – Concerns induced by the Court of Justice approach. J. NICKLESS 
distinguishes three variables that are useful for the assessment of the effects of the Court’s case 
law on national health care systems: the personal scope of social health policies – the 
individuals covered by the social security scheme, their scope of treatment – what interventions 
patients are entitled to, and their scope of implementation – the authorized providers.151 The 
personal scope of Member States’ powers is affected by the Court’s approach since patients 
receiving treatment abroad are still covered by the social security scheme of their state of 
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affiliation.152 So are the two other variables. Member States are indeed no longer completely 
free to determine which treatments are to be covered by their social security schemes. The 
Court decided in Geraets-Smits & Peerbooms that the authorization to grant a patient the right to 
receive treatment abroad has to be based on “what is sufficiently tried and tested by 
international medical science.”153 Therefore, international criteria will trump national ones if 
the latter do not conform to the former. As a result, this could compel Member States to cover 
treatments, which not only are unavailable on their territory but are also “actively opposed by 
the medical profession.”154 Likewise, compliance with the equal treatment principle may, as a 
matter of fact, compel Member States to conclude agreements with nonresident providers.155  
281. In view of these developments, some claim that health care rulings have the effect of 
reshaping the basic organizational principles of Member States’ social security schemes. They 
first expressed their concerns when the Court of Justice ruled that the freedom to provide 
services was applicable, regardless of whether the national scheme involved was a benefits-in-
kind scheme or not.156 In their view, the Court’s decisions would result in undermining the 
basic principles governing benefits-in-kind schemes because, on the one hand, this would 
compel Member States to open their health care systems to providers they did not have 
previous agreements with, and, on the other hand, this would challenge the very principle 
whereby benefits are provided in kind, since patients going abroad have to pay the foreign 
practitioners/institutions. Even greater fears were expressed with respect to the UK National 
Health Service (thereafter ‘NHS’). The organization of the NHS displays unique features.157 It is 
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a paternalistic system, characterized by medical dominance, and the absence of recognized 
rights for patients. General practitioners play a role of gatekeepers by referring patients in need 
of secondary care. Primary Care Trusts have the task of commissioning for their area, while a 
public body assesses the suitability of drugs and treatments. Last but not least, the system is 
based on waiting lists. Many patients have tried to challenge these features before the English 
Courts, advocating for the recognition of rights, but they have been mostly unsuccessful. In 
short, “considerable state control is exercised over the scope of services that can be funded 
under the NHS,”158 and “English law continues to maintain a system of prior approval to 
ensure that the NHS funds only what professionals think suitable.”159 Therefore, the Court’s 
cases decided in the field of cross-border health care could be seen as being contrary to the 
philosophy of the NHS. J. MONTGOMERY argues that they bring about “a fundamental change 
in the domestic law on access to health services,”160 in the sense that they could enable 
individuals to by-pass waiting lists and thus undermine the resource allocation policy of the 
NHS. G. DAVIES is of the view that three substantial changes are induced by the Court of 
Justice’s case law.161 First, the NHS would be compelled to rethink its waiting-list system in such 
a way as to assess the personal circumstances of patients in order to comply with the obligation 
to not impose undue delays on patients. Second, it would have to quantify the costs of the 
treatments in order to reimburse patients who receive treatment abroad.162 Finally, these 
adjustments might bring about internal changes by increasingly moving the NHS towards 
reimbursements of treatments received in private UK hospitals. For G. DAVIES, the Court of 
Justice case law ultimately “leads to the restructuring of public institutions.”163 
282. Cross-border health care – The Court of Justice approach put in perspective. Powerful 
arguments show that the impact of the Court of Justice approach is not as profound as it may 
                                                 
2005), 145-156; J. V. MCHALE, “Framing a right to treatment in English law? Watts in retrospective,” above, n. 
144; J. MCHALE, “Health care, the United Kingdom and the draft Patients’ Rights Directive: One small step for 
patient mobility but a huge leap for a reformed NHS?,” in Health care and EU Law, (Eds.) E. SZYSZCZAK et. al., 
(Asser/Springer, 2011), 241-265. 
158 J. MONTGOMERY, “Impact of European Union Law on English health care law,” above, n. 157, 149. 
159 Ibid., 150. 
160 Ibid., 145-146. 
161 G. DAVIES, “The effect of Mrs. Watts’ trip to France on the National Health Service,” 18 K.L.J. 158-167 (2007). 
162 As noted by G. DAVIES, Ibid., 165, n. 37: “One might think that some form of price list must exist, so that the 
NHS can bill other Member States for the cost of treating their citizens under the Regulation 1408/71 procedure, 
including emergency treatment. However, many states have agreements whereby they pay lump sums per year, or 
even do not pay at all: the amount of cross-border benefit-in-kind treatment does not justify a complicated 
administrative apparatus, and often cancels itself out between states.” 
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seem at first glance. To begin with, this is supported by empirical data. In practice, very few 
patients go abroad to receive cross-border treatments.164 Y. JORENS has noted that only three 
categories of patients are likely to use their free movement rights: those living in border areas, 
those seeking complex medical services, and those having at their disposal all the necessary 
information.165 Thus, the Court of Justice case law has not, so far, created substantial financial 
burdens on Member States’ social security budgets. Neither has it jeopardized their planning 
capacities. Two other arguments, of a legal nature, demonstrate that the Court of Justice case 
law does not amount to jeopardizing national health care powers. First of all, the Court has 
gradually drawn distinctions so as to safeguard the material scope of Member States’ powers. 
Indeed, distinctions between intramural and extramural treatments on the one hand, and 
between extramural treatments involving the use of major medical equipment and those not 
relying on such equipment on the other hand,166 reveal that the Court of Justice has, from the 
inception of its case law, taken into account Member States’ practical and financial interests. To 
put it differently, concerns relating to the necessity to safeguard the sustainability of national 
health care systems are reflected in the justifications accepted by the Court. Second of all, if, 
admittedly, Member States must adjust their health care systems so as to comply with European 
Union law, they always have the “final say.”167 They are indeed responsible for deciding, at each 
stage of the procedure, whether a patient may be allowed to seek cross-border health care: they 
rule on which treatments may be sought, on the personal circumstances of patients, and they 
grant prior authorizations. The recent cases decided by the Court furthermore tend to show 
that Member States are allowed to maintain prior authorization requirements as soon as they 
can demonstrate that the treatments at stake involve significant costs. 
283. Higher education – Access. As seen earlier, access to higher education is based, in Belgium 
and Austria, on the principle of open, or unrestricted, access.168 It could seem, at the outset, 
that the interpretation of the EU non-discrimination principle by the Court of Justice is such as 
                                                 
164 D. S. MARTINSEN, “Towards an internal health market with the European Court,” 28: 5 West European Politics, 
1035, 1047 (2005). This has also been underlined by J. V. MCHALE, “Framing a right to treatment in English law? 
Watts in retrospective,” above, n. 144, with respect to the United Kingdom. 
165 Y. JORENS, “The right to health care across borders,” above, n. 154, 100. 
166 Case C-512/08, Commission v. France, [2010] ECR I-8833. 
167 This is pointed out with respect to other contexts by C. O'BRIEN, “Real links, abstract rights and false alarms: 
The relationship between the ECJ's 'real link' case law and national solidarity,” 33 European law review 643-665 
(2008), but it also holds true as far as health care is concerned. 
168 See, Supra, §§ 147s.  
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to bring about fundamental changes.169 In Commission v. Austria170 and Bressol,171 Advocates 
General JACOBS and SHARPSTON both took the stance that European Union law could compel 
Member States to alter the basic principle underlying the conditions of access to their higher 
educational systems. E. SHARPSTON went as far as to suggest, for instance, that: 
It seems to me very possible that implementing less discriminatory measures may mean 
abandoning the current system of unrestricted public access to higher education for all 
Belgians. I can well see that that will be thought undesirable and that it might well be 
better if […] the flow of students across borders were regulated at Community level. In the 
absence of such a system, however, the fact that such changes may be necessary reflects the 
need to comply with the obligations arising from the principle of equal treatment under 
the Treaty.172 
These views amount to acknowledging that the application of European Union law in the field 
of education may give rise to a substantial erosion of the material scope of Member States’ 
powers. This was vehemently criticized by A. SOMEK in the following terms: 
[W]ith regard to the graduating students a system of university admission which is based on 
test scores not only engenders a far more inegalitarian effect but cannot accommodate a 
concern that may have lain at the heart of the Austrian system. […] The Court thus 
effectively forced upon Austria a ‘merit based’ system of admission. Austria seems to be no 
longer free to pursue, as an outgrowth of its own national understanding of solidarity, a 
system where ‘merit’ is something that is earned in the course of one’s studies and not 
before one has engaged in them.173 
It was moreover added that the Court of Justice approach could undermine Member States’ 
task to ensure their population access to education. Emphasis was placed on the risk that 
nonresident students would fill most of the places available, thereby preventing resident 
students from being selected by their home universities.174 However, it is once again necessary 
to temper these fears. As shown earlier,175 in both Commission v. Austria and Bressol, the Court of 
                                                 
169 K. LENAERTS, “Federalism and the rule of law: Perspectives from the European Court of Justice,” above, n. 115, 
1348. 
170 Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969. 
171 Case C-73/08, Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735. 
172 Opinion in Case C-73/08, Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735, 108. (Emphasis added) See also Advocate General 
JACOBS’ similar line of reasoning in his Opinion in Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969, 51-
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173 A. SOMEK, “Solidarity decomposed: being and time in European citizenship,” 32: 6 Eur. Law Rev. 787, 817-818 
(2007). See also S. GROSBON, “Libre circulation et systèmes de sélection universitaire: une équation complexe,” 
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174 M. DOUGAN, “Cross-border educational mobility and the exportation of student financial assistance,” 33: 5 Eur. 
Law Journal 723, 737 (2008). 
175 See, Supra, §§ 147s.  
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Justice endorsed an approach that was more flexible than previous cases when it was faced with 
access restrictions: 
Admittedly, it cannot be excluded from the outset that the prevention of a risk to the 
existence of a national education system and to its homogeneity may justify a difference in 
treatment between some students.176 
The Court seems to have ruled out the Austrian measure primarily because the Austrian 
government did not come up with empirical evidence that opening access to nonresident 
students would imperil its higher education system. In Bressol, it only gave little guidance as to 
the outcome to the national court, thereby leaving it with significant leeway. Accordingly, this 
validates the assumption whereby cases pertaining to access to higher education do not alter 
the material scope of national powers, but rather recognize that Member States remain 
responsible for the organization and planning. 
284. Higher education – Students’ financial assistance. Two types of concerns have been 
expressed with respect to students’ financial assistance. First, cases involving financial assistance 
of nonresident students as well as financial assistance of outgoing students raised fears with 
respect to the financial impact that would be faced by Member States. ‘Free rider’ arguments 
were also raised to criticize the Court of Justice’s approach in this matter. It seems however 
unlikely that the obligations imposed upon Member States are such as to impose significant 
burdens. Students must indeed demonstrate that they share sufficient links with their 
host/home state. With respect to incoming students, the Court accepted in Förster,177 for 
instance, that a five-year residence requirement was proportionate. Yet it is doubtful that 
migrant students may be led to study more than five years in another Member State – it takes, 
for instance, no more than five years to obtain a Master’s degree in most of the Member States 
of the European Union. It is more probable that only those students who arrived prior to 
taking up university studies – like Mr. Bidar178 – will be able to benefit from their host States’ 
financial support. As a result, Member States still “have considerable discretion in setting 
residence/social integration requirements for benefit eligibility.”179 Second, it was further 
argued that the Court of Justice approach with respect to outgoing students would amount to 
                                                 
176 Case C-73/08, Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735, 53. 
177 Case C-158/07, Förster, [2008] ECR I-8507. 
178 Case C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119. 
179 C. O'BRIEN, “Real links, abstract rights and false alarms: The relationship between the ECJ's 'real link' case law 
and national solidarity,” above, n. 167, 653. 
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compelling Member States to indirectly subsidize foreign institutions, thereby breaching the 
territoriality principle which is at the basis of national education systems.180 This concern was 
particularly expressed with respect to Schwarz,181 which involved a tax-relief subsidy. However, at 
no point did the Court compel Member States to put money in the hands of foreign 
institutions. Rather, it compelled them to subsidize its own outgoing citizens. 
285. Compensation of civil war victims. Cases relating to the compensation of civil war victims 
give rise to similar observations than those just formulated. They raise the fear that this could 
redraw the conditions of national membership, and that this could induce unreasonable 
financial burdens for Member States, which would have to subsidize nationals who no longer 
reside in their territories. Similar counterarguments to those already mentioned may be 
advanced. The Court of Justice has recognized that Member States enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation to assess the “degree of connection to society.”182 It went on by acknowledging that 
criteria such as nationality and residence were legitimate, to the extent that they did not go 
beyond what was necessary.183 Therefore, despite the European Union law requirements 
applying to the conditions of award of the compensation of civil war victims, Member States are 
still at liberty to set out inclusion and exclusion rules. Furthermore, the existence of preexisting 
links between the national community and the welfare recipient, as well as the necessity to 
submit supporting evidence, are absolute prerequisites to benefit from the state allowance. 
286. As far as welfare powers are concerned, two defining features characterize the approach 
developed by the Court of Justice. On the one hand, the Court consistently takes into account 
the potentially adverse implications of its case law for national welfare systems.184 Both the 
acceptance of justifications reflecting national (financial) interests and the assessment of 
proportionality are used by the Court to protect the sustainability of national welfare systems. 
On the other hand, with the exception of cases relating to access to higher education, the 
various rulings rely on Member States to assess whether an individual’s circumstances justify 
that they are awarded welfare benefits. This, in turn, permits, as C. O’BRIEN accurately points 
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out, “each Member State to be the final arbiter over where the line of exclusion lies.”185 To 
conclude, the Court of Justice’s approach in fields relating to welfare may be described as 
containing “a tacit recognition that the welfare state is – and will remain – a largely domestic 
matter.”186 
287. Conclusion of Section 1. All in all, Section 1 has established that the Court of Justice 
power-based approach brings about singular effects, which differ from the effects induced by 
traditional free movement cases. The latter are of a preemptive nature, in the sense that they 
affect Member States’ decision to assert, or not to assert, jurisdiction and, therefore, that they 
deprive them of their powers. By contrast, cases involving powers retained by Member States 
alter the territorial and personal scopes of these powers, but without, notwithstanding a few 
notable exceptions, pertaining to the assertion of jurisdiction, and only to the extent that they 
do not jeopardize the integrity of the material scopes of these powers. This results in a 
discrepancy between the far-reaching scope of application of European Union law and its actual 
effects. As a way of conclusion, I claim that the Court of Justice’s power-based approach, if it 
seems to limit the powers retained by Member States, amounts more to an apparent 
disempowerment then to an actual loss of power. 
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SECTION 2. THE APPARENT EMPOWERMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
288. While Section 1 has focused on the implications of the Court of Justice power-based 
approach for Member States powers, Section 2 concentrates on its ramifications for the 
European Union. On this issue, two main standpoints may be identified. For some, the 
application of the free movement principle in fields encompassing the powers retained by 
Member States “is not equivalent to a centralized action by the Community. It does not lead to 
a Community competence taking the place of national competences.”1 However, the action of 
the institutions of the European Union, supported by various doctrinal stances, runs counter to 
this assumption. Under this alternative view, the European Court of Justice case law may serve 
as a basis for empowering the European Union in fields which previously fell within the powers 
retained by Member States. So far, this trend has already concerned two of the fields analyzed 
herein. In the field of cross-border health care, the European Parliament and the Council 
adopted in 2011 the Directive on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border health care.2 
The European Commission launched a similar attempt with respect to the right to strike in 
2012.3 But, given the strong opposition of national parliaments, it very soon had to abandon its 
undertaking. That being said, the purpose of Section 2 is to assess whether, and if so, to what 
extent, the European Court of Justice’s approach ultimately leads to the conferring of new 
powers on the European Union. To this end, I start by shedding light on the move from 
negative towards positive integration. I then point to the fact that the acts of secondary 
legislation pertaining to the powers retained by Member States that have been (un)successfully 
adopted reflect a general concern to safeguard the integrity of national powers. 
                                                 
1 L. AZOULAI, “The Court of Justice and the social market economy: The emergence of an ideal and the conditions 
for its realization,” 45:5 C. M. L. Rev. 1340, 1342 (2008). See also, in the same vein, D. RITLENG, “Les États 
membres face aux entraves,” in L’entrave dans le droit du marché intérieur, (Ed.) L. AZOULAI, (Brussels: Bruylant, 
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libertés de circulation. Il en résulte que même dans le champ de compétence nationale retenue, les Etats membres 
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2 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of 
patients’ rights in cross-border health care. 
3 COM(2012) 130 final, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action 
within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. 
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1. From negative to positive integration 
289. I have seen in Chapter 1 that fields relating to the powers retained by Member States 
are characterized by the nonexistent, or limited, character of the jurisdiction held by the 
European Union. Therefore, it is not self-evident that the European legislator could validly 
(un)successfully adopt acts of secondary legislation involving cross-border health care and the 
right to strike. This raises the question as to whether the European Union actually has 
jurisdiction to do so. In order to address this issue, I set forth, in the following paragraphs, the 
respective geneses of the (un)successful adoption of the two acts, the general conditions of 
harmonization that must be complied with, and a critical assessment of the two main 
arguments that are usually used to justify the validity of the respective legal bases of the acts. 
a. Geneses of the (un)successful adoption of acts of secondary legislation 
290. Directive on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border health care. The European 
Commission began to be interested in adopting an act of secondary legislation in the field of 
cross-border health care in the early 2000s, when it issued a series of Communications. This 
prompted it to initially consider including a specific provision in the proposed Directive on 
services in the internal market.4 However, it was compelled to remove it after it encountered 
strong resistance from the European Parliament and the Council.5 It was subsequently decided 
to establish a specific legal framework for the area of health care. Then followed the traditional 
phases of consultation and impact assessment, which resulted in the Commission Proposal for 
a Directive in July 2008.6 As underlined by the European Commission: 
                                                 
4 Article 23 of COM(2004) 2 final, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
services in the internal market: “1. Member States may not make assumption of the costs of non-hospital care in 
another Member State subject to the granting of an authorization, where the cost of that care, if it had been 
provided in their territory, would have been assumed by their social security system. […] 2. Member States shall 
ensure that authorization for assumption by their social security system of the cost of hospital care provided in 
another Member State is not refused where the treatment in question is among the benefits provided for by the 
legislation of the Member State of affiliation and where such treatment cannot be given to the patient within a 
time frame which is medically acceptable in the light of the patient’s current state of health and the probable 
course of the illness […].” 
5 W. SAUTER, “The proposed patient mobility Directive and the reform of cross-border health care in the EU,” 
TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2008-034, 33. This was acknowledged by the European Commission in COM(2008) 
414 final, Commission Communication of 2 July 2008, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border health care, 2. 
6 COM(2008) 414 final, Commission Communication of 2 July 2008, Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border health care. 
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[T]his initiative aims at ensuring a clear and transparent framework for the provision of 
cross-border health care within the EU, for those occasions where the care patients seek is 
provided in another Member state than in their home country.7 
This proposal, nonetheless, met with much opposition, particularly from the Member States. 
After much debate, the Directive was eventually adopted in March 2011. One of the main 
bones of contention during the adoption process relates to two jurisdictional issues. Firstly, the 
Member States saw the European Union as overstepping its jurisdiction. Secondly, once the 
idea of adopting an act of secondary legislation in itself was accepted, the issue as to the legal 
basis arose. The initial Proposal of the Commission indeed only referred to Article 95 EC (now 
Article 114 TFEU). This choice raised fears that a market-driven logic would prevail over the 
specific logic characterizing health care policies. In addition: 
The concern was the dominance of economic integration issues over the explicit wording 
of what is now Article 168(7) TFEU recognizing the limited EU competence in the area of 
health care, invoking concepts of subsidiarity and proportionality.8 
A compromise was ultimately found after the European Parliament and the Council added 
Article 168 TFEU on top of Article 114 TFEU.9 The Directive on the application of patients’ 
rights in cross-border health care now comprises two legal bases, the general harmonization 
clause used for internal market matters, and the sector-specific clause relating to the field of 
public health. 
291. Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the 
context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. The Proposal on the 
exercise of the right to take collective action followed the two highly controversial rulings of the 
Court of Justice, Viking10 and Laval.11 Its purpose is to offer a legislative framework for the 
regulation of transnational industrial action. The European Commission argued that: 
[T]he cases brought to light the need to ensure setting the right balance between the 
exercise of the right to take collective action by trade unions, including the right to strike, 
                                                 
7 COM(2008) 415 final, Communication from the Commission, A Community framework on the application of 
patients’ rights in cross-border health care. 
8 E. SZYSZCZAK, “Patients’ rights: A lost cause or missed opportunity?,” in Health care and EU Law, (Eds.) J. W. VAN 
DE GRONDEN et al., (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2011), 119. 
9 W. SAUTER, “Harmonization in health care: the EU patients’ rights Directive,” in Social inclusion and social 
protection in the EU: Interactions between Law and Policy, (Eds.) B. CANTILLON, H. VERSCHUEREN & P. PLOSCAR, 
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and the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, economic freedoms 
enshrined in the Treaty.12 
This time, it based its proposed regulation on Article 352 TFEU, the so-called flexibility clause. 
This choice of legal basis probably reflects the cautious approach taken by the Commission. 
Many indeed contained that the reasoning developed by the Court in Viking and Laval was 
based on the idea whereby the economic freedoms were to prevail over the right to strike, 
which was yet commonly recognized as a fundamental right. In using Article 352 TFEU, the 
Commission may have shown its concern to disconnect the issues raised by the two rulings 
from a purely market-driven logic. But it above all acknowledged that the Treaty does not 
provide the European Union with powers in matters relating to the right to take collective 
action. However, its efforts proved insufficient. For the first time since the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, enough national parliaments activated the ‘yellow card procedure’ under the 
Subsidiarity protocol.13 One of the main concerns raised by the twelve national Parliaments was 
the lack of jurisdiction of the European Union.14 In September 2012, the European 
Commission simply decided to withdraw its proposal. 
292. A common bone of contention: the jurisdictional issue. The two proposals raised similar issues 
of jurisdiction. Indeed, these issues were one of the main raisons behind the withdrawal of the 
proposal relating to the right to take collective action. It therefore poses the more general 
question as to whether the Court of Justice’s case law involving powers retained by Member 
States may legitimately serve as the basis for harmonizing the fields concerned. 
b. General conditions for harmonizing 
293. Before detailing thoroughly the arguments that may be put forward to justify the 
adoption of acts of secondary legislation in fields relating to powers retained by Member States, 
it is worth briefly recalling the conditions that must be met to use the two general clauses of 
harmonization. 
                                                 
12 COM(2012) 130 final, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action 
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294. Article 114 TFEU. Article 114§1 TFEU confers on the European institutions a general 
power to adopt acts of secondary legislation “which have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market.” Article 114§3 further provides that the Commission’s 
proposals must “take as a base a high level of protection” when they concern “health, safety, 
environmental protection and consumer protection.” The Court of Justice summarized the 
conditions that must be met to use Article 114 TFEU as follows: 
[T]he object of measure adopted on the basis of Article [114](1) must genuinely be to 
improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market […]. 
While a mere finding of disparities between national rules and the abstract risk of 
infringements of fundamental freedoms or distortion of competition is not sufficient to 
justify the choice of Article [114 TFEU] as a legal basis, the Community legislature may 
have recourse to it in particular where there are differences between national rules which 
are such as to obstruct the fundamental freedoms and thus have a direct effect on the 
functioning of the internal market. […] Recourse to that provision is also possible if the aim 
is to prevent the emergence of such obstacles to trade resulting from the divergent 
development of national laws. However, the emergence of such obstacles must be likely and 
the measure in question must be designed to prevent them.15 
Besides these conditions, described as the “outer limit” of Article 114 TFEU,16 the legislator 
must also comply with the centre of gravity doctrine, its “inner limit.”17 Under this 
requirement, Article 114 TFEU may not be used if another sector-specific legal basis is 
available.18 The Court exceptionally accepts two or more legal bases if the aims pursued by the 
act are indissoluble.19 The European legislator has used Article 114 TFEU extensively. This 
provision has moreover been the subject of significant jurisdictional disputes, the most 
notorious being Tobacco Advertising since, in this case, the Court of Justice decided for the first 
and only time that the European Union had overstepped its jurisdiction in adopting a directive 
aiming at regulating conditions of tobacco advertising. The challenged directive in Tobacco 
Advertising is but one example of acts of secondary legislation based on Article 114 TFEU, 
                                                 
15 Case C-58/08, Vodafone, O2 et al v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, [2010] ECR I-
4999, 32-33. 
16 A. KNOOK, “Guns and tobacco. The effect of interstate trade case law on the vertical division of powers,” 11 
Maastricht journal of European and comparative law 347, 357 (2005). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Case C-300/89, Commission v. Council, [1991] ECR I-2878 (Titanium Dioxide). See R. BARENTS, “The internal 
market unlimited: Some observations of the legal basis of Community legislation,” 30: 1 C. M. L. Rev. 101, 106 
(1993). 
19 Case 165/87, Commission v. Council, [1988] ECR 5545, 11. 
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which do not have as their core internal market objectives but rather the pursuit of non-market 
aims.20  
295. Article 352 TFEU. Article 352 TFEU – formerly 235 EEC and then 308 EC – has played 
a key role in the European Union legal order. While it remained dormant during the first few 
decades of the then Economic Community, it began to be used extensively after the Paris 
Summit Conference of 1972. From then on, it became a major tool to develop policies that 
were not formally included into the treaties.21 Several conditions must be met to make use of 
Article 352 TFEU. They were originally four: (i) Union action had to be necessary; (ii) Union 
action had to pertain to one of the objectives set out in the Treaty; (iii) the Treaty should not 
have provided the necessary powers; and (iv) Union action had to concern “the course of the 
operation of the internal market.”22 This last condition used to be one of the main points of 
contention. Indeed, according to the “synthetic school” view, it had to be interpreted broadly, 
in light of “extra-economic” objective, while the “restrictive school” maintained that the then 
articles 235 EEC and 308 EC could only be used to achieve economic objectives.23 Interestingly 
enough, this condition has been removed by the Lisbon Treaty, thereby extending the scope of 
application of the new Article 352 TFEU.24 Henceforth, the issue that remains controversial 
relates to the residual dimension of the clause, and the requirement that another Treaty 
provision may not be used instead of Article 352 TFEU.25 
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WINCOTT, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, Oxford Studies in European Law), 215. 
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Markets: Perspectives from the United States and Europe, (Eds.) T. SANDALOW & E. STEIN (Vol. II, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1982), 95. 
24 A. VON BOGDANDY & J. BAST, “The federal order of competences,” in Principles of European Constitutional Law, 
(Eds.) A. VON BOGDANDY & J. BAST, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 300. 
25 P. CRAIG, EU Administrative Law, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 386. 
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c. Critical assessment of the arguments justifying the validity of the acts’ legal 
bases 
296. Health care and the right to strike are both characterized by the very limited or 
nonexistent nature of EU action. On the one hand, Article 168§5 TFEU expressly excludes any 
harmonization in the field of health care, and provides, in any case, that: 
Union action shall respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of 
their health policy and for the organization and delivery of health services and medical 
care. The responsibilities of the Member States shall include the management of health 
services and medical care and the allocation of the resources assigned to them.26 
On the other hand, Article 153§5 TFEU clearly states that: 
The provisions of this Article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to 
strike or the right to impose lock-outs. 
Therefore, the adoption of acts of secondary legislation may seem to be at odds with the letter 
of the Treaty. However, two ranges of powerful arguments are usually put forward to go beyond 
the apparent contradiction. First, authors are generally of the view that there is a correlation 
between the respective scopes of negative and positive integrations. Second, they consider that 
general harmonizing clauses should prevail over saving clauses such as Article 168§5 TFEU and 
Article 153§5 TFEU. In what follows, I assess to what extent these two ranges of arguments are 
well-founded with respect to the subject matters at hand. 
297. Correlation between the respective scopes of negative and positive integrations. Authors usually 
consider that the provisions relating to the free movement of goods, the freedom to provide 
services, and Article 114 TFEU form a coherent and complementary whole. J. H. H. WEILER, 
for instance, speaks of the “triangle of Articles [34], [36], and [114],”27 while A. KNOOK refers to 
the “cross-pollination effect between Articles [34] and [114].”28 Under this view, then, the scope of 
the powers of the European Union would coincide with the scope of application of the 
fundamental freedoms.29 Therefore, the review of national measures in light of the economic 
freedoms would affect “the vertical division of power in the Community […] for the benefit of 
                                                 
26 Article 168§7 TFEU. 
27 J. H. H. WEILER, “The constitution of the common market place: Text and context in the evolution of the free 
movement of goods,” in The Evolution of EU Law, (Eds.) P. CRAIG & G. DE BURCA, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 362. 
28 A. KNOOK, “Guns and tobacco. The effect of interstate trade case law on the vertical division of powers,” above, 
n. 16, 374. 
29 A. VON BOGDANDY & J. BAST, “The federal order of competences,” above, n. 24, 293. 
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the centre.”30 Thus, for instance, the mere characterization of medical services as services within 
the meaning of Article 56 TFEU would have the effect of conferring harmonizing powers on 
the European legislator.31 More specifically, all the mandatory requirements that are recognized 
by the Court of Justice as being capable of justifying the restrictive effects of national measures 
could form the basis of harmonizing measures at European Union level.32 The same may be 
said with respect to Article 352 TFEU, which has been used, for instance, in the field of 
environment or consumer protections.33 However, it is doubtful that this range of arguments 
may entirely give grounds for action by the European Union. Firstly, as far as cross-border 
health care is concerned, I have shown in Chapter 334 that the justifications accepted in this 
field differ from traditional ones. The Court of Justice has indeed recognized the “control of 
health expenditure,” the “avoidance of the possible risk of undermining a social security 
system’s financial balance,” or the “maintenance of treatment capacity or medical competence 
on national territory” as legitimate justifications. These justifications clearly reflect the 
possibility for Member States to safeguard the integrity of their powers rather than an aim 
similar to that of the protection of the environment or of the consumer that could be pursued 
at European Union level. Secondly, it is one thing to accept that the scope of application of 
European Union law is broader than the scope of European Union powers, but it is another to 
go along with the idea that the latter may be as unlimited as the former. I have indeed shown in 
Chapter 235 that the Court of Justice’s reasoning amounts to conferring an unlimited character 
on the scope of application of European Union law. Therefore, the argument whereby the 
respective scopes of negative and positive integrations coincide could ultimately lead to the 
claim that the scope of the powers of the European Union are boundless, thereby rendering the 
conferral principle meaningless.  
                                                 
30 J. SNELL, “Who’s got the power? Free movement and allocation of competences in EC law,” 22: 1 YEL 323, 324 
(2003). See also D. WYATT, “Is the European Union an organization of limited powers?,” in A constitutional order of 
states? (Essays in EU Law in honour of Alan Dashwood), (Eds.) A. ARNULL, C. BARNARD et al, (Oxford: Hart, 2011), 3, 
15. 
31 D. WYATT, “Community competence to regulate medical services,” in Social welfare and EU Law, (Eds.) M. 
DOUGAN & E. SPAVENTA, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005), 131-143, 142-143. 
32 B. DE WITTE, “A competence to protect. The pursuit of non-market aims through internal market legislation,” 
above, n. 20, 31; R. BARENTS, “The internal market unlimited: Some observation on the legal basis of Community 
legislation,” above, n. 18, 106. 
33 M. DOUGAN, “Judicial Activism or Constitutional Interaction? Policymaking by the ECJ in the Field of Union 
Citizenship,” in The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States, (Eds.) H.-W. MICKLITZ & B. DE 
WITTE , (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012), 132. 
34 See, Supra, §§ 157s. 
35 See, Supra, §§ 134s. 
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298. Prevalence of general harmonizing clauses over saving clauses. Another issue relates to whether 
saving clauses such as Articles 153§5 or 168§5 TFEU are such as to bar, or at least limit, the 
jurisdiction held by the European Union under the general harmonizing clauses. For the 
Commission, the answer clearly lies in the negative. It argued, in turn, that: 
As confirmed by the Court, [Article 168§5] does not […] exclude the possibility that the 
Member states may be required under other Treaty provisions, such as Article [56 TFEU], 
or Community measures adopted on the basis of other Treaty provisions, to make 
adjustments to their national health care and social security systems.36 
[T]he Court rulings have clearly shown that the fact that Article 153 does not apply to the 
right to strike does not as such exclude collective action from the scope of EU law.37 
As far as Article 168§5 is concerned, this stance seems to be at least partly supported by the 
Court of Justice’s case law. Even in Tobacco Advertising, which ruled out European Union 
action, the Court stressed that: 
[P]rovided that the conditions for recourse to Articles 100a, 57(2) and 66 as a legal basis are 
fulfilled, the Community legislature cannot be prevented from relying on that legal basis 
on the ground that public health protection is a decisive factor in the choices to be made. 
On the contrary, the third paragraph of Article 129(1) provides that health requirements 
are to form a constituent part of the Community's other policies and Article 100a(3) 
expressly requires that, in the process of harmonization, a high level of human health 
protection is to be ensured.38 
Thus, the Court does not consider the limitation stemming from Article 168§5 TFEU as an 
outer constitutional limit of the use of Article 114 TFEU, provided that the aforementioned 
conditions of application are met.39 It will only preclude European Union action if Article 114 
TFEU is in fact used to “circumvent the express exclusion of harmonization laid down in 
Article [168§5] of the Treaty.”40 But, as long as the European Union measure “makes some 
contribution to internal market aims,”41 the Court will uphold it. Therefore, European Union 
                                                 
36 COM(2008) 414 final, Commission Communication of 2 July 2008, Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border health care, 8. 
37 COM(2012) 130 final, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action 
within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, 11. 
38 Case C-376/98, Germany v. Council, [2000] ECR I-8419 (Tobacco Advertising), 88. See also Case C-210/03, Swedish 
Match, [2004] ECR I-1193, 32. 
39 S. WEATHERILL, “The limits of legislative harmonization ten years after Tobacco Advertising: How the Court’s case 
law has become a ‘drafting guide’,” 12 German Law Journal 827, 833 (2011). 
40 Case C-376/98, Germany v. Council, [2000] ECR I-8419 (Tobacco Advertising), 79. R. SCHÜTZE, “Limits to the 
Union’s ‘Internal Market’ competence(s): Constitutional comparisons,” in The Question of competence in the 
European Union, (Ed.) L. AZOULAI, (Oxford, United Kingdom; New York: Oxford University Press), 2014, 231. 
41 D. WYATT, “Community competence to regulate the internal market,” in 50 years of European Treaties, (Eds.) M. 
DOUGAN & S. CURRIE, (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2009), 104. 
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action may be based on Article 114 TFEU even though it primarily pursues non-market aims, 
which may even be the subject of saving clauses such as Article 168§5.42 In other words, “there 
is no constitutional limit to the kinds of public policy concerns that the European legislature 
may take into account when enacting internal market laws.”43 This explains why the various 
saving clauses spread around the Treaty are viewed as only applying to the measures based on 
the provision in which they are located.44 Thus, for instance, a European Union measure based 
on Article 168 TFEU could not validly harmonize national laws, since harmonization is 
expressly excluded by Article 168§5. But certain aspects of public health may be harmonized 
through the use of Article 114 TFEU. These various arguments may be transposed to the 
conditions of application of Article 352 TFEU, to an even greater extent since its scope is no 
longer confined to the operation of the internal market.  
299. Having said that, one might nevertheless wonder whether the respective conditions of 
application of Articles 114 TFEU, 168 TFEU, and 352 TFEU were met in the Directive on 
patient’s rights and in the stillborn Regulation on the right to strike. To begin with the former, 
it is open to question whether it might be established that the Directive contributes, even 
remotely, to the functioning of the internal market. Even B. DE WITTE, who ardently justifies 
internal market-based acts of secondary legislation not having at their core economic objectives 
concedes that they nonetheless “are all about market regulation” if not about “market-
building.”45 It is, of course, a matter of perspective, but the patients’ rights Directive turns out 
to relate exclusively to: (i) the definition of the respective responsibilities of Member States of 
treatment and Member States of affiliation, and the rights conferred on European Union 
patients; and (ii) the cooperation among national authorities. To be sure, nowhere does it 
justify how it plays a part in the elimination of obstacles to trade or distortions of competition, 
whether in its recitals or in the provisions themselves. In addition, one might legitimately 
wonder whether the choice to base the Directive on both Articles 114 TFEU and 168 TFEU is 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 139. The same holds true with respect to cultural policy: B. DE WITTE, “A competence to protect. The 
pursuit of non-market aims through internal market legislation,” 33-34. 
43 B. DE WITTE, “A competence to protect. The pursuit of non-market aims through internal market legislation,” 
above, n. 20, 35. 
44 A. VON BOGDANDY & J. BAST, “The federal order of competences,” above, n. 24, 286; G. DAVIES, “The 
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45 B. DE WITTE, “A competence to protect. The pursuit of non-market aims through internal market legislation,” 
above, n. 20, 28. 
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not self-contradictory, and does not conflict, in any case, with the aforementioned case law of 
the Court of Justice.46 Turning now to the proposed Regulation on the right to strike, it should 
be recalled that the Court of Justice held, with respect to Article 352 TFEU, that: 
That provision, being an integral part of an institutional system based on the principle of 
conferred powers, cannot serve as a basis for widening the scope of Community powers 
beyond the general framework created by the provisions of the Treaty as a whole and, in 
particular, by those that define the tasks and the activities of the Community. On any view, 
Article [352] cannot be used as a basis for the adoption of provisions whose effect would, 
in substance, be to amend the Treaty without following the procedure which it provides for 
that purpose.47 
As a result, Article 153 TFEU being a part of the “general framework created by the provisions 
of the Treaty,” the fact that it excludes the right to strike from the harmonizing powers of the 
European Union should at least have been taken into consideration. 
2. The safeguard of the integrity of national powers? 
300. While the above has focused on the issue as to whether the Directive on patients’ rights 
and the proposed Regulation on the right to strike are grounded on valid legal bases, I now 
look more closely into their substance. This inquiry reveals that, somehow paradoxically, these 
acts of secondary legislation both basically aim to safeguard the integrity of national powers. 
a. The Patients’ Rights Directive 
301. A Directive aiming at protecting national powers? The various Communications issued by 
the European Commission in relation to cross-border health care, as well as the final version of 
the patients’ rights Directive, strikingly reveal the concern of the European legislator to 
safeguard the integrity of national powers in this field. They indeed comprise multiple 
references to the idea that, as a matter of principle, Member States hold jurisdiction to regulate 
health care: 
                                                 
46 E. SZYSZCZAK, “Patients’ rights: A lost cause or missed opportunity?,” above, n. 8, 120. For an alternative view, 
see, for instance, S. DE LA ROSA, “The Directive on cross-border health care of the art of codifying complex case 
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Member States retain responsibility for providing safe, high quality, efficient and 
quantitatively adequate health care to citizens on their territory.48 
The second key idea at the basis of the Directive lies in the repeated assertions that European 
Union law respects in any case the various components of Member State jurisdiction, as 
illustrated by Article 1: 
1. This Directive provides rules for facilitating the access to safe and high-quality cross-
border health care and promotes cooperation on health care between Member States, in 
full respect of national competencies in organizing and delivering health care. […] 
4. This Directive shall not affect laws and regulations in Member States relating to the 
organization and financing of health care in situations not related to cross-border health 
care.49 
302. The containment of the preexisting cross-border rights. Both Member States of treatment and 
of affiliation are put under the obligation to facilitate cross-border health care, but only to the 
extent that this does not undermine the integrity of their powers. This is clearly reflected in the 
provisions of the Directive relating to prior authorizations, which seem to go beyond the leeway 
already left by the Court to Member States in its case law. According to Recital 42 of the 
Directive: 
Given that the Member States are responsible for laying down rules as regards the 
management, requirements, quality and safety standards and organization and delivery of 
health care and that the planning necessities differ from one Member States to another, it 
should therefore be for the Member States to decide whether there is a need to introduce a 
system of prior authorization […]. (Emphasis added) 
This seems to grant Member States considerable control over patients willing to seek treatments 
abroad. Indeed, even if under Article 7.8 of the Directive the basic governing principle seems to 
prevent Member States from subjecting cross-border health care to prior authorizations, Article 
8 mitigates it substantially, and goes beyond the Court of Justice traditional case law in the field 
of health care.50 The initial Proposal of the Commission seemed to be more in line with the 
                                                 
48 Recital 4 of the Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the 
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50 S. DE LA ROSA, “The Directive on cross-border health care of the art of codifying complex case law,” above, n. 
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Court’s rulings, since it distinguished between non-hospital care, not subject to prior 
authorizations, and hospital and specialized care, subject to prior authorizations if they turned 
out to be necessary to preserve Member States’ financial balance as well as planning and 
rationalization. However, in the final version of the Directive, this distinction is set aside. 
Instead, Member States are entitled to require prior authorizations under the following 
circumstances: if (i) they can establish that they are necessary to preserve the sustainability of 
their health care policies when patients are hospitalized for at least one night or in case of 
specialized and cost-intensive medical infrastructure or medical equipment; (ii) “treatments 
presenting a particular risk for the patient or the population” are involved; and (iii) health care 
“is provided by a health care provider that […] could give rise to serious and specific concerns 
relating to the quality or safety of the care.”51 Interestingly, the Court of Justice anticipated the 
changes brought about by the Directive. In Commission v. Spain,52 it refused to apply the 
principles of its case law to emergency care, thereby circumscribing the concept of restriction in 
the field of health care. In Commission v. France,53 it moreover held that a Member State could 
legitimately impose a prior authorization requirement when the use of major equipment 
outside hospital setting was involved. 
303. The inclusion of novel aspects. The patients’ rights Directive comprises two novel aspects, 
not present in the traditional Court of Justice case law, that are even more remote from the 
freedom to provide services. First, it imposes on both Member States of treatment54 and of 
affiliation55 an obligation to inform patients. This would actually constitute, in the opinion of 
several authors, the real innovation of the Directive.56 Second, the Directive also organizes a 
system of cooperation among national authorities in relation to: mutual assistance and 
cooperation, the recognition of prescriptions, European reference networks, rare diseases, 
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ehealth, and health technology assessment.57 These mechanisms are somewhat reminiscent of 
other mechanisms of cooperation, such as the system of mutual assistance set up by the services 
Directive.58 Not only does the Directive place once again emphasis on the fact that such 
mechanisms must respect Member State jurisdiction, but it is also remarkable that many of 
these mechanisms rely on the willingness of Member States to actively cooperate in the 
operation of the Directive.59 
b. The Regulation on the Right to Strike 
304. A similar rationale. The proposed Regulation on the Right to Strike seemed to be based 
on the same underlying rationale as the Patients’ rights Directive. As a matter of fact, it referred 
repeatedly to the “role and importance of existing national practices relating to the exercise of 
the right to strike in practice.”60 It started from the premise, stated in proposed Article 1.2, that: 
This regulation shall not affect in any way the exercise of fundamental rights as recognized 
in the Member States, including the right or freedom to strike or to take other action 
covered by the specific industrial relations systems in Member States in accordance with 
national law and practices. Nor does it affect the right to negotiate, conclude and enforce 
collective agreements and to take collective action in accordance with national law and 
practices. 
The proposed Article 2 was in line with the European Court of Justice’s case law, since it stated, 
as a general principle, that the exercise of the right to take collective action and the exercise of 
the freedom of establishment as well as the freedom to provide services must mutually respect 
each other. Therefore, this would have invited national courts to assess litigious transnational 
industrial actions through the lenses of the principle of proportionality. Accordingly, this could 
have resulted in introducing substantial changes into some national legal orders, such as those 
of the Nordic Member States or France and Italy, in which the standard of protection is higher, 
                                                 
57 See, for further details, T. M. HERVEY, “Cooperation between health care authorities in the proposed directive 
on patients’ rights in cross-border health care,” in Health care and EU Law, (Eds.) VAN DE GRONDEN J. W. et al., 
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or that of the United Kingdom, where the standard of protection is lower. By contrast, this 
would have left the German legal order unaffected, since the regulation of the right to take 
collective action is also based on the proportionality principle.61 Nonetheless, in spite of this, 
Article 2 should have been read along with the aforementioned Article 1.2. As a result, it seems 
that national courts would have, in any case, retained a significant degree of discretion. As for 
Article 3 of the proposal, it essentially required Member States to provide alternative resolution 
mechanisms to resolve labor disputes in order to ensure equal access to such mechanisms. Here 
again, the cautious approach of the European Commission was clear. Indeed, it placed 
emphasis on the fact that: 
The present proposal does not introduce changes into such alternative resolution 
mechanisms existing at national level, nor does it contain or imply an obligation to 
introduce such mechanisms for those Member States not having them.62 
The Commission moreover underlined that national courts should enjoy a wide margin of 
discretion,63 which was reflected in proposed Article 3.4. 
305. Conclusion of Section 2. All in all, parallel conclusions to those of Section 1 may be 
drawn. On the one hand, the Patients’ rights Directive as well as the stillborn Regulation on 
the right to strike reveal that the European institutions see the Court of Justice case law 
involving powers retained by Member States as a basis for regulating fields in relation to which 
Member States are traditionally seen as anjoying exclusive jurisdiction since the European 
Union holds no, or very limited, jurisdiction. Thus, this tends to lead to an empowerment of 
the European Union through the extension of its regulatory jurisdiction. However, on the 
other hand, the second part of Section 2 has shown that the two acts of secondary legislation 
have a somewhat paradoxical purpose, which consists in not affecting Member States’ powers in 
the respective fields. Therefore, the Court of Justice case law appears to lead more to a 
‘seeming’ empowerment than to a genuine transfer of powers from the Member States to the 
European Union. The Directive and the proposed Regulation indeed recurrently reaffirm that, 
as a matter of principle, Member States retain responsibility in the field of cross-border health 
care and with respect to the right to strike. 
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CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 4. 
306. While the first section of this chapter has focused on the jurisdictional implications of 
the Court of Justice power-based approach for the Member States, the second section has 
placed more specific emphasis on the European Union. While findings of Chapter 4 are 
consistent, they may seem, at first glance, somewhat unexpected and at odds with conventional 
wisdom. They reveal that neither do the cases concerned by the power-based approach in fact 
disempower the Member States, nor do the (un)adopted acts of secondary legislation 
substantially empower the European Union. Admittedly, the former affect the substance of the 
powers retained by Member States. But they alter the personal and territorial scopes of these 
powers only to the extent that this reshaping effect does not jeopardize the integrity of their 
material scope. In a similar way, the acts of secondary legislation that have been so far 
(un)successfully adopted reflect the concern of the European legislator not to intrude too 
deeply into the spheres of national powers, by constantly reasserting that Member States 
remain, as a matter of principle, principally responsible for regulating the fields of cross-border 
health care and the right to strike. 
307. Beyond the jurisdictional implications. If the Court of Justice’s power-based approach brings 
about significant jurisdictional implications, its ramifications with respect to the issue of 
Union’s membership are even deeper. The cases concerned by this original approach are 
indeed a good example of what Union membership implies for the various actors of European 
integration. 
  
CHAPTER 5. EUROPEAN UNION’S MEMBERSHIP 
 
INTRODUCTION OF CHAPTER 5. 
308. Purpose. The previous chapters have shown, in a nutshell, that European integration 
extends in core areas of Member State autonomy. Member States are subject, even in fields 
where they retain main responsibility, to the requirements deriving from the principle of free 
movement. Against this backdrop, the purpose of the present chapter is twofold. On the one 
hand, it intends to demonstrate that the Court of Justice’s power-based approach has 
fundamental implications for the framing of the contours of European Union’s membership, 
or, to put it differently, to understand what belonging to the European Union consists of, and 
implies. On the other hand, this chapter seeks to shed light on the various types of implications 
that are induced. First, the power-based approach reveals that the members of the European 
Union are no longer monad states, but have become, instead, members of a wider 
constitutional arrangement. But, second, it also indicates that Member States are not simply 
dissolved in a bigger whole, but do in fact preserve their identity as states. In sum, cases 
concerned by the Court of Justice power-based approach carry out what O. BEAUD has 
described as the “federal operation,”1 characterized by a metamorphosis of the states belonging 
to a federation. Throughout this operation, states go through a metamorphosis process, which 
is twofold. They fundamentally change, but, at the same time, they also conserve their own 
identity.2 
309. Approach. The approach followed in this chapter draws on the notion of federalism as I 
have defined it in the General Introduction.3 In addition, it understands the Member States 
from a twofold perspective. First, Member States are understood as entities that are in constant 
interactions with the other institutional actors of the European Union. Second, they are also 
                                                 
1 O. BEAUD, Théorie de la Fédération, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007), 202. 
2 Ibid., 204-205. 
3 See, Supra, §§ 35s. 
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regarded as individual independent polities, which enjoy a peculiar status within the European 
Union constitutional order. Last but not least, this approach resorts to the comparative tool. It 
uses the US constitutional order as a means to better understand the singular features of 
European Union’s membership. 
310. Outline. I have divided Chapter 5 into two parts. To begin with, I will focus on the 
transformation that affects the members of the European Union, and that the Court of Justice 
power-based approach enhances. Following this, I will then turn to the identification of the 
resulting position of the Member States within the European Union constitutional order. 
SECTION 1. FROM MONAD TO MEMBER STATES 
311. The twofold dimension of constitutional federalism. A. ERBSEN has accurately pointed out, 
regarding the US constitutional context, that “[c]onstitutional federalism has two distinct 
dimensions: the federal government must interact with the states, and states must interact with 
each other.”4 Indeed, as J. F. ZIMMERMAN puts it: 
The division of political power in a federal system, between the national government and 
the states, automatically produces relations between the latter.5 
While the former is commonly referred to as vertical federalism, the latter – too often 
overlooked – is usually described as horizontal federalism. A. ERBSEN has further added that 
the basic principle governing federal/state relations is that of supremacy, which makes these 
interactions “hierarchical” in essence.6 By contrast, interstate relations involve “entities on an 
equal plane of constitutional status,”7 which makes it more difficult to understand how the 
members of the US federation interact, as well as to identify the governing principles of their 
various interactions. The same holds true with respect to the European Union constitutional 
order. European Union vertical federalism is first and foremost governed by the principle of 
primacy. And, in a similar way to what occurs in the US constitutional order, horizontal 
relations among the Member States of the European Union are less easily perceived since there 
is no overarching governing principle. 
                                                 
4 A. ERBSEN, “Horizontal federalism,” 93 Minn. L. Rev. 493, 501 (2008). 
5 J. F. ZIMMERMAN, Horizontal federalism. Interstate relations, (State University of New York Press, Albany, 2011), 1. 
6 A. ERBSEN, “Horizontal federalism,” 93 Minn. L. Rev. 493, 501 (2008). 
7 Ibid. 
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312. In what follows, I focus on the transformation affecting Member States that is triggered 
by the Court of Justice’s power-based approach. O. BEAUD has shown, in this respect, that this 
transformation is carried out along two main lines, since the “federal operation” pertains to 
both the vertical relationship between a federation and its members, and the horizontal 
relations among the members of the federation.8 Therefore, I first look – briefly, since I have 
already dealt with its main aspects in the previous chapters – at the vertical dimension of 
Member States’ transformation i.e. at the metamorphosis of the Member States process within 
the context of European Union-Member States relations. Following this, I turn to the 
horizontal dimension of Member States’ transformation – i.e. to Member States’ 
metamorphosis process caused by Member States’ interrelations. 
1. The vertical dimension: European Union-Member States relations 
313. From monad to federate states. Authors often point out that the building of the European 
Union, and the development of the vertical relations between the Union and its members, 
entails a profound alteration of the Member States.9 In fact, the making of a federation results 
in the creation of a new status for each of its members.10 The case law of the Court of Justice 
relating to the powers retained by Member States reveals, in this regard, that Member States are 
compelled to serve, in any area of their jurisdiction, European Union interests. When 
exercising their jurisdiction, they “must take into account any possible nexus with EU law […] 
[They] are to place their policies in an EU law framework.”11 In other words, they must “think 
federal.”12 In this sense, the cases concerned by the power-based approach are a way for the 
Court of Justice to remind them that they are no longer monad states, and that they may not, 
as a result, act unilaterally without taking into account the wider constitutional space they have 
decided to create and to belong to. Thus, they must behave as genuine federate actors. 
                                                 
8 O. BEAUD, Théorie de la Fédération, above, n. 1, 202. 
9 O. BEAUD, “L’Europe vue sous l’angle de la fédération. Le regard paradoxal de Paul Reuter,” 45 Droits 63, 65 
(2007). 
10 C. SCHMITT, Théorie de la Constitution, (Trad. From German to French by L. Deroche), (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1993), 513. 
11 K. LENAERTS, “Federalism and the rule of law: Perspectives from the European Court of Justice,” 33 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1338, 1340 (2011). See also, in the same vein, J. H. H. WEILER, “Fédéralisme et 
constitutionnalisme: le Sonderweg de l’Europe,” in Une Constitution pour l’Europe?, (Ed.) R. DEHOUSSE, (Presses de 
Science Po, 2002), 174. 
12 K. LENAERTS, “Federalism and the rule of law: Perspectives from the European Court of Justice,” 33 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1338, 1340 (2011). 
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314. From monad to loyal states. To put things differently, the Court of Justice power-based 
approach contributes to turn the members of the European Union federation into loyal 
members, regardless of the field involved. In this respect, I have noted in Chapter 2 that this 
approach may be traced back to a CECA ruling decided in 1961. In De Gezamenlijke 
Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg, the Court indeed justified:  
[T]he jurisdiction of the Community to impinge on national sovereignty in cases where, 
because of the power retained by the Member States, this is necessary to prevent the 
effectiveness of the Treaty from being considerably weakened and its purpose from being 
seriously compromised.13 
In M. BLANQUET’s view, this statement, according to which the jurisdiction of the – now – 
European Union may legitimately affect the powers retained by the Member States, is 
implicitly based on the principle of loyalty.14 The logic expressed by the Court is, as a matter of 
fact, reminiscent of various legal orders that base corresponding intrusions on the idea of 
loyalty, as well as of the case law of the European Court of Justice, which explicitly refers to the 
principle of loyalty.  
315. To begin with, it is usually accepted, in public international law, that one of the effects 
of the application of the principle of good faith is the curtailing of the exercise of states’ 
sovereignty. The Permanent Court of Arbitration held, in this respect, that good faith may: 
[Exclude] the right to legislate at will concerning the subject matter of the treaty, and [limit] 
the exercise of sovereignty of the State bound by a treaty with respect to that subject matter 
to such acts as are consistent with the treaty.15 
In other words, “states are under an obligation to refrain both from acts defeating the object 
and purpose of a rule and from any other acts preventing its implementation.”16 Turning now 
to the principle of federal loyalty, it finds its origins in the case law of the German 
Constitutional Court, which usually refers to the concept of Bundestreue. The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht once described this principle as follows: 
                                                 
13 Case 30/59, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen, [1961] ECR 1, 24. 
14 M. BLANQUET, L’article 5 du Traité C.E.E. Recherche sur les obligations de fidélité des Etats membres de la Communauté., 
(LGDJ, Bibliothèque de droit international, Paris, 1998), 181. 
15 The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain v United States of America) (Award) [1910] XI RIAA 169, 188. 
16 I. I. LUKASHUK, “The principle pacta sunt servanda and the nature of obligation under international law,” 83 
American Journal of International Law, 515 (1989). See also S. JOVANOVIC, Restriction des compétences discrétionnaires 
des Etats en droit international, (Paris, Pédone, 1988), 200s. 
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[B]oth the federation and the Länder are obliged to cooperate pursuant to the nature of the 
constitutional ‘pact’ between them and have to contribute to its consolidation as well as to 
the maintenance of the well-understood interests of the federation and the constituent 
states.17 
The principle of federal loyalty plays a significant role in many federal systems, such as Austria, 
Switzerland, or Belgium – but with the notable exception of the United States. Its purpose and 
its scope are reminiscent of both the European Union’s own principle of loyalty and the 
international principle of good faith, even if it goes well beyond the latter. It does not pertain 
to enforce formal rules relating to the vertical division of powers, but, instead, “it may put an 
internal limit to the exercise of a competence.”18 As noted in the German context, the 
principle of federal loyalty imposes duties on both the federation and the federate states that go 
beyond the formal obligations set out in the federal constitution.19 It compels them to act 
loyally vis-à-vis each other, which means that while the federate states must respect the 
existence and the integrity of the federation’s powers, the latter must respect the existence and 
the autonomy of the former.20 In other words, they must take into account their respective 
interests and jurisdictions when they exercise their powers. They must also refrain from 
damaging each other, and must instead assist each other and cooperate.21 In sum, the idea of 
loyalty stems from the necessity to require actors to take into account external interests while 
exercising their powers, without having to refer to formal rules on the division of powers.  
316. Thus, in the same way as federal loyalty, the Court of Justice’s power-based approach 
goes beyond the formal rules relating to the division of powers between the European Union 
and the Member States.22 It consists in preventing the latter from jeopardizing the achievement 
                                                 
17 BVerfGE 6, 309, 361. For an overview of the German Constitutional Court case law on the Bundestreue 
principle, see E. ORBAN, “La Cour constitutionnelle fédérale et l’autonomie des Länder en République Fédérale 
d’Allemagne,” in Fédéralisme et Cours Suprêmes – Federalism and Supreme Courts, (Ed.) E. ORBAN, (Brussels, Bruylant, 
Les presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1991), 162s; P. M. BLAIR, Federalism and Judicial Review in West Germany, 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981). 
18 A. GAMPER, “On loyalty and the (federal) constitution,” 4 ICJ-Journal 157, 164 (2010). 
19 H. A. SCHWARZ-LIEBERMANN VON WAHLENDORF, “Une notion capitale du droit constitutionnel allemand: la 
Bundestreue (fidélité fédérale),” Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique 769, 772 (1979). 
20 M. BLANQUET, L’article 5 du Traité C.E.E.. Recherche sur les obligations de fidélité des Etats membres de la Communauté, 
above, n. 14, 380. 
21 M. BOTHE, “The constitutional court of the Federal Republic of Germany and the powers of the German 
Länder,” in Fédéralisme et Cours Suprêmes – Federalism and Supreme Courts, (Ed.) E. ORBAN, (Brussels, Bruylant, Les 
presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1991), 132-133. 
22 E. NEFRAMI, “Le rapport entre objectifs et compétences: de la structuration et de l’identité de l’Union 
européenne,” in Objectifs et Compétences dans l’Union européenne (Ed.) E. NEFRAMI, (Bruylant, Brussels, 2013), 24. 
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of the common interest through the exercise of their powers,23 even in the absence of a specific 
rule governing this type of conflicts. It therefore results in furthering the transformation of 
Member States into loyal federated states by making them aware that (i) even in fields where 
they retain principal responsibility, the exercise of their powers may result in frustrating the 
interests of the European Union; (ii) they must take into account their vertical interactions with 
the European Union when they exercise their powers in such a way as to comply with the 
requirements of the law of free movement. 
2. The horizontal dimension: Interstate relations 
317. Membership to the European Union does not only affect Member States vertically. It 
also transforms them horizontally. To be sure, distinguishing between the two dimensions is 
not always clear-cut since vertical and horizontal federalisms intersect, and are therefore 
intrinsically linked. First, interstate harmony24 is as much a national interest as a European 
Union interest – after all, the European Union was created in the first place to create peaceful 
relations among the European nation states,25 and to render them so intertwined that a 
disintegration would be made impossible. Second, in the same way as in the US constitutional 
order, federal institutions – and, as far as the power-based approach is concerned, the Court of 
Justice – “play a coordinating role in the exercise of concurrent state authority.”26 That being 
said, the following paragraphs focus primarily on the horizontal dimension of Member States’ 
transformation. In order to shed light on its defining features, I start by identifying the types of 
horizontal interactions that are at hand in the cases involving powers retained by Member 
States. To this end, I notably rely on the work of the few US scholars who have addressed 
horizontal federalism issues in relation to the US constitutional order. I then establish that, as 
far as membership of the Union is concerned, the Court of Justice’s power-based approach has 
the fundamental effect of furthering the links of interdependency among the Member States. 
                                                 
23 M. BLANQUET, L’article 5 du Traité C.E.E.. Recherche sur les obligations de fidélité des Etats membres de la Communauté, 
above, n. 14, 346. 
24 On the necessity to coordinate interstate relations see, for instance, M. S. GREVE, “Federalism’s frontier,” 7 Tex. 
L. Rev. & Pol. 93, 95 (2002); S. FRUEHWALD, “The Rehnquist Court and horizontal federalism: An evaluation and 
a proposal for moderate constitutional constraints on horizontal federalism,” 81 Denv. U. L. Rev. 289, 328 (2003). 
25 “Editorial comments. Union membership in times of crisis,” 51 CMLR 1 (2014). 
26 A. ERBSEN, “Horizontal federalism,” above, n. 4, 504. 
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a. Types of horizontal interactions 
318. Despite their significance for better understanding the implications of membership to a 
federation, the lack of literature focusing specifically on interstate relations is striking, whether 
in the US or in the European Union. In what follows, I attempt to draw a general pattern 
describing the various interactions that may occur among the Member States of the European 
Union. This preliminary step allows me to subsequently identify the specific types of conflicts 
that are involved in the cases concerned by the Court of Justice power-based approach. 
319. Structural features characterizing interstate relations. To begin with, it should be recalled that 
“[t]here is no transsubstantive preference rule for resolving state-state conflicts,”27 either in the 
US constitutional order, or in the European Union legal order. Instead, fundamental structural 
features, present in most federal systems, tend to muddle interstate interactions. These relations 
are indeed organized along three main basic principles: (i) the principle of aggregate power, 
according to which all the powers not conferred on the federation belongs to the states 
understood as a whole. This logically implies that there is no way to know how the states’ 
respective spheres of jurisdiction are to interact with each other;28 (ii) the principle of equality: 
the European Union federation, like its US counterpart, is composed of equal states, the 
citizens of which are also equal.29 As a result: 
Each state has an equivalently strong claim to exercise collectively held powers absent a 
context-specific restraint. Each state likewise has an equivalently strong claim to operate 
without interference from the others.30 
(iii) last but not least, states operate in line with the territoriality principle, according to which 
they should be free from restraint inside their geographical borders, while not exceeding their 
territorial reach.31 In other words, as A. O’M. BOWMAN sums up, “states have de jure 
symmetry.”32 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 506. 
28 Ibid., 510. 
29 D. LAYCOCK, “Equal citizens of equal and territorial states: the constitutional foundations of choice of law,” 92 
Col. Law Rev. 249, 250 (1992); G. E. METZGER, “Congress, Article IV, and interstate relations,” 120 Harvard L. 
Rev. 1468, 1517 (2007). 
30 A. ERBSEN, “Horizontal federalism,” above, n. 4, 508. 
31 D. LAYCOCK, “Equal citizens of equal and territorial states: the constitutional foundations of choice of law,” 
above, n. 29, 250; G. E. METZGER, “Congress, Article IV, and interstate relations,” above, n. 29, 1520. 
32 A. O’M. BOWMAN, “Horizontal federalism: Exploring interstate interactions,” 14 J. Public Adm. Res.Theory 535, 
536 (2004). 
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320. The various interactions characterizing the relations among Member States. The few US 
scholars who have dealt with horizontal federalism issues so far all agree that interstate 
dynamics may take different forms, ranging, for instance, from hostility to cooperation.33 The 
same holds true with respect to the relations among the Member States of the European 
Union. The following table synthesizes the various types of interactions that may occur among 
the Member States. It uses, in particular, the typology drawn by A. ERBSEN, who, to my 
knowledge, has provided the most comprehensive analysis of interstate relations in the US 
constitutional order.34 
INTERACTION NON-INTERACTION 
(a) Voluntary 
cooperation 
(b) Absence of 
conflicts 
 
(c) Positive conflicts (a) Absence of 
conflicts 
(b) Negative 
conflicts 
(i) Positive 
conflicts 
(ii) Absence 
of conflicts 
Type of 
interstate 
coopera-
tion 
contrary 
to 
European 
Union law 
“Interstate 
harmony” 
“Interstate 
harmony” 
A. ERBSEN’s typology: 
(i) Dominion; 
(ii) Havens; 
(iii) Exclusions; 
(iv) Favoritism; 
(v) Externalities; 
(vi) Rogues; 
(vii) Competition; 
(viii) Overreaching. 
“Interstate 
harmony” 
“Underrea-
ching” 
 
321. Instances of interaction. The starting point of my reasoning lies in the fact that Member 
States may either interact or simply not interact. To begin with, they may interact according to 
three ways:  
(a) Voluntary cooperation, such as, for instance, international agreements or treaties. 
Voluntary cooperation may result in (i) positive conflicts, in case the way Member 
States cooperate is contrary to European Union law; or in (ii) the absence of conflicts, 
in case they operate in compliance with European Union law;  
(b) Absence of conflicts. Without necessarily voluntarily cooperating, the interactions 
among Member States may nonetheless not give rise to conflicts that would affect 
                                                 
33 J. F. ZIMMERMAN, Horizontal federalism. Interstate relations, above, n. 5, 1. 
34 A. ERBSEN, “Horizontal federalism,” above, n. 4, 498-584. 
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the European Union interest. This corresponds to situations where, for instance, 
the Court of Justice finds that the parallel exercise of Member States’ jurisdictions 
does not infringe the free movement principle;  
(c) Positive conflicts: the parallel exercise of Member States’ respective spheres of 
jurisdiction frustrates the European Union interest. It may give such results 
through eight distinct but not mutually exclusive mechanisms that have been 
identified by A. ERBSEN: (i) dominion: “when one state attempts to assert sovereign 
power over another’s territory or officers;”35 (ii) havens: one state becomes “a haven 
for behavior that other states seek to restrain;”36 (iii) exclusions: “when states decide 
to ban conduct that others allow;”37 (iv) favoritism: states “favor local interests over 
out-of-state interests;”38 (v) externalities: “one state pursues otherwise lawful 
objectives that have negative effects in other states. […] The inverse of state action 
creating negative externalities is free-riding by states on the positive externalities of 
investments in infrastructure and human capital by other states;”39 (vi) rogues: states 
refuse, for instance, to recognize other states’ judgments; (vii) competition, which is 
probably the type of interstate interaction that is most often explored; (viii) 
overreaching: this corresponds to a state’s efforts “to extend the effective reach of [its] 
authority beyond [its] borders.”40 In the US, this latter case is generally discussed 
from the perspective of the conflict of laws. 
322. Instances of non-interaction or indifference. Besides these instances of interactions among 
Member States, mention must also be made of cases of non-interaction. The lack of interaction 
(a) may first give rise to ‘interstate harmony,’ or, in other words, it may result in the absence of 
interstate conflicts. But (b) it may, in the same way as instances of interactions, equally affect 
the European Union interest, and, as such, contribute to shaping the status of Member States 
within the European Union constitutional order. Non-interaction may indeed bring about 
what I have described as ‘negative conflicts,’ which are instances where no Member State 
regulates a situation. To mirror the previous category of overreaching, these cases may be 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 514. 
36 Ibid., 516. 
37 Ibid., 520. 
38 Ibid., 521. 
39 Ibid., 523-524. 
40 Ibid., 527. 
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labeled as cases of ‘underreaching.’ In these cases, it is the very lack of interaction, and 
therefore of regulation of a given situation, that frustrates the European Union interest. 
323. The types of interactions involved in the cases concerned by the power-based approach. Drawing 
on this general pattern, I have identified, in the cases involving powers retained by Member 
States, six combinations, corresponding to as many types of interactions among Member States. 
As shown by the following, two kinds are overrepresented: favoritism and underreaching: 
1. Favoritism-Externalities: Rulings involving access to higher education and the 
financial assistance of nonresident students correspond to instances where host 
states favor their residents since nonresidents are subject to more burdensome 
conditions to get access to their public infrastructures41/to be granted social 
benefits.42 In addition, host states’ education policies bring about positive 
externalities, which (might) attract nonresidents. 
2. Favoritism-Overreaching: Member States’ interrelations are characterized, in several 
subfields of direct taxation, by favoritism coupled with overreaching. (i) This covers 
the case of the exit taxes imposed on outgoing taxpayers, whether individuals or 
companies:43 they only concern movers, and, through their imposition, Member 
States seek to extend their taxing jurisdiction. (ii) The same holds true with respect 
to the imposition of inbound dividends44 by the host state and the imposition of 
outbound dividends45 by the home state. 
3. Favoritism-Exclusion: The “favoritism-exclusion” combination occurred in cases 
involving the right to take collective action. In Laval,46 the host state sought to favor 
its own workers, and to prevent a foreign provider of services from applying labor 
standards banned from domestic labor law. In Viking,47 the home state sought to 
favor its own workers, and to prevent a provider of services from benefiting from 
less burdensome labor standards in a more permissive Member State. 
                                                 
41 See, Supra, §§ 181s. 
42 See, Supra, §§ 192; 199s. 
43 See, Supra, § 191. 
44 See, Supra, § 197. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Case C-341/05, Laval, [2007] ECR I-11767. 
47 Case C-438/05, Viking, [2007] ECR I-0779. 
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4. Favoritism-Underreaching: Instances of favoritism and underreaching comprise the 
remaining subfields of direct taxation: the taxation of individual48/corporate49 
nonresidents by the host state refusing to take into account cross-border elements; 
and the taxation of individual50/corporate51 residents by the home state refusing to 
take into account financial interests occurring in another Member State. They also 
correspond to cases involving bilateral agreements concluded between a Member 
State and a non-EU country.52 These agreements favor the nationals of the Member 
State party, with the latter refusing to extend its jurisdiction in such a way as to 
include non-nationals from other Member States of the European Union. 
5. Underreaching: Many cases involving powers retained by Member States correspond 
to the underreaching mechanism. (i) Cross-border health care:53 initially, there was 
no cooperation between home states and host states. Patients willing to seek health 
care abroad were no longer subject to the jurisdiction of their state of affiliation. 
The same holds true with respect to: (ii) the exportation of financial assistance in 
the field of education;54 (iii) the compensation of civil war victims no longer 
resident in their home state;55 (iv) the conditions to withdraw naturalization by the 
host state not taking into account the individual’s cross-border circumstances;56 (v) 
the conditions of loss of citizenship with the home state not taking into account the 
individual’s cross-border circumstances;57 and (vi) the taking into account of a 
debtor’s ability to pay.58 In all these instances, the lack of cooperation among 
Member States brings about negative conflicts, in the sense that it results in 
creating “stateless”59 people, and, accordingly, in frustrating the European Union 
law of free movement. These people are no longer protected by their home states 
                                                 
48 See, Supra, §§ 192s. 
49 See, Supra, §§ 194s. 
50 See, Supra, §§ 192s. 
51 See, Supra, §§ 194s. 
52 See, Supra, §§ 219s. 
53 See, Supra, §§ 186s. 
54 See, Supra, § 185. 
55 See, Supra, § 205. 
56 See, Supra, § 207. 
57 Ibid. 
58 See, Supra, § 213. 
59 On the notion of “stateless” citizens in the context of horizontal federalism, see A. ERBSEN, “Horizontal 
federalism,” above, n. 4, 547-549. 
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because they have left, but they are not yet protected by their host states because 
they are not considered as full-fledged members of their new respective 
communities.  
6. Rogues: In Micheletti,60 the Member State refusing to recognize the effectiveness of 
the nationality of another Member State can be described as “rogue,” since its 
attitude amounts to a sign of distrust or suspicion towards the Member State 
having awarded its nationality. Similarly, cases relating to the rules governing 
surnames amount to instances where the host state refuses to recognize lawful 
practices of other Member States. 
That having been established, I can now identify how the way the Court of Justice adjudicates 
the disputes involved in the cases concerned by the power-based approach contributes to turn 
the members of the European Union into interdependent members of the federation. 
b. From monad to interdependent states 
324. The linkage of Member States through solidarity. While the vertical dimension of the 
metamorphosis affecting Member States relies on the principle of loyalty, its horizontal 
dimension is induced by the obligation of mutual solidarity that binds the Member States. I 
have shown, in Chapter 2, that cases involving powers retained by Member States include 
indirect references to the joined Cases 6 & 11/69 Commission v. France.61 These latter cases 
mention explicitly Article 5 EEC as the basis of the Court of Justice reasoning: 
16. The solidarity which is at the basis of these obligations as of the whole of the 
Community system in accordance with the undertaking provided for in Article 5 of the 
Treaty, is continued for the benefit of the States in the procedure for mutual assistance 
provided for in Article 108 where a Member States is seriously threatened with difficulties 
as regards its balance of payments. 
17. The exercise of reserved powers cannot therefore permit the unilateral adoption of 
measures prohibited by the Treaty. [Emphasis added] 
Accordingly, solidarity is the horizontal counterpart of loyalty. It embodies a “duty of 
cooperation between Member States,”62 and consists in compelling them to take into account 
                                                 
60 See, Supra, § 215. 
61 (Cases 6&11/69) Commission v. France, [1969] ECR 523. 
62 J. T. LANG, “Community constitutional law: Article 5 EEC Treaty,” 10 Fordham International Law Journal 503, 
671 (1986). 
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their mutual interests when exercising their powers, even if the latter fall within their retained 
spheres of jurisdiction.63 In the same way as loyalty, the principle of solidarity shows how 
necessary it is to have states cooperating with each other, especially in the fields analyzed 
herein. European integration would indeed be put in jeopardy if Member States could undo, 
through the exercise of their retained powers, what is done within the scope of European 
Union powers.  
325. The (re)shaping of the relations of cooperation and interdependency among Member States. The 
cases concerned by the power-based approach reveal that the Court of Justice continuously 
enhances the codependency of Member States. It does so by making them increasingly 
interdependent on one another in each of the fields analyzed herein, even if these fields involve 
essential state functions. All in all, it develops three main strategies.  
326. Inclusion of other EU nationals/companies. First of all, the most obvious strategy relates to 
the obligation placed upon Member States to include other European Union 
individuals/corporations into preexisting national arrangements. Thus, in most cases decided 
in the field of direct taxation, whether they pertain to individual income taxation, corporate 
income taxation, or dividend taxation, Member States have been compelled to include in the 
personal scope of their taxation powers individuals or companies, that were previously 
excluded. The same holds true with respect to national education systems. Provided that this 
does not jeopardize the sustainability of their systems, Member States must grant nonresidents 
access on the same basis as what they do with respect to residents. In the same vein, they must 
provide nonresident students with financial assistance.  
327. ‘Mutual consideration.’ Second of all, the Court of Justice increasingly resorts to a strategy 
that can be described as a ‘mutual consideration.’ This strategy consists in compelling Member 
States to constantly take one another into account. For instance, it results from Rottmann that 
Member States must take the nationality policies of other Member States into consideration 
when the concurrent application of two (or more) Member States’ jurisdictions results in 
statelessness – and, hence, the loss of European Union citizenship. Likewise, Member States 
must fully trust their fellow members with respect to the granting of nationality. They have no 
                                                 
63 M. BLANQUET, L’article 5 du Traité C.E.E.. Recherche sur les obligations de fidélité des Etats membres de la Communauté, 
above, n. 14, 227. 
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other choice but to recognize and give full effect to any other Member State nationality.64 In a 
similar vein, but provided that this does not infringe any fundamental (constitutional) principle 
of their legal orders, Member States must recognize other Member States’ rules and practices 
with respect to the rules governing surnames. In addition, when implementing national public 
policies, they must take into consideration cross-border elements in order to treat European 
Union citizens involved in cross-border situations fairly. The taxation of nonresident workers 
illustrates this trend well,65 as do the conditions of enforcement for the recovery of debts with 
respect to people no longer residing in the Member State where they have incurred debts.66 
This last component entails significant practical effects, since Member States are de facto and de 
jure encouraged to mutually cooperate and to assist each other in order to convey and to obtain 
relevant cross-border information.  
328. Mitigation of the territoriality principle. Last but not least, the Court of Justice binds the 
Member States together by mitigating the principle of territoriality. To begin with, compelling 
Member States to recognize other legal institutions and practices has the effect of strengthening 
the extraterritorial effects of the application of Member States’ laws and practices. Next, the 
logic of the Court of Justice rulings involving the exportation of social benefits – i.e. cross-
border health care, financial assistance to study abroad, and the compensation of civil war 
victims – essentially consists in rebutting the presumption that a refusal by a Member State to 
export its social benefits complies with the territoriality principle.67 In these three fields, home 
States are compelled to give an extra-territorial effect to – or they must, alternatively, increase 
the extra-territorial effect of – the exercise of their retained powers by granting benefits outside 
their territorial borders. To put it differently, “the Court has launched a conceptual 
                                                 
64 Case C-369/90, Micheletti, [1992] ECR I-4239. 
65 See, Supra, §§ 192s. 
66 Case C-224/02, Pusa, [2004] ECR I-5763. 
67 M. DOUGAN, “Expanding the frontiers of Union Citizenship by dismantling the territorial boundaries of the 
national welfare states?” in The outer limits of European Union law, (Eds.) C. BARNARD & O.ODUDU, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2009), 119, 128: “Community law takes at its starting point the idea that any refusal by the Member 
State to export its own social security benefits constitutes a prima facie breach of the Union citizen’s free 
movement rights which must be scrutinized to ensure it is genuinely necessary in the public interest. (…) the 
exportation of benefits is no longer to be treated as some sort of privilege generously bestowed by the Community 
legislature upon its subjects; rather, the territoriality of the national social security systems is presumed to be a 
limitation on the full economic and social integration of Union citizens within the broader European Union.” 
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transformation in the territorial identity of the national welfare state,”68 which amounts to the 
“deterritorialization” of welfare powers.69 
329. Conclusion of Section 1. To sum up, the Court of Justice power-based approach reveals 
that “thinking federal,” to borrow K. LENAERT’s words, means that Member States may no 
longer act unilaterally and/or selfishly, as if they were still monad state. Instead, they must 
accept that they evolve within the European Union constitutional space, and that they relate to 
both the European Union and the other co-equal members of the European Union federation. 
When faced with cross-border situations, they must behave loyally towards the European 
Union, and in a harmonious manner with their fellow members. All in all, the power-based 
approach furthers the transformation process of the Member States. They are gradually and 
increasingly turned into loyal and codependent states. 
                                                 
68 Ibid., 121. 
69 See, e.g. M. DOUGAN, “The spatial restructuring of national welfare States within the European Union: The 
contribution of Union citizenship and the relevance of the Treaty of Lisbon,” in Integrating Welfare Functions into 
EU Law: From Rome to Lisbon, (Eds.) R. NIELSEN et al., (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2009), 148, 149-150 and, 
with respect to cross-border health care, L. AZOULAI, “En attendant la justice sociale, vive la justice procédurale! À 
propos de la libre circulation des patients dans l’Union (CJCE 16 mai 2006, Watts, Aff. C-372/04),” Revue de droit 
sanitaire et social, 843, 851 (2006). 
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SECTION 2. THE RESULTING POSITION OF MEMBER STATES WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
330. While Section 1 has focused on the implications of Member States’ vertical and 
horizontal interactions for European Union’s membership, in Section 2 I focus more 
specifically on Member States seen as unique independent polities. In a nutshell, I attempt to 
identify and describe the implications of the Court of Justice power-based approach for the 
position of Member States within the European Union constitutional order. To this end, I first 
assess to what extent the approach reshapes the contours of their national political 
communities. I then claim that, despite the undeniable adjustments that are required from 
them, Member States nevertheless conserve their state identity. 
1. The reshaping of the contours of the national political community 
331. The vertical instrumentalization of Member States. The vertical interactions between the 
European Union and its Member States in cases involving powers retained by Member States 
reveal that the latter are instrumentalized. All state functions are, as a matter of fact, allotted to 
the interests of the European Union. National policies and practices, i.e. any autonomous 
action, are turned into instruments of European Union integration for the benefit of the 
citizens of the European Union.1 Interestingly, this instrumentalization process not only occurs 
within the framework of the Court of Justice’s power-based approach. It is also part of a 
broader trend. It is sufficient to think, for instance, of the constraints placed on Member State’s 
procedural and institutional autonomy.2 Likewise, E. NEFRAMI has established that, as far as the 
field of external relations is concerned, Member States are instrumentalized in two main ranges 
of situations: while they enforce European Union law, and in the framework of their 
autonomous sphere of action.3 This instrumentalization process, taken together with the effects 
of the horizontal interactions among Member States in cases concerned by the power-based 
approach, ultimately reshapes the conditions of national membership originally set out by the 
Member States free from external constraints. 
                                                 
1 L. AZOULAI, “Le rôle constitutionnel de la CJCE tel qu’il se dégage de sa jurisprudence,” Revue Trimestrielle de 
Droit Européen 29, 41 (2008). 
2 See, Supra, § 34. 
3 E. NEFRAMI, “L’Etat Membre au service de l’Union européenne,” Annuaire de droit européen 51, 53 (2004). 
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332. The reshaping of the conditions of national membership. The dynamic characterizing cases 
involving powers retained by Member States brings about two fundamental sets of implications 
for national membership. It may be described, first of all, as destructuring, to the extent that 
Member States are detracted from unilaterally and freely determining the personal and 
territorial scopes of their powers. Accordingly, they may no longer define, free of restraints, the 
personal and territorial frontiers of their national political community. But the Court’s power-
based approach also brings about a restructuring process, since it compels Member States to 
adopt and to enforce new national membership criteria. Personal criteria must be set out in 
such a way as to include other European Union citizens/companies. As for territorial criteria, 
they do not necessarily correspond to the geographical territory of the Member States. They 
must, under certain circumstances, extend as far as individuals/companies move within the 
European Union. As a result, the new criteria blur traditional distinctions between nationals 
and non-nationals, as well as between residents and nonresidents. They also tend to disregard 
traditional territorial boundaries. 
333. The example of solidarity in the fields relating to welfare. The fields relating to the provision 
of welfare are a good illustration of the effects of the power-based approach on the contours of 
the national political community. In many of the cases involving welfare, Member States have 
tried to justify their restrictive measures by relying on the solidarity principle. Thus, in Gravier, 
which relates to access to the Belgian educational system, Belgium argued that maintaining the 
Minerval fee was necessary because: 
Otherwise students from other Member States could not only claim the benefit of services 
provided for its own nationals, paid for substantially out of taxes by its own nationals, but 
they might exclude from places in educational institutions the Member State’s own 
nationals in cases where the number of students in the institutions was limited.4 
Similarly, the United Kingdom claimed in Bidar that, with respect to the financial assistance of 
nonresident students, it was: 
[L]egitimate for a Member State to ensure that students’ parents have contributed 
sufficiently, or that the students themselves are likely to make a sufficient contribution to 
the public finances through taxation in order to justify maintenance assistance being 
granted.5 
                                                 
4 Opinion in Case 293/83, Gravier, [1985] ECR 593, 596. See also Opinion in Case C-147/03, Commission v. 
Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969, 27. 
5 Opinion in Case C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119, 65. 
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Member States have developed arguments of the same nature in cases relating to the 
compensation of civil war victims. As noted by Advocate General KOKOTT in Tas-Hagen: 
Article 3 of the WUBO provides that it is applicable only to civilian war victims who hold 
Netherlands nationality and are resident in the Netherlands on the date of the application 
for benefits (Article 3 of the WUBO). This nationality and territorial criterion stems from the 
idea that the special obligation of solidarity towards civilian war victims on the part of the 
Netherlands people has a scope which is restricted by nationality and country of residence.6 
Therefore, Member States conceive of the idea of solidarity as being first and foremost national, 
and as reflecting the basic social contract that binds them to their respective communities. For 
to benefit from national redistributive policies, it is necessary to contribute financially through 
taxation7 – in the case of education – or to hold the nationality of the Member State and reside 
on its territory – in the case of the compensation of civil war victims.  
334. The Court has never denied the crucial role played by solidarity with respect to Member 
States’ welfare arrangements. However, it has also obliged Member States to extend the benefit 
of their solidarity mechanisms at least to a certain extent. In the field of education, it held, for 
instance, that: 
Member States must, in the organization and application of their social assistance systems, 
show a certain degree of financial solidarity with nationals of other Member States.8 
In cases relating to the compensation of civil war victims, the Court found that the residence 
criterion was not unlawful per se, but that the way it was implemented went beyond what was 
necessary, on the grounds that imposing a condition of a territorial nature, under which 
applicants must reside in their home state at the moment where the application is sought was: 
[N]ot a satisfactory indicator of the degree of attachment of the applicant to the society 
which is thereby demonstrating its solidarity with him.9 
                                                 
6 Opinion in Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen, [2006] ECR I-10451, 8. See also, Ibid., 57 and Case C-499/06, Nerkowska, 
[2008] ECR I-3993, 21. 
7 See M. DOUGAN, “The spatial restructuring of national welfare States within the European Union: The 
contribution of Union citizenship and the relevance of the Treaty of Lisbon,” in Integrating Welfare Functions into 
EU Law: From Rome to Lisbon, (Eds.) R. NIELSEN et al., (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2009), 168 who underlines 
that welfare rights “are fundamentally about the redistribution of income between social groups, and imply a claim 
on resources and legitimization of the redistributive role of the state.” 
8 Case C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119, 56. See also the Opinion in Case C-158/07, Förster, [2008] ECR I-
8507, 55: “Whereas a Member State was previously required to assume full social responsibility and provide 
welfare for those who had already entered its employment market, and who thus made some contribution to its 
economy, such financial solidarity is now in principle to be extended to all Union citizens lawfully resident on its 
territory.” 
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In this regard, Advocate General POIARES MADURO aptly summarized the rationale behind the 
Court’s restructuring process of the personal and territorial scopes of welfare-retained powers: 
Citizenship of the Union must encourage Member States to no longer conceive of the 
legitimate link of integration only within the narrow bounds of the national community, 
but also within the wider context of the society of peoples of the Union.10 
335. The foregoing raises the question as to whether the Court of Justice approach has the 
effect of promoting an alternative model of solidarity, and hence to what extent it reshapes the 
conditions of national membership. The starting point of the inquiry necessarily requires 
pointing out that the Court’s reasoning relies on national solidarity mechanisms. Some authors 
speak of a ‘constitutional asymmetry’ to describe the discrepancy between what is provided by 
the Member States and what can be provided by the European Union: 
[T]he pressures on national social choices exerted by the European economic integration 
are not matched by the availability at Union level of countervailing resources for the 
purposes of protecting and promoting social rights in general, or welfare provision in 
particular.11 
Therefore, the basic component of the Court’s model of solidarity lies in the fact that, whatever 
forms it may take, it is presently inexorably mediated by the Member States’ solidarity 
mechanisms. Hence the endless difficulty faced by the Court: furthering European Union 
integration by extending it into social spheres, while safeguarding the ability of Member States 
to pursue welfare policies. Without them playing a key role, there simply cannot be welfare 
policies. As noted by G. DAVIES: 
As long as states exist and collect taxation it will not be possible to entirely prevent a 
certain degree of closure.12 
                                                 
9 Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen, [2006] ECR I-10451, 39. 
10 Opinion in Case C-499/06, Nerkowska, [2008] ECR I-3993, 23. (Emphasis added) See also the Opinion in Case 
C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969, 39 with respect to nonresident students’ access to educational 
systems. C. RIEDER, 43 CMLR 1711-1726 (2006) has noted in this regard that “it is necessary for Member States to 
become aware of the fact that in a common market, where people move around, it will always be the case that a 
Member State pays for a person’s education without necessarily harvesting the fruit i.e. in the form of taxes.” 
11 M. DOUGAN, “The spatial restructuring of national welfare States within the European Union: The contribution 
of Union citizenship and the relevance of the Treaty of Lisbon,” above, n. 7, 152. See also M. DOUGAN & E. 
SPAVENTA, “‘Wish you weren’t here…’ New models of social solidarity in the European Union,” in Social welfare 
and EU law, (Eds) M. DOUGAN & E. SPAVENTA, (Hart publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2005), 183, 189: 
“the lack of extensive harmonizing competences makes it difficult to identify a truly effective vehicle by which the 
Community might articulate any genuinely supranational framework of social solidarity.” 
12 G. DAVIES, “The humiliation of the state as a constitutional tactic,” in The constitutional integrity of the European 
Union, (Eds.) F. AMTENBRINK & P.A.J. VAN DEN BERG, (The Hague, Asser Press, 2010), 147. 
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As a result, the Court must necessarily be careful about mitigating the effects of its rulings.13 
Given the fundamental reliance of welfare policies on the Member States, several authors have 
attempted to identify the main features of the model of solidarity suggested by the Court in its 
case law. In this respect, a distinction must be drawn between situations involving host states 
and European Union migrants, and situations involving home states and their own outgoing 
nationals. 
336. Solidarity and host state national community. With respect to the former, authors often refer 
to the creation of a ‘transnational solidarity.’14 As far as non-economically active European 
Union citizens are concerned, the distinction drawn by C. BARNARD is useful. She has indeed 
shown that the Court’s case law leads to the creation of a “spectrum of situations.”15 First, long-
term residents are placed on the same footing as nationals. They benefit fully from national 
solidarity, defined as solidarity between nationals. Second, medium-term residents are not fully 
assimilated into the host community but are nonetheless granted certain benefits and for 
certain periods. This time, they benefit from transnational solidarity, defined as solidarity 
between nationals and migrants. As for the individuals who have just arrived in the host State, 
“they enjoy only limited equal treatment with nationals due to the virtual absence of solidarity 
between the newly arrived migrant and the resident.”16 This threefold distinction shows that the 
Court’s solidarity model concerns the ‘medium-term residents,’ including non-economically 
active European Union citizens. Under this understanding, transnational solidarity differs from 
the concept of national solidarity in a fundamental respect. It cannot be, by definition, 
conditional upon nationality/residence or financial contributions to the economy through 
taxation. Instead, as it is the result of the reshaping of the personal and territorial scopes of 
Member States’ welfare powers, transnational solidarity is commensurate with the degree of 
integration of European Union citizens into the Community of the host State.17 In other 
                                                 
13 G. DAVIES, “Welfare as a service,” 29 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 27, 38 (2002). 
14 See A. SOMEK, “Solidarity decomposed: being and time in European citizenship,” 32: 6 Eur. L. Rev. 787, 807s 
(2007); C. BARNARD, “European Union citizenship and the principle of solidarity,” in Social welfare and EU law, 
(Eds) M. DOUGAN & E. SPAVENTA, (Hart publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2005), 166; F. DE WITTE, 
“The role of transnational solidarity in mediating conflicts of justice in Europe,” 18 European Law Journal 694, 
704s (2012). 
15 C. BARNARD, “European Union citizenship and the principle of solidarity,” in Social welfare and EU law, (Eds.) 
M. DOUGAN & E. SPAVENTA, (Hart publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2005), 157, 166. 
16 Ibid. 
17 C. BARNARD, 42 C. M. L. Rev. 1465, 1476-1477 (2005); C. BARNARD, “Solidarity and new governance in social 
policy,” in Law and new governance in the EU and the US, (Eds) G. DE BÚRCA & J. SCOTT, (Oxford; Portland, Or.; 
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words, as A. SOMEK notes it, “the connecting factor is, quite simply, being and time, that is, 
presence in a Member State.”18 The same author has described the Court’s approach as 
amounting to extending the principle of solidarity “by interpenetration:” 
By leaving out the ‘utilitarian’ element it amends de facto solidarity’s article of faith with 
the accumulation of presence over time.19 
As for M. DOUGAN & E. SPAVENTA, they have qualified the Court’s model as an ‘assimilation 
model,’ which consists in: 
[G]uaranteeing equal treatment between Community and own nationals, so that foreign 
migrants are fully integrated into the solidarity system of their host society, but without 
otherwise questioning the competence of each Member State to determine its own welfare 
choices […] provided they apply without unjustified discrimination on grounds of 
nationality.20 
337. Solidarity and home state national community. The effects of the Court’s approach on the 
principle of solidarity when situations between a state and its own nationals are involved are 
different. Indeed, allowing nationals to export social benefits does not pertain to the integration 
of new individuals into national solidarity mechanisms, but rather to the preservation of the 
bonds between individuals and their home State despite cross-border movements. Here, the 
Court’s stance may be described as entrenching a ‘continuance model.’ The crossing of borders 
may no longer justify a rupture of bonds of solidarity. This is what F. DE WITTE refers to as 
‘aspirational solidarity,’ which “allows […] citizens to retain access to the welfare entitlements 
[…] in their home state.”21 This model of solidarity concerns patients seeking cross-border health 
care, student financial assistance in the form of tax relief, and the compensation of civil war 
victims. As far as student financial support in the form of grants is concerned, students must 
demonstrate a sufficient degree of integration into the society of their home State. The effects 
of the ‘continuance model’ are specific: 
                                                 
Hart, 2006), 171-172 and 172: “Bidar emphasizes a ‘quantitative’ approach: the longer migrants reside in the 
Member State, the more integrated they are in that state and the greater the number of benefits they receive on 
equal terms with nationals. The corollary of this is that in respect of newly arrived migrants there is insufficient 
solidarity between them and the host state taxpayer to justify requiring full equal treatment in respect of social 
welfare benefits.” 
18 A. SOMEK, “Solidarity decomposed: being and time in European citizenship,” above, n. 14, 807. 
19 Ibid., 814. 
20 M. DOUGAN & E. SPAVENTA, “‘Wish you weren’t here…’ New models of social solidarity in the European 
Union,” above, n. 11, 189. 
21 F. DE WITTE, “The role of transnational solidarity in mediating conflicts of justice in Europe,” above, n. 14, 708. 
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Obliging the home state to provide welfare support in respect of its own migrant nationals 
helps such individuals to move closer to the point at which they can instead claim to be 
assimilated into the welfare systems of the host state; the gradual weakening of one ‘real 
link’ morphs into the gradual strengthening of another ‘real link’ so as to help ensure for 
the Union citizen a smoother transition between welfare states and better continuity of 
social support.22 
All in all, Member States are precluded from assuming that crossing the border systematically 
breaks membership bonds between individuals and their solidarity mechanisms. Patients, 
students, and civil war victims exercising their free movement rights may continue to be part of 
the national community i.e. to benefit from social support provided by their home States. This 
is tantamount, as M. DOUGAN points out, to a “revolution in the conceptual foundations of 
the European welfare state” where, up to now: 
[C]itizens who chose to go abroad, and no longer share in the national community – or for 
that matter, pay taxes to the national exchequer, or submit themselves to supervision by the 
national authorities – [have been] presumed to forfeit the expectation of social support 
from their country of origin.23 
338. The Court’s concern not to have EU citizens/companies left on their own. The example derived 
from solidarity in the fields relating to the provision of welfare reveals the Court of Justice’s 
core concern not to have ‘stateless’ European Union citizens. Member States are compelled to 
reshape the conditions of membership to their national community in such a way as to ensure 
that the lowest possible number of people be left on their own. To the extent that this does not 
jeopardize the sustainability and the viability of their welfare systems, they must alternatively 
either include new individuals, or keep their own nationals into their respective political 
communities. All of this holds true as far as the other fields analyzed herein are concerned. The 
very point of Rottmann was, for instance, not to have Member States “giving up” one of their 
(former) citizens.24 In Pusa, the debtor had her personal circumstances taken into account 
neither in her home state nor in her host state.25 As for direct taxation cases, 
                                                 
22 M. DOUGAN, “The spatial restructuring of national welfare States within the European Union: The contribution 
of Union citizenship and the relevance of the Treaty of Lisbon,” above, n. 7, 160. See also M. DOUGAN, 
“Expanding the frontiers of Union Citizenship by dismantling the territorial boundaries of the national welfare 
states?,” in The outer limits of European Union law, (Eds.) BARNARD C. & ODUDU O., (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2009), 134-135. 
23 M. DOUGAN, “Cross-border educational mobility and the exportation of student financial assistance,” 33: 5 Eur. 
L. Rev. 723, 724 (2008). 
24 Case C-135/08, Rottmann, [2010] ECR I-1449. 
25 Case C-224/02, Pusa, [2004] ECR I-5763. 
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nonresident/resident taxpayers did not benefit from tax advantages either in their home states, 
or in their host states.  
339. The power-approach: between liberalism and communitarian assumptions. Thus, in which 
direction does the Court of Justice compel Member States to reshape their national political 
communities? L. BRILMAYER’s distinction between traditional liberalism and communitarian 
assumptions might be useful to answer this question.26 She has distinguished these two notions 
in the context of conflicts of laws in the United States, and has shown that they correspond to 
“two different approaches to the reach of state power in legal disputes that cross state 
borders.”27 She has defined them as follows: 
The notion that a state may regulate activities or consequences that occur within the state 
reflects traditional liberalism. The notion that state authority is most appropriately directed 
at domiciliaries and local corporations reflects communitarian assumptions.28 
This distinction can be transposed within the framework of the power-based approach. It 
indeed seems that, when the European Court of Justice is faced with Member States refusing to 
open their political communities to other European Union citizens/corporations – 
corresponding to ‘entry restrictions’ – it imposes on them what L. BRILMAYER describes as the 
traditional liberalism model. The traditional state’s membership is “downplayed,”29 and the 
Court gives voice to the individuals’ will to be subject to the jurisdiction of their host state on 
an equal basis. By contrast, when the Court faces Member States that are reluctant to keep 
intact the bonds that link them to outgoing citizens/residents, it endorses a ‘communitarian 
approach,’ and it justifies the conservation of these bonds despite cross-border movements by 
the very fact that these people belong to the national community. 
340. Therefore, not only does the power-based approach deepen the bonds of loyalty that 
link the Member States and the European Union together, as well as the interdependency of 
Member States, but it also affects and reshape the contours of national political communities. 
However, notwithstanding these deep-seated effects, I am of the view that, overall, this 
approach allows Member States to conserve their state identities, and that it even ensures them 
                                                 
26 L. BRILMAYER, “Liberalism, community, and state borders,” 41 Duke Law Journal 1-26 (1991). 
27 Ibid., 4. 
28 Ibid., 3. 
29 Ibid., 10. 
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that European Union law does not jeopardize the integrity of what defines them as 
independent polities. 
2. The conservation of state identity 
341. Besides the deepening of the metamorphosis affecting the members of the European 
Union, the Court of Justice power-based approach also simultaneously reasserts their state and 
political identity. In this respect, I have shown, in Chapter 4, that cases involving powers 
retained by Member States do not alter the latter’s decision to assert jurisdiction. Furthermore, 
I have demonstrated that the Court mitigates the effects of the application of the free 
movement principle as soon as it is established that it might otherwise jeopoardize the integrity 
of national powers.30 The United States Supreme Court follows a similar approach when faced 
with comparable jurisdictional conflicts.31 As pointed out by J. D. VARAT: 
If sufficiently important to the fulfillment of core state functions, certain distinctions based 
on residence might also be justified despite their incompatibility with strict adherence to 
the unification objective of the commerce and privileges and immunities clauses.32 
The European Court of Justice stance may be explained by two interrelated reasons. The first is 
of a practical nature, and is specific to the institutional settings of the European Union. The 
second, which is echoed in the US constitutional order, is deeper, and connected with the 
original federal model characterizing the European Union, and its understanding of the role to 
be played by Member States within the European Union constitutional order. 
342. Practical reason for preserving Member States’ essential functions. The obvious reason that 
comes to mind to explain the European Court of Justice endeavors to preserve Member States’ 
essential functions throughout its case law lies in the fact that the European Union is 
fundamentally dependent on Member States to develop and implement the political and social 
public policies analyzed herein. In this respect, F. DE WITTE accurately notes that “the Union 
currently lacks the public sphere and a system of representative democracy strong enough to 
support a contractarian model of justice.”33 This statement holds all the more true in relation to 
                                                 
30 See, Supra, §§ 270s.  
31 See, Supra, §§ 23s. 
32 J. D. VARAT, “State “citizenship” and interstate equality,” 48 University of Chicago Law Review 487, 522 (1981). 
(Emphasis added) 
33 F. DE WITTE, “The role of transnational solidarity in mediating conflicts of justice in Europe,” above, n. 14, 697. 
See also M. DOUGAN, “The spatial restructuring of national welfare states within the European Union: The 
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policies embodying political powers such as nationality, taxation, or the rules governing 
surnames. In addition, the European Union lacks the necessary budget to pursue redistributive 
policies. Therefore, the social state capacities of Member States must not only be preserved at 
such, but also because the social goals of the European Union may only be carried out through 
them.34 The European Union greatly differs from the United States on this point. The US 
Constitution, as a matter of fact, grants the national government a spending power,35 which 
allows it to develop various ambitious programs. These programs curtail states’ powers much 
more deeply36 than European Union law with respect to its members. However, the 
preservation of the state and political identity of the members of the European Union is not 
entirely the result of practical considerations. The Court of Justice’s stance towards 
safeguarding Member States’ essential functions also relies on the European Union conception 
of the role to be played by the Member States.  
343. The revealing character of the US Supreme Court stance. A few references to the United 
States Supreme Court jurisprudence may help better reveal the peculiar features of the 
European Union constitutional order. Supreme Court Justices are indeed often more explicit 
as to the role to be played by the states with respect to American federalism than the judgments 
of the European Court of Justice. For instance, Justice BLACKMUN asserted in Baldwin v. Fish 
and Game Commission of Montana that: 
Some distinction between residents and nonresidents merely reflect the fact that this is a 
Nation composed of individual States, and are permitted; other distinctions are prohibited 
because they hinder the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single Union of 
those States. Only with respect to those privileges and immunities bearing upon the vitality of 
the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, 
equally.37 
                                                 
contribution of Union citizenship and the relevance of the Treaty of Lisbon,” above, n. 7, 152-153, who refers to a 
‘constitutional asymmetry.’ 
34 L. AZOULAI, “The European Court of Justice and the duty to respect sensitive national interests,” in (Eds) M. 
DAWSON, B. DE WITTE & E. MUIR, Judicial activism at the European Court of Justice: causes, responses and solutions, 
(Cheltenham : Edward Elgar, 2013), 167, 184. 
35 Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the US Constitution: “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, 
duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the 
United States.” 
36 For detailed analyses, see, among many: NOTE, “Federalism, political accountability, and the spending clause,” 
107 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1429 (1994) ; L. B. KADEN, “Politics, Money, and State sovereignty: The judicial role,” 79 
Colum L. Rev. 847, 867, 874 (1979) ; M. SHAPIRO, “American Federalism,” in Constitutional Government in America, 
(Ed.) R. K. L. COLLINS (Durham, N. C. 1980), 359-371; M. S. KOLKER, “National League of Cities, the Tenth 
Amendment, and the conditional spending power,” 21 Urban Law Annual 217, 221 (1981) . 
37 Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (Emphases added). 
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As in the context of the European Union, the US Supreme Court aims to preserve the 
independence of the states through safeguarding their political and welfare powers. To this end, 
it allows states to enact laws which, if they seem at first glance to impinge upon the principle of 
unity of the Nation, ultimately enable the states to protect their political integrity38 as well as 
the special relationship that they bear with their citizens. It accepts, as a matter of principle, 
that “States may spend money on their own citizens.”39  
344. To take but a few examples, states may in theory validly impose durational residence 
requirements40 in the field of education under US constitutional law. Durational residence 
requirements consist in subjecting the grant of benefits to the condition that one person must 
reside for a certain period of time in the state before being entitled to such benefits. They are to 
be distinguished from bona fide residence requirements, which simply require that a person 
must be resident of the state granting the benefits.41 As the US Supreme Court itself once 
recognized: 
[W]ithout certain residency requirements the state ‘would cease to be the separate political 
communit[y] that history and the constitutional text make plain w[as] contemplated.’42 
The states may moreover limit the number of places available to nonresidents.43 The 
justifications that states have put forward to justify these requirements are of a practical nature: 
“the state will not provide the benefits unless they can be restricted,” and also more illustrative 
of the need to protect their political community when they expressed a “resentment of ‘free 
rider.’”44 Likewise, the US Supreme Court upheld a durational residence requirement of one 
year for obtaining a divorce.45  
345. However, it struck down a law from Connecticut under which students could never 
qualify as residents so long as they remained students. This durational residence requirement 
                                                 
38 D. S. BOGEN, Privileges and Immunities. A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution, (Praeger, Westport, 
Connecticut, London, 2003), 68. 
39 Ibid., 74. 
40 See T. B. PARENT, “Tuition residence requirements: A second look in light of Zobel and Martinez,” 61 Indiana 
Law Journal 287, 289 (1986). 
41 Martinez v. Bynum 461 U.S. 321 (1983), Starns v. Malkerson 401 U.S. 985 (1971), Sturges v. Washington 414 U.S. 
1057 (1973). 
42 Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper 470 U.S. 274, 282 (1985). 
43 G. J. SIMPSON, “Discrimination against nonresidents and the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV,” 
128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 395 (1979). 
44 D. S. BOGEN, Privileges and Immunities. A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution, above, n. 38, 81. 
45 Sosna v. Iowa 419 U.S. 393 (1975). 
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was considered too absolute.46 In the same way, it decided in the seminal Shapiro v. Thompson47 
case that a state could not subject welfare benefits to a one-year residence requirement. This 
decision concerned another law enacted by Connecticut. This time, the state submitted the 
following justifications: the preservation of the “fiscal integrity of state public assistance 
programs” which could be reached by deterring indigents from entering into its jurisdiction,48 
an “attempt to distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of the contribution they 
have made to the community through the payment of taxes,”49 and administrative ease 
(particularly for planning purposes and avoiding fraud).50 The Supreme Court, after applying 
the compelling state interest standard test, ruled them all out. With respect to the third 
justification, it held that less restrictive means than a one-year period requirement were 
available. It seems to have rejected the first two mainly because they primarily relied on a 
distinction between indigents and non-indigents: 
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its 
programs. It may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures, whether for public 
assistance, public education, or any other program. But a State may not accomplish such a 
purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. It could not, for example, 
reduce expenditures for education by barring indigent children from its schools. Similarly, 
in the cases before us, appellants must do more than show that denying welfare benefits to 
new residents saves money. The saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise 
invidious classification.51 
The Supreme Court confirmed its suspicious approach towards states’ statutes limiting the 
grant of welfare benefits in Saenz v. Roe.52 A California statute did not deny welfare benefits to 
newcomers, but limited their amount to what newcomers were entitled to in the state of their 
prior residence. Stressing that California relied on an “entirely fiscal justification,” the majority 
of the Supreme Court struck down the statute. Justice STEVENS, writing for the majority of the 
Court, concluded that: 
Citizens of the United States, whether rich or poor, have the right to choose to be citizens 
"of the State wherein they reside." […] The States, however, do not have any right to select 
their citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment, like the Constitution itself, was, as Justice 
Cardozo put it, "framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or 
                                                 
46 Vlandis v. Kline 412 U.S. 441 (1973). 
47 Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
48 Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618, 628-629 (1969). 
49 Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618, 632 (1969). 
50 Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969). 
51 Ibid. 
52 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
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swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not 
division." Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 523 (1935). 
346. In sum, durational residence requirements tend to be struck down when they are used 
by states for purely fiscal purposes – which is reminiscent of the approach of the European 
Court of Justice. However, if states manage to demonstrate that these requirements are 
necessary to preserve their political integrity, the latter are more likely to be upheld. Likewise, 
states can restrict the political power to residents by limiting “the making of policy to members 
of the community.”53 Therefore, states are considered, in the US constitutional order, as 
“separate political entities,” and are protected as such. It is accepted that they play a key-role, 
and hence that their interests may sometimes prevail over the unity of the Nation.  
347. The Member States, full-fledged actors of the European Union. Thus, just like the states are 
recognized as having a key-role to play in the US constitutional order, the European Court of 
Justice’s power-based approach (and, for that matter, the acts of secondary legislation 
(un)successfully adopted in the fields analyzed herein) understands the Member States of the 
European Union as ‘full-fledged actors’ within the structure set up by the Treaties. European 
Union law may impose requirements on Member States in fields involving their retained 
powers, but only to the extent that this does not undermine the principle that they retain 
jurisdiction and that they are to remain the key-players. As a result, the Court of Justice power-
based approach somehow unexpectedly, ultimately enhances the legal, political, and social 
weight borne by the Member States within the constitutional order of the European Union.54 
The justifications permitted in cases involving powers retained by Member States, if they reflect 
values commonly shared in the European Union, are a further means for Member States to 
protect their own jurisdiction. Ultimately, as L. AZOULAI underlines it: 
The impingement of EU law on core states competences is […] compensated by the 
acknowledgment of the essential functions of states as autonomous political actors and 
guarantors of national collective goods and assets.55 
In this sense, I concur with other scholars who have come to the conclusion that, far from 
destroying the States, the building of the European Union has had the effect of enhancing 
                                                 
53 D. S. BOGEN, Privileges and Immunities. A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution, above, n. 38, 75. 
54 L. AZOULAI, “Sur un sens de la distinction public/privé dans le droit de l’Union européenne,” Revue Trimestrielle 
de Droit Européen 842-860 (2010); L. AZOULAI, “La formule des compétences retenues des Etats membres devant la 
Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne,” in Objectifs et compétences dans l’Union européenne, (Ed.) E. NEFRAMI, 
(Brussels: Bruylant, 2013, Droit de l'Union Européenne), 359. 
55 L. AZOULAI, “Introduction,” in Deconstructing federalism through competences, (EUI WP Law 2012/06), 4. 
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them, or at least of reasserting they full-fledged role. For instance, S. HOFFMANN noted already 
in 1982 that the then European Economic Community, “in exchange for curtailing the states’ 
capacity for unilateral action, serve[s] to preserve the nation-state as the basic unit in world 
affairs,”56 while A. MILWARD has claimed that the nation-state could reassert “itself as the 
fundamental unit of political organization”57 through the building of the then European 
Community. 
348. Conclusion of Section 2. Thus, this second section has established that the Court of Justice 
power-based approach contributes to reshaping the contours of the national political 
communities composing the European Union. The Member States are no longer absolute 
masters entitled to define, free from constraints, who is to belong to their political 
communities. Nor may they automatically break the bonds with the outgoing members of their 
respective communities. But, at the same time, cases involving powers retained by Member 
States reveal in a striking manner that the European Union fundamentally relies on 
independent polities that remain the key-players at the political, social, and economic levels. 
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 5. 
349. In conclusion, Chapter 5 has shown that the Court of Justice power-based approach 
brings to light very significant features of European Union membership. As a matter of fact, the 
case law of the European Court of Justice involving powers retained by Member States confirms 
O. BEAUD’s assertion that the “federal operation” entails both a metamorphosis of the 
members of a federation and a conservation of their identity. Member States are gradually 
compelled to “think federal” while exercising their powers in fields where they retain 
jurisdiction. They must think federal vertically, and, in this sense, European Union law turns 
them into loyal federate states. In addition, they must do so horizontally, which has the effect of 
transforming them into states that are codependent on the other members of the European 
Union federation. However, at the same time, cases involving powers retained by Member 
States reflect that European Union membership does not call into question Member States’ 
ability to act unilaterally, and to make basic choices that confirm their status as independent 
polities. In sum, European Union membership has the effect of turning the Member States into 
                                                 
56 S. HOFFMANN, “Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe today,” 21: 1 Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 35 (1982). 
57 A. MILWARD, The European rescue of the nation-state, (2nd Ed., Routledge, London and New York, 2000), 2. 
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both full-fledged members of the European Union federation and key-vertical and horizontal 
actors of the European Union constitutional order. 
  
CHAPTER 6. STRUCTURAL REASSESSMENT OF THE POWER-
BASED APPROACH 
 
INTRODUCTION OF CHAPTER 6. 
350. Purpose. The preceding five chapters of this thesis have dealt expansively with the 
identification and the jurisdictional implications of the European Court of Justice’s power-
based approach. In this final chapter, I take a broader perspective, and provide an overall 
structural reassessment of my previous findings. As I have already stressed, my basic assumption 
is that the cases involving powers retained by Member States play a significant role in the 
development of the relationship between the European Union and its Member States on the 
one hand, and the relations among Member States on the other hand.1 That being said, the 
purpose of the present chapter is to describe the fundamental features of these two sets of 
institutional relationships from a structural point of view. 
351. Approach. To this end, I draw on the notion of federalism as defined in the General 
Introduction.2 I moreover rely thoroughly on the US federal experience, in order to better 
identify the specific features of the Court of Justice’s power-based approach. In particular, I rely 
on US constitutional history and the many developments that have affected the US Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence in relation to issues of federalism since its inception. 
352. Outline. I have divided this chapter into two parts. First, I intend to demonstrate that 
the power-based approach is characterized by the striking silence of the Court of Justice on two 
main points: why certain fields, and not others (or at least not to the same extent) are subject to 
the original legal framework of the power-based approach, and the rationale behind this 
original form of integration. Second, I identify which structural model is reinforced by the 
Court of Justice’s power-based approach. 
                                                 
1 See, Supra, §§ 311s. 
2 See, Supra, §§ 35s. 
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SECTION 1. THE PERSISTENT SILENCE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
353. In this first section, I focus specifically on the authority of the Court of Justice power-
based approach, or, in other words, on how the Court justifies its reliance on this original line 
of reasoning in a specific range of free movement cases. In this respect, I show that, from a 
structural point of view, the Court of Justice displays a persistent silence on two defining issues. 
First of all, at no point of its reasoning does it explain why the various fields analyzed herein are 
subject to the original legal framework characterizing the power-based approach. As a matter of 
fact, it does not set out the criteria that lead it to single them out from the other fields involved 
in the law of free movement. Second of all, the Court is equally silent with respect to the 
rationale behind its approach. It has never provided an account of the reasons why the law of 
free movement should intrude into spheres of powers over which the European Union has no, 
or very limited, jurisdiction. 
1. Silence regarding the fields subject to the power-based approach 
354. The following shows, to begin with, that the Court of Justice, in contrast to the US 
Supreme Court, has never set out clear criteria for distinguishing between the fields concerned 
by the power-based approach and the fields subject to the general law of free movement. And 
yet, distinguishing between spheres of powers requires that the Courts, as ‘umpires of the 
federal system,’3 single out judicial criteria. The identification of such criteria is of the utmost 
importance because the characterization of ‘police power’ in the United States or ‘retained 
power’ in the European Union entails the application of specific legal frameworks. For 
instance, under the dual model of federalism in the United States,4 states could exercise their 
police powers in absolute freedom, while the central government was strictly precluded from 
intruding into such spheres – and vice versa. As for the European Union legal order, the 
designation by the European Court of Justice of powers as being retained by the Member States 
results in the implementation of the power-based approach, which differs from the traditional 
legal framework usually implemented in free movement cases. 
355. Autonomous distinctions. Both American states and European Member States have 
attempted to preserve their own spheres of powers in order to prevent too many encroachments 
                                                 
3 P. A. FREUND, “Umpiring the Federal System,”54 Columbia Law Review 561 (1954). 
4 See, Infra, §§ 427s. 
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from the central government. To this end, they have claimed that certain subject matters ought 
to fall per se within their sphere of jurisdiction, understood as strictly distinct from the 
jurisdiction of the central government. They have moreover asserted themselves as entitled to 
an absolute freedom while exercising such powers. In reply to these lines of arguments, the 
Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice have both rejected the idea that the states 
could themselves decide which subject matters are to fall within their reserved/retained powers. 
Even under the TANEY Court in the United States, which gave much weight to the states’ 
claims based on the need to protect their police powers, it was solely for the Court to identify a 
police power. Admittedly, it defined the notion of police powers broadly, and construed its 
corresponding legal framework as giving significant leeway to the states in New York v. Miln: 
That all those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may, perhaps, 
more properly be called internal police, are not thus surrendered nor restrained; and that, 
consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a State is complete, unqualified and 
exclusive.5 
But, as E. S. CORWIN has noted in this regard: 
[I]t did not signify that the States, acting through either their legislatures or their courts, 
were the final judge of the scope of these ‘sovereign’ powers. This was the function of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, which for this purpose was regarded by the 
Constitution as standing outside and over both the National Government and the States, 
and vested with authority to apportion impartially to each center its proper powers in 
accordance with the Constitution’s intention.6 
Likewise, the European Court of Justice has also consistently defined the content and reach of 
the powers retained by Member States autonomously. Even though it has never set out a 
comprehensive and abstract definition of the concept itself, it has nonetheless identified, on a 
case-by-case basis, via its formulae, the subject matters that fall within the powers retained by 
Member States. The Courts’ respective independent assessments have significant implications 
for the enforcement of American and European federalism. For if the states were permitted to 
themselves decide over which subject matters they have exclusive jurisdiction, the uniformity of 
federal law would be seriously undermined. As a result, each state could independently and 
unilaterally define the content of their reserved/retained powers, and consequently encroach 
on the own powers of the central government. 
                                                 
5 New York v. Miln 11 Peters 102 (1837). 
6 E. S. CORWIN, The Commerce Power versus States’ Rights, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936), 15. 
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356. US Constitutional law. From the 19th century through the early 20th century, the 
American Supreme Court developed significant doctrines in an attempt at drawing a line 
between national and states spheres of powers. The doctrines that better depict the debates 
raised by the dual model of federalism concern the dormant Commerce Clause. I am therefore 
going to focus on the latter in the following paragraphs. To begin with, the TANEY Court 
referred to the concept of ‘police powers’ of states to identify the matters over which the states 
had exclusive jurisdiction. In the same way as the MARSHALL Court, it initially drew a 
‘commerce/police’ test7 by looking at the purpose8 of a state regulation. If it was found to 
regulate commerce, the state statute was overruled. However, it would be upheld where its 
purpose pertained to the police of the state, it was sustained. The TANEY Court never 
elaborated a comprehensive definition of the notion of police powers. Rather, it defined it as 
follows:  
[I]t is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a State, to advance the safety, 
happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and 
every act of legislation.9 
It subsequently went on by adding up that they were “nothing more or less than that power of 
government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominion, the power to govern 
men and things.”10 The first years of the TANEY Court were characterized by “little clarity or 
agreement”11 among the Justices. Some of them saw the regulation of interstate commerce as 
an exclusive power of Congress. As a result, only state ‘police’ statutes – to the exclusion of 
laws regulating ‘commerce’ – were considered constitutional. TANEY himself followed a more 
balanced approach, according to which states could regulate commerce so long as their 
measures did not conflict with the Constitution or a law of Congress.  
                                                 
7 E. A. YOUNG, “Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affaires Exception,” 69 The George 
Washington Law Review 139, 147 (2001). 
8 E. A. YOUNG, “Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affaires Exception,” above, n. 7, 148; 
K. M. SULLIVAN & G. GUNTHER, Constitutional Law, (Foundation Press, University Casebook Series, 2001), 242. 
9 New York v. Miln 11 Pet. 102, 139 (1837). 
10 The License Cases 5 How. 462, 504 (1847). 
11 K. M. SULLIVAN & G. GUNTHER, Constitutional Law, above, n. 8, 218. 
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357. The Court eventually tried to reach a compromise between the exclusive and concurrent 
doctrines in Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia.12 A new subject-matter test13 
emerged, based on the distinction between national and local subjects:  
Now the power to regulate commerce embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but 
exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a 
single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every port; 
and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, 
which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.14  
The Cooley rule has sometimes been described as ‘selective exclusiveness.’ It allowed states to 
regulate commerce, but only to the extent that they regulated local aspects of interstate 
commerce, and as long as Congress had not exercised its power. Accordingly, Cooley recognized 
that the commerce power was in some way concurrent. However, this did not toll the death 
knell for the Supreme Court’s dual understanding of federalism. As E. A. YOUNG has pointed 
out, under the Cooley doctrine, some subject matters were still described as “exclusively 
national” or “local in nature.”15  
358. The search for a borderline between the national and states spheres of powers led the 
Court to draw an ultimate test, this time based on the direct/indirect character of the effects of 
states’ statutes.16 Even though the latter were upheld if their effects on commerce happened to 
be merely indirect, this way of reasoning was also based on a dual interpretation of American 
federalism. Referring to the direct-indirect distinction, E. A. YOUNG has shown that the Court 
still insisted on “the viability of boundaries despite the interdependence of different markets 
and activities.”17 This is confirmed by the fact that, when interpreting the Commerce Clause, 
the Supreme Court continued to understand the police powers as forming a sphere of 
jurisdiction over which the states had almost absolute freedom.18 Thus, throughout the 19th 
                                                 
12 Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia 12 Howard 299 (1851). 
13 E. A. YOUNG, “Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affaires Exception,” above, n. 7, 147. 
14 Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia 12 Howard 299 (1851). 
15 E. A. YOUNG, “Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affaires Exception,” above, n. 7, 147. 
16 See Southern Railway Co. v. King 217 U.S. 524 (1910), and Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell 244 U.S. 310 (1917). 
See also E. S. CORWIN, The Commerce Power versus States’ Rights, above, n. 6, 175-209. 
17 E. A. YOUNG, “Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affaires Exception,” above, n. 7, 148. 
See also E. S. CORWIN, The Commerce Power versus States’ Rights, above, n. 6, 208: “The distinction is one of kind, 
not of degree; and this is so (…) because the purpose of this distinction is to maintain the States in exclusive 
possession of the power to regulate productive industry, and especially the power to regulate the relationship of employer 
and employee in such industry.” 
18 See Henderson v. New York 92 U.S. 259 (1875): “[C]ertain powers necessary to the administration of their internal 
affairs are reserved to the States, (…) among these powers are those for the preservation of good order, of the 
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century and until the beginning of the 20th century, the Supreme Court to a large extent only 
sought to draw judicial tests aimed at distinguishing between national and state spheres of 
jurisdiction. If, admittedly, it set out tests that were increasingly flexible, the initial purpose 
remained. The Court was indeed still primarily interested in isolating exclusive spheres for the 
benefit of the states or, alternatively, Congress. 
359. The ECJ power-based approach. In contrast to the Supreme Court, the European Court of 
Justice has never attempted to define the notion of powers retained by Member States, nor has 
it set out a test distinguishing between cases involving the power-based approach and traditional 
free movement cases. Instead, the Court simply asserts, through the statement of its formulae, 
that a certain range of fields falls within the powers retained by Member States. It does not 
make explicit the criteria used to describe a power as retained by Member States, which ought 
to be subject, as such, to the power-based approach. Even if the Court of Justice does not 
substantiate its approach, at least two hypotheses may be put forward with respect to the criteria 
it takes implicitly into account when implementing its power-based approach. On the one 
hand, while the conferral principle is not relevant for the identification of the powers retained 
by Member States, the fact that there is no, or very limited, harmonization in the fields 
subjected to the power-based approach at the European Union level may nonetheless be a 
pertinent factor. The institutional constraints weighing on the European legislator – such as the 
unanimity rule in the field of direct taxation, or the lack of consensus among Member States to 
adopt, for instance, the Patients’ Rights Directive19 – might also explain why the Court has 
developed an approach that gives more leeway to Member States. On the other hand, as I have 
already mentioned elsewhere,20 the fields concerned by the Court’s power-based approach 
pertain to Member States’ ‘essential functions.’ Accordingly, it makes sense to single them out, 
and to subject them to a specific legal framework, which takes into account Member States’ 
sensitive interests. In sum, the Court of Justice must be cautious, because deregulating fields 
                                                 
health and comfort of the citizens, and their protection against pauperism and against contagious and infectious 
diseases, and other matters of legislation of like character (…). This power, frequently referred to in the decisions of 
this Court, has been, in general terms, somewhat loosely called the police power;” New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana 
Light Co. 115 U.S. 650 (1885): “[T]here is a power, sometimes called the police power, which has never been 
surrendered by the States, in virtue of which they may, within certain limits, control everything within their 
respective territories, and upon the proper exercise of which, under some circumstances, may depend the public 
health, the public morals, or the public safety, is conceded in all the cases;” Southern Railway Co. v. King 217 U.S. 
524, 531-532 (1910). 
19 See, Supra, §§ 288s. 
20 See, Supra, § 72. 
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such as those analyzed herein could seriously undermine the legitimate autonomy of Member 
States. Notwithstanding these two hypotheses, the fact remains that the criteria used to 
distinguish the powers retained by Member States are still, to say the least, vague. Their 
identification ultimately depends on the Court’s discretionary power to subject certain domains 
to the power-based approach, resulting in a lack of transparency. 
2. Silence regarding the rationale behind the power-based approach 
360. If the Court of Justice is silent with respect to the basis on which it subjects certain 
fields to the power-based approach, it is equally tight-lipped about the sources of authority of its 
case law. The fact that the European Union is an organization of limited powers makes this 
issue all the more significant. In cases involving powers retained by Member States, the Court 
may not, as a matter of principle, rely on the conferral principle to justify and legitimize the 
limitations put on the exercise of powers that fall in spheres over which the European Union 
has no, or very limited, jurisdiction. In spite of that, when it comes to setting out the grounds 
of its approach, the Court of Justice is anything but expansive. As seen in Chapter 2, it does not 
go beyond the statement of formulae, which consist more in asserting a principle than in 
putting forward articulated legal foundations capable of legitimizing the limitations put on the 
exercise of the powers retained by Member States. In what follows, I review, in turn, the various 
grounds that are/could be put forward to justify the subjection of the fields analyzed herein to 
the Court of Justice scrutiny, which allows me to shed light on their shortcomings. I then 
defend the point that the power-based approach ultimately lacks structural foundations that 
would be powerful enough to enshrine both its authority and its legitimacy. 
a. The shortcomings of the usual justifications 
361. Overall, I have identified discrete sets of justifications that are usually/could be put 
forward to justify the power-based approach: (i) the principle of primacy of European Union 
law; (ii) functional justifications, which are explicitly put forward by the Court of Justice and/or 
its Advocates General, namely the principles of effectiveness and uniformity of European 
Union law; and (iii) underlying justifications, which, if they are not explicitly referred to by the 
Court of Justice seems nevertheless to play a significant role in its reasoning: the principle of 
sincere cooperation and the representation of out-of-state interests. With respect to the 
principle of primacy, I am of the view that it is an unconvincing legal ground, as it is more of an 
instrument to settle conflicts than an instrument establishing that there is a conflict. As for the 
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two other sets of justifications, they are of course relevant and useful to account for the 
applicability of European Union law. They contribute, as such, to legitimize the limitations put 
on the exercise of the powers retained by Member States. But my claim is that they are 
nonetheless unsatisfactory, mainly because they do not specifically give grounds for intrusions 
of European Union law into areas falling within Member States’ jurisdiction.  
1. The principle of primacy 
362. Two understandings of the primacy principle. As is well known, primacy is, with direct effect, 
one of the cornerstones of European Union constitutional law. Not formerly included into the 
Treaties, it was recognized at an early stage in Costa v. ENEL.21 To define it simply, “supremacy 
denotes the capacity of [the] norm of European Union law to overrule inconsistent norms of 
national law in domestic court proceedings.”22 It may be understood through two distinct 
perspectives, one static and the other one dynamic.23 The first perspective consists in 
connecting, through their qualification, activities or sets of facts either to the municipal domain 
or to the European Union domain. And it is only if these activities or sets of facts can be 
connected to the European Union domain that European Union law trumps national laws. 
This understanding corresponds to J. H. H. WEILER’s: 
The principle of supremacy can be expressed, not as an absolute rule whereby Community 
(or federal) law trumps Member State law, but instead as a principle whereby each law is 
supreme within its sphere of competence. This more accurate characterization of 
supremacy renders crucial the question of defining spheres of competence […].24 
This static conception differs from the dynamic perspective, based on the assumption that the 
European Union and national legal orders are fundamentally intertwined. Under this view, 
there is no need to distinguish between spheres of jurisdiction. Instead, it is accepted that 
European Union law trumps national laws each time a conflict of norms arises. B. DE WITTE 
supports this second understanding, when he argues that: 
                                                 
21 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] ECR 585. 
22 B. DE WITTE, “Direct effect, supremacy, and the nature of the legal order,” in The Evolution of EU Law, (Eds.) P. 
CRAIG & G. DE BÚRCA, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 177. See also, by the same author, B. DE WITTE, 
“Retour à “Costa.” La primauté du droit communautaire à la lumière du droit international,” Revue Trimestrielle de 
Droit Européen 425-454 (1984). 
23 This distinction was drawn by R. GARRON, “Réflexions sur la primauté du droit communautaire,” Revue 
Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 29-30 (1969). 
24 J. H. H. WEILER, “The transformation of Europe,” Yale Law Journal 2410, 2414 (ft. 26) (1991). 
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[T]he supremacy of primary [European Union] law cannot be explained in terms of division 
of competences; it is hierarchical in nature.25 
Cases involving powers retained by Member States tends to support the second understanding. 
They indeed confirm that the Court of Justice does not hesitate to overturn any national law 
conflicting with the free movement principle, even if the national measure falls within fields 
where the European Union has no, or very limited, jurisdiction. As seen in Chapter 2,26 the 
Court refuses to exclude the application of the principle of primacy on the basis that this would 
affect national spheres of jurisdiction. 
363. The reliance on the dynamic understanding to justify the applicability of EU law in cases 
involving retained powers. Some authors, by (implicitly) relying on its dynamic understanding, 
infer that the applicability of European Union law in fields involving the powers retained by 
Member States is justified by the primacy principle. Under this view, the limitations put on the 
exercise of Member States’ powers would stem entirely from this principle.27 The Court of 
Justice case law would be nothing more than the logical development of the cases relating to the 
primacy principle.28 The Advocate General in Inizan, for instance, shared this view. He indeed 
stated the formula, and emphasized the fact that “national authorities […] have a duty to ensure 
the primacy of, and compliance with, the principles of the Treaty.”29 
364. Inherent limits. However, resorting to the primacy principle to give grounds for the 
applicability of European Union law in the fields analyzed herein turns out to be untenable for 
two main reasons. First of all, this view springs from a misconception of the primacy principle. 
As underlined by a few authors, the purpose of this legal tool is to dictate how to settle a conflict 
of norms occurring between a European Union rule and a national rule.30 In other words, 
“[t]he problem of primacy concerns the manner in which […] a conflict, if it is found to exist, 
will be resolved.”31 However, the primacy principle does not answer the question as to under 
                                                 
25 B. DE WITTE, “Direct effect, supremacy, and the nature of the legal order,” above, n. 22, 191, n. 63. 
26 See, Supra, §§ 108s.  
27 This is what K. LENAERTS & L. BERNARDEAU, “L’encadrement communautaire de la fiscalité directe,” 33 Cahiers 
de Droit Européen 19, 32-33 (2007) claim in relation to direct taxation. 
28 V. MICHEL, Recherches sur les compétences de la Communauté, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003), 459. 
29 Opinion in Case C-56/01, Inizan, [2003] ECR I-12403, 31-33. 
30 R. SCHÜTZE, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism. The changing structure of European law, (Oxford University Press, 
2009), 190. 
31 M. WAELBROECK, “The emergent doctrine of Community pre-emption – Consent and re-delegation,” in Courts 
and Free Markets: Perspectives from the United States and Europe, (Eds.) E. STEIN & T. SANDALOW, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982, Vol. 2), 551. (Emphasis added) 
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which conditions a conflict of rules arises. For primacy to apply, a conflict must have been 
identified beforehand.32 To put it differently, primacy is a tool for conflict resolution, but it is 
not a means of conflict identification. Second of all, and this closely relates to the reason just 
mentioned, using the primacy principle as the basis of the applicability of European Union law 
in cases involving powers retained by Member States ends up to putting the cart before the 
horse. As I have already indicated,33 free movement cases are divided into four main steps: (1) 
applicability, (2) assessment of the restrictive character of the measure, (3) assessment of the 
acceptability of the justifications put forward by Member States, and (4) assessment of 
proportionality. Since the primacy principle is a tool for conflict resolution, it may only come 
into play if: (i) the national measure is found to restrict the free movement principle, and no 
valid ground may justify it; or (ii) the national measure is found to restrict the free movement 
principle, valid grounds of justification may be relied on, but it is nonetheless disproportionate. 
If, however, the measure either does not have a restrictive character, or is restrictive but 
justified, the primacy principle does not come into play since, by definition, there is no conflict 
between the free movement principle and the national measure subject to scrutiny by the Court 
of Justice. As a result, it must be accepted that the issue relating to the legal bases of the 
applicability of European Union law in fields where the European Union holds no, or very 
limited, jurisdiction, is distinct from the issue of primacy. Finding that European Union law is 
applicable does not in fact presuppose the existence of a conflict of norms, for the European 
Court of Justice happens to rule that European Union law is applicable, but that the national 
measure nevertheless does not conflict with the free movement principle. Accordingly, the 
primacy principle is not useful for justifying the applicability of European Union law in cases 
involving powers retained by Member States. The broadening of the scope of the free 
movement principle does not flow from an extension of the scope of the primacy principle. It is 
quite the reverse: the broadening of the scope of primacy is arises from the extension of the 
scope of the fundamental freedoms. 
                                                 
32 I. PERNICE, “Costa v. ENEL and Simmenthal: Primacy of European law,” in The Past and Future of EU Law: The 
Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty, (Eds.) M. MADURO & L. AZOULAI, (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2010), 58. 
33 See, Supra, § 20. 
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2. The principle of effectiveness 
365. Advocate General KOKOTT’s Opinion under Tas Hagen. A few years ago, Advocate General 
KOKOTT attempted to put flesh on the bones of the reasons justifying the applicability of 
European Union law in the fields analyzed herein. She expressed her views in Tas-Hagen,34 
which involved, as seen earlier,35 the interpretation of European Union citizenship in a case 
where a nonresident was denied a benefit relating to the compensation of civil war victims, this 
type of benefit being expressly excluded from the scope of Regulations 1408/71 and 
883/2004.36 Her opinion deserves, in this respect, to be quoted at length: 
33. […] Union citizens can assert their right to free movement even if the matter concerned 
or the benefit claimed is not governed by Community law. 
34. The nature of Union citizens’ right to free movement as a fundamental freedom is 
expressed therein. As a fundamental freedom, Article 18(1) EC is directly applicable and to 
be interpreted broadly. In particular, this provision has, like the classic fundamental 
freedoms of the internal market, a scope which is not restricted to specific matters. 
35. Thus, the classic fundamental freedoms apply also to matters in respect of which the 
Treaty grants the Community no powers or otherwise contains rules. If such matters not 
governed by Community law were excluded from the scope of the fundamental freedoms, 
it would be impossible reasonably to implement one of the Community’s core tasks, 
namely to establish an internal market without obstacles to the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital (Article 3(1)(c) EC). The internal market would not have the 
comprehensive aim of providing an area without internal frontiers (Article 14(2) EC), but 
would be merely fragmentary as it would be limited to individual products and activities 
governed by specific rules of Community law. 
36. A fortiori the scope of the fundamental freedoms cannot be restricted merely to matters 
in respect of which the Community has already exercised its powers, in particular by 
adopting harmonization measures. On the contrary, the fact that it can produce its effects 
primarily in fields which are not (yet) harmonized is consistent with the spirit and purpose 
of the fundamental freedoms and precisely an expression of their direct applicability. To 
make the application of a fundamental freedom subject to the existence of a harmonizing 
measure would ultimately be to deprive it of direct effect. […] 
38. However, it would be equally inconsistent with the notion of Union citizenship as the 
fundamental status of all Union citizens, which they enjoy irrespective of any economic 
activity, if the Member States did not have to observe Union citizens’ right to free 
movement in all areas but merely in individual matters in respect of which the Treaty 
grants the Community specific powers or other rules of Community law exist. 
Thus, Advocate General KOKOTT provides a comprehensive reasoning, which may be divided 
into three parts. First, she relies on the basic features of European Union citizenship, which 
                                                 
34 Opinion in Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen, [2006] ECR I-10451. 
35 See, Supra, §§ 130. 
36 See, Supra, § 57. 
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are, as she describes them, very similar to those of the four economic freedoms. Second, she 
justifies the applicability of European Union law in fields where the European Union holds no 
jurisdiction. Finally, she explains why European Union law is applicable in fields where the 
European Union holds jurisdiction, but has nonetheless not exercised its powers. 
366. A common rationale. To begin with, Advocate General KOKOTT starts from the premise 
that the fundamental freedoms share three inherent features: they are directly applicable, they 
should be construed broadly and, last but not least, their scope is “not restricted to specific 
matters.” A few words should be said, in this respect, about Advocate General KOKOTT’s overall 
line of reasoning. There was no doubt that if one freedom was applicable to the facts of Tas-
Hagen, it could only be European Union citizenship since no economic activity was involved. 
Nevertheless, in order to make her claim, the Advocate General makes references to both 
European Union citizenship and the four economic freedoms, and draws several parallels 
between them. This sheds light on three important aspects. First, this confirms that European 
Union citizenship and the four economic freedoms ought to be increasingly placed on the same 
footing. Second, this reveals that the Advocate General uses the four economic freedoms as a 
way to back up her claim, and to give it more weight. Her reasoning indeed consists in showing 
that what holds true for the economic freedoms also holds true for European Union 
citizenship. Last but not least, this upholds the assumption according to which cases involving 
powers retained by Member States form a coherent whole, whether based on European Union 
citizenship or on the economic freedoms. 
367. Two justifications. Once the basic features of the fundamental freedoms have been 
recalled, the Advocate General goes on by focusing on the applicability of the four economic 
freedoms in fields where the European Union holds no jurisdiction. To this end, she develops 
an ‘a contrario reasoning,’ and sheds light on the negative implications that would result if the 
Court of Justice were to find them inapplicable. She argues that this would give rise to two 
adverse outcomes. On the one hand, this would undermine the implementation of one of the 
“core tasks” assigned to the European Union, the establishment of the internal market, and on 
the other hand, this would entail a fragmenting effect. 
368. The preservation of the integrity of EU jurisdiction. First, the applicability of European 
Union law is justified by the need to preserve the integrity of the jurisdiction of the European 
Union. M. P. MADURO has also alluded to this argument to provide grounds for the limitations 
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placed on nationality powers in Rottmann: “otherwise, the competence of the Union to 
determine the rights and duties of its citizens would be affected.”37 This justification is 
reminiscent of the reasoning developed by Chief Justice MARSHALL in the landmark McCulloch 
v. Maryland case decided in 1819.38 This decision involved a statute enacted by the state of 
Maryland, which subjected the Bank of the United States to a tax. The Supreme Court was 
called upon to assess whether this amounted to a reasonable exercise of state power. It first 
established that Congress correctly exercised its power when it chattered the bank, by broadly 
construing the necessary and proper Clause of the US Constitution.39 It then focused on 
whether Maryland could tax the bank. Chief Justice MARSHALL acknowledged that “the power 
of taxation is of vital importance; that it is retained by the States; [and] that it is not abridged by 
the grant of a similar power to the Government of the Union.”40 However, he tempered this 
principle, and for the first time put limitations on a state’s retained power: 
[T]he States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any 
manner control the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into 
execution the powers vested in the General Government.41 
In other words, as in cases involving powers retained by Member States, US states are at liberty 
to exercise their powers so long as this does not undermine the General Government’s 
jurisdiction. Chief Justice MARSHALL added, in this regard, that the US Constitution is to be 
construed in such a way as to not “defeat the legitimate operations of a supreme 
Government.”42 However, emphasis should be put on a significant difference between the 
European and the American contexts. In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court referred to 
the necessity to preserve the integrity of powers already exercised by the General Government. 
By contrast, in cases involving powers retained by Member States, the exercise of national 
powers does not affect specific acts of secondary legislation, but the free movement principle 
itself, a constitutional principle enshrined in the Treaty. Therefore, J. KOKOTT developed her 
                                                 
37 Opinion in Case C-135/08, Rottmann, [2010] ECR I-1449, 26. 
38 McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 318 (1819). 
39 US Constitution, Article 1, Section 8: “The Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” 
40 McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 318, 425 (1819). 
41 McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 318, 436 (1819). See O. BEAUD, “De quelques particularités de la justice 
constitutionnelle dans un système fédéral,” in La justice constitutionnelle, (Eds.) C. GREWE, O. JOUANJAN & E. 
MAULIN, (Paris, Dalloz, 2005), 68-70. 
42 McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 318, 427 (1819). 
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reasoning in a more ‘hypothetical’ context than the US Supreme Court. Indeed, she ultimately 
relied on the need to preserve powers held by the European Union that have not (yet) been 
exercised. 
369. The prevention of fragmentation. Second, J. KOKOTT also stressed that if European Union 
law were not applicable in the fields analyzed herein, this would produce fragmenting effects. 
Here, she referred to a cardinal principle of the constitutional law of the European Union, the 
principle of uniformity. This principle forms one of the bases of the European Union legal 
order, as already stated by the Court of Justice in Costa v. ENEL: 
The executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to another […] without 
jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty […].43 
The whole project of the European Union indeed relies on uniformity. Accepting that Member 
States may act unilaterally, without being subject to the Court’s scrutiny would lead to a 
“territorial fragmentation,” and, ultimately, to a “fragmentation of the European integration 
project.”44 This would open the door to the creation of multiple discriminations and/or 
obstacles hampering the free movement principle. This would then jeopardize the principle of 
unity of the internal market and, more generally, the European Union project itself.45 This 
situation would lead to what N. POLITIS described, decades ago, in the context of public 
international law, as the creation of “anarchy” in international relations.46 The preservation of 
unity is also at the core of US constitutional law. It is often used as a way to justify the 
limitations put on States’ powers, which stem from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV and the Dormant Commerce Clause, the US equivalents of the TFEU provisions 
relating to European Union citizenship and the four economic freedoms.47 J. D. VARAT notes, 
with respect to the former, that it is “primarily […] an instrument of national unification,”48 
                                                 
43 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] ECR 585. 
44 R. BARENTS, “The single market and national tax sovereignty,” in Fiscal sovereignty of the Member States in an 
internal market. Past and future, (Ed.) S. JANSEN, (Alphen: Kluwer Law International, 2011), 61; L. AZOULAI, “La 
formule des compétences retenues des Etats membres devant la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne,” in 
Objectifs et compétences dans l’Union européenne, (Ed.) E. NEFRAMI, (Brussels: Bruylant, 2013, Droit de l'Union 
Européenne), 363. 
45 See with respect to direct taxation: F. C. DE HOSSON, “On the controversial role of the European Court in 
corporate tax cases,” 34: 6/7 Intertax 294, 297 (2006). 
46 N. POLITIS, “Le problème des limitations de la souveraineté et la théorie de l’abus des droits dans les rapports 
internationaux,” 6 Recueil des Cours 1, 52 (1925). 
47 See, Supra, §§ 23s. 
48 J. D. VARAT, “State “citizenship” and interstate equality,” 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 487, 518 (1981). 
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while J. NZELIBE points out that the latter “embodies a concept of economic nationhood, of a 
‘common market.’”49 In sum: 
Because state power to discriminate against nonresidents or recently arrived residents is in 
tension with the constitutional goals of a cohesive federal union and an open economy, it 
seems obvious that the objectives of interstate equality often may trump that of a state’s 
particular interests.50 
In other words, the applicability of European Union law flows from the necessity to prevent 
Member States from bypassing the free movement principle through the exercise of their 
retained powers. They may not indirectly place the unity of the European Union integration 
project at risk by acting unilaterally in fields where the European Union holds no jurisdiction. 
370. The preservation of the fundamental freedoms’ direct effect. The same holds true when the 
European Union holds jurisdiction, but has not exercised it. In J. KOKOTT’s view, the 
applicability of European Union law in areas that are not (yet) harmonized is “precisely an 
expression of [the fundamental freedoms’] direct applicability.” Her argument is built upon two 
fundamental components of the European Union legal order: the principle of direct effect and 
the principles stemming from the landmark decision Cassis de Dijon.51 One of the main 
concerns underlying the principle of direct effect, recognized for the first time in Van Gend en 
Loos, is to “secure a uniform interpretation of the Treaty.”52 Therefore, a finding that the free 
movement principle is applicable once again turns out to be a means to ensure the uniformity 
of European Union law. The Advocate General also refers to Cassis de Dijon in paragraph 36 of 
her Opinion. She is thus of the view that the same logic as that developed in the 1979 decision 
justifies the applicability of European Union law in fields where the Court of Justice 
implements its power-based approach. It is in fact true that the Court of Justice case law 
involving powers retained by Member States is reminiscent of the issues raised in this case. 
Germany referred implicitly to the conferral principle in order to object to the applicability of 
European Union law. After relying on the “functional separation of powers between the 
national authorities and the Community authorities,” it argued that: 
In relation to the interpretation of Article 30, that fundamental principle of the Treaty 
implies that the application of that provision reaches its limits at the point where the 
                                                 
49 J. NZELIBE, “Free movement: A federalist reinterpretation,” 49 Am. Univ. L. Rev. 433, 465 (1999). 
50 Ibid., 465. 
51 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon), [1979] ECR 649. 
52 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 3, 12. 
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functional exercise of the powers retained by the Member States would be jeopardized. The 
Member States must continue to be able effectively to exercise those powers, until the 
achievement of harmonization transfers their freedom of action to the Community.53 
As is well known, the Court of Justice developed a different perspective. However, it did not 
specifically reply to the German argument based on the conferral principle. It instead stated 
that, as a matter of principle, Member States retain jurisdiction in the absence of harmonizing 
measures, but only to the extent that their measures satisfy mandatory requirements.54 The 
starting point of its reasoning did not therefore lie in the need to preserve the functional 
exercise of Member States’ retained powers, but in the concern to preserve the interests and 
the jurisdiction of the European Union. It implicitly ruled out the possibility, in a similar way 
as it consistently does today, that Member States enjoy a safe haven for enacting discriminatory 
or restrictive measures, regardless of the field involved. 
371. A ‘total’ principle. It stems from the above that Advocate General KOKOTT justifies the 
applicability of European Union law in fields over which the European Union has no 
jurisdiction, or with respect to which it has not exercised its jurisdiction, on arguments of a 
functional nature, which all closely relate to the principle of effectiveness. The principle of 
effectiveness goes beyond the principles of primacy and direct effect; it also embodies the effet 
utile principle, as well as the principle of unity.55 The full effectiveness of European Union law 
depends on uniformity and the consistent application of European Union law.56 The Court 
itself, as well as several Advocate Generals, has referred to the need to safeguard this principle 
in cases involving powers retained by Member States.57 In sum, it takes precedence over the 
formal division of powers between the European Union and its Member States, and its 
application does not depend on whether the European Union has exercised its jurisdiction or 
not. Member States have a general duty not to put the European Union project at risk, and 
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must, notwithstanding the field at issue, “take ‘the bitter with the sweet’ of free movement 
law.”58 This line of reasoning leads to what L. AZOULAI describes as the ‘totalization’ of 
European Union law.59 All the national spheres of powers must ultimately serve the principle of 
effectiveness. European integration not only affects on the “limited fields”60 transferred by the 
Member States to the European Union, but has an effect on any field, which may be linked to 
it in one way or another. As a result, the applicability of the free movement principle is defined 
by the functional aim of the fundamental freedoms, and not by reference to the conferral 
principle.61 
372. Critical assessment. To conclude, it may be pointed out that J. KOKOTT attempted to 
provide a comprehensive analysis to justify the applicability of European Union law in cases 
where the Court develops its power-based approach, and as a result went beyond the usual 
reasoning of the Court of Justice. However, one may question whether it is enough to explain 
the validity of the Court’s case law in light of arguments that are of a purely functional nature. 
This inevitably leads to the question of whether the end can systematically justify the means. It 
is moreover doubtful that purpose-oriented principles can provide sufficient grounds for a 
phenomenon that contributes to turning the European integration project into a totalizing 
endeavor. Cases involving powers retained by Member States are at odds with the basic 
proposition that the European Union is an organization of limited powers, and that, as a result, 
European integration is a partial phenomenon. Last but not least, one must not lose sight that 
the Court of Justice’s power-based approach puts limitations on powers that are constitutive of 
Member States’ core political and social identities. From a democratic perspective, it is 
therefore necessary that it be based on solid grounds of authority and legitimacy. In other 
words, the functional arguments used by Advocate General KOKOTT do not comprise 
substantial democratic justifications as to how to explain that European Union law may intrude 
into spheres that Member States wish to retain within their own jurisdiction – be it through 
specific saving clauses inserted into the Treaty, through the unanimity rule, or through the 
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mere silence of the Treaty. They account for the necessity of the Court of Justice power-based 
approach, but not for its deeper legitimizing roots. 
3. The principle of sincere cooperation 
373. Compelling Member States to comply with the free movement principle even in fields 
where the European Union has no, or very limited, jurisdiction, may also be seen as simply the 
result of Member States’ obligations stemming from the Treaties. After all, it may be argued 
that when they entered into these international agreements, they tacitly accepted not to 
frustrate any interest of the European Union, even indirectly through the exercise of their 
retained powers. To be sure, they are bound by the principle of sincere cooperation.62  
374. Identification. Article 4§3 TEU defines the principle of sincere cooperation as follows: 
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, 
in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.  
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure 
fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the 
institutions of the Union.  
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from 
any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the Union's objectives.  
This principle is a genuine legal rule, and plays a significant role in the European Union legal 
order. It entails a series of obligations for both the Member States and the institutions of the 
European Union. Member States are subjected, in particular, to a number of duties that flow 
from the fact that they belong to the European Union.63 In the manner of M. BLANQUET, they 
may be gathered into four discrete categories: the obligation of cooperation, the obligation of 
collaboration, the obligation of loyalty, and the obligation of solidarity.64 The obligation of 
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cooperation consists of an obligation of enforcement and an obligation to supplement EU 
action. It is intrinsically linked to the question of the practical effectiveness of European Union 
law, and raises the issue of the institutional and procedural autonomy of Member States. The 
obligation of collaboration consists in enabling the action and the functioning of the organs of 
the European Union.65 Under the obligation of loyalty, Member States must “refrain from any 
measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the Union’s objectives.” As M. BLANQUET 
shows, this obligation encompasses both a functional perspective, under which Member States 
must protect the full effect of European Union rules, and a structural perspective, under which 
they must protect the institutional structure of the European Union as well as its funding 
system. Finally, the obligation of solidarity compels Member States to assist each other, and to 
coordinate among themselves. In sum, M. BLANQUET points to the fact that Article 4§3 TEU 
allows the Court to settle conflicts where the European Union interest is at stake, but where the 
rules relating to the division of powers are not sufficient to provide a solution to the 
jurisdictional conflict.66 In cases involving powers retained by Member States, the Court of 
Justice implicitly draws on the last two dimensions of the principle of sincere cooperation. This 
is revealed by the twofold transformation that affects the Member States described in Chapter 
5.67 This transforms the Member States both vertically, which is done in accordance with the 
obligation of loyalty, and horizontally, under the obligation of solidarity. 
375. Shortcomings of the loyalty and solidarity principles. The fact that both public international 
law and federal law recognize that the principle of good faith or loyalty may place limitations 
upon the exercise of states’ powers tends to indicate that the European Union principle of 
loyalty may be a valid factor to justify European Union law intrusions into Member States’ 
jurisdiction. However, two main points must be pointed out. First, it is noteworthy that, in 
similar fashion to public international law, it is the functional dimension of the European 
Union principle of loyalty that primarily justifies the incursions of European Union law into 
the national spheres of powers. And, as I have just stressed, purpose-oriented grounds do not 
constitute an entirely satisfactory justification. Second, admittedly, the European Union 
principle of loyalty shares many features with the federal principle of loyalty. However, in a 
federal state, federal law intrusions into the legal orders of the federate entities are justified by 
                                                 
65 Ibid., 125. 
66 Ibid., 286. 
67 See, Supra, §§ 311s. 
Chapter 6. Structural Reassessment of the Power-Based Approach 
 
288 
the principle of loyalty, which is itself supported by “the nature of the constitutional ‘pact’” 
between the federation and the states.68 In accordance with this constitutional ‘pact,’ the 
federation is legitimized by popular sovereignty. This is not the case in the European Union 
legal order, where popular sovereignty is first and foremost expressed at the Member State level. 
In sum, the principle of loyalty once again sheds light on the functional necessity of the 
limitations put on the exercise of the powers retained by Member States but not on the roots of 
their authority and legitimacy. Likewise, the principle of solidarity, which governs interstate 
relations,69 lacks a dimension that would fully justify the existence of limitations placed on the 
exercise of the powers retained by Member States. 
4. The representation of out-of-state interests 
376. A close analysis of the cases involving powers retained by Member States sheds light on 
another underlying rationale of the Court of Justice power-based approach. Broadly speaking, 
this rationale consists in reinforcing the representation of out-of-state interests. When the 
Court of Justice subjects the Member States to the free movement principle in the fields 
analyzed herein, it is indeed driven by concerns relating to fairness. These concerns result in the 
Court’s efforts to urge Member States to give voice to out-of-state interests, which are, by 
definition, underrepresented in the national political forum. To put it differently, the Court 
uses the free movement principle as a proxy to counterbalance deficiencies inherent to the 
national democratic process. 
377. The doctrine. Several authors have developed an argument based on the representation-
reinforcing theory to justify the Court of Justice’s scrutiny of national measures in light of the 
free movement principle. The latter is given a role of “correction of national political 
processes,”70 of “correction of ‘nation-state failures.’”71 M. P. MADURO and C. JOERGES, the two 
main advocates of this approach, both start from the same premise. National political processes 
are flawed to the extent that they lead to the underrepresentation of non-EU nationals and/or 
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residents, which are nonetheless affected by national laws.72 European Union law is seen, in 
similar fashion to US constitutional law, as a “democracy enhancer.”73 In this sense, these 
authors contend that not only does the free movement principle give rise to economic rights, 
through the four economic freedoms, but also to political fundamental rights.74 The logic 
underpinning the argument developed by M. P. MADURO and C. JOERGES may, in addition, be 
used in relation to outgoing individuals. In case of exit restrictions, European Union law 
indeed plays a representation-reinforcing role of individuals in their own home countries. This 
category of European Union citizens or economically active individuals constitutes, as a matter 
of fact, a “minority,” whose interests are usually underestimated by the national legislature. 
378. US Constitutional theory. The roots of this doctrine can be found in US constitutional 
theory. J. H. ELY, in his seminal work Democracy and Distrust,75 set out a theory of judicial review 
built upon a representation-reinforcing mode. To the question as to how to interpret the US 
Constitution, he ruled out, in turn, constitutional constructions based on clause-bound 
interpretivism, and the discovery of fundamental values. Instead, the starting point of its 
reasoning laid in United States v. Carolene Products Co., a case decided by the US Supreme Court 
in 1938. In a footnote, Justice STONE, who wrote for the majority, stressed the following: 
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when 
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such 
as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be 
embraced within the Fourteenth. […] 
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political 
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, 
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. […] 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes 
directed at particular religious […] or national […] or racial minorities […]; whether 
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prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.76 
For J. H. ELY, while the first paragraph of this statement is “pure interpretivism,”77 the second 
paragraph, coupled with the third, give an overview of what judicial review should consist in. 
On the one hand, the function of the Court is to guarantee the integrity of political processes 
(paragraph 2) or, in other words, the “machinery of majoritarian democracy.”78 However, on 
the other hand, paragraph 3 “suggests that the Court should also concern itself with what 
majorities do to minorities.”79 In a majoritarian democracy, so the argument goes, the majority 
tends to preserve its own interests, at the expense of minorities. As a result, it “does not ensure 
[…] the effective protection of minorities whose interests differ from the interests of most of the 
rest of us.”80 This ultimately runs counter to the fundamental principle of representation, 
according to which representatives must represent all the people, and not only majorities. As a 
way to offset the inherent deficiencies of the model of majoritarian democracy, the judiciary 
must develop a “representation-reinforcing mode of judicial review.”81 To this end, it must 
ensure “virtual representation” of minorities. J. H. ELY identifies two main minority groups. 
There are, in the first place, those who are members of a community, and who have therefore a 
voice in the political process, but who “find themselves functionally powerless.”82 There are also 
the “geographical outsiders, the literally voteless.”83 In this respect, J. H. ELY is of the view that 
the raison d’être of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause84 is precisely to make sure that nonresidents are virtually represented. He 
notes, with respect to the Privileges and Immunities Clause, that: 
[T]he reason inequalities against nonresidents were singled out for prohibition in the 
original Constitution is obvious: nonresidents are a paradigmatically powerless class 
politically. How then were they to be protected? Not by a set of substantive entitlements 
                                                 
76 United States v. Carolene Products Co. 304 U.S. 144 (1938), n. 4, 152-53 (citations omitted). 
77 J. H. ELY, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, above, n. 75, 1, defines interpretivism as “indicating 
that judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly 
implicit in the written Constitution.” 
78 Ibid., 76. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., 78. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., 84. 
83 Ibid. 
84 These two clauses are, as seen in the General Introduction the two main constitutional clauses used by the US 
Supreme Court to limit states’ powers. See, Supra, §§ 23s. 
Ch. 6. Section 1. The persistent silence of the Court of Justice 291 
but rather by what amounts to a system of virtual representation: by constitutionally tying 
the fate of outsiders to the fate of those who did possess political power, the framers 
insured that their interests would be well looked after.85 
In the end, J. H. ELY’s approach to judicial review is a “remedy for the process defect of 
exclusion from democratic decisionmaking procedures.”86 Many US constitutionalists have 
relied on it. In the contexts of interstate equality and interstate commerce, which raise similar 
issues to those of the European Union free movement principle,87 the limitations placed on the 
exercise of states’ police powers have been justified, for instance, by the fact that “everyone who 
is affected ought to be represented.”88 Likewise, it has been suggested that since nonresidents 
are deprived from the right to vote, they should be able to rely on constitutional equality 
principles.89 
379. Widening of the scope of the doctrine. J. H. ELY’s doctrine pertains primarily to the policing 
of the process of representation or, in other words, to the “integrity of the mechanics that 
produce the legislation.”90 It claims to be, in this sense, what could be described as a 
“democracy enhancer.”91 Some authors have suggested going beyond the initial scope of the 
representation-reinforcing theory, and to extend it in such a way as to justify the judicial 
creation of welfare rights. F. I. MICHELMAN, in particular, contends that these rights are “a part 
of constitutionally guaranteed democratic representation.”92 In this sense, they are necessary to 
complement and ensure the rights of participation of both nonresidents and ‘powerless’ 
minorities. The author notably refers to Goldberg v. Kelly, where the US Supreme Court stated 
that: 
Welfare […] can help bring within reach of the poor the same opportunities that are 
available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community […]. Public 
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assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to ‘procure the Blessings of Liberty to 
ourselves and our Posterity.’93 
380. Criticisms. All in all, J. H. ELY’s theory is a process-based theory, which expressly excludes 
from its rationale the taking into account of substantive values and it is this very aspect that has 
attracted objections. Authors have put forward two main ranges of criticisms. On the one hand, 
they have drawn attention to the fact that the doctrine wrongly assumes that “majoritarian 
democracy is the predominant constitutional value in every situation.”94 L. H. TRIBE moreover 
pointed to the “inherently incomplete nature of channel-clearing as an aim.”95 On the other 
hand, some scholars have referred to the federal features of the US political order. For R. B. 
COLLINS, J. H. ELY’s theory does not allow the basic question as to which level of government 
ought to act to be dealt with. Yet, if states are found to be entitled to legislate, their voters may 
legitimately advantage themselves.96 This relates to D. H. REGAN’s point, whereby 
“[n]onrepresentation of foreign interests follows from the simple fact that there are separate 
states.”97 
381. Shortcomings. The question is now whether the representation-reinforcing doctrine may 
equally justify the Court of Justice scrutiny when powers retained by Member States are 
involved. This theory undeniably goes beyond the functional justifications that I have reviewed 
so far. It indeed endeavors to build the legitimacy of European Union law upon substantive 
grounds based on democratic concerns. Nonetheless, it does not specifically address the issue as 
to why Member States should be compelled to give voice to out-of-state interests even in fields 
falling within their exclusive jurisdiction. M. P. M. MADURO concedes, admittedly, that: 
The existence of States, as identifiable political communities, only makes sense as long as 
those political communities express a greater degree of solidarity with their members than 
with non-members.98 
However, the representation-reinforcing perspective, like its US counterpart, does not take into 
account the division of powers characterizing the federal order of the European Union. C. 
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JOERGES stresses that it “clarifies and sanctions the commitments arising from its 
independence with equally democratically legitimized states.”99 But what if Member States have 
decided not to commit in certain fields, such as the fields analyzed herein? The same type of 
objection could be raised in the US context. However, it can be more easily overcome, as seen 
in the following section. As far as the nature of the Union is concerned, the US Supreme 
Court develops a consistent approach, which sees the Union as an entity established by the 
people of the United States, thereby representing popular sovereignty. Such an approach, or an 
equivalent, does not exist in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. 
382. Conclusion of Section 1. Section 2 has shed light on two sets of factors, which explicitly or 
implicitly motivate the European Court of Justice when it rules on cases involving powers 
retained by Member States. However, they are not entirely satisfactory. The principles of 
effectiveness, uniformity, and sincere cooperation are of a functional nature. They reveal the 
practical and theoretical necessity of the Court’s power-based approach. However, they are not 
sufficient to convincingly ground the authority and the legitimacy of European Union law 
when it limits the exercise of Member States’ powers in fields over which they wish to retain 
jurisdiction. The necessity to represent out-of-state interests within national political processes 
is, in this respect, more compelling. Yet, all the grounds that I have reviewed so far are 
characterized by the same shortcomings: they do not specifically bring to light the authority of 
European Union law for applying in fields over which Member States have retained 
jurisdiction. 
b. The lack of a compelling rationale 
383. In this paragraph, I claim that, notwithstanding the fact that it is not deprived of 
relevant justifications, the Court of Justice’s power-based approach ultimately lacks compelling 
grounds of justification. To this end, I resort to two complementary illustrations. These 
illustrations both shed light on how two other constitutional courts have relied on political 
philosophy in such a way as to substantiate their stance on the legal status to be imposed on 
states’ reserved powers. I first take an example outside the context of the European Union. I 
refer to US constitutional theory, and, in particular, the debate over the nature of the Union. I 
establish that by endorsing the view that the Constitution is a fundamental law created by one 
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single people, the US Supreme Court has been able to provide a coherent set of justifications to 
legitimize the judicial limitations placed upon states’ reserved powers. I then turn to an example 
relating specifically to the case of the European Union, namely the stance of the German 
Constitutional Court towards European integration. My point is not to assess whether the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht is right or wrong when it assumes the right to ultimately limit the reach 
of European integration. Instead, I show that its position is in line with the assumptions 
pertaining to the nature of the European Union that form the premises of its reasoning. These 
two examples allow me to ultimately demonstrate that, given that the European Court of Justice 
has never settled the issue of the nature of the European Union, its power-based approach is, as 
a result, deprived of solid foundations, thereby leaving its authority open to question. 
384. The US debate over the nature of the Union. The American Revolution literally 
revolutionized political theory, by transforming the then established concept of sovereignty. 
Until the 1776 Declaration of Independence, the American colonies were subject to British law 
and its principle of parliamentary sovereignty.100 Under this principle, sovereignty was vested in 
Parliament, which included the king, lords, and commons. As is well known, the American 
colonists called for actual representation within the British Parliament, notably after the Stamp 
Act was passed in 1765, which for the first time required them to pay a direct tax to England. 
They professed the principle of ‘no taxation without representation.’ The British replied that 
they were already virtually represented, since each Member of Parliament represented not only 
his district, but also the entire nation. The colonists rejected this view and claimed instead that 
sovereignty could only reside in the people themselves. Accordingly, they fundamentally altered 
the existing paradigm by shifting the locus of sovereignty from the Parliament to the people. 
This ultimately led to the Declaration of Independence, which proclaimed that “Governments 
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.” 
385. Unresolved issues. Following the Declaration of Independence, the former colonies 
adopted the Articles of Confederation. It quickly became apparent that the central government, 
as it was established, was too weak to respond to the many challenges of the time. To address 
this problem, representatives of the states met at the Convention of Philadelphia, which 
eventually led to the adoption of the US Constitution in 1787. Both the Articles of 
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Confederation and the Constitution were based on the principle of popular sovereignty.101 S. 
H. BEER has noted, in this respect, that this principle “made possible the distinctively American 
form of constitutionalism and so of federalism.”102 However, if the US Constitution conferred 
on the central government substantial powers, such as, to quote but a few, the power to collect 
taxes, to borrow money or to regulate interstate commerce,103 it nonetheless left fundamental 
constitutional issues unsettled. One of the most significant related to the very concept of 
sovereignty: where was it to reside? Everyone at the time agreed that it resided in the people, 
but some claimed that it was vested in the people of the nation, while others maintained that it 
was vested in the separate peoples of the states.104 This question reflected a fundamental 
disagreement over the issue relating to the nature of the Union. For the former, the Union was 
a sovereign nation, composed of one single people, whereas for the latter, it was nothing more 
than a compact between sovereign states. This debate, deeply intertwined with the slavery issue, 
as well as with issues of an economic and societal nature,105 divided American society until the 
second half of the nineteenth century. The nineteenth century witnessed a series of crises 
between nationalists and states’ rightists, which ultimately culminated with the Civil War that 
took place from 1861 through 1865. Each of these crises gave nationalists and states’ rightists 
the opportunity to put forward the conceptions they made of the Union respectively. The Civil 
War, won by Northern States, symbolizes the victory of the nationalist doctrine over the states’ 
rights doctrine.  
386. Outline. In the following paragraphs, I set forth, in turn, these two doctrines, which 
allows me to shed light on their respective claims relating to the status and legal framework that 
ought to be imposed on states’ reserved powers. I finally show that the US Supreme Court has 
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from very early on endorsed the nationalists’ claims, which has enabled it to give substantial 
grounds for the limitations it has placed over time upon states’ reserved powers. 
387. (i) Sovereignty resides in the people of each state. The theory of compact federalism, whereby 
the US Constitution amounts to a compact between sovereign states, is rooted in 
MONTESQUIEU’s confederate republic model. This republic, so the argument goes, is a 
“convention agreed by the governing bodies of the member republics,”106 composed of “small 
states related to one another by only a few external needs, such as defense.”107 The Anti-
Federalists pleaded for compact federalism during the constitutional debates,108 and were then 
taken over by the advocates of the states’ rights doctrine throughout the nineteenth century.109 
A. R. AMAR sums up their stance as follows: 
To states’ rightists […], the Peoples of each state were sovereign. […] The Constitution was a 
purely federal compact among thirteen sovereign principals to coordinate certain joint 
activities by employing a common agency. […] At most the Constitution simply made clear 
that sovereignty did not reside in state legislatures, as the Articles could have been 
(mis)interpreted as implying, but in state Peoples.110 
Defending the view that sovereignty resides in the people of each state has defining 
implications for the status of states’ reserved powers.111 
388. Implications for states’ reserved powers. Two main occasions gave states’ rightists the 
opportunity to expose their views: the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, and protective tariffs. 
Firstly, the adoption of the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798 gave rise to the theory of 
interposition. The states of Kentucky and Virginia issued Resolutions, in which they argued 
that, since the US Constitution was nothing more than a compact, states had the right to 
interpret the Constitution themselves, and, if necessary, to declare Acts of Congress such as the 
Alien and Sedition Acts, unconstitutional.112 J. MADISON, who secretly drafted the Virginia 
Resolution, stated that when Congress exceeded its delegated powers, state governments “have 
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the right and are in duty bound to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil.” According to 
this standpoint, states have a constitutional right to protect their spheres of powers against any 
encroachment from the national government. Next, protective tariffs were also at the center of 
political debates between Northern and Southern states. While the former were in favor of high 
tariffs to protect their industries, the latter wanted to lower them in order to encourage their 
exports.  
389. One of the most famous of these political debates involved R. Y. HAYNE, a states’ 
rightist, and D. WEBSTER, a nationalist, in 1830. It gave them the occasion to elaborate on their 
respective understanding of the Union. R. Y. HAYNE based its speeches on the premise that the 
Constitution was a compact between preexisting independent sovereign states.113 In line with 
the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, he reiterated that the states have a constitutional right 
to interpret and enforce the Constitution, because they are to be put on equal footing with the 
national government: “if there be no common superior, it results, from the very nature of 
things, that the parties must be their own judges.”114 From this he inferred interesting conclusions 
with respect to states’ powers: 
[States] have, it is true, voluntarily retained themselves from doing certain acts, but, in all 
other respects, they are as omnipotent as any independent nation whatever.115 
Thus, limitations on states’ powers may only flow from the will of the states. They enjoy 
discretion with respect to any power that they have not surrendered. In other words, they 
remain the final judges of the “proprietary of [their] use,”116 which ultimately implies that they 
are entitled to settle issues relating to the division of powers between themselves and the 
national government.  
390. Another famous Southern proponent stepped into the debate involving protective 
tariffs. J. C. CALHOUN, who described the 1828 Tariff as a ‘Tariff of Abominations,’ elaborated 
a comprehensive theory on government in his Exposition and in A Disquisition on Government.117 
Like other states’ rightists, he viewed the US Constitution as a compact between sovereign 
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states. If the national government exceeded its powers, the states had the right, and even the 
duty, to interpose, and to nullify unconstitutional laws.118 J. C. CALHOUN is mostly 
remembered for his ideas on the concurrent majority. Under this theory, the majority of the 
majority and the majority of the minority must systematically find an agreement on all core 
issues before a law may be adopted. The national and states governments being equal, they have 
the right to determine the reach of their respective powers. The supremacy clause may only 
apply within the spheres of the powers delegated to the national government. In sum, J. C. 
CALHOUN maintained that: 
The concurrent majority […] tends to unite the most opposite and conflicting interests, and 
to blend the whole in one common attachment to the country. By giving to each interest, 
or portion, the power of self-protection, all strife and struggle between them for 
ascendency, is prevented; and, thereby, not only every feeling calculated to weaken the 
attachment to the whole is suppressed, but the individual and the social feelings are made 
to unite in one common devotion to country.119 
391. This brief overview of the states’ rights doctrine reveals that defending the compact 
theory has significant implications for the nature of the Union, and therefore for the nature of 
the relationship between the national government and the states. Under this view, the national 
government, including federal courts, does not hold the authority or the legitimacy to encroach 
upon states’ spheres of powers. Sovereignty is vested in the people of each state, which have a 
say on each law enacted by Congress that would affect them individually. In the long run, the 
Southern states went as far as to use this doctrine to assert the power to secede, which was, in 
particular, a way for them to preserve their slavery powers as well as their economic interests, 
and which ultimately led to the Civil War. 
392. (ii) Sovereignty resides in one single people. Turning now to the nationalists’ stand, they took 
a very different perspective. Instead of describing the Constitution as a compact, they depicted 
it as the fundamental law of one single people. While MONSTESQUIEU inspired compact 
federalism, the national theory finds its roots in J. HARRINGTON’s work The Commonwealth of 
Oceana.120 In Oceana, the people of the whole nation ratify the “order.” For J. HARRINGTON, 
the local governments moreover “serve local needs and guard against the possible abuse of 
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power by the center; yet even in this role, they act as subdivisions of one nation.”121 These ideas 
are reflected in the views of the nationalists: 
To nationalists […], the people of the United States as a whole were sovereign. […] The 
Constitution was not an inter-sovereign compact or treaty, but a supreme statute deriving 
from the supreme sovereign legislature – the People of the nation.122 
Two variants may be identified among nationalists’ stances. On the one hand, some argue that 
the creation of the American people dated from the Declaration of Independence. The two 
main nineteenth-century proponents of this view are J. STORY and A. LINCOLN. In this respect, 
the latter famously claimed in 1861 that: 
Originally some dependent colonies made the Union, and, in turn, the Union threw off 
their old dependence for them, and made them States […]. The Union, and not themselves 
separately, produced their independence and liberty. By conquest or purchase the Union 
have to each of them whatever independence or liberty it has. The Union is older than any 
of the States, and, in fact, it created them as States.123 
On the other hand, others make a case for a ‘transformational view,’ according to which prior 
to the ratification process of the Constitution, the states were in fact independent sovereigns. 
Their transformation was induced by the various ratifications, which “formed the basic social 
compact by which formerly distinct sovereign Peoples, each acting in convention, agreed to 
reconstitute themselves into one common sovereignty.”124 These two alternatives thus raise the 
question as to where sovereignty was vested before the adoption of the Constitution.125 
However, notwithstanding their differences, they have the same implications for states’ reserved 
powers. 
393. Implications for states’ reserved powers. From the existence of one single people, nationalists 
infer fundamental principles. First, the interpretation of the Constitution may only be uniform. 
As J. STORY underlines it, “having been adopted by the majority of the people,” the 
fundamental law “binds the whole community proprio vigore.”126 Very interestingly, he goes on to 
assert that states are precluded from imposing their individual views on the whole of the 
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people.127 The point implied here is that this would be contrary to the majoritarian, and 
therefore to the democratic, principles. In the same vein, and in response to R. Y. HAYNE, D. 
WEBSTER asserted, for instance, that: 
It is, sir, the People’s Constitution, the People’s Government; made for the People, made 
by the People; and answerable to the People.128 
For myself, sir, I do not admit the jurisdiction of South Carolina, or any other State, to 
prescribe my constitutional duty, or to settle, between me and the People, the validity of 
laws of Congress, for which I have voted. I decline their umpirage.129 
Logically, this first principle gives rise to a second one, which is intrinsically linked to it. The 
uniform interpretation of the Constitution may be guaranteed only if the Supremacy Clause is 
enforced.130 This leads to a third basic principle: the existence of one single interpreter of the 
Constitution.131 Therefore, nationalists firmly reject any states’ right to interposition or 
nullification. States, far from being entitled to delineate and protect themselves their own 
spheres of powers, are subject to the decisions of the federal tribunals in case of jurisdictional 
conflicts. And, since the People directly established the national government, the latter may 
exercise its powers without being subject to any state veto, but only to the rulings of the US 
Supreme Court.132 
394. (iii) The endorsement of the national theory by the Supreme Court. Sketching a comprehensive 
overview of the Supreme Court political philosophy would fill several volumes. For present 
purposes, I will therefore limit myself to refer to but a few of the Supreme Court early rulings, 
which nonetheless give a good sense of where it stands. It endorsed, very early in its case law, 
the national theory. Strikingly, the cases in which it laid the basis for the most fundamental 
principles of its jurisprudence all start from the premise according to which the Constitution is 
a fundamental law created by one single people forming one nation. Admittedly, the Supreme 
Court was never directly called upon to rule on interposition or nullifications issues. The latter 
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were mostly discussed during public debates. However, just a few years after the Kentucky and 
Virginia Resolutions, the Supreme Court set forth its fundamentally differing conception of the 
Constitution in the seminal case Marbury v. Madison, decided in 1803.133 As is well known, this 
decision opposed W. Marbury, who had been appointed Justice of the Peace by the former 
President J. Adams, but whose commission was not subsequently delivered. The Supreme 
Court was asked whether the new Secretary of State J. Madison was to be compelled to deliver 
the aforementioned commission. To this end, it argued that it had to establish whether the 
provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that had enabled W. Marbury to bring his claim before 
the Court, which turned out to be contrary to the Constitution, should as a result be 
overturned. On this point, it began by stating: 
That the people have an original right to establish for their future government such 
principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness is the basis on 
which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a 
very great exertion; nor can it nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, 
therefore, so established are deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they 
proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.134 
Therefore, the starting point of its reasoning lies in the supreme character of the authority, 
vested in the people, who establish the fundamental principles of their government. It is from 
this fact that the Supreme Court infers that the Constitution is “superior, paramount law, 
unchangeable by ordinary means,”135 and then that “a legislative act contrary to the 
Constitution is not law.”136 In other words, it is the national theory that allowed the Supreme 
Court to give grounds for its doctrine of judicial review, and to indirectly rule out the theories 
of interposition and nullification.137  
395. The Court followed the same approach in two subsequent rulings. In Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee, decided in 1816, J. STORY, writing for the majority, specified that the scope of the power 
of judicial review extended to state courts decisions involving civil matters of federal law after 
reasserting that: 
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The Constitution of the United States was ordained and established not by the States in 
their sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the Constitution declares, 
by ‘the people of the United States.’138 
Likewise, in Cohen v. Virginia, the Supreme Court asserted jurisdiction with respect to state 
courts rulings involving criminal matters when the defendant claimed that her constitutional 
rights had been violated after placing emphasis on the following: 
That the United States form, for many and for most important purposes, a single nation 
has not yet been denied. In war, we are one people. In making peace, we are one people. In 
all commercial regulations, we are one and the same people. In many other respects, the 
American people are one, and the government, which is alone capable of controlling and 
managing their interests in all these respects, is the government of the Union.139 
396. National theory and states’ powers. The endorsement of the national theory by the 
Supreme Court also had significant implications for the relationship between the national 
government and the states. It allowed it, in particular, to justify the major developments of its 
jurisprudence with respect to states’ powers. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, it already noted, 
incidentally, that the US Constitution “was to act not merely upon individuals, but upon 
States, and to deprive them altogether of the exercise of some powers of sovereignty and to 
restrain and regulate them in the exercise of others.”140 Accordingly, not only does it govern the 
division of powers between the national government and the states, but also the conditions 
under which states’ powers are exercised. The decisive moment occurred a few years later, in 
1819, when the Court decided McCulloch v. Maryland. As I have already mentioned,141 the facts 
of this case involved a statute enacted by the state of Maryland, which subjected the Bank of the 
United States to a tax. The Supreme Court was called upon to rule on two distinct issues. First, 
it was to decide whether the national government could validly establish a bank. Second, it was 
to assess whether the exercise of Congress power could have the effect of restraining states’ own 
taxing powers. In both cases, it appealed to the national theory. With respect to the former, it 
interpreted for the first time the ‘Necessary and Proper Clause’142 of the Constitution and 
claimed that: 
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The Government of the Union then […] is, emphatically and truly, a Government of the 
people. In form and in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, 
and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.143 
Relying on this premise, the Court then demonstrated that since the Constitution was not a 
compact concluded by the various peoples of the states, the Clause was to be interpreted 
broadly.144 With respect to the latter, I have already noted that Chief Justice MARSHALL 
resorted to arguments of a functional nature.145 Besides these arguments, he added that: 
[W]hen a State taxes the operations of the Government of the United States, it acts upon 
institutions created not by their own institutions, but by people over whom they claim no 
control. It acts upon the measures of a Government created by others as well as themselves, 
for the benefit of others in common with themselves. The difference is that which always 
exists, and always must exist, between the action of the whole on a part, and the action of a 
part on the whole.146 
In other words, a state may not impinge on the jurisdiction of the national government for the 
very reason that the latter has been created by the whole of the people, while the state only 
represents its own constituents. Chief Justice MARSHALL thus based the necessary limitations 
placed upon states’ taxing powers on the superiority of the authority of the national 
government over the authority of each individual state.147  
397. Therefore, the national theory has played a fundamental role for the consistency and 
legitimation of the Supreme Court jurisprudence, and, in particular, of the judicial limitations 
placed upon states’ powers. It forms an integral part of the Court’s reasoning, and is the 
cornerstone of its internal coherence, as well as its own authority and legitimacy. In this respect, 
it is striking that the US Supreme Court almost systematically refers to the unity of the nation, 
and the necessity to preserve it, in rulings that have the effect of restricting states’ reserved 
powers. It often refers, for instance, to Justice CARDOZO’s famous assertion that “the peoples of 
the several states must sink or swim together,” and that “prosperity and salvation are in union 
and not division.”148 All in all, the case law of the US Supreme Court reveals its constant efforts 
to justify and to set forth the rationale behind its reasoning. It does so by relying on the 
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national theory, and does not limit itself to explain why it is necessary, from a practical point of 
view, to restrain the exercise of states’ reserved powers. Instead, it goes beyond functional 
arguments, by setting out why these restrictions are justified. And it does so by relying on 
structural arguments149 i.e. “on basic principles it believes immanent in the structure of the 
United States as a federal union:”150 
There is no express provision for the case, but the claim has been sustained on a principle 
which so entirely pervades the constitution, is so intermixed with the materials which 
compose it, so interwoven with its web, so blended with its texture, as to be incapable of 
being separated from it, without rending it into shreds.151 
398. The German Constitutional Court approach.152 Similarly, the German Constitutional Court 
has based its judgments involving European integration issues on a comprehensive set of 
premises that rely on political philosophy, while using these assumptions in a very different way 
than the US Supreme Court. 
399. Premises reminiscent of the US compact federalism theory. The very starting point of the 
German Constitutional Court reasoning is, as J. H. H. WEILER and J. P. TRACHTMAN put it, 
the “no demos thesis.”153 The Bundesverfassungsgericht has indeed described the then European 
Community and the current European Union as a ‘federation of States’ (Staatenverbund), which: 
[C]overs a close long-term association of states which remain sovereign, a treaty-based 
association which exercises public authority, but whose fundamental order is subject to the 
decision-making power of the Member States in which the peoples, i.e. the citizens, of the 
Member states, remain the subjects of democratic legitimation.154 
In other words, the source of authority of the European Union lies in the individual peoples of 
the Member States.155 This premise is intrinsically linked to another assumption made by the 
German Court, namely that the Member States “remain the masters of the treaties.”156 The 
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Court moreover never misses an opportunity to recall that each Member State is sovereign, and 
that its powers proceed from its own people.157 As a result, the fundamental feature of the 
European Union legal order lies in its derived character: 
The exercise of sovereign power through a federation of States like the European Union is 
based on authorizations from States which remain sovereign and which in international 
matters generally act through their governments and control the integration process 
thereby. It is therefore primarily determined governmentally.158 
400. Implications for Member States’ powers. Thus, the doctrine developed by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht is highly reminiscent of the US compact federalism theory. It moverover 
infers implications for Member States’ powers that are similar to its US counterpart.159 Since 
the German Constitutional Court is of the view that the European Union derives both its 
authority and legitimacy from the Member States, it concludes that the latter’s spheres of 
powers must be preserved.160 The line that must not be crossed is defined by the conferral 
principle. Under no circumstances may the European Union have Kompetenz-Kompetenz.161 In 
this respect, the Court argues that “[t]he obligation under European law to respect the 
constituent power of the Member states as the masters of the Treaties corresponds to the non-
transferrable identity of the constitution.”162 It goes on by stressing that fields such as criminal 
law, the use of force, taxation, social policy, and cultural aspects relating to family law, 
education, and religious freedom are essential for Member States’ constitutional identity.163 
This leads the Bundesverfassungsgericht to assert a fundamental principle, which is inconsistent 
with the European Court of Justice basic doctrine. Just as the states’ rightists in Antebellum 
America, it is of the view that national constitutional courts have jurisdiction to review 
European Union acts that would encroach upon Member States’ assent to the transfer of 
certain powers to the European Union.164 Accordingly, it considers the principles of uniformity 
of interpretation and of primacy of European Union law as only relative. The German 
Constitutional Court indeed openly claims that it will rule out the application of a European 
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Union act on the German territory if it turns out to breach the conferral principle.165 It thus 
sees itself, together with the other national constitutional courts, as the final arbiter of 
jurisdictional disputes involving the European Union and its Member States.166 The adoption 
of these premises has therefore allowed the Bundesverfassungsgericht to follow a state-centered 
perspective, and to locate the source of authority of the European Union in the peoples of the 
Member States. Under this view, the European Union is a compound of States, and primarily 
remains an instrument of international law. The conclusions that the German Constitutional 
Court draws from these assumptions openly conflict with the case law developed by the 
European Court of Justice. 
401. Critical assessment. Regardless of whether or not we agree with the doctrines developed 
by the US Supreme Court and the German Constitutional Court respectively, my claim is that 
they have the merit of being based on explicit premises. These assumptions have allowed the 
two courts to put forward a coherent set of arguments with respect to the legal framework that 
ought to be given to states’ reserved powers. By contrast, the European Court of Justice power-
based approach, much like its entire case law, lacks convincing foundations, which would make 
explicit and give grounds for the authority and legitimacy of European Union law to place 
limits upon the exercise of the powers retained by Member States. 
402. The striking silence of the European Court of Justice. As is well known, the European Court 
established, in the very early years of the then European Economic Community, that not only 
does European Union law trump any national law contrary to it, but also that the Court is itself 
the ultimate interpreter of European Union law, thereby binding the national courts.167 The 
enshrinement of the principles of direct effect and primacy gave rise to the constitutionalization 
process of the European Union legal order. Under this view, the latter is autonomous and 
independent of national legal orders: 
                                                 
165 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 be 2/08 (2009), 241. 
166 R. SCHÜTZE, “On ‘federal’ ground: the European Union as an (inter)national phenomenon,” 46: 4 C. M. L. 
Rev. 1069, 1094-1095 (2009). See also M. HERDEGEN, “Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court: 
Constitutional restraints for an ‘ever closer union’,” 31: 1 C. M. L. Rev. 235 (1994); A. G. SOARES, “The principle 
of conferred powers and the division of powers between the European Community and the Member States,” 23: 1 
Liverpool Law Review 57, 74-75 (2001); P. KIIVER, “The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court: A 
Court-ordered strengthening of the national legislature in the EU,” 16 European Law Journal 578-588 (2010). 
167 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, [1963] ECR 3; Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] ECR 585. In Case 294/83 Parti 
Ecologiste les Verts v. European Parliament, [1986] ECR I-1339, the European Court of Justice described the Treaties 
as the ‘constitutional charter of the Community,’ and dropped the reference to international law.  
Ch. 6. Section 1. The persistent silence of the Court of Justice 307 
[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of 
which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the 
subjects of which comprise not only Member states but also their nationals.168 
[T]he Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and 
have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves.169 
But where from does the European Union derive its legitimacy? Several authors have addressed 
this issue. For some of them, the European Union is deprived of a constituent power; it 
emanates from international treaties, the parties of which are the Member States.170 Others 
maintain that Member States’ peoples provide its authority indirectly, through their respective 
governments and national parliaments.171 Finally, mention must be made of P. PESCATORE, 
former scholar who was also a very influential judge at the European Court of Justice from 
1967 through 1985. He is one of the first scholars who emphasized the significance of the 
structure of the then European Communities. He notably described the system established by 
the European Communities as “supranational,” and defined the notion of supranationality as 
the “creation of a whole system of relationships of authority and power.”172 More specifically, 
three factors characterize it: (i) the recognition of common values; (ii) the existence of effective 
powers; (iii) and the existence of autonomous powers.173P. PESCATORE also made the claim that 
the law of integration, distinct from international law, rested on the premise of the “divisibility 
of sovereignty.”174 Starting from this fundamental assumption, he inferred that: 
The creation of common institutions, organized in such a way that all the states 
participating can recognize their objectivity, makes acceptable the limitations on national 
sovereignty arising from accession to a system governed by the law of integration.175 
Accordingly, P. PESCATORE based the limitations placed on national sovereignty or, in other 
words, on national powers, on substantive arguments that relied on the nature of sovereignty, 
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the latter being seen as divided between two levels of government, and not exclusively on the 
practical necessity to impose constraints upon the Member States.  
403. By contrast, the European Court of Justice has, up to now, always been conspicuously 
silent as to the source(s) of authority of the European Union. Unlike the US Supreme Court 
and the German Constitutional Court, it has never developed a comprehensive reasoning 
explaining the basis of the European Union’s legitimacy. It has never, in other words, set out its 
own conception of the nature of the European Union. That being said, my claim is that the 
lack of such a premise in its reasoning has a detrimental effect on the coherence and 
consistency of its overall case law. Indeed, it ultimately prevents the Court from developing a 
thorough doctrine based on compelling grounds of authority and legitimacy, and also from 
countering the reluctance of national courts, starting with the Bundesverfassungsgericht. This is 
particularly true of its power-based approach. The power-based approach indeed pertains to 
fields where the European Union has either no, or very limited, jurisdiction. As a result, the 
conferral principle may not be used as a legitimate basis to give it solid grounds of justification. 
However, while the US Supreme Court has endorsed the national theory to justify the 
limitations put on states’ reserved powers, and while the German Constitutional Court has 
developed the ‘no demos’ thesis to arrogate itself the right to rule out European Union acts 
impeding the conferral principle or Germany’s constitutional identity, the European Court of 
Justice has simply stated the principle according to which Member States must comply with 
European Union law when exercising their retained powers, without going beyond the 
aforementioned functional justifications. In other words, as B. DE WITTE accurately points out: 
[The] Court has remained remarkably silent on the subject of sovereignty and has not made 
any attempt at formulating a comprehensive theory about the place of (State) sovereignty 
within the framework of European integration.176 
My overall conclusion is, as a result, that the European Court of Justice power-based approach 
does not comprise comprehensive grounds of authority and legitimacy. However, I do not 
argue that the European Court of Justice should specifically follow either the perspective of the 
US Supreme Court or that of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Instead, my point is that it should in 
turn develop its own coherent and explicit set of justifications. As a result, its power-based 
                                                 
176 B. DE WITTE, “Sovereignty and European integration: The weight of legal tradition,” 2 Maastricht J. Eur. & 
Comp. L. 145, 154 (1995). 
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approach would be more coherent, legitimate and transparent, and thus less questionable from 
the perspective of legitimacy. It would also strengthen the Court’s own authority as the 
ultimate arbiter of jurisdictional conflicts between the European Union and its Member States. 
404. Conclusion of Section 1. In this first section, I have claimed that the Court of Justice’s 
power-based approach is not grounded on a solid rationale. I have first established that the 
principle of primacy of European Union law is an unconvincing ground of justification as it is 
an instrument that does not aim to determine when there is a conflict but rather how to solve 
such a conflict. I have then reviewed, in turn, several justifications that actually play a part in 
the identification of the rationale behind the Court of Justice’s case law involving powers 
retained by Member States. Justifications of a functional nature, such as effectiveness and the 
principle of sincere cooperation, are, admittedly, relevant grounds, but they nonetheless do not 
give sufficient authority and legitimacy to the power-based approach. As for the representation 
of out-of-state interests, it constitutes a deeper ground, based on democratic and fairness 
concerns, nonetheless it does not aim to specifically explain why the applicability of European 
Union law should extend to fields over which the European Union has no, or very limited, 
jurisdiction. These findings have led me to look into the reasoning of the US Supreme Court 
and the German Constitutional Court. Both courts have developed doctrines based on explicit 
foundations, which have allowed them to infer coherent implications for the legal status to be 
given to American states’ and European Member States’ powers respectively. This very element 
is lacking in the European Court of Justice’s own power-based approach, which has the effect of 
weakening the legitimacy and authority grounds of the case law and of the Court itself. Cases 
involving powers retained by Member States – and, to a certain extent, all free movement cases 
– therefore reveal a striking discrepancy between the comprehensive assessment of 
proportionality made by the Court, as seen in Chapter 3,177 and, to say the least, its evasive 
attitude towards the justification of the applicability of European Union law in fields over 
which Member States seek to retain jurisdiction. 
                                                 
177 See, Supra, §§ 139s. 
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SECTION 2. THE STRUCTURAL MODEL ENTRENCHED BY THE POWER-BASED APPROACH 
405. The purpose of the present section is to shed light on the structural model that is 
entrenched by the power-based approach in cases involving powers retained by Member States. 
In order to do so, I focus specifically on three components of the concept of federalism:1 (i) the 
federal principle, which can be described as the general agreement that binds the members of a 
federation and which corresponds, therefore, to the foundation on which is built a federation; 
(ii) the federal balance, which refers to the manner the two levels of government interact; and 
(iii) the safeguards of federalism, i.e. the means used to safeguard the integrity of the various 
entities composing the federation. Taken together, these elements will help me shed light on 
the defining features of the nature of European federalism characterizing cases involving powers 
retained by Member States. Once again, I will rely in particular on the US federal experience. 
1. Free movement, the cornerstone principle governing European federalism 
406. In cases involving powers retained by Member States, the European Court of Justice 
primarily resorts to the principle of free movement as a yardstick against which the interplay 
between the European Union and its Member States, as well as among Member States 
themselves, is defined. As a result, the free movement principle should be described as a 
cornerstone principle governing European federalism. My argument is twofold. First, the 
central value underlying the free movement principle is the promotion of federalism, and not, 
contrary to what is commonly accepted, the protection of individual rights. Second, consistent 
with this assumption, I show that the primary function of the free movement principle, in cases 
involving powers retained by Member States, is the enforcement of federalism or, in other 
words, the regulation of the relations between the European Union and its Member States, and 
amongst Member States. 
a. The underlying value: the promotion of federalism 
407. In what follows, I provide a ‘federal/structural-based’ analysis of the free movement 
principle, which better reflects, in my view, the way it is used in cases involving powers retained 
by Member States. This approach draws on an understanding of the four traditional freedoms 
and European Union citizenship that is more holistic than the way they are traditionally 
                                                 
1 See, Supra, §§ 35s. 
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understood. This reveals that, notwithstanding their respective legal frameworks, the five 
freedoms ultimately protect the same value, the promotion of federalism. In order to 
substantiate my claim I first examine the US constitutional debate.  
408. The US constitutional debate. As far as US constitutional provisions relating to what 
would be depicted in the context of the European Union as ‘free movement issues’ are 
concerned, several authors have challenged the traditional rights-based analysis. They have 
offered a reading of these provisions based on a structural perspective, which reveals that they 
primarily seek to promote federalism. As seen in the General Introduction, the US legal order 
includes several constitutional principles relating to free movement issues, namely: the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV – also commonly called the ‘Comity Clause,’ the 
dormant Commerce Clause, and the right to travel.2 In the same way as in the context of the 
European Union, many commentators, and, to a greater or lesser extent, the US Supreme 
Court itself, usually see these provisions as aiming primarily to protect individual rights.3 
However, several authors have challenged this traditional view, and have developed powerful 
arguments bringing to light its limits, and putting forward alternative, and more compelling, 
interpretations. 
409. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV of the US Constitution is, to begin with, very instructive, given that the US Supreme 
Court itself used to cast it as a constitutional provision protecting individual fundamental 
rights. Justice WASHINGTON, writing for the majority of the Court in Corfield v. Coryell, initially 
defined the privileges and immunities as those “which are, in their nature, fundamental; which 
belong, of right, to the citizens of all free Government.”4 Under this construction, the Privileges 
and Immunities was used to protect fundamental rights per se, regardless of the implications for 
the state statute subject to the Supreme Court’s scrutiny for federalism. Following this initial 
phase, the Court began to move away from natural rights theories.5 In Paul v. Virginia, it 
                                                 
2 See, Supra, §§ 23s. 
3 J. NZELIBE, “Free movement: A federalist reinterpretation,” 49 Am. Univ. L. Rev. 433, 441 (1999): “It seems that 
every anti-discriminatory, union-promoting principle embedded in the Constitution has been cast at one time as a 
personal or individual right.” 
4 Corfield v. Coryell 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). 
5 L. H. TRIBE, American Constitutional Law, (New York: N.Y.: Foundation Press, 2000), 1251; D. S. BOGEN, 
Privileges and Immunities. A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution, (Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 
London, 2003), 69. 
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described the privileges and immunities as “those privileges and immunities that each state 
affords to its own citizens under their constitution and laws.”6 It instituted a new test, under 
which it had to be asserted whether a state discriminated against nonresidents and, if so, 
whether the rights affected were fundamental. The decisive move occurred in Toomer v. Witsel, 
where the Supreme Court abandoned the ‘fundamentality’ criterion to focus instead on the 
justifications given by the states with respect to the challenged discrimination. The majority of 
the Court ruled that: 
The primary purpose of this clause […] was to help fuse into one nation a collection of 
independent, sovereign states. It was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures 
into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy.7 
Even if the Supreme Court again referred to fundamental rights in several subsequent cases,8 a 
number of authors have developed compelling arguments showing that the primary purpose of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause is “to facilitate federalism by preventing parochialism in 
the treatment by a state of citizens of other states.”9 At the core of the Comity Clause is 
ensuring harmonious interstate relations, not protecting individuals from state interference. J. 
M. GONZALES shows, in this respect, that it must be read in the context of other constitutional 
provisions, all of which aim to “promote peaceful relations among the states by eliminating 
many of the obstacles to the realization of an effective union among them.”10 These provisions 
are the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV, the Interstate Rendition Clause of Article 
IV, the Interstate Compact provision of Article A, the Commerce Clause, and Article III, §2, 
Clause 1 relating to the federal judicial power. The Comity Clause moreover has its roots, as 
does the Commerce Clause, in Article IV of the Articles of Confederation, the purpose of 
which was to regulate interstate relations.11 
                                                 
6 Paul v. Virginia 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). 
7 Toomer v. Witsell 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948). 
8 E.g. Hicklin v. Orbeck 437 U.S. 518 (1978); New Hampshire v. Piper 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985). 
9 J. M. GONZALES, “Comment: The interstate Privileges and Immunities: Fundamental rights or federalism?,” 15 
Capital University Law Review 493, 494 (1986). 
10 Ibid., 495-496. 
11 Article IV, §1 of the Articles of Confederation reads as follows: “The better to secure and perpetuate mutual 
friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of 
these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and 
immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall free ingress and regress to and 
from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, 
impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not 
extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to any other State, of which the owner 
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410. The dormant Commerce Clause. Many authors point to the common features shared by the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause.12 The latter is 
intrinsically linked to the building of a common market, which was one of the main reasons 
why the US Constitution was ratified in the first place. Here again, some scholars have shown 
that the dormant Commerce Clause should be read from a federal-based perspective instead of 
an individual-rights perspective. Consistent with this approach, R. B. COLLINS has described 
the rights recognized under this provision as “intergovernmental,” and not as “personal.” He 
has maintained that the dormant Commerce Clause is fundamentally concerned with interstate 
jurisdictional conflicts on the following grounds:  
Personal theories are wrong. The framers’ concern with economic union arose from 
conflicts among the states and problems of foreign trade, not from disputes between the 
states and individual merchants.13 
411. The right to travel. Turning now to the right to travel, as one author has put it, its 
“sources and dimensions […] as a constitutional entitlement remain mysterious and 
indeterminate.”14 The Supreme Court nonetheless seems to have rooted it in the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, constitutional issues involving 
interstate travel are analyzed through the lens of a rights-based perspective, which consists in 
focusing on “classifications based on how recently an individual has traveled into a state.”15 In 
Crandall v. Nevada, which concerned a tax imposed by the state of Nevada on people leaving 
this state by vehicles which were in the business of transporting passengers, the Court held for 
the first time that the right to travel was a fundamental right.16 In Saenz v. Roe, a contemporary 
ruling involving a California statute limiting the amount of welfare benefits available to 
newcomers to what they were entitled to in their state of prior residence,17 it confirmed this 
‘rights-based reading’ of issues relating to interstate travel: 
                                                 
is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid by any State, on the property 
of the United States, or either of them.” 
12 See, for instance, L. H. TRIBE, American Constitutional Law, above, n. 5, 1260. 
13 R. B. COLLINS, “Economic union as a constitutional value,” 63 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 43, 46 (1988). 
14 B. H. WILDENTHAL, “State parochialism, the right to travel, and the privileges and immunities Clause of Article 
IV,” 41: 6 Stanford Law Review 1557, 1575 (1989). 
15 B. H. WILDENTHAL, “State parochialism, the right to travel, and the privileges and immunities Clause of Article 
IV,” above, n. 14, 1574. See also J. NZELIBE, “Free movement: A federalist reinterpretation,” above, n. 3, 435. 
16 Crandall v. Nevada 73 U.S. 35 (1868). 
17 See, Supra, § 345. 
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The states have not now, if they ever had, a power to restrict their citizenship to any classes 
or persons. A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional right to go to and 
reside in any state he chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, and an equality of rights 
with every other citizen; and the whole power of the nation is pledged to sustain him in 
that right.18 
However, convincing arguments have been developed to challenge this understanding. To 
begin with, S. O’CONNOR, a Supreme Court Justice, offered a convincing alternative in a 
concurring opinion in Zobel v. Williams. This case related to a law enacted by Alaska in order to 
distribute income derived from its natural resources to its residents, the amounts of which 
varied depending on the length of each citizen’s residence. It thus had the effect of favoring 
long-term residents to the detriment of newcomers. S. O’CONNOR argued that the right to 
travel should no longer be grounded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but instead in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. She argued 
that: 
[A]pplication of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to controversies involving the "right 
to travel" would at least begin the task of reuniting this elusive right with the constitutional 
principles it embodies.19 
The constitutional principles S. O’CONNOR alluded to relate to federalism principles. As L. 
TRIBE has persuasively pointed it out, the right to travel primarily embodies a “concern for 
interstate comity”20 instead of an individual right relating to interstate movement. It is indeed a 
“structural principle,”21 which reflects “the Court’s vision of governmental design in a federal 
union of equal states.”22 Other authors have similarly shown that the underlying values of the 
right to travel are in fact the “explicit condemnation of state parochialism,”23 and the 
promotion of the federal union.24 
412. The common rationale behind the US ‘free movement provisions.’ Therefore, taken together, 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the dormant Commerce Clause, and the 
right to travel embody the same rationale despite the different constitutional contexts in which 
                                                 
18 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
19 Saenz v. Roe 526 U.S. 489 (1999). (S. O’Connor, concurring). 
20 L. H. TRIBE, “Comment: Saenz sans prophecy: does the privileges or immunities clause revival portend the future 
– or reveal the structure of the present?,” 113 Harvard Law Review, 110, 141 (1999). 
21 Ibid., 146. 
22 Ibid., 154. 
23 B. H. WILDENTHAL, “State parochialism, the right to travel, and the privileges and immunities Clause of Article 
IV,” above, n. 14, 1575. 
24 J. NZELIBE, “Free movement: A federalist reinterpretation,” above, n. 3, 435. 
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they apply. They are all meant to protect two sets of intertwined interests: the preservation of 
the nation’s political, social, and economic unity,25 and the prevention of state parochialism.26 
These two sets of concerns are ultimately two sides of the same coin, the promotion of 
federalism. As J. NZELIBE convincingly puts it, “the freedom-to-move principle, the Commerce 
Clause, and the Comity Clause constitute a ‘trio’ of union-conserving norms.”27 
413. The lessons for the ECJ power-based approach. In what follows, I demonstrate that the 
traditional reading of the free movement principle, stemming, in a similar way to what occurs 
in the US context, from a rights-based approach, does not allow for an entirely comprehensive 
account of the role and function played by that principle in the cases concerned by the power-
based approach. Its shortcomings, to be overcome, call for what I have described a “federalist” 
or “structural” reinterpretation inspired by what I have just depicted in relation to US 
constitutional theory. 
414. Traditional reading: the conferring of individual rights. The principle of free movement is of 
crucial importance for European integration. It forms the pillar of the establishment and the 
functioning of the internal market, which was, historically, the primary goal of the then 
European Economic Community. As is well known, it encompasses the four traditional 
economic freedoms. In this respect, Article 26§2 TFEU provides that: 
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaties.  
Mention must also be made of a non-economic freedom, the free movement enjoyed by citizens 
of the European Union, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. The European Court of Justice 
gradually recognized that each of the freedoms have direct effect, which has enabled natural 
and/or legal persons to resort to the free movement provisions before national courts when 
their claims involve free movement issues. Scholars typically note that, as F. G. JACOBS puts it, 
“[w]ith the assistance of direct effect, the freedoms set out in the Treaty […] are transformed 
                                                 
25 D. S. BOGEN, Privileges and Immunities. A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution, above, n. 5, 27; R. B. 
COLLINS, “Economic union as a constitutional value,” above, n. 13, 60; J. NZELIBE, “Free movement: A federalist 
reinterpretation,” above, n. 3, 436, 445; W. A. KNOX, “Prospective applications of the Article IV Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution,” 43 Missouri Law Review 1, 18 (1978). 
26 R. A. SEDLER, “The negative commerce clause as a restriction on state regulation and taxation: an analysis in 
terms of constitutional structure,” 31 Wayne Law Review 885, 1011 (1985); B. H. WILDENTHAL, “State 
parochialism, the right to travel, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,” above, n. 14, 1563. 
27 J. NZELIBE, “Free movement: A federalist reinterpretation,” above, n. 3, 441. 
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into individual rights.”28 The Court of Justice has inferred from each freedom, described as 
“fundamental,” a specific set of individual rights. On that account, free movement cases are 
usually analyzed from a right- and an individual-centered perspective. E. SPAVENTA’s claim 
according to which “the effect of the free movement provisions is to impose a duty to refrain 
from disproportionate interference with fundamental economic and non-economic rights,”29 is 
emblematic of this approach. This author also characterizes the Court of Justice as “a guarantor 
of individual rights vis-à-vis national regulators.”30 In other words, the free movement principle 
is seen as a tool creating a direct bond between the European Union and individuals. Under 
this view, it is considered as a means to prevent national authorities from hampering individual 
free movement rights. 
415. Traditional reading: the focus on the nature of individual rights. In line with this view, many 
authors have looked into the content and the nature of free movement rights. Many of them 
have focused on the significant shift that has occurred. Initially, so the argument goes, the 
rights embodied in the four traditional freedoms were first and foremost of an economic 
nature.31 They were designed to protect economic interests, in accordance with the economic 
agenda of the European Economic Community. However, the broadening of the scope of free 
movement rights followed the expansion of the objectives pursued by European integration. 
The European Court of Justice soon attached a social dimension to the rights derived from the 
four economic freedoms, principally the free movement of workers and the freedom of 
establishment. For instance, workers and self-employed, as well as their families, were 
recognized as having free movement rights pertaining to the fields of social security and 
education.32 In some notable cases, such as Carpenter33 in particular, the Court of Justice moved 
                                                 
28 F. G. JACOBS, “The evolution of the European legal order,” in A Review of Forty Years of Community Law. Legal 
Developments in the European Communities and the European Union (Ed.) A. MCDONNELL, (Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague, 2005), 26. (Emphasis added) 
29 E. SPAVENTA, “From Gebhard to Carpenter. Towards a (non-)economic European constitution,” 41 C. M. L. Rev. 
743 (2004). 
30 Ibid., 772-773. 
31 See, for instance, P. PESCATORE, “Fundamental rights and freedoms in the system of European Communities,” 
18 Am. J. Comp. L. 343, 349 (1970); C. A. BALL, “The making of a transnational capitalist society: The Court of 
Justice, social policy and individual rights under the European Community’s legal order,” 37 Harv. Int’l. L. R. 307, 
339 (1996). For a critique of the traditional Court’s approach see, for instance, J. COPPEL & A. O’NEILL, “The 
European Court of Justice: Taking rights seriously?,” 29 C. M. L. Rev. 669-692, (1992). 
32 See, generally, C. A. BALL, “The making of a transnational capitalist society: The Court of Justice, social policy 
and individual rights under the European Community’s legal order,” above, n. 31, esp. 333s; F. DE WITTE, “The 
role of transnational solidarity in mediating conflicts of justice in Europe,” 18 European Law Journal, 694, 699 
(2012); N. NIC SHUIBHNE, “The Outer Limits of European Union citizenship: Displacing Economic Free 
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further away from a pure economic rationale.34 Against this backdrop, European Union 
citizenship was introduced, and the Court soon described it as the “fundamental status” of 
European Union citizens.35 It decided cases of great significance, which have the effect of 
integrating non-economically active individuals into the law of free movement, and of allowing 
them to benefit from a brand new range of rights. Taken together, these various trends laid 
down the foundations for a decisive shift from ‘market citizenship’ towards the building of 
‘Union citizenship.’36 The four economic freedoms and European Union citizenship are 
increasingly seen as forming a whole, and as mutually complementing and influencing each 
other. Next, some scholars, instead of focusing on the social dimension of the economic 
freedoms, have put emphasis on their political dimension. M. P. MADURO and C. JOERGES 
inferred, as I have already pointed it out in Section 1,37 that rather than giving rise to economic 
or social rights, the four freedoms must be seen as bringing about fundamental political rights. 
Under this view, the primary function of the free movement principle is to reinforce the rights 
of individuals who are not represented in the national political process. All in all, most authors 
agree that the law of free movement has produced a set of fundamental individual rights, which 
forms one of the defining features of the European Union legal order. G. DE BÚRCA has 
shown, in this respect, that the “language of rights,” as introduced by the European Court of 
Justice – notably but not exclusively in free movement law – has both “a legitimating and an 
integrating force.”38 
416. Cases involving powers retained by Member States. Cases involving powers retained by 
Member States are admittedly another illustration of the Court of Justice increasingly placing 
economic, social, and political concerns on the same footing. Thus, for instance, one of the 
main outcomes of the cases relating to social security is the creation of cross-border patients’ 
                                                 
Movement Rights?,” in The Outer Limits of European Union Law, (Eds.) C. BARNARD & O. ODUDU, (Hart 
Publishing, 2009), 167-195. 
33 Case C-60/00, Carpenter, [2002] ECR I-6279. 
34 E. SPAVENTA, “From Gebhard to Carpenter. Towards a (non-)economic European constitution,” above, n. 29, 
744. 
35 Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, [2001] ECR I-6193, 31. 
36 A. TRYFONIDOU, “Further steps on the road to convergence among the market freedoms,” 35: 1 Eur. Law Rev. 
39-41 (2010); F. WOLLENSCHLÄGER, “A new fundamental freedom beyond market integration: Union Citizenship 
and its dynamic for shifting the economic paradigm of European integration,” 37: 1 European Law Journal 1-34 
(2011). 
37 See, Supra, §§ 376s. 
38 G. DE BÚRCA, “The language of rights and European integration,” available from 
http://aei.pitt.edu/6920/1/de_búrca_gráinne.pdf.  
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rights, which are first and foremost social in nature. They apply to any patient seeking cross-
border health care, regardless of whether they are economically active. The same holds true, to a 
certain extent, for direct taxation. Recognizing new tax rights certainly provides nonresident 
taxpayers with economic benefits. But these rights also entail a social dimension, as they allow 
nonresident individuals to benefit from the solidarity of their employment state, and from a 
certain degree of integration in their host society. Cases involving powers retained by Member 
States also confirm that there is an increasingly converging rationale behind the traditional four 
freedoms and European Union citizenship. Schwarz39 concerned, for instance, a German tax 
rule according to which payments of school fees to certain schools located in the German 
territory, but not payments to schools located in other Member States, could be treated as 
special expenditure leading to a reduction of income tax. The Court assessed, in turn, whether 
the national measure was compatible with the freedom to provide services and European 
Union citizenship. It notably construed the two provisions in a quasi-identical way. In 
particular, it looked at the German rule in light of the same ranges of justifications,40 and 
reached identical conclusions. Accordingly, this case corroborates the idea that an originally 
purely economic freedom and European Union citizenship may now both protect rights of a 
similar nature, in this case the right to seek education abroad. Cases involving powers retained 
by Member States moreover confirm that the European Court of Justice uses the free 
movement principle as a way to give voice to individuals not represented in the national 
political process in any field, regardless of whether it involves Member States’ core economic, 
social, and political autonomy. As a result, cases involving powers retained by Member States 
are another sign of the gradual objectification of the fundamental freedom provisions. They are 
not economic-centered, but affect equally national interests of an economic, social, and political 
nature. 
417. Shortcomings. However, this usual reading of the free movement principle offers an 
explanatory framework that does not provide an entirely satisfactory scheme to analyze the cases 
involving powers retained by Member States. My claim is that it suffers from at least two main 
shortcomings. First of all, this approach overshadows, to a great extent, a fundamental range of 
actors, which nonetheless play a defining role in the framework of the power-based approach, 
                                                 
39 Case C-76/05, Schwarz, [2007] ECR I-6849. 
40 Ibid., 95-96. 
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namely, the Member States. In this respect, I have previously shown that if individual rights 
play a significant role in the Court of Justice’s reasoning, it nevertheless primarily assesses these 
cases through an approach that puts great emphasis on the Member States.41 Second of all, this 
approach does not provide a full understanding of the nature of individual free movement 
rights, as it ignores the their implications and significance for European integration. The fact 
must be stressed that free movement rights do not have the same nature as traditional 
individual rights. They reflect, to borrow R. LECOURT’s words, that free movement rights 
holders are “auxiliary agents” of the European Union.42 To put it differently, as far as cases 
involving powers retained by Member States are concerned, the traditional reading of the free 
movement principle suffers from the same shortcomings as the traditional US literature relating 
to the abovementioned constitutional provisions and principles. It does not pay enough 
attention to the structural dimension of the four economic freedoms and European Union 
citizenship. 
418. A federalist reinterpretation of the free movement principle. That being said, I suggest 
revisiting the free movement principle through a federal/structural perspective. Cases involving 
powers retained by Member States reveal that the free movement principle is not primarily 
about conferring individual rights, but rather regulating the relations between the European 
Union and its Member States on the one hand, and interstate relations on the other hand. It is 
about striking a balance between European and national interests i.e. between free movement 
requirements and national autonomy. This is particularly reflected at the applicability stage, 
which includes the formulae, and at the justification stage. As seen earlier,43 the justifications 
admitted in cases involving powers retained by Member States are a means for Member States 
to reassert their jurisdiction, and/or to protect their financial interests. Taken together, the 
four economic freedoms and European Union citizenship are, like their US counterparts, 
characterized by the same underlying value, the promotion of federalism. They are used by the 
Court to both preserve the unity of the European integration process and prevent Member 
States’ parochialism. Such a perspective allows the aforementioned shortcomings of the rights-
based reading of the free movement principle to be overcome. First, it is more in line with the 
wording of the free movement provisions, which are, it is to be recalled, directed at Member 
                                                 
41 See, Supra, § 91. 
42 R. LECOURT, L’Europe des juges, (Brussels, Bruylant, 1976). 
43 See, Supra, §§ 154s. 
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States.44 Second, a federal-based perspective places Member States’ interests on the same footing 
as individual and European interests, thereby better reflecting their role for the European 
integration process. Last but not least, it provides a better assessment of the nature of the free 
movement principle and of the rights attached to it. It depicts the free movement principle as a 
neutral principle, which, for the needs of the preservation of European federalism, may equally 
give rise to economic, social, and political individual rights. Like the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV, the dormant Commerce Clause, and the right to travel, it is first and 
foremost a structural principle governing the relations between the European Union and its 
Member States and interstate relations. 
b. The primary function: the enforcement of federalism 
419. Understood as embodying a value promoting federalism, the free movement principle 
must be seen as having as its primary function the enforcement of federalism in cases involving 
powers retained by Member States. This function consists in striking the right federal balance, 
which ultimately has the effect of bestowing a peculiar nature on individual free movement 
rights. 
420. Striking the European federal balance. As far as the US constitutional order is concerned, J. 
M. GONZALES points out that: 
[T]o prevent states from ignoring constitutional proscriptions of parochialism, several 
express provisions of the federal Constitution limit the extent to which the several states 
are permitted to exercise powers reserved to them under the Constitution.45 
Therefore, one of the main functions assigned to these constitutional provisions is to place 
limitations upon states’ powers, to the extent that this jeopardizes the US federal principle. The 
same holds true with respect to the four economic freedoms and European Union citizenship 
in cases involving powers retained by Member States. As I have demonstrated it in Chapter 3,46 
one of the main effects of the European Court of Justice power-based approach is to limit the 
discretionary character of the way Member States exercise their powers. Thus, the Court 
primarily uses the free movement principle as a means to regulate the exercise of the powers 
retained by Member States. Such an exercise must comply with two sets of interests: the 
                                                 
44 See, Supra, § 2. 
45 J. M. GONZALES, “The interstate Privileges and Immunities: Fundamental rights or federalism?,” above, n. 9, 
495. 
46 See, Supra, §§ 177s. 
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interests of the European Union and the interests of the other Member States involved in the 
jurisdictional dispute at stake. In addition, the four economic freedoms and European Union 
citizenship also allow Member States to rely on a set of justifications aimed at protecting and 
preserving their autonomy and their existence as separate individual states. All in all, the Court 
of Justice uses the free movement principle to ensure harmonious relations among the different 
actors of European integration: the European Union, the Member States and the individuals. 
421. The resulting nature of free movement rights. The primary function of the free movement 
principle being the enforcement of federalism, this is reflected in the nature of free movement 
rights. The reference to the US legal order is once again helpful. First of all, J. NZELIBE 
characterizes the rights conferred on individuals by the Supreme Court in rulings involving free 
movement issues as “surrogate rights,” that ought to be distinguished from fundamental rights: 
[S]urrogate rights can be considered those interests asserted by the individual against the 
state to protect values that are essential to the existence of one union, as opposed to values 
that presume there are certain liberties inherent to the individual upon which the state may 
not infringe.47 
Likewise, I contend that, in the European Union legal order, free movement rights embody the 
same federalist values. In free movement cases, and in cases involving powers retained by 
Member States in particular, individuals are, so to speak, agents of the European Union, or, as 
the same author would put it, “private enforcer[s] of a norm designed to promote federalism.”48 
In other words, much like in the US legal order, in the European Union, individual free 
movement rights “depend pervasively on judicial assessment of the appropriate scope of 
government powers.”49 They are not counterbalanced to other individual rights, but, instead, to 
national interests. In free movement cases, the Court seeks to assess whether the recognition of 
individual rights at the European Union level has a deterrent effect on Member State 
autonomy. As a result, this original understanding of free movement rights explains why the 
Court of Justice may equally recognize economic, social, and political rights. Second of all, A. 
ERBSEN has emphasized the horizontal dimension of the US free movement rights. Describing 
them as “horizontal rights,” he has shown that one of the defining features of these rights is to 
“shield individuals from adverse effects of the friction-inducing behavior […] that are an 
                                                 
47 J. NZELIBE, “Free movement: A federalist reinterpretation,” above, n. 3, 451-452. 
48 Ibid., 451. 
49 R. H. FALLON, “Individual rights and the powers of government,” 27 Georgia Law Review 343, 363 (1992). 
Chapter 6. Structural Reassessment of the Power-Based Approach 
 
322 
inevitable consequence of divided sovereignty, coequality and aggregate state power.”50 The 
same holds true with respect to the rights recognized in cases involving powers retained by 
Member States. They indeed allow individuals to appeal to a federal arbitrator, the European 
Court of Justice, when they face two Member States unwilling to cooperate to allow them to 
move freely throughout the European Union. All in all, seeing these free movement rights as 
being simultaneously individual, surrogate, and horizontal rights better reveals the interactions 
between rights and structure that occur in the cases involving powers retained by Member 
States. To put it differently, this reveals a cross-fertilization process, defined by G. P. MILLER in 
the US context as follows: 
Principles derived under the system of rights ought to have some impact on questions that 
arise under the system of structure; conversely, principles derived from the system of 
structure ought to inform our understanding of rights.51 
In other words, this reflects the role played by these rights for the gradual building of the 
European federal balance that must now be identified. 
2. The nature of the European federal balance 
422. A few years ago, R. SCHÜTZE published a book entitled From Dual to Cooperative 
Federalism. The Changing Structure of European Law52 in which he contends that European 
federalism is nowadays moving on from dual to cooperative federalism. In his view, Europe’s 
exclusive powers, as well as those of the Member States, are gradually declining while a form of 
European cooperative federalism is emerging and is even in the process of being 
constitutionalized.53 He supports his claim by taking many concrete examples.54 And yet, he 
does not refer to the European Court of Justice’s power-based approach. The aim of the present 
section is therefore to put specific emphasis on this issue, and to assess whether the Court’s 
approach is closer to a dual or a cooperative model of federalism by comparing it with the 
relevant case law of the American Supreme Court. My claim is basically that in cases involving 
                                                 
50 A. ERBSEN, “Horizontal federalism,” 93 Minn. L. Rev. 493, 547-548 (2008). 
51 G. P. MILLER, “Liberty and constitutional architecture: The rights-structure paradigm,” 16 Harvard Journal of Law 
and Public Policy 87, 88 (1993). 
52 R. SCHÜTZE, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism. The changing structure of European law, (Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
53 Through the principle of subsidiarity (See R. SCHÜTZE, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism. The changing structure 
of European law, above, n. 52, 241-265) and complementary competences (Ibid.,  265-286). 
54 Among them Article 352 TFEU (the so-called ‘flexibility clause’) and Articles 114 and 115 TFEU (former 
Articles 94 and 95 relating to the power to harmonize national legislations in the internal market field).  
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powers retained by Member States, the Court of Justice implements a hybrid approach which 
borrows, to a greater or lesser degree, from the two US models of dual and cooperative 
federalism. After defining the concepts of dual and cooperative federalism, I show that the 
power-based approach is both characterized by the recognition of discrete spheres of powers, 
and by the intrusions of European Union law into fields where the European Union has no, or 
very limited, jurisdiction. 
a. Defining terms: dual federalism v. cooperative federalism 
423. Dual federalism. Dual federalism has been defined in the American context as “a concept 
of separate state and federal governments operating in distinct spheres with little significant 
overlap or significant ‘sharing’ of authority,”55 where “each of the two sovereignties has its own 
exclusive area of authority and jurisdiction, with few powers held concurrently.”56 E. S. 
CORWIN has famously described its four axioms as follows: 
1. The national government is one of enumerated powers only. 2. Also, the purposes which 
it may constitutionally promote are few. 3. Within their respective spheres the two centers 
of government are ‘sovereign’ and hence ‘equal’. 4. The relation of the two centers with 
each other is one of tension rather than collaboration.57 
Thus, the main feature of dual federalism resides in the idea that it is possible to identify two 
discrete spheres of powers in a constitutional order: one that belongs exclusively to the States 
and another that belongs exclusively to the general government. In each of these spheres, the 
centers of government may exercise their powers in their own way, without taking into account 
the interests of the other center. 
424. Cooperative federalism. Cooperative federalism is generally distinguished from dual 
federalism. Unlike the latter, the cooperative model does not assume that the spheres of 
federate and federal powers are mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the powers of states and of 
the central government are viewed as being deeply intertwined: “the National government and 
the States are mutually complementary parts of a single governmental mechanism all of whose 
powers are intended to realize the current purposes of government according to their 
                                                 
55 H. N. SCHEIBER, “American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives,” 
9 University of Toledo Law Review 619, 626 (1977-1978). 
56 D. J. ELAZAR, The American Partnership, (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1966), 22. 
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applicability to the problem in hand.”58 Accordingly, the cooperative model constitutes an 
alternative to the “rigid ‘parallel function’ theory of dual federalism.”59 In this regard, M. H. 
REDISH has suggested labeling it as “interactive federalism:” 
[A] term more neutral than ‘cooperative’ and one that recognizes the inevitable 
intertwining of the state and federal systems as they both go about the business of 
governing. At times, this interaction will be combative in nature, where the governing 
decisions of one sovereign differ from the other’s and threaten the social and economic 
policies sought to be advanced by the other’s decisions. Yet, at other times the actions of 
the respective sovereigns will be supplementary or complementary to each other, 
combining to meet the same problem in different but not conflicting ways. At still other 
times the problems facing government will call for some form of cooperative action – either 
through direct joint action, or more indirectly, through the exchange of information, ideas 
and experience. There is no reason to believe that combative and cooperative federalism 
are mutually exclusive; both are manifestations of the dynamic interaction of the state and 
federal systems.60 
425. Thus, dual and cooperative federalism models substantially differ from one another. 
The former is based on the assumption that the federal balance can only be preserved if powers 
are strictly and rigidly divided. Conversely, the latter is based on the idea that powers are 
intertwined, which implies that each level of government may regulate the same subject matters, 
and that the two levels of government are coordinated in such a way as to act alongside 
harmoniously. Accordingly, the fundamental issue is no longer ‘Who has the power to exercise a 
powers?’ but instead ‘How are powers to be exercised?’ 
b. The recognition of discrete spheres of powers 
426. In what follows, I focus on the ‘dual dimension’ of the European Court of Justice case 
law involving powers retained by Member States. In doing so, I assess to what extent the 
European Court of Justice approach can be compared to the US Supreme Court cases that 
were decided when American federalism corresponded to a dual model of federalism. To this 
end, I inquire how the European and American Courts have recognized the existence of 
separate spheres of powers within their respective legal orders. 
427. US Constitutional law. The American Supreme Court was called upon, from its earliest 
decisions, to settle disputes between the national and state governments regarding the division 
and the exercise of powers. This gave it the opportunity to set out the main features of 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 19. 
59 M. H. REDISH, The Constitution as Political Structure, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 29. 
60 Ibid. (Emphases added). 
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American federalism. Views differ as to the basis on which the Court developed its first judicial 
theories regarding federalism. Some scholars contend that the Court genuinely respected the 
intentions of the Framers.61 Others are of the view that “it does not appear that the 
Constitution on its face dictates the dual federalism model.”62 The fact remains, however, that 
the Supreme Court initially opted for a dual interpretation of American federalism.63 The US 
Supreme Court was asked for the first time,64 in McCulloch v. Maryland, to settle a jurisdictional 
dispute between a state and the central government. Chief Justice MARSHALL ruled, in this 
regard, that: 
In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the Government of the Union 
and those of the States. They are each sovereign with respect to the objects committed to it, 
and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other.65 
In Chief Justice MARSHALL’s mind, divided sovereignty implies dual federalism. Powers are 
strictly divided, and belong to two mutually exclusive spheres. Each center of government 
exercises its powers freely and independently from the other center. Accordingly, the idea of 
“peaceful” or “fruitful” interaction between the two spheres is excluded; this corresponds to E. 
S. CORWIN’s fourth axiom that described the relation between such spheres as “one of 
tension.” Chief Justice MARSHALL confirmed his initial position in Gibbons v. Ogden, the first 
case involving the power to regulate interstate commerce.66 He defined it as an exclusive 
congressional power: 
It is the power to regulate, that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be 
governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be 
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed 
in the Constitution. (…) If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, 
though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce 
with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it 
would be in a single government.67 
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Once again, he made a dual interpretation of American federalism, by excluding any idea of 
concurrent power to regulate interstate commerce that could be shared between the national 
government and the states. He clearly distinguished it from “[t]he acknowledged power of a 
State to regulate its police, its domestic trade, and to govern its own citizens.”68 The notion of 
“police powers” gradually became a “linguistic means of drawing the line between state and 
federal activities.”69 In Willson v. The Blackbird Creek Marsh Company,70 for instance, Chief 
Justice MARSHALL decided that health, safety and the protection of public order were part of 
the ‘reserved powers’ of states, which meant that they were fully sovereign while exercising 
them – provided that this exercise did not interfere with congressional powers.71  
428. The Supreme Court followed a similar path with respect to the enforcement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.72 In the Slaughter House Cases, it refused to apply the Bill of Rights to 
state actions on the following grounds: 
[W]e doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination 
against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within 
the purview of this provision.73 
It thus rejected the incorporation doctrine, whereby the Bill of Rights does not only apply to 
acts of the federal government, but also to state actions through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, initially, for the Supreme Court, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, adopted during the Reconstruction era, was solely aimed at barring racial 
discrimination, not at subjecting the states to the individual rights and freedoms protected by 
the Bill of Rights. The Court took the same stance with respect to the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Barbier v. Connolly, the defendant sought to challenge an 
ordinance enacted by San Francisco regulating the establishment of public laundries. Justice 
FIELD ruled that the constitutional provision was not relevant: 
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Neither the Amendment – broad and comprehensive as it is – nor any Amendment, was 
designed to interfere with the power of the State – sometimes termed its police power – to 
prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of 
the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its 
resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity.74 
429. Thus, this first series of rulings marked the initial steps towards the enshrinement of 
dual federalism. As K. LENAERTS has put it, “[t]he State was regarded as being sovereign, with 
full powers within its sphere, i.e., possessing to their full extent all the powers not transferred to 
the Union by explicit grant or by necessary implication.”75 Accordingly, this line of reasoning 
compelled the Supreme Court to identify, on a case-by-case basis, which matters fell within the 
national government or, alternatively, within the states. This approach prevailed until the 
1930s. It should be noted, however, that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV did 
not have the same fate. Indeed, the Supreme Court has not limited its scope of application. 
However, as seen earlier, it construed the Clause, during the dual federalism era, through the 
lens of fundamental rights. Moreover, it did not have many occasions to interpret it, unlike the 
other aforementioned clauses. 
430. The ECJ power-based approach. The European Court of Justice recognizes that Member 
States may operate within a discrete sphere of powers in cases involving their retained powers. 
This is supported by the fact that it systematically uses the formulae.76 The various justifications 
used in this specific range of cases moreover reveal that for the Court of Justice certain fields 
are the primary responsibility of the Member States. The latter must be recognized as having a 
great deal of leeway to preserve their autonomy, and to prevent too burdensome encroachments 
from European Union law. In sum, the power-based approach reveals that the idea of separate 
spheres of powers is not absent from the Court’s reasoning when it deals with powers retained 
by Member States. As a result, in the eyes of the Court, there exist, at least formally, distinct 
spheres of powers over which Member States – at least temporarily – have exclusive jurisdiction. 
This line of reasoning is reminiscent of the cases where the US Supreme Court implemented a 
dual model of federalism. However, as will be seen in the following paragraph, the European 
Court of Justice does not attach the same consequences to the separation of spheres of powers 
as the US Supreme Court.  
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431. Only a few cases involving powers retained by Member States may be characterized as 
enshrining a strict model of dual federalism. As I have mentioned in Chapter 2,77 the Court of 
Justice used to exclude students’ assistance from the scope of application of European Union 
law. It justified its stance in Lair and Brown by making the following argument: 
[A]t the present stage of development of Community law assistance given to students for 
maintenance and for training falls in principle outside the scope of the EEC Treaty for the 
purposes of Article 7. It is, on the one hand, a matter of educational policy, which is not as 
such included in the spheres entrusted to the Community institutions and, on the other, a 
matter of social policy, which falls within the competence of the Member States in so far as 
it is not covered by specific provisions of the EEC Treaty.78 
Even if the Court has since reversed its position in Bidar,79 these two cases nonetheless reveal 
that it happened to follow a line of reasoning very close to that of the US Supreme Court. Not 
only did the Court recognize two discrete spheres of powers, but it also found that a national 
measure falling within a power retained by the Member States was to fall outside the purview 
of European Union law. Similarly, in Kaur, it accepted that the United Kingdom could define, 
further to the 1972 Declaration annexed to the Treaty of accession, the category of UK 
nationals falling within the scope of the EU Treaties, without being subject to any free 
movement requirement.80  
432. The power-based approach thus shares similarities with the US Supreme Court dual 
model of federalism during the first era of American federalism. But two main divergences 
differentiate the two approaches. The first is of a methodological nature. As seen in Section 1,81 
while the US Supreme Court has attempted to explain how it distinguished states’ police 
powers from other powers, the European Court of Justice has remained silent with respect to 
the powers retained by Member States. The second is more fundamental. The two Courts have 
inferred different effects from the recognition of two discrete spheres of powers. Under the US 
dual model of federalism, states were totally prevented from regulating a field if the latter 
pertained to interstate commerce. Conversely, they enjoyed absolute freedom to exercise their 
police powers. However, under the power-based approach, if the Court of Justice recognizes 
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that Member States have exclusive jurisdiction over fields falling within their retained powers, it 
nonetheless places them under the obligation to comply with European Union law. 
c. The intrusions of European Union law into the powers retained by Member 
States 
433. The development of American federalism experienced a tipping point during the first 
half of the twentieth century, when the Supreme Court reversed its previous interpretation of 
dual federalism. This led to the replacement of its initial formal approach by an approach 
centered on balancing national and state interests. The new approach recognized that national 
and state spheres of powers were deeply intertwined. The central government was no longer 
precluded from regulating fields pertaining to states’ police powers, while the states could enact 
statutes affecting Congress’ own powers. This marked the enshrinement of a cooperative model 
of federalism within the US constitutional order. The ECJ power-based approach also reveals, 
to a certain extent, the Court’s inclination to understand the interplay between the European 
Union and its Member States as being cooperative. Even if the jurisdiction and the primary 
responsibilities retained by Member States are acknowledged, the latter must nonetheless 
comply with the obligations flowing from the free movement principle. 
434. US Constitutional law. In the US legal order, as far as the dormant Commerce Clause is 
concerned, the US Supreme Court’s highly formal interpretation deriving from the Cooley rule 
began to be increasingly criticized from the 1920s. In a famous dissenting opinion, Justice 
STONE considered that “the traditional test of the limit of state action by inquiring whether the 
interference with commerce is direct or indirect seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in 
its application, and too remote from actualities, to be of value.” Referring to the distinction 
arising from Cooley between direct and indirect interferences, he added that: 
[I]t is clear that those interferences not deemed forbidden are to be sustained, not because 
the effect on commerce is nominally indirect, but because a consideration of all the facts 
and circumstances, such as the nature of the regulation, its function, the character of the 
business involved and the actual effect on the flow of commerce, lead to the conclusion 
that the regulation concerns interests peculiarly local and does not infringe the national 
interest in maintaining the freedom of commerce across state lines.”82 
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STONE therefore proposed to introduce a new approach, based on the balancing of state and 
national interests, that would replace what R. A. SEDLER has called the “allocation of powers” 
approach.83 The Supreme Court eventually ruled out the Cooley doctrine. Its modern decisions 
“have generally abandoned any attempt to apply categorical distinctions between exercises of 
‘police’ and ‘commerce’ powers, between ‘local’ and ‘national’ subject matters, or between 
‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ effects.”84 In other words, the Court moved away from its dual vision of 
federalism, and instead gradually leaned toward a cooperative interpretation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  
435. Today, it strikes down state regulations in three cases: 1) where they overtly discriminate 
against interstate commerce; 2) where they are on their face neutral but they have in fact 
protectionist effects; 3) where they unduly burden interstate commerce, notwithstanding their 
facially neutral character.85 In the third case, the Supreme Court follows a balancing of interests 
approach, as defined in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona: 
[M]atters for ultimate determination are the nature and extent of the burden which the 
state regulation of interstate trains, adopted as a safety measure, imposes on interstate 
commerce, and whether the relative weights of the state and national interests involved are 
such as to make inapplicable the rule, generally observed, that the free flow of commerce 
and its freedom from local restraints in matters requiring uniformity of regulation are 
interests safeguarded by the commerce clause from state interference.86 
Accordingly, the Court no longer prevents the states from regulating interstate commerce. 
Instead, it places limitations upon the exercise of their powers in such a way as to compel the 
states to comply with the Commerce Clause, and not to jeopardize Congress’ interests. As a 
result, the Supreme Court no longer seeks to draw the line between separate spheres of powers 
in the way it used to under the dual model of federalism. It “requires state governments to 
regulate in an even-handed way, without limiting the subject matter upon which their 
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regulation can operate.”87 In addition, it follows the same uniform approach, regardless of the 
nature of the state power involved. E. A. YOUNG has noted that “[t]he abandonment of dual 
federalism has been most obvious – and probably least controversial – in the context of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.”88 But interesting parallel developments have occurred with 
respect to the Fourteenth Amendment.89 Regarding first the Due Process Clause, the US 
Supreme Court reversed its initial approach in the 1920s, and has since applied the 
incorporation doctrine.90 As a result, the federal government is not only subjected to the Bill of 
Rights, but the states are also accountable, regardless of the field involved.91 As for the Equal 
Protection Clause from which seems to spring the right to travel, the Supreme Court 
intensified its scrutiny in such a way as to control an ever wider range of states’ regulations. 
This is evidenced by the fact that most cases relating to the right to travel were decided during 
the second half of the twentieth century.92 It results from these various evolutions that the 
states are nowadays required to comply with federal law and to take into account the interests 
of the national government in any field, regardless of whether these fields fall within their 
‘police’ or ‘reserved’ powers. The US Supreme Court thus enforces a cooperative 
interpretation of federalism. 
436. The ECJ power-based approach. The power-based approach, in the same way as the 
contemporary case law of the US Supreme Court or traditional free movement cases, also relies 
on a test revolving around the balancing of the respective interests of the two levels of 
government. Therefore, the recognition, by the European Court of Justice, that Member States 
have exclusive jurisdiction to exercise their retained powers does not imply that they enjoy 
absolute freedom when doing so. This is in line with its previous approach. The Court of 
Justice has indeed consistently rejected Chief Justice MARSHALL’s absolute dual vision of 
federalism put forward in McCulloch v. Maryland or Gibbons v. Ogden. Even if the Court has 
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never formally denied the existence of separate spheres of powers in which the European 
Union and the Member States respectively operate, it has repeatedly taken the view that 
interferences and mutual influences between these spheres are conceivable. As seen earlier,93 it 
recognized in De Gezamenlijke Steenkolnmijnen in Limburg that the jurisdiction of the Community 
could “impinge on national sovereignty” to preserve the effectiveness of European Union law. 
The reference to “the jurisdiction of the Community” and to “national sovereignty” indicates 
that the Court recognizes the existence of two separate spheres. However, as P. PESCATORE has 
noted, “here the Court shows that the sovereignty of the Member States is affected beyond the 
scope of the exclusive powers that have been transferred to the Community.”94 In a subsequent 
case decided in 1969 and involving Member States’ powers in the monetary field, the Court 
expressly asserted that “the exercise of reserved powers cannot therefore permit the unilateral 
adoption of measures prohibited by the Treaty.”95 In cases involving powers retained by 
Member States, the Court acknowledges that certain fields ought to be singled out, and ought 
to be more protected from intrusions of European Union law. However, notwithstanding this 
dual dimension, the European Court of Justice does not attach the same effects as the US 
Supreme Court does under the US dual federalism model. Admittedly, its power-based 
approach does not challenge the existence of national powers. As seen earlier,96 it does not have 
a preemptive effect: the Court of Justice has never denied Member States their ability to 
exercise their retained powers. Instead, it focuses almost exclusively on ‘how Member States 
exercise their retained powers.’ This means that when Member States are found to infringe 
European Union law, it is not on the grounds that they have occupied the European field, but 
rather because they have not properly exercised their powers. This is precisely in this respect 
that the respective approaches of the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice 
differ. Under the dual federalism model, the former used to infer that once it was recognized 
that states held jurisdiction over a subject matter, they were to enjoy absolute liberty to exercise 
their powers. By contrast, one of the defining features of the European Court of Justice power-
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based approach is to subject the exercise of Member States’ retained powers to European 
Union law requirements even though they do hold jurisdiction. 
437. The hybrid character of the ECJ power-based approach. The European Court of Justice 
approach borrows from both the dual and cooperative models of federalism. It may therefore 
be described as ‘hybrid.’ The Court’s scrutiny over Member States’ measures primarily consists 
in setting limits on the exercise of their retained powers, which is consistent with the 
cooperative model of federalism. And yet, it also shares a range of similarities with the dual 
model of federalism since it seeks to draw the line between discrete spheres of powers in order 
to subject the powers retained by Member States to a specific legal framework. The example 
derived from Watts is revealing: 
[A]lthough Community law does not detract from the power of the Member States to 
organize their social security systems and decide the level of resources to be allocated to 
their operation, the achievement of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty 
nevertheless inevitably requires Member States to make adjustments to those systems. It 
does not follow that this undermines their sovereign powers in the field.97 
This statement synthesizes the twofold dimension of the power-based approach. On the one 
hand, Member States have ‘sovereign powers’ in the sense that they have sole jurisdiction to 
exercise the power to organize their social security systems. They are moreover recognized as 
having more leeway than usual to preserve their autonomy. On the other hand, the power-
based approach borrows to an even greater extent from the cooperative model of federalism. 
Member States are required to cooperate, i.e. to comply with European Union law, even if the 
obligations placed upon the exercise of their powers at least partially reflect that they are 
primarily responsible for regulating the fields analyzed herein.  
438. Now that I have identified the nature of the federal balance characterizing the European 
Court of Justice power-based approach, I can deal with a final point, which raises the issue of 
the safeguards of federalism the Court uses in cases involving powers retained by Member 
States. 
3. The safeguards of European federalism 
439. The role and function of safeguards of federalism. To be sustainable, a federal system must 
contain safeguards guaranteeing the preservation of the integrity of each of its component parts. 
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The permanence of both the federation and its Member States must be ensured in some way. 
Otherwise, this could lead to the disappearance of the states due to an excessive centralization 
in favor of the federation or alternatively, to the dilution, and even the dismantling, of the 
federation if the latter is not sufficiently protected from unauthorized state encroachments. In 
other words, as C. SCHMITT pointed out, a federation aims to preserve the political existence of 
all its members.98 Contemporary federations are generally characterized by centripetal trends. 
The European Union is no exception and the literature has therefore increasingly focused on 
the issue of how to properly safeguard the autonomy of the Member States. Two main sets of 
safeguards may be distinguished: ex-ante and ex-post methods. The former aim to set “clear-cut 
frontiers to the EU enumerated powers,”99 while the latter refer to safeguards of a judicial 
nature. In this regard, the previous chapters of this thesis have shown that the Court’s power-
based approach is a way of ensuring that, even within their spheres of retained powers, Member 
States do not unduly undermine the interests of the European Union. But how does it 
safeguard the legitimate autonomy of Member States? In the following paragraphs I answer this 
question by addressing, in turn, two points. First, the power-based approach confirms that, in 
the European Union legal order, Member States are not entitled to a “nucleus of sovereignty.” 
Second, I draw a typology of the safeguards of federalism that are gradually being drawn by the 
Court of Justice. However, before undertaking this exercise, I draw a brief picture of the US 
constitutional debate, which sheds light on the various issues raised by the need to protect state 
autonomy. 
440. The various safeguards used in the US legal order. The issue relating to the safeguards of 
federalism is at the core of the US constitutional debate. Three main judicial trends and/or 
doctrinal propositions, which reflect the significant developments that have occurred since the 
origins of US federalism, may be identified. There is, first, what has been described as Tenth 
Amendment federalism,100 or power federalism.101 This doctrine consists in drawing lines 
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between national and state spheres of powers, and views the Tenth Amendment102 as granting 
the states a constitutional right to have their reserved powers protected from encroachments by 
the national government. The US Supreme Court endorsed it during the dual federalism era,103 
and used the Tenth Amendment to reserve the regulation of certain subject matters to the 
states, over which the latter were deemed to have a “complete, unqualified, and exclusive”104 
authority.105 This approach has been criticized in two main respects. First, it turns out to rely 
too heavily on Justices’ policy preferences.106 The tests drawn by the US Supreme Court have 
been said to reflect too heavily the Justices’ own conceptions of the organization of society. 
Second, in the end, the US Supreme Court never succeeded in setting out satisfactory and 
workable criteria for distinguishing between national and state spheres of power.107 These two 
shortcomings partly explain that the Court moved away from its initial dual model of 
federalism, and instead turned towards a cooperative model. As seen earlier, it no longer 
primarily focuses on drawing the line between two discrete spheres of powers. As an alternative, 
it considers that the national government and the states may concurrently regulate the same 
subject matters, thereby seeking to coordinate their respective spheres of action.108 As a result, it 
has significantly reduced the role played by the Tenth Amendment, and it even happened to 
describe it as a mere “truism.”109 The Supreme Court has since nonetheless resorted again to its 
initial dual logic in a few instances. To begin with, it held in National League of Cities v. Usery, 
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decided in 1976 and involving Congress’ conditional spending power, that the Tenth 
Amendment constrained congressional commerce power on the grounds that: 
[T]here are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be 
impaired by Congress, not because Congress lacks an affirmative grant of legislative 
authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the 
authority in that manner.110 
The Supreme Court found that the Fair Labor Standards Act (‘FLSA’), through which 
Congress sought to regulate wages, hours, and benefits of state employees – including those in 
hospitals and schools –, displaced “the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas 
of traditional governmental functions.”111 Faced with the difficulty of identifying the 
traditional state governmental functions, it soon abandoned this logic again, before somehow… 
resurrecting it. On the one hand, in the 1990s, it entrenched the anti-commandeering 
doctrine, under which the national government is prohibited from commandeering state 
governments. New York v. United States112 barred Congress from commandeering the state 
legislative branch, Printz v. United States113 barred the commandeering of the state executive 
branch, and, finally, Alden v. Maine114 barred the commandeering of the state judicial branch.115 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court held fairly recently that Congress unduly encroached 
on states’ reserved powers while exercising its commerce power in United States v. Lopez,116 
which concerned a federal statute regulating the carrying of handguns in schools, and United 
States v. Morrison,117 which involved the Violence Against Women Act.  
441. Despite these notable rulings, the US Supreme Court today tends to refrain from 
drawing lines between national and state spheres of powers. This leads to another doctrine 
aiming at enforcing US federalism, namely process federalism. In Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority,118 decided in 1985, the Supreme Court ruled, in line with H. 
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WECHSLER’s seminal 1954 article,119 that there was no need to set out judicial safeguards of 
federalism. Instead, it should be acknowledged that the national political process protects 
states’ interests effectively, since the states themselves participate in the composition and 
selection of the national government.  
442. Last but not least, mention should be made of Guarantee Clause federalism. The 
Supreme Court has never officially enforced this doctrine, but it is nonetheless an interesting 
doctrinal proposition made by D. J. MERRITT.120 This author basically suggests to use the 
Guarantee Clause of the US Constitution, which provides that “[t]he United States should 
guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government,” to protect state 
autonomy: 
The language of the Guarantee Clause […] has two aspects. On the one hand, the clause 
prohibits the states from adopting nonrepublican forms of government. On the other 
hand, as long as the states adhere to republican principles, the clause forbids the federal 
government from interfering with state governments in a way that would destroy their 
republican character.121 
She further argues that this judicial safeguard of federalism should have been at the basis of 
numerous cases involving six ranges of federalism issues: the franchise,122 the structure and 
mechanics of state government, qualifications for state office,123 wages of state employees, 
regulation of private activity, and employing the states as agents of the nation (i.e. 
commandeering issue). With respect to the second, she argues that: 
[T]he guarantee clause promises the states federal support for the continued existence of 
some form of government. […] The guarantee clause, moreover, restricts the federal 
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government’s power to interfere with the organizational structure and governmental 
processes chosen by a state’s residents.124 
443. All in all, the US Supreme Court jurisprudence reveals the difficulty the Court faces to 
erect and/or recognize workable safeguards of federalism. It fluctuates between establishing 
safeguards of a judicial nature, which are often tinged with the Justices’ subjectivity, and in any 
case hard to enforce in practice, and trusting the political process to protect state autonomy. In 
particular, the question as to whether the states are to enjoy a “nucleus of sovereignty” has still 
not been entirely settled. The Supreme Court has largely abandoned the recourse to the Tenth 
Amendment, but still happens to resort to it in order to protect states’ reserved powers that it 
seems to consider in some way “impenetrable.” 
444. European Union law: No nucleus of sovereignty. In contrast to its US counterpart, the 
European Court of Justice has never, aside from a few exceptions, recognized the existence of a 
nucleus of sovereignty in favor of the Member States.125 Looking more closely at free movement 
cases, Member States contended, in the early years of the Community, that the express 
derogations to the free movement of goods set out in the Treaty reserved to them certain 
matters, over which they had sole jurisdiction. The Court firmly rejected this view on the 
following grounds: 
[T]he purpose of Article 36 of the Treaty is not to reserve certain matters to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Member States; it merely allows national legislation to derogate from the 
principle of the free movement of goods to the extent to which this is and remains justified 
in order to achieve the objectives set out in the Article.126 
As a result, as K. LENAERTS puts it, “[t]he residual powers of the Member States have no 
reserved status.”127 The same holds true with respect to cases involving powers retained by 
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Member States.128 As I have shown in Chapter 2, the European Court of Justice has not 
accepted to recognize limits to the applicability of the free movement principle, and therefore 
to the intrusions of European Union law into national spheres of jurisdiction.129 Schwarz, a 
decision involving a German tax advantage allowing school fees to be deducted but that was 
inapplicable if the schools were not established on German territory, is telling. The Court ruled 
out an argument developed by Germany, which drew on “the allocation of competences 
envisaged by the EC Treaty,”130 by stating its formulae.131 In the same vein, it dismissed 
arguments aiming at excluding the applicability of European Union law, which were based on 
one of the Treaty provisions excluding EU-level harmonization. In particular, it held in Watts 
that: 
That provision [Article 152§5 TFEU] does not, however, exclude the possibility that the 
Member States may be required under other Treaty provisions, such as Article 49 EC, or 
Community measures adopted on the basis of other Treaty provisions […] to make 
adjustments to their national systems of social security.132 
Accordingly, except in a few early cases decided in the field of education133 – and which have 
since been reversed – and in Kaur,134 where the Court of Justice has construed European 
federalism from a strict dualist perspective, cases involving powers retained by Member States 
confirm that the European Union legal order does not safeguard the autonomy of Member 
States through the recognition of a “nucleus of sovereignty.” Provisions relating to the 
allocation of powers between the European Union and its Member States, including the 
conferral principle, are of no further help in tilting the balance in the Member States favor.135 
As a result, safeguards of federalism are to be found elsewhere. 
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445. Typology of the safeguards of federalism used in the power-based approach. Cases involving 
powers retained by Member States reveal that the Court of Justice resorts to two types of 
safeguards of federalism for the protection of Member State autonomy. On the one hand, it 
results from the findings set out in Chapter 3 that the European Court of Justice has fashioned 
safeguards of a judicial nature. First of all, it has accepted specific grounds of justification, 
which allow Member States to preserve the core of their essential political and social functions, 
as well as their economic interests.136 Second of all, when implementing the power-based 
approach, the Court moreover makes a flexible appraisal of the proportionality test, in order to 
give more leeway than in its traditional free movement cases to Member States. It has shaped 
the requirements imposed upon the latter in such a way as to not jeopardize the sustainability 
and the internal coherence of their retained powers.  
446. On the other hand, mention should also be made of the Court’s recent tendency to 
increasingly rely on textual safeguards of federalism. In Wittgenstein, it acknowledged that: 
[I]n accordance with Article 4(2) TEU, the European Union is to respect the national 
identities of its Member States, which include the status of the State as a Republic.137 
It subsequently ruled in Vardyn & Wardyn that: 
According to the fourth subparagraph of Article 3(3) EU and Article 22 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Union must respect its rich cultural and 
linguistic diversity. Article 4(2) provides that the Union must also respect the national 
identity of its Member States, which includes protection of a State’s official national 
language.138 
Therefore, in these two cases, the Court took into account safeguards that Member States have 
expressly included into the European Union Treaty. They are in line with other decisions, such 
as Omega139 and Schmidberger,140 where it received favorably Member States’ claims based on the 
need to respect their constitutional identity.141 
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447. A right to political existence. In sum, taken together, the judicially-created and the textual 
safeguards of federalism used in cases involving powers retained by Member States are 
reminiscent of what is embodied in, and protected by, in D. J. MERRITT’s opinion, the US 
Guarantee Clause.142 They indeed prevent European Union law from interfering in a too 
burdensome way into Member States’ organizational structures and governmental processes. 
They also echo the fundamental rights of states doctrine developed in public international law. 
Under this doctrine, states are entitled to a certain number of rights, for the simple reason that 
they are states. These rights include the right to existence, independence or sovereignty, 
equality, mutual respect, and free trade.143 A few authors have claimed that the European 
Union legal order has incorporated this doctrine through the adoption of Article 4§2 TFEU, 
which provides that: 
The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their 
national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, 
inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State 
functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and 
order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole 
responsibility of each Member State.144 
The European Court of Justice power-based approach reveals that the idea of protecting 
Member States “fundamental rights” is not only present in Article 4§2, but also in most of the 
judicially created safeguards used in cases involving powers retained by Member States. All in 
all, both the judicially created and the textual safeguards of federalism may be described as 
“arrangements designed to preserve the position of Member States,”145 or, in other words, as 
ensuring that Member States remain full-fledged states within the European Union legal order. 
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fondamentaux aux Etats Membres de l’Union européenne?, (Eds.) J.-D. MOUTON & J.-C. BARBATO, (Bruylant, Coll. 
Droit de l’Union européenne, 2010), 269, 276. For an another perspective, which considers Article 4§2 TFEU as 
protecting “the hard core of sovereignty which the Union may not affect,” see C. TIMMERMANS, “ECJ doctrines on 
competences,” in The Question of competence in the European Union, (Ed.) L. AZOULAI, (Oxford, United Kingdom; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 155, 160. 
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As a result, they amount to providing Member States with a “right to political existence,” which 
reflects that the federation, i.e. the European Union, is constitutionally forbidden to call into 
question Member States’ political existence.146  
448. That being said, I am of the view that the preservation of Member State autonomy may 
rely too heavily on the discretion of the European Court of Justice. Admittedly, unlike the US 
Supreme Court, it never fell into the trap of dual federalism, which gives the illusion that state 
jurisdiction is better protected if completely isolated. The power-based approach nonetheless 
does lead the Court to unilaterally draw the contours of spheres that, in its own view, deserve 
specific protection. This explains why the Court ultimately faces the same range of difficulties 
as the US Supreme Court. In similar fashion to its US counterpart, it is confronted with the 
challenge of singling out subject matters that ought to be specifically safeguarded. The Court of 
Justice has moreover often seemed hesitant with respect to the intensity of the requirements to 
be imposed upon Member States. In this regard, it is striking that it mitigated, on several 
occasions, the initial effects of its case law,147 considered by many Member States and 
commentators as undermining Member State autonomy too heavily. Suffice to think, for 
instance, of cases relating to access to higher education148 and students’ financial assistance.149 
The same holds true with cross-border losses in the field of direct taxation. Cases relating to 
social security also illustrate this trend.150 In sum, cases involving powers retained by Member 
States reveal that, like its US counterpart, the European Court of Justice is in a continuing 
search of workable safeguards of federalism, which tends to create some legal uncertainty. 
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 6. 
449. In this final chapter, I have provided an overall structural reassessment of the Court of 
Justice power-based approach. I have first shed light on the persistent silence of the Court 
regarding the fields subject to the original form of integration, and the rationale behind it, 
                                                 
146 O. BEAUD, Théorie de la Fédération, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2007), 324. 
147 This has notably been noticed by V. HATZOPOULOS, “Actively talking to each other: the Court and the political 
institutions,” in Judicial activism at the European Court of Justice: causes, responses and solutions, (Eds.) M. DAWSON, DE 
WITTE B. & MUIR E., (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013), 102, 139. 
148 See the discrepancy between Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969 and Case C-73/08, 
Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735. 
149 See the discrepancy between Case C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119 and Case C-158/07, Förster, [2008] ECR 
I-8507. 
150 See the discrepancy between Case C-372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-4325 and Case C-512/08, Commission v. 
France, [2010] ECR I-8833 or Case C-211/08, Commission v. Spain, [2010] ECR I-5267. 
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which ultimately has the effect of weakening both its authority and legitimacy. Second, I have 
focused on the structural model that is entrenched by the power-based approach, and I have 
reviewed, in turn, its three fundamental components. I have argued that the free movement 
principle ought to be considered as a genuine federal/structural principle regulating the 
relations between the European Union and its Member States, and interstate relations. I have 
then highlighted the hybrid character of the federalism model implemented in the power-based 
approach. Even if the Court rejects a strict dual model of federalism, it nonetheless identifies, 
on the basis of rather vague criteria, fields characterized by limited intrusions of European 
Union law. Last but not least, I have shown that the power-based approach is characterized by 
the use of safeguards of federalism that encompass a genuine right to political existence for 
Member States. All in all, cases involving powers retained by Member States confirm that free 
movement is the cornerstone principle of European Union law. They also reassert that Member 
States are fundamental actors of the European Union legal order. Indeed, European 
integration cannot proceed without them, which explains why the Court of Justice erects 
safeguards aiming to preserve their political existence, without nonetheless ruling out the 
applicability of European Union law where it is necessary to protect the European Union’s own 
interests
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450. A legal framework composed of three fundamental features. This thesis has shown that, as far 
as free movement cases are concerned, the characterization by the European Court of Justice of 
a power as being “retained” by the Member States results in the implementation of a power-
based approach. In Chapter 1, I claimed that the Court’s reasoning revolves around the notion 
of power. Hence, the cases concerned by the original form of integration display a more 
structural-oriented dimension than traditional free movement cases. In Chapter 2, I highlighted 
the subtle distinction that the Court draws between the existence and the exercise of a power in 
order to infer that the law of free movement is applicable even in fields where the European 
Union holds no, or very limited, jurisdiction. This ultimately results in a divergence between 
the scope of application of European Union law and the powers held by the European Union. 
Last but not least, Chapter 3 shed light on the original way the Court of Justice settles the 
vertical and horizontal jurisdictional conflicts it is called upon to adjudicate. It does so through 
a ‘mutual adjustment resolution.’ On the one hand, the Court imposes constraining 
adjustment requirements upon the conditions of exercise of the powers retained by Member 
States. On the other hand, it self-adjusts its approach by giving more weight to national 
interests than in traditional free movement cases. 
451. A unique legal framework. Everything considered, the power-based approach may be 
described as a combination of three fundamental features. Taken together, these features 
amount to a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. As a result, it may not be inferred 
from the simple fact that the Court of Justice grants Member States wide margins of 
appreciation that it is necessarily implementing the power-based approach. Its case law relating 
to games of chance, betting or gambling1 clearly illustrates this point. Admittedly, in these cases, 
                                                 
1 Case C-275/92, Schindler, [1993] ECR I-1039; Case C-6/01, Anormar, [2003] ECR I-8621; Case C-338/04, 
Placanica, [2007] ECR I-1891; Case C-42/07, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol, [2009] ECR I-7633; Joined Cases C-316/07, 
C-358/07, C-359/07, C-360/07, C-409/07 & C-410/07, Stoß and others, [2010] ECR I-8069; Joined Cases C-
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the Court recognizes that, as far as the aforementioned activities are concerned, Member States 
should enjoy a great deal of discretion in the pursuance of objectives of social policy and public 
health. It has held, for instance, that they are “free to set the objectives of their policy on 
gambling and, where appropriate, to define in detail the level of protection sought.”2 Thus, 
when it faces national restrictive schemes setting up, among others, exclusive rights to manage 
off-course betting on horseracing,3 public monopolies at state level,4 or national legislation 
restricting the operation and playing of games of chance or gambling to specific areas,5 it is 
inclined to develop a rather deferential proportionality test, and to give more weight to 
Member States’ specific interests than it usually does.6 Therefore, this trend seems at first glance 
reminiscent of the Court of Justice’s power-based approach. However, it nevertheless remains 
distinct since at least two of its fundamental components are missing. The Court does not 
allude to the notion of power in these cases. Moreover, it neither states formulae nor resorts to 
the distinction between the existence and the exercise of a power in some other way at the 
applicability stage. To put it differently, the power-based approach should not be simply viewed 
as encompassing all the cases where the Court carries out a flexible assessment of 
proportionality. 
452. A unique constitutional arrangement part of a more general trend. All in all, the power-based 
approach is constitutive of a unique constitutional arrangement within the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice. But it also forms part of a more general trend that concerns an 
increasing number of facets of the European Union legal order. As a result, this trend is 
becoming ever more significant. It consists in subjecting any national domain that might affect 
in some way the interests of the European Union to the “common framework of action”7 set up 
by the Treaties. Thus, as I have already mentioned,8 Member States may not, through the 
exercise of their powers, adversely affect the positive action undertaken by the European 
                                                 
447/08 & C-448/08, Sjöberg & Gerdin, [2010] ECR I-6921; Case C-46/08, Carmen Media Group, [2010] ECR I-
8149; Case C-212/08, Zeturf Ltd., [2011] ECR I-5633. 
2 Joined Cases C-447/08 & C-448/08, Sjöberg & Gerdin, [2010] ECR I-6921, 39. 
3 Case C-212/08, Zeturf Ltd., [2011] ECR I-5633. 
4 Joined Cases C-316/07, C-358/07, C-359/07, C-360/07, C-409/07 & C-410/07, Stoß and others, [2010] ECR I-
8069. 
5 Case C-6/01, Anormar, [2003] ECR I-8621. 
6 D. RITLENG, “Les États membres face aux entraves,” in L’entrave dans le droit du marché intérieur, (Ed.) L. AZOULAI, 
(Brussels: Bruylant, 2011), 315-316. 
7 “Editorial comments. Union membership in times of crisis,” 51 C. M. Law Rev. 1 (2014). 
8 See, Supra, § 31. 
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Union. Even if their powers involve fields over which the latter has no, or very limited, 
jurisdiction, the exercise of their powers may not jeopardize the effectiveness of acts of 
secondary legislation.9 Likewise, Member States may not, through the exercise of their external 
retained powers, undermine the external action of the European Union, even when the latter 
has no jurisdiction in the field, or has not (yet) exercised its jurisdiction.10 They are bound by 
the principle of cooperation and the duty of loyalty. As a result, and to echo the General 
Introduction of this thesis, the Court of Justice power-based approach consists in “bringing 
together” previously independent “parts into a whole,”11 the parts being the national spheres of 
jurisdiction concerned by the power-based approach and the whole being the “common 
framework of action” of European integration. Therefore, the power-based approach amounts 
to a process of absorption of national powers in the sense given by J. H. H. WEILER.12 
453. Breadth v. depth.13 The various findings of this thesis invite us to draw a distinction 
between breadth and depth and to keep in mind its significance for properly understanding the 
meaning of, and the implications induced by, the power-based approach. This thesis has 
revealed the striking discrepancy that exists between the breadth of the applicability of 
European Union law in the fields concerned by the power-based approach, and the depth of its 
application. The former turns out to be potentially unlimited. It relies on the distinction 
between the existence and the exercise of a power, which may be virtually used in any area. Its 
breadth is therefore tremendous, and the Court of Justice will most probably keep expanding it 
over the years. But the depth of the application of European Union law is more restricted. As I 
have shown in Chapters 3 and 4 in particular, the Court is increasingly inclined to mitigate the 
effects of the application of the free movement principle. It applies the later in such a way as 
not to deprive the Member States of their powers and only to the extent that this does not 
undermine the basic components of their autonomy. As a result, a corresponding contrast 
exists between the theoretical ramifications of the Court of Justice power-based approach and 
                                                 
9 Case 9/74, Casagrande, [1974] ECR 773. 
10 See, for instance, Cases C-466/98, C-467/98, C-468/98, C-469/98, C-471/98, C-472/98, C-475/98, C-476/98, 
“Open Skies Judgments,” [2002] ECR I-9427.  
11 B. BALASSA, “Towards a theory of economic integration,” 14: 1 Kyklos, 1 (1961).  
12 J. H. H. WEILER, “The Transformation of Europe,” in The Constitution of Europe: Do the new Clothes have an 
Emperor? And other Essays on European Integration, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 49. See, Supra, § 
31. 
13 I have borrowed this distinction from S. GARDBAUM, “The breadth v. the depth of Congress’s Commerce 
power: the curious history of preemption during the Lochner era,” in Federal Preemption: States’ powers, national 
interests, (Eds.) R. A. EPSTEIN & M. S. GREVE, (Washington, The AEI Press, 2007), 48-78. 
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their practical implications. The latter are limited in scope. In this respect, Chapters 3 and 4 
have established that Member States do retain primary responsibility in the fields analyzed 
herein, in spite of the various adjustments they are required to accept. By way of contrast, the 
former are deep-seated. Indeed, the power-based approach seems to be but another illustration 
of the turning point at which European integration stands at the moment. Initially conceived of 
as a partial phenomenon, it is increasingly turning into a “total” one. All the spheres of 
national activity are gradually subjected to the European Union’s principle of legality, and are 
thereby being absorbed into the legal order of the European Union. The states composing the 
European Union are compelled to give up their initial status of monad states and must instead 
behave like genuine members of the European Union federation, regardless of the field 
involved. They must do so loyally, as shown in Chapter 5, in the framework of the vertical 
relationship with the European Union, but also in compliance with the principle of solidarity, 
when they interact horizontally with the other Member States. Viewed from this angle, the 
European Union’s interest must be understood as encompassing both the interests of the 
federation, and the interests of its members. European Union law is therefore a means of 
protecting both the federation and its members from the encroachments of other institutional 
actors. 
454. The main weaknesses of the Court of Justice power-based approach. The power-based approach, 
which consists in requiring Member States to cooperate, and to take into account the respective 
interests of the European Union and of the other members of the European Union federation 
in all of their fields of activity, can be accounted for rather easily from a utilitarian perspective. 
It is, as a matter of principle, necessary to prevent the Member States from undoing what the 
European Union institutions – and hence themselves – are gradually building through the 
exercise of powers that fall within their spheres of autonomy. However, I have argued 
throughout this thesis and in Chapter 6 in particular, that the power-based approach lacks 
deeper grounds of authority and legitimacy. As a comparison with the respective case laws of 
the US Supreme Court and the German Constitutional Court strikingly reveals, the Court of 
Justice remains silent as to where the foundations of its approach are to be found. This holds 
true, in my view, with respect to all the cases14 having the effect of curtailing the exercise of 
national powers over which the European Union has no, or very limited, jurisdiction. In view 
                                                 
14 See, Supra, §§ 88s. 
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of this, this thesis should be seen as an incentive for the Court to deepen its reasoning and to 
expand in its various cases on the different reasons why subjecting the Member States to the 
free movement principle even in areas where they have de facto or de jure exclusive jurisdiction is 
justified from the point of view of democracy and legitimacy. In sum, this thesis calls for 
making explicit the source(s) of authority of the power-based approach.  
455. In a similar vein, one may legitimately wonder which criteria are at the basis of the 
Court of Justice’s decision to subject only certain fields to the power-based approach. Chapter 1 
has shown, in this respect, that the fields analyzed herein correspond in all likelihood to what 
are commonly considered in Western Europe as “essential state functions.” But how is this 
concept to be defined? Through which criteria? As the reference to the US constitutional 
experience has made it clear,15 it is extremely difficult to find compelling criteria for 
distinguishing between different state functions. Most of the time such criteria turn out to be 
unworkable. The current stand of the European Court of Justice is nonetheless unsatisfactory, 
since the subjection of the fields concerned by the power-based approach relies entirely on its 
discretion. Once again, I call for a clarification of the judicial tools used to identify the fields 
that ought to be subject to a specific legal framework. 
456. Implications for the analysis of European Union constitutional law (i). I have used, throughout 
my thesis, an original framework to analyze the cases involving powers retained by Member 
States. First, I have provided a crosscutting analysis of the cases involving powers retained by 
Member States. In this respect, my various findings confirm that from a structural perspective 
the four economic freedoms and European Union citizenship form a coherent whole. They 
should, in this respect, be seen as an incentive to increasingly understand the free movement 
principle as a unitary principle. I am indeed of the view that the law of free movement should 
be increasingly subdivided depending on the substantive field involved – i.e. social security, 
direct taxation, company law, gambling, etc. – instead of relying on each freedom individually. 
In any case, as the Court increasingly bases its rulings on more than one freedom, the use of 
separate freedoms would appear to be increasingly less relevant. It is sufficient to think, for 
instance, of the cases of Schwarz and Commission v. Germany,16 cases in which the simultaneous 
                                                 
15 See, Supra, §§ 356s. 
16 Case C-76/05, Schwarz, [2007] ECR I-6849; Case C-318/05, Commission v. Germany, [2007] ECR I-6957. 
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application of the freedom to provide services and European Union citizenship led the Court 
to reach the exact same conclusions. 
457. Implications for the analysis of European Union constitutional law (ii). Second, I have taken as 
the starting point of my inquiry the institutional and constitutional bonds that tie the 
European Union and its Member States on the one hand, and the Member States together on 
the other hand. I have seen how the entrenchment of the power-based approach has the effect 
of reshaping and refashioning these bonds. I have attempted to renew the perspective that is 
traditionally endorsed to analyze the contours of the constitutional law of the European Union. 
Instead of focusing on rights, I have almost exclusively looked at the structure that characterizes 
the European Union. At times, I might have too overlooked the “right dimension” of the cases 
concerned by the power-based approach. However, my structural approach has the merit of 
bringing to light findings, such as the issue relating to Union’s membership, that would not 
have been arrived at had I followed the traditional approach. 
458. From a broader perspective, my approach in fact sheds light on the necessity to bridge 
the gap, as far as the constitutional law of the European Union is concerned, between structure 
and rights. Even if constitutional theory in the United States is, in many respects, very different 
than that of the European Union, the following statement made by G. P. MILLER with respect 
to the US constitutional order does not lose its relevance with respect to EU constitutional law: 
A basic challenge of modern constitutional law […] is to develop a Grand Unified Theory 
that would explain both the system of rights and that of structure as manifestations of 
deeper underlying principle.17 
This is what I have somehow attempted to do, however modestly, when I have drawn the 
attention, for example, to the peculiar nature of the individual rights recognized in the cases 
involving powers retained by Member States.18 They differ from what is traditionally referred to 
as “fundamental rights.” Indeed, they include a vertical or “surrogate” dimension, in the sense 
that they reflect the need to promote and to further the unity of the European integration 
project. They also display a horizontal facet, revealing of the interactions among Member States. 
Put differently, an accurate understanding of the peculiar nature of the rights that stem from 
the cases involving powers retained by Member States requires the structure characterizing the 
                                                 
17 G. P. MILLER, “Rights and structure in constitutional theory,” 8 Social Philosophy & Policy 196, 198 (1991). 
18 See, Supra, § 421. 
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European Union to be taken into account. This approach moreover better reflects the 
reasoning of the Court of Justice itself. Similarly, the structural architecture of the European 
Union can only be assessed if the role played by individuals rights – and, in particular, the way 
they are used by the Court to legitimate its overall authority –19 is adequately taken into 
consideration.
                                                 
19 G. DE BÚRCA, “The language of rights and European integration,” available from http://aei.pitt.edu/ 
6920/1/de_búrca_gráinne.pdf. 
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